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ABSTRACT 
 
Explaining why students cheat when it violates their moral beliefs, also called the 
‘belief-behavior incongruity’ (BBI), is a difficult challenge most often overcome by referring 
to neutralization techniques, first described by Sykes and Matza (1957), whereby individuals 
deceive themselves with specious justifications for ignoring the moral imperative to follow 
rules. An underlying assumption of the neutralization view, that individuals’ abstract moral 
beliefs apply automatically to all contexts, is critiqued in the present work. The account of 
academic dishonesty developed herein is centered on the hypothesis that adolescent students’ 
felt moral obligation is informed by an intuitive sense of reciprocity between themselves and 
their learning contexts, which resembles a social contract, or ‘psychological teaching-learning 
contract’ (PTLC). Students who regard a class context or teacher more negatively are thus 
expected to feel less moral obligation to follow rules, and to cheat more as a result. 
 The hypothesized PTLC model, which included key variables related to (A) self-
concept, (B) achievement goal structure, (C) learning strategies, (D) moral obligation, and (E) 
social comparison theory, was tested with data from a diverse sample of secondary students 
in fifteen international schools across Asia, Europe, and Africa. A pilot study (N = 96) of the 
construct validity of psychometric measures was conducted prior to the Main Study, which 
included a Time 1 sample of N = 493, a Time 2 sample of N = 297 (spaced by approximately 
one year), and a longitudinal matched sample of N = 225. Structural equation modeling 
techniques were used to test the validity and invariance of the measurement model, as well 
as the structural relations hypothesized between variables. A small degree of gender non-
invariance prompted separate analyses of gender-specific models. Results supported the 
PTLC hypothesis. Moral obligation overwhelmingly mediated the effects of perceived class 
quality on academic integrity, indicating that students felt morally obliged to be honest in a 
given class, as a function of their regard for its quality. 
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To my children. 
 
 
 
 
Think for yourselves.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
OVERVIEW: HARD PROBLEMS 
 
 
In 1900, renowned mathematician David Hilbert famously challenged his field to solve 
a set of so-called ‘hard problems’, which he speculated would take most of the coming 
century. The majority of Hilbert’s hard problems have since been solved, and, in the process, 
have motivated the field of mathematics to challenge its limits (Sampson, 2013). Hard 
problems are not unique to mathematics. They have also been identified in fields such as law, 
criminology, and physics. Such challenges press scholars to reassess and often reformulate 
existing paradigms in order to address the shortcomings of current understanding. 
The preeminent ‘hard problem’ of scholarship on academic cheating is to explain why 
so many students who view cheating as immoral, still cheat. This discrepancy between moral 
beliefs and moral action, which pervades research on moral cognition generally (Bergman, 
2002; Blasi, 1980; 1983), has been described in cheating literature as the ‘judgment-action gap’ 
(Olafson, Schraw, Nadelson, Nadelson, & Kehrwald, 2013) and the ‘belief-behavior 
incongruity’ (hereafter ‘BBI’) (Stephens & Nicholson, 2008). The BBI should not, theoretically, 
endure in individuals over time. The rational-cognitive paradigm of moral psychology holds 
that acting against one’s moral beliefs should cause cognitive dissonance, which individuals 
should then strive to eliminate by changing either their beliefs or their behaviors (Aronson, 
1968; Blasi, 1980; Jurdi, Hage, & Chow, 2011a). Scholarship on cheating clearly indicates that 
this does not happen in the way rational-cognitive theories predict. Quantitative studies of 
cheating, such as those conducted biannually by the Josephson Institute (e.g. 2012), indicate 
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that the BBI is widespread and persistent among secondary students. Approximately half of 
the students surveyed in 2012 (Josephson Institute, 2012) admitted, for instance, to cheating 
on a test during the previous year (52%) despite agreeing that ‘People should play by the rules 
even if it means they lose’ (92%), and indicating that having good moral character was 
important to them (98%). 
A rational-cognitive explanation for the BBI problem that has been invoked by 
numerous scholars is that students ‘neutralize’ the internal discomforts of cognitive 
dissonance by blaming their cheating behavior on external factors (e.g. Beasley, 2014; Blasi, 
1983; Olafson et al., 2013). Techniques of neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1957) have been used in 
many studies to catalogue the justifications and excuses offered by students for why they 
cheat. Students who cheat are held, by this view, to understand that cheating is absolutely 
immoral, and to actively exploit opportunities to blame situations for their behavior. 
The inability of rational-cognitive frameworks to explain BBI has, in addition to 
popularizing the neutralization framework, more recently helped engender support for a 
dual-process paradigm of moral psychology, according to which rational-cognitive processes 
operate alongside, and interact with, non-rational processes related to emotion and intuition 
(Ajzen & Sexton, 1999; Mallon & Nichols, 2010). Dual-process perspectives, which are 
currently nascent in the literature of cheating (McTernan, Love, & Rettinger, 2014; Murdock, 
Beauchamp, & Hinton, 2008), may open the way to new explanations of the BBI that exceed 
the normal limits of rational-cognitive theories of moral judgment, such as that embodied by 
Kohlberg’s (1968) notion of ‘children as moral philosophers’. Children might be better 
portrayed, from the dual-process perspective, as ‘philosophizing moral intuits.’  
This thesis develops a dual-process framework for cheating in which moral obligation 
is held to fluctuate as a function of contractarian reciprocal fairness. Within this framework, 
when students perceive class contexts to be unfair or of low quality, the nature of the rules 
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that forbid cheating may shift in their view from expressing moral imperatives to expressing 
social conventions (Turiel, 1983, 2002, 2006), due to non-rational processes such as emotion 
and intuition.  
A contractarian theory of adolescent moral judgment does not fit within the rational-
cognitive frameworks associated with Jean Piaget (1896 – 1980) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1927 
– 1987), wherein moral judgment based on social contract heuristics is a ‘postconventional’ 
mental operation, held to be beyond the developmental limits of most adolescents (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987; Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, et al., 1983; Rest, 1986). However, studies in the field 
of evolutionary psychology have shown that contractarian judgment is performed more 
commonly than these frameworks allow (Cosmides, 1989; Rettinger, 2007). Reciprocal 
fairness, the most fundamental element of social contracts, is seen to be understood by 
children as young as three years-old (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Olson & Spelke, 2008), as well 
as by a variety of primate species (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002, 2003; de Waal, 1991, 2014). The 
Kohlbergian perspective on moral judgment appears to be correct insomuch contractarian 
judgments in young children cannot be accounted for by rational cognition. Such judgments 
appear, instead, to occur automatically – a hallmark of emotional-intuitive processes 
(Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010; Kahneman, 2011). The dual-process paradigm posits that 
moral judgments may arise from both rational-cognitive processes, such as moral reasoning, 
and emotional-intuitive processes, such as disgust (Narvaez, 2010; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & 
Jordan, 2008), which, as in the case of detecting violations of reciprocal fairness, often occur 
too quickly to be accounted for by conscious reasoning (Kahneman, 2011).  
The social contract framework for academic cheating developed herein holds that a 
shift in one’s view of cheating from the moral domain to the conventional domain is 
tantamount to a ‘felt’ reduction of the moral obligation to be honest, or a reduction in what 
has also been described as ‘moral motivation’ (Schroeder, Roskies, & Nichols, 2010). The 
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framework is contractarian in nature because it proposes that within specific contexts, such as 
classrooms, moral obligation is a “two-way street”. Students are hypothesized to feel less 
morally obliged within academic contexts when they perceive moral failures on the parts of 
teachers and schools, and vice versa. Feeling less moral obligation in a given context should 
alleviate, or at the extreme preclude, the moral dilemma of BBI for students who cheat. Instead 
of neutralizing the immorality of cheating, therefore, students may genuinely feel 
unrestrained by moral imperatives against it – a feeling rooted in non-rational processes 
associated with social contract-based judgment that may not respond to honor codes, well-
reasoned exhortations, or even threats of external punishment.  
It is important to note that no judgment is passed in the present work on whether 
circumstances ever reduce the immorality of cheating. Feeling that circumstances nullify the 
moral imperative to be honest, does not make it true. To the extent that such feelings are 
genuine, however, potentially due to non-rational processes rooted in brain architecture 
(Greene, Nystrom, Engell, et al., 2004; Haidt, 2007; Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, et al., 2006), 
they may represent truth to the actor. This perspective suggests a more complex picture of 
cheating psychology than currently prevails, and advocates for new approaches to addressing 
the problem. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Just as a man cannot be a good cosmopolitan and humanitarian until he has first 
been a good nationalist, so he cannot be devoted to abstract social ethics until he 
has served his apprenticeship in personal ethics. To prematurely act on general 
ethical grounds is to destroy the very foundations of the moral nature. And so we 
must be patient with children, and university students, and with ourselves until 
we grow up to social manhood and womanhood. 
—Barnes, 1904, p. 488 
 
The present review of literature begins with a discussion of the incidence and definition 
of cheating. Subsequently, because the broader research project is international in scope, 
findings on how culture and group-level identity affect cheating are summarized in section 
2.2. Sections 2.3 – 2.4 cover the personological and situational predictors of cheating that stand 
out most prominently in the literature of the past 110 years. Section 2.5 then reviews 
multivariate person/situation models of cheating that have been developed within the 
rational-cognitive paradigm of moral psychology and that illustrate the contributions and 
problems, such as BBI, associated with that paradigm. The inability of such models to predict 
behaviors based on cognitive factors has frequently been explained as the result of 
neutralization techniques, whereby students find or invent justifications for cheating behavior 
in order to evade negative self-perceptions. The neutralization framework is critically 
reviewed in section 2.6. Finally, section 2.7 reviews contractarian perspectives on cheating that 
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have been raised metaphorically in several major studies, but that have never been studied 
empirically. 
More recent studies will be privileged, generally, over older ones, as will those 
conducted in secondary contexts, or that involve secondary school-aged subjects, over those 
conducted in tertiary or post-tertiary contexts. While research into academic integrity at the 
secondary level has increased considerably over the last decade, studies conducted in tertiary 
settings are still far more common and contain many valuable insights about cheating that 
generalize to the secondary level. Tertiary students report cheating for many of the same 
reasons, and based on many of the same attitudes, as high school students. It has been 
commonplace, therefore, to capitalize on the greater depth and range of work provided by 
tertiary literature in studies of secondary cheating (Miller, Murdock, Anderman, & 
Poindexter, 2007).  
2.1 Definition and incidence of cheating 
Many studies have found that, for several decades, cheating incidence among 
American students has been approaching ‘epidemic proportions’ (e.g. Desruisseaux, 1999). 
While such findings often accompany concern over the apparent crash in American morality 
that an ‘epidemic’ of cheating suggests, the incidence and moral implications of cheating 
depend largely on how it is defined. Students and teachers have been found to differ in how 
they define cheating (Broeckelman-Post, 2008; Higbee, Schultz, & Stanford, 2011), and in how 
they believe various acts of cheating should be judged, and punished (Feinberg, 2009). This is 
an important consideration for researchers whose choice of definition influences how they 
measure cheating, and what implications they draw from their results. 
The incidence of cheating is widely perceived to have increased dramatically for 
several decades, in both American secondary schools (e.g. Zito & McQuillan, 2011; Galloway, 
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2012) and colleges (e.g. Bernardi, Baca, Landers & Witek, 2008), to levels approaching 
‘epidemic’ (Alschuler & Blimling, 1995; Desruisseaux, 1999; Haines, Diekhoff, LaBeff, & Clark, 
1986; Miller et al., 2007; Schraw, Olafson, Kuch, et al., 2007; Seider, Novick & Gomez, 2013; 
Stephens & Nicholson, 2008; Wellborn, 1980). In a recent study by Galloway (2012), 93% of 
4,136 American high school students in grades 9-12 reported having cheated at least one time 
during their high school careers. Cheating was defined by Galloway’s (2013) study as 
engagement in any of thirteen cheating behaviors listed on an inventory developed by 
McCabe and Treviño (1993) (e.g. turning in work done by another; using cheat sheets; working 
together when the instructor asked for individual work; getting an extension using a false 
excuse). Behavioral inventories such as this have been widely used in research on cheating for 
the last half-century, at both the college and high school levels (e.g. Evans, Craig & Mietzel, 
1993; McCabe & Treviño, 1997; Miller, Shoptaugh & Wooldridge, 2011; Schab, 1969, 1980, 
1991).  
 
The high incidences of cheating frequently found on wide-ranging inventories of 
cheating behavior tend to support the ‘epidemic’ narrative, especially when summarized as 
the percentage of students who report having cheated ‘in any form’ (e.g. O’Rourke, Barnes, 
Deaton et al., 2010). It is not always clear, however, whether respondents to such measures 
realize that researchers will interpret all of the listed behaviors unequivocally as cheating. 
Informing students of how researchers define cheating does appear to have a significant effect 
on how much cheating is reported. Burrus, McGoldrick, & Schuhmann (2007) examined the 
effect of providing respondents with a clear definition of cheating on its incidence in a self-
reported format, by asking 300 American undergraduates to respond to an inventory of 
cheating behaviors twice: once before being provided with the definition, and once after. The 
incidence of reported cheating increased significantly after the definition was provided. This 
means that, on the one hand, students did not initially understand what the researchers 
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considered cheating to be. On the other hand, after being provided with a definition, 
respondents reported acts of cheating they had apparently not understood to be cheating 
when they committed them. It is not immediately clear, therefore, which incidence is the more 
valid; the pre-definition incidence, which included only those acts that students themselves 
defined as cheating, or the post-definition incidence, which additionally included acts of 
cheating that were unintentional. Bisping, Patron, and Roskelley (2008) addressed this 
conceptual issue by asking students to indicate both whether they had ‘done it’, with respect 
to each of 31 cheating behaviors gleaned from across the literature, and whether they ‘knew 
it was wrong’. In the case of 22 behaviors, half or more of the respondents who admitted to 
engaging in them also indicated not having known it was wrong. 
All forms of academic misconduct, accidental or otherwise, are harmful to equity, 
undermine the mission of schools to foster intellectual growth, and should be taken seriously. 
The urgency expressed in the literature frequently emphasizes above all, however, the specter 
of moral decline, which is apparently portended by the ever-increasing prevalence of cheating 
(e.g. Callahan, 2004; Haines et al., 1986; Harding, Carpenter, & Finelli, 2012; McCabe, 1999; 
Schraw et al., 2007). Inasmuch as moral behavior is a function of internal moral judgment 
(Blasi, 1980), a trend of moral decline implies that students are becoming more likely to 
commit acts they judge to be immoral. This perspective champions the pre-definition 
incidence of cheating in Burrus et al. (2007), discussed above, in that it excludes unintentional 
cheating. The alternative perspective, that cheating is defined externally, champions the post-
definition incidence of cheating in Burrus et al. (2007), which ignores whether the acts of 
cheating are recognized as such by students when they commit them. The latter of these 
perspectives is implied by measures of cheating ‘in any form’ that do not differentiate between 
intentional and unintentional acts. While such measures may be legitimate from an 
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administrative perspective, in terms of the equity and integrity of educational programs, they 
provide a weak basis for raising moral concerns because they ignore intentionality. 
Students’ judgments of the immorality of cheating have also been found to vary 
predictably by what type of cheating was committed, to what extent, and why. Two 
multidimensional scaling analyses of students’ perceptions of cheating, conducted at the 
secondary and tertiary levels by Liora Schmelkin and colleagues (Schmelkin, Gilbert, Spencer, 
et al., 2008; Schmelkin, Gilbert & Silva, 2010) found that students judged cheating along two 
dimensions: (1) papers vs. exams, and (2) serious vs. trivial. Exam cheating behaviors such as 
using crib notes, copying during exams, and passing along questions and answers to peers in 
later sections were among the infractions that students viewed as being most serious. This 
implies, moreover, that students would be more likely to recognize these acts as cheating, 
without needing a definition, than acts they consider ‘trivial’. 
Acts of cheating on exams were also found to form a coherent factor in a study 
conducted among tertiary students in the UK by Franklyn-Stokes and Newstead (1995), 
whereas Rakovski and Levy (2007) identified two coherent factors related to severity (greater 
vs. lesser) in an analysis of American tertiary students’ perceptions of fifteen acts of cheating. 
Respondents in the latter study indicated believing that more serious forms of cheating 
deserved “higher penalties”, and that all forms of exam cheating were “more serious” (pp. 
476-477). 
These studies indicate, in sum, that students’ judgments of the morality of various acts 
of cheating have a consistent latent structure, wherein acts of cheating on exams are generally 
considered among the worst. For this reason, self-report measures that lump all forms of 
cheating together as a homogenous moral abstraction known as ‘cheating’ may lead to 
unnecessarily dire concerns about moral decline. Ignoring the variation in how students judge 
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the seriousness of different cheating behaviors overlooks differences in the intrinsic moral 
content of such behaviors. Figures 2.1 – 2.3 present data from studies published over the last 
eighty years, of high school cheating incidence on tests vs. ‘in any form’. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Incidence of high school cheating – on tests (1932-2012); solid line = individual data 
points; dashed line = moving average 
Figure 2.1 presents the results of thirteen measurements of cheating on tests between 
1932 and 2012. Some of the variability may reflect the use of different methods. For instance, 
Steiner (1932) used an experimental technique, whereas Ludeman (1938) asked college 
students the question “Did you cheat in high-school tests?” The measures used by Schab 
(1969, 1980, 1991) and Brandes (1986) both asked specifically whether students had used crib 
notes to cheat on tests. Brandes (1986) also asked whether students had copied from other 
students during tests, and found similar results for both measures (73.5% and 75%, 
respectively). The Josephson Institute took a broader approach on all of its biannual Ethics of 
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American Youth questionnaires, by simply asking respondents whether they had cheated on 
tests during the past year. The moving average for cheating on tests over the last eighty years 
rises from approximately 47% in the 1960s to a sustained level of approximately 70% between 
Schab (1991) and Josephson Institute (2002), after which it declines, overall, until Josephson 
Institute (2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Incidence of high school cheating – on tests (1986-2012).  
Figure 2.2 shows a twenty-six year decline in the rate of high school cheating on tests, 
which Schmelkin et al.’s (2010) multidimensional analysis found to be the most ‘serious’ form 
of cheating in the view of most high school students. Brent and Atkisson (2011) found 
similarly that, among 420 undergraduates at an American university, cheating on tests was 
viewed as more ‘serious’ than cheating on homework. “They offer fewer justifications for it,” 
the authors observe, “further acknowledging the illegitimacy of such cheating” (p. 655). The 
observation that during 2012 approximately 50% of American high school students cheated 
on tests has distressing moral and administrative implications. That the problem appears to 
have been improving for a quarter-century suggests, however, that a growing body of 
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research on cheating over the same period may have had benefits. Figure 2.2 does not, at any 
rate, portray an increase in immoral behavior.  
The data in Figure 2.3 tell a very different story. According to these data, the incidence 
of high school cheating ‘in any form’ has increased dramatically over the past two decades. 
Ignoring differences in the seriousness of the forms of cheating lumped together by these 
studies, one is inclined to interpret this trend as a crash in student morality. While it is possible 
that these data do reflect an epidemic rise of cheating ‘in any form’, however, Burrus et al.’s 
(2007) finding that students report more cheating when they understand how it is defined, 
suggests an alternative explanation. The increasing prevalence of self-reported cheating ‘in 
any form’ may, especially in studies where measured behaviors are not identified explicitly 
as cheating, reflect an increasingly sophisticated awareness among students of the full range 
of behaviors considered to be cheating, which may lead, in turn, to increased rates of 
reporting. 
 
Figure 2.3.  Incidence of high school cheating – ‘in any form' (1995-2012) 
While neither of the trend lines in the preceding two figures (2.2 and 2.3) is proof of 
an underlying pattern of moral change, the negative trend line for cheating on tests in Figure 
2.2 makes a more compelling moral case than does the positive trend line for cheating ‘in any 
form’ in Figure 2.3, because of the seriousness that students ascribe to cheating on tests. From 
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a rules-based perspective on why cheating is wrong, however, a student’s judgment of the 
seriousness of different forms of academic dishonesty is not necessarily ‘moral’ judgment. 
Perceptions of seriousness may also reflect perceived risk. Eisenberg (2004) used vignettes 
with a sample of 161 Israeli middle school students to examine how attitudes toward cheating 
might differ between those who view it as a moral issue and those who view it as a 
conventional, or rules-based, issue. Forty-five percent of the sample was found to take a 
conventional, or a-moral, view of cheating, versus fifty-five percent who viewed it in moral 
terms. As Eisenberg (2004) expected, students classified as “morals” were found to have less 
favorable attitudes towards cheating than those classified as “a-morals”. While all students 
appeared to recognize rules-based definitions of cheating, only a fraction of that number 
understood why cheating was morally wrong.  
Standing in contrast to behavioral inventories are conceptions of cheating that 
emphasize the abstract, unifying definitional properties of cheating behavior, such as 
intentionality (Colnerud & Rosander, 2009; Feinberg, 2009), shirking responsibility (Evans et 
al., 1993), gaining unfair advantage (Fang & Casadevall, 2013), and breaking school rules 
(Eisenberg, 2004). Garavalia, Olson, Russell, and Christensen (2007) object to abstract 
definitions of cheating that fail to include unintentional acts because such definitions, they 
argue, “allow clever individuals to readily defend academic dishonesty” (p. 34). They adopt, 
instead, Cizek’s (2003) tripartite definition of cheating (1. unauthorized information exchange, 
2. use of prohibited materials, 3. otherwise gaining unfair advantage), which amounts to 
shorthand for the lengthy inventories of cheating behavior discussed above. While an 
inventory approach to cheating behavior may be more cut-and-dry than an abstract definition 
for administrative purposes, the prevention of excuses is also more of a policing issue than a 
scholarly one. By ignoring intentionality, many inventories also ignore whether individual 
acts of cheating have moral content in the minds of the actors. Definitions of cheating that 
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focus on its abstract properties provide, by contrast, more fundamentally accurate expressions 
of the consciously immoral and/or rule-violating character of what students mean when they 
admit to having done something called ‘cheating’.  
Several scholars have recently expanded the notion of cheating to include behaviors 
that, while not involving cheating in the mainstream sense of the word, share with it the 
crucial abstract quality of obtaining grades without learning. These behaviors, such as rote 
memorization, ‘plug-and-chug’ applications of mathematical formulae, and otherwise 
attending exclusively to the superficial aspects of learning tasks in order to ‘earn’ grades with 
minimal effort, have been grouped together with cheating under the term ‘disintegrity’ (Miller 
et al., 2011). Acts of disintegrity “may lack integrity or subvert the goals of education, [though] 
we may or may not refer to them as cheating” (p. 170). Kohn (2007a) described a similarly 
broad conception of cheating in terms of privileging product over process, citing Renard’s 
(1999) lament that the countermeasures deployed against cheating behaviors generally ignore 
the fundamental problem of systemic forces, such as high stakes assessment regimes, that 
teach students that “the final product takes precedence over learning” (p. 11). In his foreword 
to the monograph Psychology of Academic Cheating, Kohn (2007b) used the term “legal 
cheating” to refer to strategies that involve “teaching to the test… when real instruction gives 
way to extensive exam preparation [such that] scores can be raised without improving 
learning at all” (p. XII). It follows from this that all activities, whether teacher- or student-
driven, that focus on the superficial aspects of learning, purely for the sake of obtaining grade-
credentials, share important abstract definitional properties with cheating, such as 
intentionality and shirking responsibility. This novel conception, referred to hereafter as 
‘disintegrity’, has never been investigated in an empirical study.  
Measures of cheating as an abstraction, which tend to comprise fewer items, have been 
used in a number of studies at the secondary level (Anderman, Cupp & Lane, 2010; Anderman 
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& Midgley, 2004; Brown-Wright, Tyler, Stevens-Watkins et al., 2012; Murdock, Hale & Weber, 
2001). Two measures of self-reported cheating as an abstraction are the three-item scale from 
the Manual for the Patterns of Adaptive Learning Scales (PALS), developed by Midgley, Maehr, 
Haruda, et al. (2000), and a five-item scale, developed by Anderman, Griesinger, and 
Westerfield (1998). These scales tend to include a mix of items that refer either to acts that are 
readily recognized by students as cheating, such as cribbing during exams, or to the concept 
of cheating writ large, as a realm of behavior unified by definitional properties that both 
students and researchers would agree on. The PALS scale asks, for instance, whether 
respondents have (1) copied during tests, (2) copied from other students during class work, 
and (3) cheated on class work. The first and second of these items refer to behaviors that 
students are held to recognize readily as cheating, whereas the third item refers to cheating 
by name, thus appealing to students’ knowledge of what ‘cheating’ on class work entails, in a 
moral and/or regulatory sense. Phrasing the third item this way escapes the ambiguity 
around what acts students do and do not regard as ‘true’ academic transgressions, by asking 
them, very simply, whether they think they have transgressed.  
Cheating is a multidimensional construct that students, educators, and researchers 
often interpret differently. The amount of attention that the definition of cheating has received 
in recent literature highlights a substantial amount of disagreement over whether all acts of 
academic misconduct should be viewed unequivocally as cheating, or whether cheating 
should be treated as a broad realm of behavior unified by abstract definitional properties. The 
demonstrated complexity of students’ judgments of cheating suggests that lengthy inventory 
measures of cheating do not capture moral conceptions of cheating. This is because they (1) 
fail to account for variations in the degree of immorality that students ascribe to different acts, 
and (2) include non-intentional cheating. The most effective measures of cheating as an 
intentionally immoral behavior include items that query respondents’ engagement in 
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dishonest acts that students tend to recognize as ‘more serious’ (Rakovski & Levy, 2007; 
Schmelkin et al., 2008; Schmelkin et al., 2010), and/or ask students directly whether they have 
cheated. 
2.2 Socio-cultural systems and group-level identity 
Individual identity is shaped largely by affiliation with socio-cultural systems, which 
have been described as encompassing the “patterns-of-life-of-communities” (Keesing, 1974, 
p. 82). Socio-cultural systems have traditionally been seen to characterize national, regional, 
religious, ethnic, and artistic groups (Tylor, 1871), as well as industries and organizations such 
as corporations (e.g. Sørensen, 2002), and schools (e.g. Hargreaves, 1995). Among the most 
important defining features of socio-cultural systems are behavioral norms. 
Individual cheating behavior has been found in experimental studies to be influenced 
by perceptions of cheating among members of groups with which individuals identify. Gino, 
Ayal, and Ariely (2009) investigated, for instance, the degree to which undergraduate 
students’ cheating behavior fluctuated in response to overt cheating by a ‘confederate’. 
Confederate cheaters were either readily identifiable as members of the subjects’ in-group (a 
college-age individual wearing a sweatshirt from the subjects’ university) or as members of 
out-groups (older and wearing regalia from a different university). Subjects who observed the 
‘in-group confederate’ cheat successfully and receive the maximum reward subsequently 
cheated more than subjects who observed the same behavior by ‘out-group confederates’. The 
purpose of the confederate was to challenge social norms for honesty that subjects might have 
assumed to prevail in the experimental setting. The fact that in-group confederates were 
successful at challenging norms related to honesty, while out-group confederates were not, is 
evidence that socio-cultural identification has the power to shape context-bound behaviors 
such as cheating (see also Callahan, 2004; Crittenden, Hanna & Peterson, 2009b; Kidwell, 
Wozniak & Laurel, 2003). Membership in Greek fraternities and sororities has, for instance, 
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been positively correlated with cheating behavior in numerous studies since the early 
Twentieth century (Burrus et al., 2007; Harding et al.; 2012; Parr, 1936; Whitley, 1998), as have 
political and religious affiliations in the United States. Shipley (2009) found that college 
students who identified with the liberal Left had, on average, stricter views on cheating than 
those who identified with the conservative Right, whereas Hartshorne and May (1928) found 
that Baptists cheated more than Lutherans.  
Cheating has also been found to relate to socio-cultural aspects of secondary schools. 
School level features associated with cheating include motivational goal structure (Anderman 
et al., 1998), climate (Stephens & Nicholson, 2008; Zito & McQuillan, 2011), and moral tone 
(Steiner, 1930, 1932; Stephens & Nicholson, 2008). In a seminal study of the relationship 
between cheating and achievement goal motivation, Anderman et al. (1998) found that 
cheating was predicted by perceptions of school-level performance goal structure ( = .49), 
which implies a school-level socio-cultural system marked by heightened competition and 
peer comparison.  
Socio-cultural influences on cheating appear to operate also at the national level. In a 
study of 6,226 tertiary-level business students in 36 nations, Crittenden, Hanna and Peterson 
(2009a) found significant correlations between participants’ views on business ethics 
aggregated by nation, and the rankings of those nations according to Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Students in countries ranked as less corrupt were 
significantly less likely to agree with the statements “In order to succeed in business, it is often 
necessary to compromise one’s ethics” (r = -.158, p < .001), and “Business behavior that is legal 
is ethical” (r = -.173, p < .001) (p. 7). A study of 7,213 undergraduates in 21 countries by Teixeira 
and Rocha (2010) found, additionally, that students in countries rated as the least corrupt by 
Transparency International, such as Denmark and Sweden, reported the lowest incidence of 
academic cheating (0-10%).  
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Two multi-national studies of cheating have indicated that national identity also 
influences cheating among high school students. Firstly, in a study involving 322 high school 
students from West Germany, Costa Rica, and the United States, Evans et al. (1993) found that 
cheating was perceived to be a significantly less serious problem among German students 
than among American or Costa Rican students. This finding may reflect socio-cultural 
differences at the national level or, in fact, at the school level. The authors point out that 
German participants in this study were drawn from the segment of the German education 
system known as ‘gymnasium’. Gymnasium is the university track in Germany, wherein 
students may experience a less competitive school environment than in preceding years when 
they were competing for entry into more desirable educational tracks (Miller et al., 2007). 
Secondly, Magnus, Polterovich, Danilov, and Savvateev (2002) conducted a study of 
attitudes towards cheating among 885 students from four countries (Russia, Israel, the United 
States, and the Netherlands), that included 92 high school students from Russia (N = 73) and 
the Netherlands (N = 19). As in the two exclusively tertiary studies mentioned above, 
differences in attitude toward cheating were found, at the national level, to be consistent with 
national rankings on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. High school 
students were significantly more tolerant of cheating in Russia than in the Netherlands, which 
were ranked, respectively, as the most and least corrupt countries in the study. Russian 
participants also indicated ‘hating’ students who report cheating to authorities, which 
Magnus et al. (2002) interpret as a reflection of anti-government sentiment in post-Soviet 
Russia, embodied by the saying “First whip the informer” (p. 128). Latova and Latov (2008), 
who investigated the use of crib notes among Russian secondary and tertiary students, 
describe in greater depth the effects of Russian society and culture on academic cheating. They 
cite the persistence of an illicit shadow economy of massive proportions that exerts a 
corruptive influence on the mentality of many Russians. In this shadow economy, low-level 
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crime such as video and software piracy is ubiquitous. “In the minds of the majority of 
Russians”, the authors write, “there is a common opinion that cheating is one of the obligatory 
components of school” (p. 26). 
The behavioral norms that one perceives among the members of the socio-cultural 
groups with which he or she identifies appear to exert strong influences on his or her behavior. 
Perceiving that in-group members, at the school, community, and national levels, believe 
cheating is justifiable appears to increase, on average, one’s tolerance of academic cheating. 
Despite the potentially crucial role of school culture in shaping attitudes that both reflect and 
perpetuate broader socio-cultural norms, very few international studies of cheating have been 
conducted at the secondary school level. 
2.3 Personological Variables 
Research into the causes of academic integrity can be organized into two broad 
categories: studies that investigate students’ personal characteristics, and studies that examine 
situational or contextual factors (McCabe & Treviño, 1997). These two broad veins of research 
overlap in many studies, and have converged more recently into what could be described as 
a third line of research characterized by multivariate models that include both personological 
and contextual factors related to cheating.  
Dozens of personological variables have been studied in relation to cheating, among 
which the most prevalent are demographics. While scholars have recently argued that 
covariates of cheating such as age, gender and socio-economic status are of limited use to 
educational researchers or practitioners (Miller et al., 2007), these variables continue to receive 
attention in most empirical studies. Personological variables emphasized in the literature also 
include personality constructs such as conscientiousness and locus of control, as well as self-
belief factors such as self-efficacy and self-concept.   
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2.3.1 Gender 
While findings related to gender are mixed, the literature suggests that, overall, 
cheating is more common among males who are younger than females who are older, at both 
the secondary (Finn & Frone, 2004) and tertiary levels (Newstead, Franklyn-Stokes, & 
Armstead, 1996). Of twenty-seven studies of secondary cheating to have reported on gender 
since Hartshorne and May (1928), all but two found evidence that males tend to cheat more 
than females. Feldman and Feldman (1967) found, using an experimental method, that Grade 
Seven females cheated more than their male counterparts, whereas David (1973, cited by 
Bushway & Nash, 1977) found that, among a single group of American students, females 
cheated more on a math test, whereas males cheated more on a vocabulary test. Gender 
differences at the tertiary level are somewhat less consistent, tending to disappear in 
experimental studies and field observations (Whitley, 1998). A meta-analysis of gender effects 
related to college cheating conducted by Whitley, Nelson, and Jones (1999) found a small 
effect size (d = .17, Z = 25.98, p < .001) that suggested college males might, indeed, cheat more. 
Gender differences in cheating behavior have been explained in at least two ways. 
Firstly, Whitley (1998) suggests that gender differences on self-report measures may reflect a 
tendency among females to under-report their actual cheating due to higher guilt-proneness. 
At least three experimental studies at the tertiary level report finding that females cheat more 
than males (DePalma, Madsey, & Bornschein, 1995; Jacobson, Berger, & Millham, 1970; 
Leming, 1980), whereas Canning (1956) reported finding that, under experimental conditions, 
females were more likely to lie about cheating.  
Secondly, it has been suggested that gender differences with respect to cheating reflect 
gender socialization (Ward & Beck, 1990). In a study involving 229 American high school 
students, for instance, Jensen, Arnett, Feldman, and Cauffman (2002) found that cheating was 
rated as less acceptable among females than among males. Inasmuch as cheating behavior is 
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less accepted by one’s in-group members, who among adolescents are frequently of the same 
gender, it may be a greater cause for shame to cheat, or to admit to having cheated. A study 
of 2,197 Taiwanese high school students conducted by Tsai (2012) also found that peer 
influence played a significant role in gender differences. Females indicated being more 
susceptible to the influence of other females than to the influence of males, or than males were 
to that of either gender. Taken together, these studies suggest that societal gender roles may 
exert considerable pressure on individual-level cheating behaviors via peer-to-peer 
influences. 
2.3.2 Age and grade-level 
While the practice of basing grade-level groupings on student age produces a large 
correlation between these two variables at the secondary level, they do imply distinct sources 
of variance. Age is generally associated with internal processes of cognitive and physiological 
development, whereas grade-level refers to one’s external learning context. This distinction is 
important from the practitioner’s point of view, when attempting to understand how changes 
in internal factors, external factors, or interactions between the two affect cheating. 
Secondary students appear to cheat more as they get older and progress to higher 
grade-levels. Following approximately the end of high school, however, the prevalence of 
cheating is found to decline (for reviews see Cizek, 1999; Miller et al., 2007). An exception to 
this general observation was reported by Steiner (1932), who found, using an experimental 
technique on students from eight separate secondary schools, that the incidence of cheating 
actually decreased from Grade Seven to Grade Ten. A survey-based study conducted shortly 
thereafter by Ludeman (1938) found, by contrast, that more college students reported having 
cheated in high school (80%) than in grade school (43%), and indeed, most of the subsequent 
literature affirms this general pattern (Davis & Ludvigson, 1995; Evans & Craig, 1990a; 
Galloway, 2012; Jensen et al., 2002; Miller et al., 2007; Schab, 1969, 1991).  
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In college, statistical associations between cheating, age, and year show a distinctly 
different pattern. The prominent correlation between grade-level and cheating in secondary 
school disappears in college, and the direction of association between age and cheating 
becomes negative. Whitley’s (1998) review of 107 tertiary-level studies of academic integrity 
concluded that “although cheating is negatively correlated with age, it is essentially 
uncorrelated with year in college, d = -.038” (p. 242).  
Kohlberg’s (1958) theory of moral development posits that moral reasoning should 
progress with age, according to Piaget’s stages of cognitive development. The Kohlbergian 
framework holds that younger individuals should be less morally developed, on average, 
than older individuals, and therefore more likely to cheat (Briggs, Workman, & York, 2013; 
Kohlberg, 1971). Experimental studies of the relationship between moral reasoning and 
cheating among primary- and secondary-age children conducted during the latter half of the 
Twentieth-century were reviewed by Blasi (1980), who found, however, that there was little 
evidence in favor of the purported link between moral reasoning and moral behavior. The 
general hypothesis that less engagement in immoral acts will occur as moral cognition 
matures with age is also contradicted by the above-mentioned findings that cheating tends to 
increase as students matriculate to higher levels in secondary schooling.  
An alternative source of variance in how cheating behaviors change over time is 
educational context. As students matriculate to higher grade-levels, they tend to experience 
greater degrees of challenge and intensifying pressure to achieve good grades. In American 
education, for instance, middle school grades are not usually included on the transcripts that 
students submit with their college applications, whereas from beginning of Grade Nine, the 
grades that students receive directly influence their college prospects. Many students may, 
therefore, feel markedly more pressure to make good grades from the moment they transition 
to high school. In the only longitudinal study of cheating over the transition from Grade Eight 
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to Grade Nine, Anderman and Midgley (2004) found that it increased principally for students 
who perceived greater competitive pressures in Grade Nine. This finding is consistent with a 
growing literature on the effects of motivational structure that suggests that more competitive, 
grade-focused educational contexts foster more cheating (e.g. Anderman et al., 1998; Bong, 
2008; Murdock et al., 2001; Tas & Tekkaya, 2010).  
Educational experience may also affect cheating in a cumulative manner over time, 
through self-belief variables such as self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-concept. Self-belief 
variables are held both to reflect past self-experience and to shape future behavior (Bandura, 
1997; Bong, Cho, Ahn, & Kim, 2012; Pajares, 1996). Students who, due to myriad 
circumstances, cheat at lower grade-levels may come, therefore, to see themselves as less 
honest, and may cheat more as a result. Self-beliefs are discussed in the next section.  
2.3.3 Personality and self-beliefs 
The intra-psychic factors that have been related most consistently to cheating in 
empirical studies are self-belief and personality constructs that feature aspects of morality and 
control, such as conscientiousness, self-control, and self-efficacy. According to social cognitive 
theory (Bandura, 1997; Pajares, 1996), self-beliefs reflect one’s past experiences of self that are 
both central to individual identity, and that shape future behavior accordingly (Bong et al., 
2012). Self-beliefs are, as such, subject to change over time, especially during adolescence 
(Schwartz, Klimstra, Luyckx et al., 2012). Viewed as key channels for the reciprocal influence 
of experience and behavior, self-belief variables appear to play important roles in how 
individuals’ attitudes toward cheating evolve over time. It is not clear, however, to what 
extent personality factors, generally conceptualized as stable and trait-like, shape self-beliefs. 
Inasmuch as personality factors affect behavior, the self-perceptions upon which self-beliefs 
are theoretically based may, in fact, be shaped by personality. While personality factors and 
self-beliefs are generally thought of as fundamentally different phenomena, they may often 
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share a great deal of common variance. Incorrectly assuming that measures with different 
names represent fundamentally different phenomena, or, conversely, that measures of the 
same name represent the same phenomenon, are long-standing problems in social sciences 
that have, together, been referred to as the jingle-jangle fallacy (Kelley, 1927, cited in Marsh, 
1994; Marsh, Craven, Hinkley & Debus, 2003).  
Self-esteem, a relatively weak correlate of cheating (Aronson & Mettee, 1968; Van 
Gundy, Morton, Lui, & Kline, 2006; Whitley, 1998), offers an excellent example of the jingle-
jangle fallacy. Self-esteem, which refers to the overall positive/negative evaluation one makes 
of oneself, has been widely studied in social sciences, and, as a result, has been measured in a 
variety of ways (Bong et al., 2012; Rosenberg, 1965; Rosenberg, Schooler, Schoenbach, & 
Rosenberg, 1995; Van Gundy et al., 2006). A review of self-esteem literature conducted by 
Scheff (2011) identified no less than 200 distinct measures, representing multiple 
interpretations of the construct. This stands as an example of the ‘jingle’ fallacy, whereby 
disparate measures are grouped under the same name and treated as if they represent the 
same thing. Moreover, the antecedents of self-esteem, identified by Van Gundy et al. (2006, p. 
374) as “processes of reflected appraisal…, comparison…, and self-attribution”, happen to be 
strikingly similar to the antecedents of ‘global self-concept’ (Campbell, 1990). Global self-
concept, which comprises the affective and cognitive aspects of how individuals view 
themselves (Kornilova, Kornilo, & Chumakova, 2009), has, like self-esteem, small statistical 
associations with cheating (Rost & Wild, 1994), and has been found to be multicollinear with 
measures of self-esteem in empirical studies (Harter, 1999). This appears, therefore, to stand 
as an example of the ‘jangle’ fallacy, whereby measures with different names, such as ‘self-
esteem’ and ‘global self-concept’, are incorrectly assumed to measure fundamentally different 
constructs. 
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Measures of self-concept that are domain-specific, such as Subject self-concept and 
Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept, have a strong and growing research base in secondary 
educational literature (Leung, Marsh, Yeung, & Abduljabbar, 2015; Marsh, 1989; Marsh, 1992; 
Marsh et al., 2005). None of these, however, has been used to investigate secondary cheating. 
At the tertiary level, Antion and Michael (1983) found relatively small correlations between 
five self-concept dimensions (levels of aspiration, anxiety, academic interest and satisfaction, 
leadership and initiative, and identification vs. alienation) and both the amount and incidence 
of cheating (r = │.07 - .20│).  Arvidson (2004) employed a measure of self-concept, also at the 
tertiary level, that included fifteen subscales. Significant correlations between cheating and 
intellectual, scholastic, self-worth, and moral self-concept were uniformly small and negative 
across an inventory of 22 cheating acts (r’s ranging from -.10 to -.28). Among these, the four 
largest correlation coefficients all involved moral self-concept.  
Constructs that are suggestive of moral self-concept have also produced larger effects 
in several other studies. Whitley (1998) identified, for instance, three studies of the moral 
obligation not to cheat, with an overall effect size of d = -.79. ‘Moral obligation not to cheat’ 
remains of interest in current literature, particularly as a key construct in Ajzen’s (2002) theory 
of planned behavior (Mayhew et al., 2009; Simkin & McLeod, 2010; Harding et al., 2012). A 
similar construct, dubbed ‘self-rated honesty’, has also been found to negatively predict 
cheating in several tertiary studies (Burrus et al., 2007; Rakovski & Levy, 2007; Whitley, 1998). 
A self-belief-related construct that has been related recently to ethical behavior is 
‘moral self-concept maintenance’. In a series of six experiments, Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 
(2008) found that participants allowed themselves to benefit from limited amounts of 
dishonesty by re-categorizing dishonest acts in ways that allowed perpetrators to maintain a 
positive moral self-concept. Participants cheated to acquire more reward money when, for 
instance, tokens were used as an intermediary. Even though the tokens would be converted 
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to money later, cheating for tokens was less damaging to the subjects’ moral self-concept than 
cheating directly for money. Two laboratory experiments in an Israeli context, reported by 
Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, and De Dreu (2011), found, similarly, that participants actively 
balanced the benefits of lying against the harm it posed to their self-concept. When 
opportunities were made available for participants to plausibly justify acts of deception, and 
earn more money as a result, the balance tipped and they lied more. The authors argue that 
the justifications allowed participants to engage in more dishonesty without correspondingly 
greater harm to their self-concepts, a phenomenon referred to as ‘ethical maneuvering’. These 
results suggest that positive self-concept has a prominent moral dimension that makes it 
vulnerable to immoral behavior.  
Moral self-concept has also been used to reduce cheating under experimental 
conditions. Bryan, Adams, and Monin (2013) found, in an experimental field study of 
individuals chosen at random on Stanford University campus, that being asked to “not be a 
cheater” resulted in less cheating in a guessing game than being asked not “to cheat”. The 
implication of this finding was that asking someone not to be something negative, i.e. a 
cheater, was more powerful than asking someone not to do something negative, i.e. to cheat. 
The reference to ‘being’ appeared to implicate participants’ moral self-concepts, and motivate 
them to be honest. 
The strength of the moral component of individual self-concept appears, however, to 
vary with self-control. Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, and Ariely (2011) found that participants in a 
set of experiments, whose cognitive resources were depleted by demanding mental tasks, 
demonstrated less self-control and a higher likelihood of unethical behavior. An exception to 
this trend was found, however, among participants who indicated having strong moral 
identity on a post-treatment questionnaire. Strong moral identity appeared to override the 
impulse to cheat for material gain by moderating the relationship between self-control and 
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behavior. Individuals with stronger moral identity exhibited better self-control, even after 
other mental resources had been depleted.  
Control is a theme that emerges consistently in research on intra-psychic factors. 
Conscientiousness is a personality construct related, for instance, to both morality and self-
control. Conscientious individuals tend to be organized, responsible, and methodical (Day, 
Hudson, Dobies, & Waris, 2011; Kisamore et al., 2007; Lee, Ashton, & Shin, 2005). Tertiary-
level studies of conscientiousness and cheating generally find small to moderate inverse 
associations (de Bruin & Rudnick, 2007; Nathanson et al., 2006). In a vignette study of attitudes 
toward cheating that involved 44 undergraduate business students, Day et al. (2011) found, 
for instance, that conscientiousness predicted judgments of the morality of cheating ( = -.33), 
the likelihood of cheating ( = -.44), and the justifiability of cheating ( = -.44), as well as the 
degree to which either the teacher was at fault ( = -.26) or the student was at fault ( = .33) 
for cheating under various circumstances.  
Impulsivity is a personality construct of recent interest that, in contrast to 
conscientiousness, involves a tendency to act without thinking through the consequences. 
Impulsivity has been positively associated with cheating at both the tertiary level (Kelly & 
Worrell, 1978; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2003) and the secondary level (Anderman et al., 2010). 
Impulsive individuals tend to exhibit less self-control, in that they pay less heed to the risks 
and costs associated with the behavioral choices they make (Anderman et al., 2010). While at 
the tertiary level, Kelly and Worrell (1978) found that impulsivity was related to cheating in 
females exclusively, Anderman et al. (2010) found that the odds of cheating among secondary 
students increased by 3.74 times with each one-unit increase on impulsivity, irrespective of 
gender. 
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‘Locus of control’ has been an especially consistent personality correlate of cheating 
behavior (Crown & Spiller, 1998). Locus of control refers to whether an individual tends to 
identify the causes of event outcomes as being internal or external to him/herself (Rotter, 
1966; Srull & Karabenick, 1975). Whitley (1998) reports that while the relationship of locus of 
control with cheating appears, overall, to be small (d = .27), the relationship is found to be 
stronger in laboratory and experimental studies than in self-report studies. An internal locus 
of control tends to lead students to cheat when they perceive that success on a particular task 
is a matter of skill, whereas students who externalize control tend to cheat more when they 
perceive that success is a matter of chance (Whitley, 1998). While locus of control was a widely 
studied phenomenon in the 1970s and 80s, nearly all locus of control studies were conducted 
at the tertiary level. A single non-tertiary study of locus of control and cheating by Johnson 
and Gormly (1972) found that, among 113 American Grade Five students, greater 
externalizing was related to cheating, but only among female participants. 
Self-efficacy is a control-related self-belief with consistently inverse associations to 
cheating at the secondary level (e.g. Finn & Frone, 2004; Lee, Bong, & Kim, 2014; Nora & 
Zhang, 2010), as well as at the tertiary level (e.g. Bing, Davison, Vitell et al., 2012; Elias, 2009). 
Bandura (1986) defines self-efficacy as “people’s judgments of their capabilities to organize 
and execute courses of action required to attain designated types of performances… 
concerned not with the skills one has but with judgments of what one can do with whatever 
skills one possesses” (p. 94), or, in other words, one’s sense of being able to ‘exercise control’ 
over outcomes (Bandura, 1997). Cheating behavior implies, by contrast, a recognition that one 
cannot achieve the outcomes one desires, unless one breaks the rules. Zwagerman (2008) 
argues that when students feel apprehension and uncertainty over grades, in other words 
when they experience low self-efficacy, cheating “mitigates the randomness of the outcome—
it eliminates the personal factor and puts the student more firmly in control” (p. 684). It stands 
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to reason, therefore, that what students feel they cannot control legitimately, they may be 
enticed to cheat their way around. 
Academic self-efficacy was found, in a study of 495 Grade Seven and Grade Eight 
students by Murdock et al. (2001), to be the most salient motivational predictor of cheating ( 
= -.54, p < .01). Two more recent studies of secondary cheating in South Korea (Bong, 2008; 
Lee et al., 2014) and one in Turkey (Tas & Tekkaya, 2010) found, similarly, that self-efficacy 
was a reliable predictor of cheating in regression analyses. Studies at the tertiary level suggest, 
however, that the influence of self-efficacy on cheating is complex. Ogilvie and Stewart (2010) 
divided 536 Australian university students into three groups based on their self-efficacy 
scores (low, moderate, and high). Low self-efficacy students’ intention to plagiarize (ITP) was 
predicted exclusively by prior cheating; for moderate self-efficacy students, ITP was predicted 
exclusively by the perceived benefits of plagiarism; and for high self-efficacy students, ITP 
was predicted exclusively by the perceived shame associated with plagiarism. Jurdi et al. 
(2011a) found that, among 321 Canadian university students, academic self-efficacy interacted 
with ‘instrumental motivations’ for studying such as acquiring a job or degree. Instrumentally 
motivated students were more likely to report cheating, unless they also exhibited high self-
efficacy. Self-efficacy served, the authors argue, like a “‘protective factor’ that interacted with 
instrumental motives to reduce the likelihood of academic dishonesty, by keeping 
instrumentally oriented students motivated to try hard” (p. 24).  
 Whether due to personality, self-beliefs, or interactions of the two, the degree to which 
cheating is likely under given circumstances clearly varies among individuals. Two elements 
of individual difference that emerge repeatedly in research on cheating are morality and 
control. Morality has been measured in terms of moral obligation to be honest, self-rated 
honesty, and moral identity. While recent experimental studies have found that individuals 
tend to curtail immoral behavior in order to maintain a positive moral self-concept, the ability 
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to act morally is also largely a matter of self-control. More conscientious, less impulsive 
individuals generally exhibit higher levels of self-control, which may be depleted by 
cognitively demanding activities, resulting in a higher likelihood for immoral behavior in all 
but those with a strong sense of moral identity.  
2.3.4 Learner characteristics 
Academic motivational and behavioral tendencies, such as achievement goal 
orientations and approaches to learning, are important learner characteristics that students 
develop during the course of their educational careers, and that may, together, constitute an 
integrated “stance towards academic tasks” (Murphy & Alexander, 2000, p. 41). Similar to 
self-beliefs, learner characteristics both reflect past experience and shape future behavior. 
Pintrich (2000) argues that an individual’s approaches to, and purposes for, learning might 
come to “reflect an organized system, theory, or schema” for learning (p. 94), such that over time 
they tend increasingly to be activated together. While such characteristics may be relatively 
stable across various contexts, they may also be modifiable by countervailing influences in 
“‘strong’ classroom contexts or experimental manipulations” (p. 102).  
Achievement goal orientations. Achievement goal theory (AGT) holds that students’ 
learning processes and outcomes can be influenced by whether their learning activities are 
motivated by mastery or performance goals (Meece, Anderman, & Anderman, 2006; Phan, 
2009b). A mastery goal orientation is characterized by intrinsic aspirations such as 
“developing one’s abilities, mastering a new skill, trying to accomplish something 
challenging, and trying to understand learning materials. Success is evaluated in terms of self-
improvement, and students derive satisfaction from the inherent qualities of the task, such as 
its interest and challenge” (Meece et al., 2006, p. 490). A performance orientation involves, by 
contrast, extrinsic aspirations such as “demonstrating high ability relative to others, striving 
to be better than others, and using social comparison standards to make judgments of ability 
Chapter 2 Review of Literature│31 
  
  
and performance. A sense of accomplishment is derived from doing better than others and 
surpassing normative performance standards” (Meece et al., 2006, p. 490). The intrinsic vs. 
extrinsic contrast referred to here is, in fact, one of several dyadic conceptions of motivational 
orientation, like task vs. ego-orientation (Maehr, 1983), that coalesced under the mastery vs. 
performance framework of modern achievement goal theory beginning in the late 1980s 
(Ames, 1992; Ames & Archer, 1988; Elliot, 2005; Marsh et al., 2003). While prior work had 
previously demonstrated that cheating is more likely among students who are motivated by 
performance-related variables such as the need for approval (e.g. Lobel & Levanon, 1988), 
achievement anxiety (Shelton & Hill, 1969), high vs. low achievement motivation (Johnson & 
Gormly, 1972), and grade-pressure (e.g. Smith, Ryan, & Diggins, 1972; Evans & Craig, 1990a; 
Diekhoff, LaBeff, Clark, et al., 1996), the first study of cheating from the perspective of AGT, 
by Anderman et al. (1998), proved seminal, inspiring a body of research that continues in 
current literature (e.g. Galloway, 2012).  
Initial findings by Anderman et al. (1998) suggested that students with personal 
extrinsic orientations were significantly more likely to cheat than those with personal intrinsic 
orientations. Intrinsically oriented students were found, in fact, to be 1.54 times less likely to 
cheat than their extrinsically oriented counterparts. While research has generally supported 
this pattern of association between personal goal orientation and cheating, results have been 
somewhat inconsistent. At the secondary level, Murdock et al. (2001) found that while 
personal extrinsic goal orientation predicted cheating in logistic regression ( = .38, p < .05), 
the effect of a mastery goal orientation on cheating was nil (see also Rettinger & Cramer, 2009). 
A study of secondary students conducted by Stephens and Gehlbach (2007) found, by 
contrast, that a mastery orientation negatively predicted cheating, whereas a performance 
orientation exerted no significant effect. These inconsistencies also show up in relation to 
students’ views on cheating. In response to an open-ended section on a questionnaire used by 
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Olafson et al. (2013), for instance, just one-third of non-cheaters identified mastery goals as a 
key reason why they did not cheat. A study by Koul, Clariana, Jitgarun, and Songsriwittaya 
(2009) found, by contrast, that stricter views on cheating tended to be held by performance-
oriented students.  
Performance and mastery goal orientations have more recently been subdivided into 
approach and avoidance orientation constructs, thus creating a four-factor structure, or ‘2 x 2’ 
achievement goal model (Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Elliot & Murayama, 2008). Elliot, 
Murayama, and Pekrun (2011) have additionally formulated a ‘3 x 2’ achievement goal model, 
by applying a trichotomous conception of the reference points used for measuring 
competence (task, self, and other) to the approach-avoidance dimension of the 2 x 2 model. 
Approach constructs involve proactively seeking either understanding in the case of mastery-
approach, or favorable peer comparisons in the case of performance-approach. Avoidance 
constructs involve defensive measures to either avoid failing to learn, as in the case of 
mastery-avoidance, or to avoid negative peer comparisons, as in the case of performance-
avoidance.  
Findings as to how the four-factor structure relates to cheating remain, like the original 
two-factor structure, inconsistent. Bong (2008), who included measures for performance-
approach, performance-avoidance, and mastery orientations (without distinguishing between 
mastery approach/avoidance) found, in a study of 753 South Korean high school students, 
that only performance-avoidance orientation predicted cheating ( = .25, p < .05). An 
experimental study of cheating that used the same measures among 70 American university 
students conducted by Niiya et al. (2008), found similar results: performance-avoidance was 
the only orientation that predicted cheating at a significant level, albeit exclusively among 
male participants. A multi-level study conducted at the secondary level by Tas and Tekkaya 
(2010) found, by contrast, that while a mastery orientation negatively predicted cheating at 
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both the student and classroom levels ( = -.366 and  = -.397, respectively), a performance-
approach orientation exerted a relatively weak effect at the student level ( = .118), and none 
at the classroom level, whereas performance-avoidance goal orientation was not a significant 
predictor at either level.  
The results of research into associations between cheating and achievement goal 
orientation suggest, in sum, that students are generally more likely to cheat when they pursue 
performance goals, and especially when they pursue performance-avoidance goals, instead 
of mastery goals. The inconsistencies noted above appear, however, to suggest that the 
influence exerted by achievement goal orientation on cheating behavior involves 
unrecognized complexity, as may arise from intra-psychic and/or contextual factors that 
mediate or modify the relationship. 
Preferred learning strategies. Another major contribution made by Anderman et al. 
(1998) was the inclusion, for the first time in a study of cheating, of a measure of deep learning 
strategy usage, which turned out to be the strongest predictor of cheating in the study ( = -
.86). While research into AGT proliferated in academic integrity literature following 
Anderman et al. (1998), research on learning strategy has since been conducted in just three 
works at the tertiary level (Jurdi et al., 2011a, 2011b; Norton, Tilley, Newstead, & Franklyn-
Stokes, 2001), and one work at the secondary level (Bong, 2008).  
Learning strategies are widely held to be behavioral complements to corresponding 
types of motivation (Tait & Entwistle, 1996). The measure that Anderman et al. (1998) 
included, for instance, entitled Deep learning strategies, served, in effect, as a complement to 
the measure for personal mastery orientation (r = .65). The motivational complement to deep 
strategies has been measured in other works as a ‘deep motive’ (Biggs, Kember, & Leung, 
2001), which is conceptually and empirically similar to a mastery goal motivation. An 
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orientation to mastery goals has been shown, additionally, to predict deep learning strategies 
in several structural equation modeling studies at the tertiary level (Fellonar, Román, & 
Cuestas, 2007; Phan, 2008, 2009a, 2009b).  
When combined, deep learning motivation and deep learning strategy are often 
referred to as a ‘deep approach to learning’ (Biggs et al., 2001). Student learning theory, a 
prolific source of research on approaches to learning (Biggs & Tang, 2011), has generally 
focused on two approaches to learning: deep and surface. Students who take a deep approach 
to learning tend to be motivated by intrinsic interest, and generally seek to make personal 
meaning of what is to be learned. Students who adopt a surface approach tend, by contrast, 
to fear failure, and to prioritize the end results of learning, such as passing marks, over the 
actual substance of intellectual challenge and achievement. Surface strategies, such as rote 
learning and generally focusing on the superficial aspects of learning tasks (Biggs, 1987; 
Wilson & Fowler, 2005), are characteristic of acts described by Miller et al. (2011) as 
‘disintegrity’, in that they violate not the rule, but the spirit, of academic integrity. Surface 
approaches to learning aim to counterfeit intellectual achievement with the production of end 
results, which effectively invalidates assessment results intended to reflect levels of 
understanding. 
While learning strategies are, like achievement goal orientations, responsive to 
environmental variables, students may also develop relatively stable preferences for certain 
strategies due to past experience (e.g. Marton & Säljö, 1997; Wilson & Fowler, 2005). A 
semester-long field experiment involving a class of 180 Belgian university students conducted 
by Gijbels, Segers, and Struyf (2008) found, for instance, that participants’ approaches to 
learning at the beginning of the semester tended to carry through to the end, despite the use 
of constructivist, deep-level assessment methods throughout the semester. While students did 
indicate recognizing the assessment methods as being geared for deep learning, those who 
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preferred a surface approach initially, did not, on average, shift to deeper strategies by the 
end.  
 The only secondary-level study of cheating since Anderman et al. (1998) to 
incorporate measures of learning strategy was a structural equation modeling study 
conducted by Bong (2008). Both ‘cognitive strategy use’, and ‘self-regulatory strategy use’ 
were found to have significant negative correlations with self-reported cheating behavior (r = 
-.14 and -.29, respectively). Neither measure was included in the final model, however, due to 
multicollinearity between them, as well between each, respectively, and mastery goal 
orientation.  
The association between learning strategy and cheating appears to be weaker at the 
tertiary level than at the secondary level. In a study of 267 university students in the UK, 
Norton et al. (2001) found, for instance, no correlation between self-reported cheating and 
approaches to learning. A more recent study by Jurdi et al. (2011a) found small but significant 
correlations between cheating and surface learning approaches (r = .12, p < .05) and deep 
learning approaches (r = -.22, p < .01). While these results appear to merit little interest in 
approaches to learning as variables related to cheating at the tertiary level, the aforementioned 
studies by Anderman et al. (1998) and Bong (2008) suggest stronger relationships among 
secondary students. The observed difference between the tertiary and secondary school 
students in how approaches to learning tend to relate to cheating might reflect either the use 
of different measures, or differences in the consistency and intensity of the classroom 
experience between the tertiary and secondary school level. Measures used by Norton et al. 
(2001) and Jurdi et al. (2011a) came from the Approaches to Study Inventory (ASI) (Richardson, 
1990) and the Study Process Questionnaire (SPQ) (Biggs, 1987), respectively, which are both 
traditional ‘approaches to learning’ measures developed within the mainly tertiary-level 
literature of student learning theory, whereas Anderman et al. (1998) and Bong (2008) used 
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measures designed for the secondary level that focused specifically on the use of learning 
strategies that are ‘deep’ in character.  
Alternatively, students’ academic behaviors may be more responsive to 
environmental factors at the secondary level because secondary classrooms tend to play more 
a salient role in their academic lives. In a qualitative study of learning strategies in Scotland, 
Selmes (1986) found strong evidence that secondary students frequently approach learning in 
a surface manner, and that surface approaches to learning tend to arise for the same reasons 
at the secondary level as they do at the tertiary level, while “possibly having stronger effects 
in secondary than in higher education” citing “formal assessment and teaching methods, 
[and] dependence on the teacher” as key contextual factors to inducing a surface approach (p. 
25). The scarcity of research on learning strategies and their correlates at the secondary level 
is a notable lacuna in the academic integrity literature. 
Achievement goal orientations and learning strategy preferences may, over time, 
develop into relatively stable tendencies that serve as students’ default learning characteristics 
when countervailing contextual variables are weak. Research generally indicates that the 
pursuit of performance goals tends to increase cheating, whereas the pursuit of mastery goals 
tends to decrease cheating. The inconsistency with which goal orientations appear to predict 
cheating suggests, however, that the relationship may be complicated by additional factors. 
Learning strategies, which were also found by Anderman et al. (1998) to have strong 
associations to cheating at the secondary level, have received comparatively little attention in 
published research. 
2.4 Situational variables  
The second broad vein of research on academic integrity, related to situational 
variables, has traditionally been focused in two areas. The first of these areas emphasizes 
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conditions that make cheating more or less risky, such as the arrangement of seating (e.g. 
Genereux & McLeod, 1995; Houston, 1986), use of multiple test copies (e.g. Hollinger & Lanza-
Kaduce, 1996; Houston, 1983a), whether honor policies exist and are understood by students, 
the influence of peers, and the perceived risk of detection and severity of penalties (Covey, 
Saladin, & Killen, 1989; Dix, Emery, & Le, 2014; McCabe, Feghali, & Abdallah, 2008; McCabe 
& Treviño, 1993, 1997; Miller et al., 2011). Research in this area indicates that students are 
generally more likely to cheat when conditions make it easy to get away with (Houston, 1977; 
Tittle & Rowe, 1973; Whitley, 1998). Most of these variables were studied, however, 
principally at the tertiary level during the 1970s-1990s, and have low-to-moderate effect sizes 
(for a review, see Whitley, 1998). With the exception of peer influence, which continues to be 
actively investigated (e.g. Briggs et al., 2013; Nora & Zhang, 2010), contemporary interest in 
this line of research has shifted to assignment design (e.g. Briggs et al., 2013; Heckler et al., 
2013), the use of anti-plagiarism software (e.g. Batane, 2010; Gannon-Leary et al., 2009; 
Heckler et al., 2013), and the use of devices to jam and disrupt illicit communication during 
examinations (Latova & Latov, 2008).  
The second area of research on situational variables has focused on how situations 
influence students’ motivational goals, and the evaluations of fairness and quality that 
students make of academic contexts. This literature indicates, overall, that students cheat 
when they are oriented to extrinsic achievement goals; and/or they feel unprepared to succeed 
honestly; and/or they feel alienated and do not want to try (e.g. Anderman et al., 1998; Baird, 
1980; Brandes, 1986; Evans et al., 1993; Galloway, 2012; Latova & Latov, 2008; Schraw et al., 
2007; Sheard, Markham, Dick, et al., 2003; Sisti, 2007; Whitley, 1998). The above reasons for 
cheating have been related to nearly identical sets of situational variables. Factors that hinder 
students’ efforts to prepare for success include heavy workloads, difficult tasks, ineffective 
teachers, boring subject matter, and, if success is defined on a relative basis, the extent to 
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which peers gain advantages by cheating. These same factors, in addition to perceiving a 
teacher as disrespectful or uncaring, are also implicated in student feelings of dissatisfaction 
and alienation (Anderman et al., 2010; Ashworth, Banister, & Thorne, 1997; Barnhardt & 
Ginns, 2014; Evans & Craig, 1990a; McCabe, 1999; Murdock, Miller, & Kohlhardt, 2004; 
Murdock et al., 2008; Zito & McQuillan, 2011). There seems to be a point, therefore, at which 
some students make a transition from feeling that they are simply unable to prepare 
adequately for a given class, to feeling alienated and victimized by aspects of the class that 
they blame for their lack of success. Students who feel alienated from a given class often still 
feel a pressing need for good grades, and may readily sacrifice the substance of learning by 
cheating for the grade-credentials that they see as necessary for longer-term success 
(Anderman et al., 1998).  
A metaphor for the apparent balance between students’ evaluations of the fairness and 
quality of a learning context, and the obligation they feel to be honest, is the ‘teaching-learning 
contract’ (Brent & Atkisson, 2011; Murdock et al., 2001; 2004). Contractarian judgment of the 
acceptability of cheating implies situated moral flexibility consistent with the notion of 
‘situation ethics’ (Brent & Atkisson, 2011; McCabe & Katz, 2009). According to the situation 
ethics perspective, acts that are usually seen as being wrong become morally acceptable when 
the particular circumstances of a given situation create necessities that alter the rules 
(Crittenden et al., 2009a; Fletcher, 1966). Fluctuations in cheating behavior may, by this view, 
reflect the influence of situational variables on whether students perceive the rules that forbid 
cheating to be valid (Brent & Atkisson, 2011).  
While some scholars have argued that the ‘moral flexibility’ inherent to situation ethics 
is new (McCabe & Katz, 2009), studies of adolescent ethical judgment suggest that situation 
ethics may be an enduring norm. A study of 1,800, 11-16 year-olds in the UK conducted by 
Thomson and Holland (2002) found that participants were grappling with multiple moral 
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frameworks referenced to disparate cultural and moral touchstones such as peers, family, 
religion, and global youth culture. An instance of ethical judgment was found to depend 
largely upon which framework a participant referenced. These findings suggest that 
adolescent moral judgment is not composed of strict categories of right and wrong, but is 
varied, complex, and situation-sensitive. Keltikangas-Järvinen and Lindeman (1997) found, 
similarly, that among 2,594 Finnish secondary students, participants judged the immorality 
of acts such as fighting, lying, and theft on the basis of contextual criteria such as what the act 
was, how it was carried out, or the actors’ rationales. Secondary students also appear to judge 
cheating in a context-specific light (Murdock et al., 2008). Schab (1980) reported, for instance, 
that scholastic cheaters tended to be judged leniently by their peers, because cheating was 
viewed as context-specific.  
2.4.1 The nature and quality of teaching  
Research on pedagogical factors related to cheating has generally focused on either 
motivational orientation variables, such as whether teachers are perceived to encourage 
mastery or performance goals, or on relational variables, such as the degree to which a teacher 
is perceived as good, or a subject is perceived as interesting. These two sets of variables differ 
fundamentally in that motivational goals reflect the objectives toward which learning efforts 
are directed, whereas relational variables reflect students’ evaluations of the quality of 
learning contexts. Relational variables, also referred to as social motivation variables 
(Murdock et al., 2001), include the evaluations that students make of teachers, in terms of both 
whether they are skilled, and the quality of interpersonal connection they form with students. 
Students who think their teacher does a poor job may feel let down or disadvantaged, even if 
the teacher otherwise displays high levels of interpersonal caring. Likewise, low interpersonal 
caring may be damaging to teacher-learner relationships, even when the teacher is otherwise 
pedagogically competent (Murdock et al., 2004; 2008). While motivational orientation has 
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been a subject of considerable interest in cheating literature since the seminal work on 
achievement motivation and cheating by Anderman et al. (1998), relational variables have 
been studied for longer (e.g. Hartshorne & May, 1928) and findings have generally been more 
consistent.  
Motivational goal structures. Motivational goal structures have been studied in relation 
to cheating behavior in secondary students since at least Mills (1958), who found that extrinsic 
structures, such as tangible reward systems, increased the likelihood that Grade 6 students 
would cheat in experimental settings. In modern achievement goal theory, the concept of 
‘classroom goal structure’ emphasizes the situated nature of motivation, whereby students 
are held to adopt personal goal orientations in response to the goals that they see emphasized 
in class (Ames & Archer, 1988; Meece et al., 2006), through at least six dimensions of 
pedagogical practice: task, authority, recognition, grouping, evaluation and task (Ames, 1992; 
Meece et al., 2006). A mastery classroom structure emphasizes the importance of intrinsic 
goals such as aiming to develop genuine, masterful competence of course material, whereas 
a performance classroom structure emphasizes, by contrast, extrinsic goals such as achieving 
high grades and favorable peer comparisons (Ames & Archer, 1988; Anderman & Midgley, 
1997).  
Anderman et al. (1998) administered self-report measures of achievement goal 
structure pertaining to both school and classroom levels to 285 American Sixth, Seventh, and 
Eighth Grade students. Their use of hierarchical logistic regression determined that while 
cheating behavior was predicted by both school-level performance structure and classroom-
level extrinsic structure, only the latter predicted the belief that cheating was acceptable. 
Firstly, these findings suggest that “if the incentive value of the reward is more important to 
the adolescent than the academic task itself, then the student may see cheating as acceptable” 
(p. 89). This proposition is supported by several earlier experimental studies that found 
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cheating behavior in children to relate positively to extrinsic motivation (Lobel & Levanon, 
1988; Mills, 1958) as well as knowledge of peer performance (Shelton & Hill, 1969; Taylor & 
Lewit, 1966). Secondly, these findings point to the primacy of classroom contexts over larger 
school contexts in affecting students’ judgments of the acceptability of cheating. 
In contrast to Anderman et al. (1998), subsequent studies have indicated that 
classroom mastery structure has a stronger effect on cheating at the secondary school level 
than performance goal structure (Anderman & Midgley, 2004; Murdock et al., 2001; Tas & 
Tekkaya, 2010; Stephens & Gehlbach, 2007). Exceptions to this pattern have, however, also 
been found. In a structural equation modeling study conducted by Bong (2008), neither 
mastery nor performance-approach goal structures exerted a direct effect on cheating 
behavior. Anderman et al. (2010) found, similarly, that among 583 American high school 
students, cheating behavior was related negatively to both extrinsic and mastery classroom 
structures, which also shared a significant positive correlation with one another (r = .55). By 
examining this relationship among students who reported cheating at a ‘moderate’ level 
versus an ‘extensive’ level in logistic regression, however, Anderman et al. (2010) found that 
mastery goal structure was a strong negative predictor of cheating among extensive cheaters 
(β = -.60, p < .01).  
Relational variables. A series of three studies of cheating among secondary students 
conducted by Murdock and colleagues (Murdock et al., 2001, 2004) has indicated that 
relational variables such as ‘teacher competence’ and ‘interpersonal caring’ exert an influence 
on cheating behavior that is highly interrelated with that of classroom mastery structure, 
albeit with greater strength and consistency. This series of studies has also traced, as such, a 
progression away from achievement goal structure to a renewed emphasis on relational 
variables across the field (e.g. Anderman et al., 2010; Day et al., 2011; Murdock & Anderman, 
2006; Murdock, Miller & Goetzinger, 2007). In the first study to include both classroom goal 
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structure and relational variables, Murdock et al. (2001) found that, among 495 American 
Seventh and Eighth Grade students, both Teacher commitment and Mastery goal structure 
were strong predictors of self-reported cheating. These two contextual variables were, 
however, also strongly correlated with each other (.70), which confounded efforts to 
distinguish their respective effects.  
In the second of these studies, involving 204 American Ninth and Tenth-Grade 
students, Murdock et al. (2004) used vignettes to isolate the unique effects of relational 
variables and classroom goal structure. A follow-up questionnaire queried (1) participants’ 
personal goal orientations and academic self-efficacy, (2) whether they thought the student or 
the teacher was more to blame for cheating, and (3) the degree to which they judged cheating 
to be (A) likely and (B) acceptable in the vignette scenario. The ‘acceptability of cheating’ scale 
used in this study was adapted from Anderman et al. (1998). The measure separated, 
however, into two statistically coherent measures that Murdock et al. (2004) named ‘morality’ 
(three items) and ‘justifiability’ (four items). Items on the morality scale were described as 
pertaining to the “absolute acceptability of cheating”, whereas items on the justifiability scale 
were described as pertaining to whether cheating is acceptable under certain circumstances. 
The study found that when pedagogy was perceived as poor, the likelihood of cheating was 
high regardless of classroom goal structure. Blame was a function of both pedagogical 
competence and goal structure. Participants assigned equal amounts of blame to students and 
teachers in learning situations that were portrayed as either poor in pedagogy or having a 
performance goal structure. When pedagogy was portrayed as competent or a learning 
situation was portrayed as mastery-oriented, however, participants tended to shift blame 
from the teacher back to the student. 
In the third study (Murdock et al., 2004), measures of perceived classroom goal 
structure were replaced with a measure of pedagogical caring. Vignettes were modified 
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accordingly. The resulting regression model, which included blame as a mediator, explained 
18% of variance in morality, and 39% of the variance in justifiability. In both studies reported 
by Murdock et al. (2004), pedagogical competence was the most consistent predictor of the 
morality, justifiability, and likelihood of cheating. The situated nature of cheating was also 
suggested by a group of large correlations in both studies between the likelihood of cheating, 
justifiability of cheating, and blame assigned to the teacher. Across both studies these factors 
correlated within a range of .69-.73, suggesting that cheating is more likely when it is more 
justifiable and the teacher is to blame. The vignette methodology used by Murdock et al. 
(2004) has been replicated at the tertiary level by Day et al. (2011) and Murdock et al. (2007). 
Both studies suggest that students’ reactions to elements of teacher performance are largely 
uniform across secondary and tertiary contexts (see also Schraw et al., 2007).  
When students feel beset by the urge to cheat for grades that will characterize their 
ability and shape their future, an effective teacher may strengthen their resolve to be honest 
by helping them feel prepared for success. In a study of 583 American high school students, 
Anderman et al. (2010) found that for every one-unit improvement in ‘teacher credibility’, 
defined as the degree of trustworthiness, competence, and caring, cheating among ‘extensive 
cheaters’ became 33% less likely. Cheating appears, by contrast, to become more likely when 
students feel unsupported by a teacher (Evans & Craig, 1990a, 1990b; Davis et al., 1992; 
Shipley, 2009; Steininger, Johnson, & Kirts, 1964). An international study of secondary 
students conducted by Evans et al. (1993) found that 85% of respondents agreed that cheating 
is more likely when a teacher is disorganized and difficult to understand. When teachers come 
across as disorganized and unclear, students may cheat as a result of feeling abandoned in 
their effort to grapple with course material. 
Teachers appear to influence cheating both by the type of motivational goals they 
emphasize, and the levels of interpersonal caring and pedagogical skill they demonstrate to 
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students. Research reviewed below suggests, however, that secondary students tend to hold 
expectations for fairness and quality that go beyond broad notions of pedagogical skill and 
interpersonal caring, to a more nuanced array of dimensions of learner experience. These 
dimensions include assessment (e.g. Sisti, 2007), interestingness (e.g. Rowe & Hill, 1998; 
Schraw et al., 2007), fairness and consistency of rules (e.g. McCabe et al., 2008; Thornberg, 
2008), and appropriateness of workload (e.g. Galloway, 2012; Evans et al., 1993). While the 
practice and persona of the teacher greatly informs each of these dimensions in a given class, 
they have also been investigated in the literature of cheating as distinct and generalizable 
variables. 
2.4.2 Interest 
 Interest, defined by the New Oxford American Dictionary as “the state of wanting to 
know or learn about something or someone”, is a core motivation for engagement in 
meaningful learning (Schraw et al., 2007), in that it connotes genuine appreciation for the 
value of a particular skill or body of knowledge. An interest in learning is, by this definition, 
inherently antithetical to pretending to learn for the sake of a grade, i.e. disintegrity (Miller et 
al., 2011). Results of the only major published study to focus expressly on interest and cheating 
(Schraw et al., 2007) were consistent with this definitional relationship. Based on a framework 
developed by Renninger, Hidi, and Krapp (1992) (see also Hidi & Renninger, 2006), Schraw 
et al. (2007) distinguished between  personal interest, which refers to topics or subject areas 
upon which an individual places relatively high personal value over time, and situational 
interest, which refers to the information that an individual values temporarily within a specific 
context. Schraw et al.’s (2007) findings suggest that while personal interest in a class or topic 
appears to have a stronger overall influence on cheating behavior than situational interest, the 
latter was also more strongly related to other situational factors that affect cheating 
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independently, such as the perceived effectiveness of the teacher. Situational interest may, 
therefore, act as a moderator or mediator for the effects of situational variables on cheating.  
While negative associations between cheating and interest, per se, have been noted in 
two additional secondary-level studies (Ma, Lu, Turner, & Wan, 2007; Sisti, 2007), a number 
of concepts that appear to connote disinterest, or the state of not wanting to know or learn 
about something, have also been found to relate to cheating in a positive manner. These 
include, at the secondary level, “lack of clarity about the reasons or purposes of learning” 
(Evans & Craig, 1990a, p. 334); the teacher being perceived as boring (Evans et al., 1993); and 
under-engagement (Stephens & Gehlbach, 2007). In a study involving 463 American 
secondary students, Evans and Craig (1990a) found, for instance, that students were more 
likely to cheat in required courses than in elective ones. Studies at the tertiary-level also report 
positive associations between cheating and variables connoting disinterest, such as “irrelevant 
and boring course material” (Baird, 1980, p. 517), “a devalued sense of the worth of education” 
(Diekhoff et al., 1996), “trivial, uninteresting assignments” (McCabe, Treviño & Butterfield, 
2002), and “assignments… having little learning value” (McCabe & Katz, 2009, p. 17). While 
no study of disinterest, per se, has been reported in the literature, the empirical consistency 
between the abovementioned observations that cheating is negatively related to interest and 
positively related to variables that appear to connote disinterest suggests, in sum, that 
students tend to cheat less on tasks that they value more. 
2.4.3 Assessment 
A relatively small amount of research on assessment and cheating at the secondary 
level indicates that cheating is more likely when assessments are perceived as higher stakes 
(Nichols & Berliner, 2007), less personally relevant (Sisti, 2007), and less fair (Evans & Craig, 
1990a, 1990b). Cheating also tends to be more endemic to certain types of assessment, such as 
homework, than to others (Galloway, 2012; Jensen et al., 2002). Factors such as stakes, 
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relevance, fairness, and type suggest that the assessment regime in a given class should be 
viewed as a multidimensional context in its own right (Dorman & Knightley, 2006), wherein 
factors from the broader learning environment that are related to students’ levels of alienation, 
preparedness, and anxiety over grade performance become sharply focused.  
Taking realistic account of the importance that students ascribe to grades under most 
circumstances, and the levels of worry and competition that grades can engender, it stands to 
reason that cheating will be more prevalent when the stakes are high and the risk of detection 
is low (Nichols & Berliner, 2007; Schraw et al., 2007; Vitro & Schoer, 1972). The connection 
between high stakes and cheating is intuitive; as the stakes increase, so do both the 
consequences of failure and the benefits of cheating (Lee et al., 2014; Nichols & Berliner, 2007). 
Jensen et al. (2002) found, for instance, that high school students were more likely to 
sympathize with cheating in situations where the consequences of failure were high (see also 
Bracey, 2005; Lavelle, 2008; Levitt & Dunbar, 2005; Sheard et al., 2003). 
While the risk of detection that students associate with cheating on a particular 
assignment may be contingent largely upon their perceptions of the teacher’s vigilance, it also 
depends on type of assignment in question. Cheating appears, for instance, to be more 
common on assignments that are, by their nature, more difficult to monitor, such as 
homework and group work (Briggs et al., 2013). Two studies at the secondary level that used 
self-report inventories of cheating behavior found that the most common form of cheating 
was homework copying (Galloway, 2012; Jensen et al., 2002). At the tertiary level, Hudd, 
Apgar, Bronson, and Lee (2009) report finding that some participants held the instructor 
personally responsible for cheating on out-of-class assignments, on the grounds that he or she 
had failed to take appropriate steps to address an obvious problem. A study of 456 Canadian 
university professors by Leonard and LeBrasseur (2008) suggests that many professors are, 
indeed, aware of this problem, and yet choose to give such assignments anyway. A number 
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of professors who took part in this study realized that cheating on individual homework 
assignments was widespread, but continued to give such assignments, “to ensure students 
obtain learning benefits” (p. 37).  
While some students undoubtedly benefit from group work and from individual 
homework assignments, the practice of repeatedly providing low-risk opportunities to cheat 
in a given class is likely to erode integrity over time. The obvious opportunity to cheat on tests 
in an experimentally low-risk environment led to a pronounced ‘contagion’ effect over the 
course of a semester in a tertiary-level study conducted by Walker, Wiemeler, Procyk, and 
Knake (1966). The rate of cheating was 23% on the first test, but increased subsequently to 
64% on the second test, and 86% on the third test. Students who cheated on the first test 
appeared to transmit information about the ease of cheating to their classmates, who then also 
cheated. Qualitative studies at the secondary level have noted, similarly, that students often 
pass information along to their peers about how easy it is to cheat on specific assessments 
and/or in particular classes (Schraw et al., 2007), and to cheat more when they perceive lower 
risks (Ma et al., 2007). 
Another dimension of assessment design that has been related to cheating is 
authenticity, or “the extent to which assessment tasks feature real-life situations that are 
relevant to the learner” (Dorman & Knightley, 2006, p. 56). Sisti (2007) argued that secondary-
level teachers could thwart plagiarism by designing writing assignments of a more creative 
and authentic nature that cannot be readily copied and pasted or purchased on-line. “High 
school teachers should seek to craft assignments that are not simply rote research tasks but 
rather encourage and engender a sense of student ownership of the resulting product” (p. 
227). At the tertiary level, a number of scholars from United Kingdom universities have 
formed the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC), which seeks, among other things, to 
help educators ‘design out’ cheating with more authentic types of assessment that require 
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higher levels of individual creativity and analysis, and by integrating assessments with one 
another across the semester (e.g. Carroll & Appleton, 2001; Evans, 2006; Gallant, Anderson, & 
Killoran, 2013; Gannon-Leary, Trayhurn, & Home, 2009). Assignments that require students 
to formulate and explain opinions were, for instance, found to be the least plagiarized of three 
assessment types examined in a recent study involving 2,826 American university students 
(Heckler et al., 2013).  
Cheating also appears to be more likely on assessments that students believe to be less 
fair (e.g. Baird, 1980; Genereux & McLeod, 1995; McCabe, 1992). The perceived fairness of 
assessments is likely to reflect, to some extent, students’ perceptions of the fairness of a 
learning environment. Fairness has, however, been conceptualized specifically in relation to 
assessment in the cheating literature in terms of general exam difficulty (Welsh, 1993), the 
harshness of grading practices (Evans & Craig, 1990b; Vowell & Chen, 2004), and whether 
tested material has been covered in the class (Evans & Craig, 1990a). The perception that a 
teacher’s tests are unfair may lead to cheating both by amplifying students’ concerns that they 
may be under-prepared, and by alienating them due to what appears to be injustice 
(Thorkildsen, Nolen, & Fournier, 1994; Thornberg, 2008). While research on assessment 
fairness is sparse, available findings uniformly suggest a negative association with cheating. 
Online assessment. Assessment design is of especial interest in relation to online 
education (Arnold, 2012; Harmon & Lambrinos, 2008), where disagreement has emerged over 
whether cheating takes on significantly more worrisome dimensions and proportions due to 
the plethora of resources online that facilitate cooperative cheating and plagiarism 
(Anderman, Freeman & Meuller, 2007; Batane, 2010; Briggs et al., 2013; McCabe, 2005; Walker, 
2010), or whether the Internet is “at most a complication in a long-standing dynamic” 
(Howard & Davies, 2009, p. 65; also Trushell & Byrne, 2013; Trushell, Byrne & Hassan, 2013; 
Watson & Sottile, 2010; Williams, 2008). King and Case (2014) collected data on cheating in 
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online educational contexts from 1,817 undergraduate business students at a US university 
over a five-year period (2009 – 2013), and found that between 34% and 44% reported at least 
one act of cheating during a given year. Watson and Sottile (2010) report similar incidence of 
cheating in online classes among a group of 635 American undergraduate and graduate 
students (33%), which actually compares favorably to rates of self-reported cheating observed 
in studies of American university students in face-to-face classes during the same period, such 
as 60% in Stone, Kisamore, Jawahar and Bolin (2014) and 65% in Miller et al. (2011).  
A number of scholars see the loss of direct control over assessment processes in online 
settings as remediable through adapted teaching practice such as personalized writing 
assignments (Gallant, 2008; Harmon & Lambrinos, 2008; Heckler et al., 2013), online 
synchronous assessment (Chao, Hung & Chen, 2012; Moton, Fitterer, Brazier, et al., 2013), and 
student authentication processes such as videos and facial snapshots (McNabb, 2010). Chao 
et al. (2012) argue for the viability of online synchronous assessments (OSAs), in which 
multiple students are assessed simultaneously while being monitored by video. The potential 
for cheating on OSAs may be further reduced by oral assessment methods, or by taking 
remote control of students’ computers for the duration of the assessment (Chao et al. 2012). 
The fact that assessment is the venue for cheating in academic environments makes it 
of special concern to educators and researchers with an interest in academic integrity. 
Assessment appears to be a multifaceted sub-context across the spectrum of online and face-
to-face formal learning environments, wherein grade worries, competitive urges, and 
concerns over the purposes, quality, and justice of schooling all merge together. The present 
review of literature suggests that cheating is more likely on assessments that students perceive 
to be high stakes, inauthentic, unfair, poorly designed, and poorly monitored.  
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2.4.4 Workload 
While heavy workload is a common reason given by students for why they cheat in 
qualitative studies (e.g. Evans & Craig, 1990a; Galloway, 2012; Sisti, 2007; Zito & McQuillan, 
2011), in quantitative studies this factor has demonstrated only moderate statistical 
associations with cheating behavior (Jurdi et al., 2011a; Smith et al., 1972). At least three 
possible explanations for how workload affects cheating emerge from the literature. Firstly, a 
heavy workload may predict cheating in terms of preparation, by making it more difficult for 
students to finish their work without cutting corners. Secondly, it may lead to a higher 
likelihood of cheating by depleting psychological resources that individuals need to make 
accurate moral judgments and to exert self-control. Thirdly, it may predict cheating as a proxy 
measure for student commitment to a class, where less committed students are more likely to 
perceive workload as inappropriate, and vice versa. Evidence and argument for each of these 
three possible explanations is reviewed in the given order, below.  
Secondary-level students often report that heavy workloads overwhelm their ability 
to prepare to succeed honestly (Evans & Craig, 1990a; Galloway, 2012; Sisti, 2007; Zito & 
McQuillan, 2011). The experience of lacking time both to finish homework assignments and 
to prepare for in-class assessments, which is familiar to most students past and present, is well 
expressed in a statement from a high school respondent interviewed by Galloway (2012): “It’s 
1 am; I have just finished 3 hours straight of a calc problem set, Spanish vocab work and 
history reading and I still have to write an English essay. I can turn in nothing and get a ‘0’ or 
I can download something from the Internet and take my chances” (p. 392). Students who 
cannot complete assignments on time are expected, nonetheless, to control the urge to cheat. 
Depending on teachers’ policies regarding late work, this may entail having to accept failing 
grades.  
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Students may lack the self-control necessary to accept tough consequences for 
assignments that, due to sheer overwork or poor planning, they fail to complete on time. Low 
self-control may reflect immaturity, or cognitive fatigue. Self-control has, for instance, been 
found to require cognitive resources that can become depleted when individuals are 
genuinely rushed, overloaded and sleep-deprived (Greene et al., 2008). Strenuous workloads 
may weaken resistance to the temptation to cheat by exhausting the psychological resources 
that students need to exert self-control (Gino et al., 2011). In a pair of experimental studies 
among Israeli undergraduate students, Shalvi, Elder, and Bereby-Meyer (2012) demonstrated, 
for instance, that increasing the time pressure in a dice-rolling activity triggered dishonest 
behavior. Cheating is also observed to be significantly more common in people who are sleep-
deprived (Barnes, Schaubroek, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011), and cognitively overloaded (Gino 
et al., 2011; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, et al., 2008). Heavy workloads may, therefore, 
overwhelm students’ ability both to recognize the immorality of cheating, and to control the 
urge to cheat when opportunities arise.  
Evaluations of what amount of work is appropriate in a given class may also reflect 
student commitment. Just as a lack of perseverance and effort have been implicated as causes 
of cheating behavior in several secondary-level studies (Evans & Craig, 1990a; Hamlen, 2012; 
Latova & Latov, 2008), the ‘appropriateness’ of an amount of work in a student’s mind is, by 
definition, a function of the amount of time and effort they believe the work merits. A small 
amount of work that has been taught poorly or assessed unfairly might feel overwhelming to 
a student who tends to struggle, or who feels uninterested in a particular subject. Evans and 
Craig (1990a) found, for instance, that students tended to attribute cheating to workload that 
was heavy in terms of both amount and difficulty. Work that is difficult and time-consuming 
may, nevertheless, be perceived as worthwhile to students who feel more interested, capable, 
and connected to a class, i.e. more committed (Kember, 2004). Student commitment entails, as 
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such, how much work students feel internally obliged to do, or personally responsible for 
doing, in a given class. What students deem to be their personal responsibility is, indeed, not 
defined externally so much as internally (Schlenker, 1997). Several recent secondary studies 
of cheating have reported, for instance, that students described workload in terms of “feeling” 
too heavy (Sisto, 2007; Zito & McQuillan, 2011). Students who are less committed to a class 
feel less obligation to work hard at it (Curry, 1984), which may additionally imply low moral 
obligation to accomplish tasks honestly.  
Conceptualizing the appropriateness of workload is complicated by whether it reflects 
objective reality or subject perceptions. Heavy workload, as objective reality, appears likely 
to predict cheating as a function of cognitive depletion, which breaks down students’ self-
control to resist the urge to cheat. As a subjective perception, a student’s perception that the 
workload is too heavy in a given class may reflect his or her self-perceived ability and 
resulting performance anxiety, or commitment to the class.  
2.4.5 Peer influence 
In addition to the behavioral norms that individuals perceive as characteristic of the 
socio-cultural groups with which they identify, distinct behavioral norms also arise in 
specialized contexts, such as academic classes (Carson, 2013). Context-emergent peer norms 
have been identified as a major influence on individual cheating behavior in secondary and 
tertiary settings in America (e.g. Bowers, 1964; Galloway, 2012; Hartshorne & May, 1928), as 
well as in a variety of other national settings (e.g. Eisenberg, 2004; Latova & Latov, 2008; 
McCabe et al., 2008; Nora & Zhang, 2010; Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009). The general finding 
that students cheat more when they perceive that their peers cheat more suggests at least two 
possibilities: (1) individuals may be influenced to cheat by knowledge of their peers’ cheating 
behavior, and/or (2) individuals and their peers may be simultaneously influenced to cheat 
by the same environmental factors. In the first instance, believing that one’s peers cheat 
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successfully in a given class may lead to perceptions that the risk of detection is lower and 
competition is more ruthless. Such conditions may suggest that ‘good guys finish last’, 
therefore cheating is acceptable, or even necessary. In the second instance, inasmuch as 
perceptions and opinions are social constructs (Bandura, 1977, 1986), peer norms may mediate 
the effects of environmental variables on individual cheating behavior. In small-scale class 
settings, students may co-construct opinions and perceptions of factors such as teacher 
quality, assessment quality, and usefulness of learning that, together or separately, influence 
their evaluations of the overall quality of the class. Such evaluations at the individual level 
would, therefore, be at least partially mediated by group perceptions.  
Research shows not only that knowledge of peer cheating is a strong inducement to 
cheat (Burrus et al., 2007; Carrell, Malmstrom, & West, 2008; McCabe & Treviño, 1997), but 
also that students tend to over-estimate the amount of cheating their peers engage in (Engler 
et al., 2008; Jordan, 2001; Rettinger & Kramer, 2009; Shipley, 2009), and tend to condone such 
behavior by refusing to report it. In what may be the first questionnaire-based study of 
cheating, Barnes (1904) found that, among a sample of 125 American undergraduate students, 
most said they would not report a peer for cheating because they regarded ‘tale-bearing’ as 
‘contemptible’. This finding has been common in subsequent literature at both levels. Schab 
(1991) reports that in three studies over the course of thirty years (1969, 1979, 1989), the 
proportion of American high school respondents willing to report a friend for cheating fell 
form 12% to 8% to 4%. This finding does not always hold. Simon, Carr, McCullough, et al. 
(2004) found that 36% of 172 American chemistry undergraduate students were, in fact, 
willing to report cheating. In a similar university sample, Shipley (2009) found, however, that 
just 4% of 228 American university students admitted to ever having actually reported 
cheating to an authority figure. Similar results have also been found in other national contexts. 
While 20% of a sample of 1,119 undergraduate medical students in Ethiopia indicated 
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willingness to report cheating (Desalegn & Berhan, 2014), only 2% indicated willingness to 
report cheating in a sample of Singaporean undergraduates (Lim & See, 2001), and 6% in a 
sample of Lebanese high school students (Bacha et al., 2012). Approval of ‘tattletales’ in a 
sample of Russian high school students was reportedly negligible (Latova & Latov, 2008). In 
view of the strong influence that peer norms exert on individual cheating behavior, the 
unwillingness to turn in cheaters to school authorities presents a dilemma: the source of 
harmful influence, namely the knowledge of peer cheating, is protected by those who are 
harmed.  
The harm done by peer cheating may affect more than behavior. In several studies, 
students who recognized widespread cheating seemed less likely to recognize it as immoral. 
A study at the tertiary level by Harding, Mayhew, Finelli et al. (2007) found, for instance, that 
measures of ‘moral obligation’ and ‘perceived social norms’ collapsed into a single higher-
order factor that turned out to be a strong predictor of the intention to cheat on tests ( = .66). 
O’Rourke et al. (2010) observed, also at the college level, that cheating actually became less 
immoral in the judgment of students who witnessed others cheat. McCabe and Katz (2009) 
argued, similarly, that peer influence appears to constitute a key source of ‘moral flexibility’ 
among students. These results suggest that ethics and peer norms are mutually reinforcing, 
albeit perhaps less stable in smaller-scale, temporary contexts such as academic classes, than 
in larger-scale socio-cultural contexts.  
The amount by which one perceives his or her peers to cheat may also exacerbate the 
negative effects of competition in a given learning context. The immorality of cheating has 
often been traced to the unfair advantage it confers to cheaters, in terms of better grades (e.g. 
West, Ravenscroft, & Schrader, 2004). Being honest in a performance-oriented class that 
emphasizes grades, competition, and social comparisons, and where many other students 
cheat successfully, may strike students as likely to confer an unfair disadvantage. Where 
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competitive pressures are already high, the perception that cheating is commonplace may 
lead to a “cheat or be cheated” mentality (Galloway, 2012, pp. 393-394; also Schwieren, & 
Weichselbaumer, 2010), even among individuals who simultaneously recognize that cheating 
is proscribed by norms in the broader socio-cultural groups to which they belong. 
Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), first introduced as a framework for 
understanding peer influence on cheating behavior by Broeckelman-Post (2008; also Koul et 
al., 2009; Nora & Zhang, 2010), holds that individuals formulate and validate their opinions 
within the context of what their peers think. Individual perceptions of contextual factors, 
including perceptions of what behaviors are normal, are, by this view, constructed in concert 
with peer perceptions. Similar positions are supported with regard to peer norms in the 
literature on independence and conformity (Asch, 1956) and social learning (Bandura, 1977, 
1986). Inasmuch as individual-level cheating behavior is influenced by environmental factors 
such as teachers’ pedagogical skill, for example, the fact that cheating occurs at all in a given 
class may indicate to classmates that cheating is justifiable because the teacher is poor. A 2-
level hierarchical linear model tested by Murdock et al. (2008) determined, for instance, that 
the amount of blame secondary students assign to teachers for the cheating that goes on in 
their classes was predicted by both individual and classroom aggregate perceptions of the 
teacher’s pedagogy. Individual students’ perceptions of their teachers were, in other words, 
generally consistent with their peers’ perceptions, in relation to cheating. Such broad 
consensus suggests that underlying social mechanisms shape norms related to both cheating 
behavior and its justifications. Peer norms may, therefore, mediate the effects that context 
variables have on individual-level cheating behaviors. In a study involving 1,025 Romanian 
university students, Teodorescu and Andrei (2009) found that the effect of ‘quality and 
relevance of instruction’ on the intent to cheat fell from  = -.60 to  = -.45 when peer influence 
was added to the model, suggesting partial mediation. An elaborate theoretical model 
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developed by Whitley (1998), based on Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior, also 
positioned subjective peer norms as a potential mediator between alienation and the intention 
to cheat. This particular aspect of Whitley’s (1998) model has not, however, been tested in 
subsequent research.  
In determining whether cheating behavior is acceptable in a given class context, 
students appear to take important cues from the prevalence of cheating among their peers. 
Such determinations appear able to affect not only cheating behavior, but also judgments of 
whether cheating is immoral. Such perceptions are, moreover, often exaggerated, which 
potentially amplifies their influence. Perceiving a high prevalence of cheating may suggest to 
students that contextual factors justify it. Peer norms that support cheating may sensitize 
students to arguments that, for example, cheating makes up for a teacher’s pedagogical 
ineptitude, unfair assessment practices, or boring class. A high prevalence of cheating may be 
felt as a kind of democratic affirmation that a teacher has failed and students are, therefore, 
relieved of their moral obligation to be honest.  
2.5 Rational-cognitive models of deviance 
As anticipated by the foregoing review, person and situation variables have been 
studied both independently and as components of integrated models of cheating. Numerous 
models for cheating have been introduced since the 1970s that integrate person and situation 
variables under the assumption that cheating is a fundamentally rational-cognitive 
phenomenon (e.g. DeVries & Ajzen, 1971; Lau, Yuen, & Park, 2013; Smith, Davy, & Easterling, 
2011; Treviño, 1986). These models have been successful at predicting cheating-related 
cognitions such as the intention to cheat (e.g. Mayhew et al., 2009), but markedly less 
successful at predicting self-reported cheating behavior (e.g. Bong, 2008; Harding et al., 2012). 
This apparent shortcoming seems to reflect broadly the disjunction between cognition and 
action that has long been recognized in research on moral reasoning (Blasi, 1980). Several 
Chapter 2 Review of Literature│57 
  
  
scholars have, for this reason, recently suggested non-rational explanations for academic 
cheating, such as automaticity (Harding et al., 2012), emotion and intuition (McTernan et al., 
2014; Murdock et al., 2008; O’Rourke et al., 2010), and social contracts (Brent & Atkisson, 2011; 
McTernan et al., 2014; Murdock et al., 2004; Rettinger, 2007). These perspectives are consistent 
with more recent experimental evidence that contradicts the belief that moral decision-
making is principally a function of rational cognition (e.g. Brüne, Juckel, & Enzil, 2013; 
Cushman et al., 2010; Gneezy, 2005; Haidt, 2007; Peters, Västfjäll, Gärling, & Slovic, 2006). 
However, no models for academic cheating have been developed that reflect non-rational 
processes hypothesized to underlie moral judgment. 
The theory of reasoned action (TRA) appears to have been the first framework to 
integrate personological variables with perceptions of context in a structural model of 
cheating psychology (DeVries & Ajzen, 1971). TRA was a purely cognitive model that 
departed from the personality and risk/reward-oriented research characteristic of integrity 
literature in the 1960s-70s. TRA sought to describe individual differences in terms of beliefs, 
attitudes and perceived norms that led, in turn, to intentions and thus to behaviors. Moderate 
success in several early studies of the TRA model for academic cheating (e.g. Pratt & 
McLaughlin, 1989) prompted the addition of ‘perceived behavioral controls’, which 
measured, in essence, the perceived risk of detection and severity of penalties (Ajzen, 1991; 
Beck & Ajzen, 1991). The modified framework was named the theory of planned behavior 
(TPB).  
A longitudinal study of tertiary student cheating by Beck and Ajzen (1991) found that 
the TPB model predicted most of the variance in the intention to cheat, but less than half in 
actual cheating behavior. Attempts to improve the TPB model in subsequent studies by 
adding variables such as ‘moral reasoning level’ (Harding et al., 2007), ‘professional unethical 
beliefs toward cheating’ (Hsiao & Yang, 2011), and prior cheating behavior (Mayhew et al., 
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2009), have generated results that remain similar to those of Beck and Ajzen (1991); they 
predict substantially more variance in cheating cognition (intention to cheat) than in actual 
cheating behavior. Of these three additions to the TPB framework, however, prior cheating 
behavior, a non-cognitive factor, has been a substantially stronger predictor of cheating 
behavior than either moral reasoning or moral obligation not to cheat. This observation led 
Harding et al. (2012) to speculate that cheating might be better characterized as an automatic 
habit, than as an outcome of deliberate, rational cognitive processes. 
Rational-cognitive models for cheating behavior have also been developed to reflect 
motivational perspectives. A framework based on motivational variables and Kohlbergian 
moral cognition was proposed by Newstead et al. (1996), based on a study of the reasons for 
cheating among tertiary students in the UK. A similar framework has emerged more recently 
from a synthesis of research on cheating (Murdock & Anderman, 2006), which hypothesizes 
that the effects of individual and contextual variables on the propensity to cheat, are mediated 
by three motivational questions: (1) What is my purpose? (2) Can I do this? and (3) What are the 
costs? Murdock and various colleagues (2001, 2004) have additionally tested integrated 
models for cheating and cheating-related cognitions, such as the justifiability and morality of 
cheating, among American secondary students. These were the first models found to 
incorporate both relational variables, such as teacher quality, and motivational goal 
constructs, such as classroom goal structure, together with personal variables, such as 
academic self-efficacy, personal goal orientation, and grade-level. The hierarchical logistic 
regression model tested by Murdock et al. (2001), which included achievement goal 
orientation and structure, teacher quality, and social aspects of respondents’ experience of 
school, was able to identify 48% of cheaters and 90% of non-cheaters. A regression model 
tested by Murdock et al. (2004), which included a similar group of factors, but excluded 
perceived classroom goal structures, predicted as much as 40 – 42% of the variance in cheating 
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cognitions. No secondary study has yet explained more than 50% of variance in cheating 
behavior. 
The most orthodox rational-cognitive models for cheating are rooted in econometric 
frameworks based on the work of economic utility theorists such as Becker (1968) and Simon 
(1982). Such models assume a cost/benefit basis for individual behavioral choices, and make 
little or no allowance for moral considerations (e.g. Bisping et al., 2008; Burrus et al., 2007; 
Magnus et al., 2002; Schwieren & Weichselbaumer, 2010). Econometric models of cheating are 
predicated on the view that humans are an inherently utility-maximizing and cost-
minimizing species, or ‘homo economicus’, whose behavior is a matter of econometric 
probability, modeled by ‘probit’ models. Probit models examine the extent to which the 
probability of cheating reflects perceived benefits of cheating, suggested by variables such as 
current GPA and perceived competitive pressure, versus the perceived risks, suggested by 
variables such as the perceived likelihood of detection and severity of punishment. Such 
models may also typically include demographic factors such as age and gender, as well as 
contextual factors, such as the prevalence of cheating among peers.  
The probit models tested by Bisping et al. (2008) indicated that background factors 
such as gender, year in school, and age related differently to different forms of academic 
misconduct. These differences appeared, moreover, to depend largely upon whether the 
students recognized that various acts were, in fact, misconduct. Students who fail to realize 
that their instructor views a particular behavior as cheating cannot, the authors argue, 
correctly assess the risks associated with those behaviors. Instructors should, therefore, be 
clearer with students about what acts constitute cheating, and should elevate the level of risk 
that students associated with it. This recommendation echoes policy initiatives advised many 
times in the literature, as exemplified by honor policy research (e.g. McCabe et al., 2002, 2003). 
The effect of such policies appears, however, to be moderate, at best (Evans & Craig, 1990a; 
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Passow, Mayhew, Finelli, et al., 2006; Whitley, 1998). To wit, driving up the risks associated 
with cheating appears to explain some, but far from all, of its variance. 
While rational-cognitive models tested in econometric studies generate helpful 
guidance for how various factors alter the probability of cheating, the Homo economicus view 
of human nature has been challenged in recent psychological literature by growing evidence 
that people often forego their own interests for the sake of higher moral principles, such as 
peace and justice (Haidt, 2001). Haidt (2007) refers to this as the ‘homo moralis’ view of human 
behavior (p. 998), while other scholars have asserted that humans have fundamental, non-
rational moral drives (Cushman et al., 2010; Machery & Mallon, 2010; Wilson, 1993). In an 
experimental study of ultimatum bargaining, Boles, Croson, and Murnighan (2000) found that 
participants punished bargaining partners who lied by rejecting their offers, even when it 
resulted in less total gain for themselves. The authors observed that, overall, “the bargainers 
were little like those depicted by rational economic models. They offered too much, they 
rejected offers that they should have accepted, and emotions rather than simple profits 
seemed to have important effects on their behavior” (p. 255) (see also Pillutla & Murningham, 
1996). An experimental study by Gneezy (2005) found, similarly, that participants turned 
down opportunities to deceive others, even when they would have benefited from the 
deception and could not have been detected (see also Gino & Pierce, 2009).  
Results such as these have helped bring about a recent shift in moral psychology 
research from a strictly rational-cognitive view to a dual-process conception by which non-
rational determinants of moral judgment such as emotion and intuition interact with, and are 
controlled by, cognitive processes such as moral reasoning (Green et al., 2008; Haidt, 2001, 
2003, 2007; Narvaez, 2010; Shalvi et al., 2012). The dual-process view of moral judgment posits 
an evolutionary basis for moral judgment (Greene et al., 2006; Knoch et al., 2006; Machery & 
Mallon, 2010) that has also been characterized in terms of social contracts (Cosmides & Tooby, 
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2013; Rettinger, 2007). An experimental study by Cosmides (1989) found, for instance, that 
people appear to possess an innate ability to perceive violations of social contracts, such as 
the rules that govern alcohol consumption. Participants easily understood rules that were 
related to social structure, and readily identified violations. The rules of abstract logic systems, 
while fundamentally similar, were distinctly more challenging for subjects to understand and 
monitor for violations.  
While contractual thinking is highly rational-cognitive in spheres such as law, it is 
associated in social spheres with mental processes such as ‘recognizing’, ‘weighing’ and 
‘sensing’, that occur too quickly to be explained by rational cognition (Kahneman, 2011). 
“Once students see the social contract against cheating as violated,” explains Rettinger (2007, 
p. 158), “…they do not see the decision to copy another student’s homework as one of 
academic integrity because the social prohibition against it is not in force.” When a social 
contract is violated, in other words, its bindingness may be nullified for all parties. With 
regard to cheating, the official rules of the school or classroom may be inconsistent with what 
students believe the de facto rules to be, based on their observations of interpersonal and social 
factors. In a study of cheating among 164 American undergraduates, O’Rourke et al. (2010) 
found, for instance, that “seeing others cheat increases cheating behavior by causing students 
to judge the behavior less morally reprehensible, not by making rationalization easier” (p. 47). 
In response to the apparent disjunction between cheating-related cognition and 
cheating behavior, references to the dual-process perspective have been made in several 
recent cheating studies (Harding et al., 2012; Murdock et al., 2008). For instance, O’Rourke et 
al. (2010) entertain in their discussion the possibility that “automatic emotional responses 
determine cheating behavior” (p. 63). Factors such as mental overload and fatigue have, 
moreover, been found to impair cognitive control, which leads to poorer moral judgment 
(Barnes et al., 2011; Greene et al., 2008). Gino et al. (2011) found that cognitive tasks such as 
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writing short essays without using words that include the letters N and A, depleted subjects’ 
self-control, which resulted in both lower moral awareness and lower resistance to 
temptation. 
Of the many integrated rational-cognitive models for cheating tested at the secondary 
level, none accounts adequately for cheating behavior from a purely rational-cognitive 
perspective. The more recent dual-process paradigm of moral psychology (Haidt, 2007; 
Kahneman, 2011) suggests that both cognitive factors such as reasoning and self-regulation, 
and non-cognitive factors such as emotion and intuition may underlie the noted incongruence 
between abstract moral beliefs and contextualized moral behaviors, or BBI (Ajzen & Sexton, 
1999; Stephens & Nicholson, 2008). While dual-process perspectives have been emergent in 
moral psychology research for more than two decades (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Damasio, 
1994; Rettinger, 2007; Wilson, 1993), no expressly dual-process framework has yet been 
devised for academic cheating.  
2.6 Neutralization techniques 
Neutralization theory, originally developed by Sykes and Matza (1957), holds that 
individuals are able to break certain rules that they otherwise value by reasoning that certain 
circumstances alleviate the moral imperative to follow those rules. Such reasoning techniques 
include denying that one’s misbehavior harms others, or ascribing responsibility to external 
factors (see Table 2.1). Interpreting the justifications offered by students for cheating behaviors 
as neutralization techniques reflects, therefore, an underlying assumption that cheating is a 
rational-cognitive act. Rule-breakers must be aware of the immorality of their behavior in 
order to neutralize the “disapproval flowing from internalized norms and conforming others” 
(Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 666). Because neutralization techniques theoretically enable 
individuals to violate their own moral standards, they have been widely accepted as an 
adequate way to explain the BBI (e.g. Blasi, 1983; Murdock, & Stephens, 2007; Olafson et al., 
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2013; Stephens & Nicholson, 2008). If moral awareness must be conscious in order for an 
individual to neutralize the effects of an immoral act, however, which is a position taken in 
most published research on the neutralization of cheating behavior, then neutralization must 
involve intentional self-deception. To the extent that moral awareness may be unconscious, 
neutralizing justifications may, in fact, be valid in the minds of those who assert them, which 
raises the question of whether they would then have anything to neutralize.  
Categorizing all of the justifications that students give for cheating as intentional self-
deception seems likely to preclude efforts to seek deeper insight into why students cheat and 
how these reasons can be addressed. Rule-breaking is not, after all, inherently immoral, just 
as acts that are legal are not always ethical (Crittenden et al., 2009a). Research related to 
domain theory (Turiel, 1983) indicates that adolescents do, in fact, distinguish between moral 
imperatives and conventional rules (Thornberg, 2008), and may, at times, view rules that 
prohibit cheating in a conventional, or a-moral, light (Eisenberg, 2004). Inasmuch as students 
fail to recognize the moral validity of rules regarding honor, classifying their justifications for 
cheating as neutralization techniques does not resolve the BBI, but only replaces it with 
another, subtler incongruity – between rules and morals.   
Interpretations of neutralization techniques as (1) valid in the minds of rule-breakers 
and as (2) intentional self-deceptions can both be drawn from the original framework of Sykes 
and Matza (1957). Neutralization techniques are compared, for instance, to the legal 
institution of “defenses to crimes”, such as insanity and self-defense (p. 666), which, under 
Anglo-American law, may absolve individuals of culpability for infractions of law. A criminal 
justification concedes, for instance, that an individual has broken a law, yet it also challenges 
whether the infraction was immoral and thus whether the individual has acted criminally 
(Morawetz, 1986). It would appear from this comparison that, like criminal defenses, 
neutralizing rationales are also potentially legitimate, at least in the minds of those who assert 
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them. The view that neutralizing justifications may be valid in the minds of cheaters emerges 
several times in the literature on academic integrity. Justifications for cheating may, for 
instance, be interpreted as valid by a student who “believes circumstances permit or require 
violating the norm” (Galloway, 2012, p. 382), or when they result from “immature moral 
reasoning” (Diekhoff et al., 1996, p. 500). Justifications that a student ‘believes’ are legitimate, 
and that result from honest judgment, albeit immature, are unlikely to involve intentional self-
deception.  
The characterization of neutralization techniques as ‘intentional self-deception’ is 
otherwise dominant in the literature of academic integrity. Examples include “strategies used 
to justify dishonesty” (Murdock & Anderman, 2006, p. 137), “excuses to reduce the amount of 
personal blame associated with cheating” (Olafson et al., 2013, p. 149), and “attitudes [that] 
allow people to justify behavior they know to be wrong” (O’Rourke et al., 2010, p. 49). These 
characterizations clearly imply conscious intent behind the ‘use’ of neutralization techniques 
to ‘reduce’, ‘allow’ and ‘justify’, in relation to behavior that is ‘known to be wrong’. This view 
is rooted in the assumption that neutralization is accompanied by moral awareness. Inasmuch 
as morality is a matter of intent (Blasi, 1980), students who do not recognize that cheating is 
immoral cannot, in fact, be said to act immorally. Thus before students can neutralize the 
immorality of cheating, they must recognize that cheating is immoral. Individuals who 
neutralize must be aware that their rationalizations serve immoral purposes, and must fool 
themselves willingly. This underlying assumption is implied most obviously by Sykes and 
Matza’s (1957) choice of the term ‘techniques’, as distinct from ‘beliefs’ or ‘misapprehensions’. 
Students use neutralization techniques, by this conception, to outwit their own moral 
sensibilities and the moral sensibilities of others, so as to engage in immoral acts with minimal 
damage to their self-image. The paradox of ‘intentional self-deception’ is expressed in the 
following excerpt:  
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“In this sense, the delinquent both has his cake and eats it too, for he remains 
committed to the dominant normative system and yet so qualifies its 
imperatives that violations are ‘acceptable’ if not ‘right.’ Thus the delinquent 
represents not a radical opposition to law-abiding society but something more 
like an apologetic failure, often more sinned against than sinning in his own 
eyes. We call these justifications of deviant behavior techniques of 
neutralization.” (Sykes & Matza, 1957, p. 667) 
This excerpt sets up an incongruence between the beliefs and behaviors of a 
‘delinquent’ that resembles the BBI problem identified in cheating literature (Stephens & 
Nicholson, 2008). The incongruence is described as a conflict between the ‘dominant 
normative system’, to which the delinquent is committed, and his or her transgressions 
against that system. Because the delinquent is aware of violating ‘the imperatives’ of the 
system to which he or she is committed, he or she employs neutralization techniques to justify 
that deviance. While the delinquent may ‘often’ view him or herself as ‘sinned against’, the 
fact of being aware of the immorality of his or her deviance implies that techniques of 
neutralization are being employed intentionally, i.e. as means of intentional self-deception.  
Evidence for a relationship between neutralization techniques and cheating has been 
identified in many studies. Justifications for cheating that fit neatly within the neutralization 
categories provided in Table 2.1 have emerged in several qualitative studies at both the 
secondary level (Galloway, 2012; Taylor, Pogrebin, & Dodge, 2002; Zito & McQuillan, 2011) 
and tertiary level (Beasley, 2014; Brent & Atkisson, 2011; LaBeff et al., 1990; McCabe, 1992; 
Olafson et al., 2013). An experimental vignette study conducted at the tertiary level by 
Rettinger and Kramer (2009) produced evidence that neutralizing attitudes cause cheating, 
and numerous quantitative studies at both levels support this finding (Davy, Kincaid, Smith, 
and Travick, 2007; Murdock et al., 2007; 2008; Pulvers & Diekhoff, 1999; Stephens & Gehlbach, 
2007; for a review, see Whitley, 1998).  
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Table 2.1 
Neutralization techniques 
Technique Characterization 
Denial of injury  Cheating does not hurt anyone. 
 
Denial of the victim Those harmed when I cheat deserve the harm. 
They are not victims. 
Appeal to higher loyalties I cheat in order to serve higher moral principles. 
 
Denial of responsibility I am impelled to cheat due to forces beyond my 
control. 
Condemnation of the condemners 
 
The authorities cheat, too; their judgment of me 
when I cheat is hypocritical and irrelevant. 
 
The neutralization framework has also been criticized as a “stylistic convention rather 
than a genuine theory” that makes poorly-examined assumptions about how students judge 
the morality of individual instances of cheating (Bouville, 2007, p 7). Students are, for instance, 
frequently seen to neutralize cheating when they claim that factors beyond their control impel 
them to cheat, such as unfair workload, low teacher quality, and low interest in the class – 
even when the relationship between these factors and cheating is well-corroborated by 
statistical evidence. In the only study of neutralization to have been conducted at the middle 
school level, Zito and McQuillan (2011) found, for instance, that students justified cheating 
based on feeling that a teacher either assigned too much work or did not explain concepts 
well. At the tertiary level, Pulvers and Diekhoff (1999) found, moreover, that “neutralization 
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of cheating accompanied perceptions of the classroom as less personalized, less involving, less 
cohesive, less satisfying, less task oriented, and less individualized” (p. 495).  
Substantial correlational research reviewed in earlier sections shows, moreover, that 
students who genuinely do have such perceptions of learning environments are, in fact, 
statistically more likely to cheat. These statistical patterns align quite closely with many of the 
justifications that are categorized as neutralization techniques. Deeming such justifications to 
be intentional self-deceptions seems, therefore, not so much of a theoretical advance, as a 
rather arbitrary accusation.  
An outstanding exception to the view that every justification for cheating is a self-
serving self-deception is Brent and Atkisson’s (2011) assertion that the ways students 
neutralize cheating “at least sometimes display a consistent logic” (p. 655). While some 
students in the study appeared able to rationalize cheating in virtually any situation, others 
appeared to work within “a rational framework for justifying cheating that has some 
coherence”, which the authors describe as a “student-teacher contract” (p. 656). They assert 
that such contractual frameworks may embody students’ expectations for what teachers 
should do and how well they should do it, such that cheating may become justifiable when 
these expectations are not met. 
A psychological basis for the contractarian style of reasoning detected among 
participants in Brent and Atkisson’s (2011) study can be found in domain theory (Nucci, 2001; 
Richardson, Mulvey, & Killen., 2012; Turiel, 1983, 2002, 2006), which holds that children 
distinguish between two broad domains of activity: the moral, and the conventional. Rules 
and activities belong to the moral domain when they involve harm or benefits to others, 
whereas they belong to the conventional domain when they arise from custom or social norms 
and are related to conformity, such as taking one’s hat off upon entering a building (Murdock 
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& Stephens, 2007). Inasmuch as students’ contractual frameworks comprise the benefits that 
students expect from teachers, i.e. what they believe to be teachers’ obligations, such as caring, 
fairness, and pedagogical skill, then breaking those contractual expectations may negate a 
teacher’s moral authority in the eyes of students. By neglecting his or her obligations, a teacher 
may be perceived to convey insufficient benefit, or perhaps even harm, to students. Research 
in domain theory suggests that when children perceive something to be less beneficial or more 
harmful, they are less likely to respect it (Thomson & Holland, 2002). An ethnographic study 
of Swedish school children by Thornberg (2008) found, for example, that students did not 
passively accept school rules as inherently moral, or even necessarily view them as worthy of 
being followed. They tended, instead, both to actively judge the morality and legitimacy of 
rules and teachers, as well as to “judge moral transgressions as wrong regardless of the 
presence or absence of rules” (p. 49). Upon perceiving that a teacher neglects his or her 
professional obligations, students may cease to view rules governing their interaction with 
that teacher in a moral light, and therefore cease to feel morally obliged by them. While 
breaking conventional rules may risk formal consequences, it would not risk, at least in the 
mind of the actor, the taint of moral disgrace. When students break rules that they perceive as 
conventional, they may feel little or no remorse. The justifications they give for such 
infractions would, as such, have little or nothing left to neutralize. 
While Sykes and Matza (1957) theorized that neutralization techniques may lie 
“behind a large share of delinquent behavior” (p. 669), the framework has often been applied 
with a broad brush to all of the justifications that students give for cheating, as a theoretical 
means of squaring abstract moral beliefs with specific behaviors that contradict them. 
According to Blasi (1983), for instance, “not to act according to one’s judgment should be 
perceived as a substantial inconsistency, as a fracture within the very core of the self, unless 
neutralizing devices are put into operation” (p. 201). While the neutralization framework 
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likely does explain variance in how cheaters avoid damaging their self-image, there is no 
compelling reason to believe that most justifications given for cheating are neutralization 
techniques. By that logic, Bouville (2007) argues, even “Robin Hood could be said to neutralize 
his wrongdoing by shifting blame to the wronged” (p. 3). Inasmuch as students differentiate 
between moral and conventional rules, as domain theory suggests (Turiel, 1983), there may, 
in fact, be two types of cheating: cheating as a moral infraction and cheating as a conventional 
infraction. While neutralization appears relevant to the former type of cheating, it does not, 
on face value, pertain to the latter type. The contract-like framework for cheating justifications 
described by Brent and Atkisson (2011) may, in fact, operate as a mechanism by which 
students judge whether rules occupy the moral or the conventional domain. When students 
think a teacher has broken the teaching-learning contract, i.e. by failing to meet his or her 
obligations, the students may no longer feel obliged to relate morally to that teacher, thus 
shifting their view of rules that forbid cheating in his or her class to the conventional domain, 
where breaking them does not feel like a moral offense. The fundamental difference between 
the contractarian and neutralizing views of cheating appears to be that, by the contractarian 
view, the a-morality of cheating may be a genuinely-held belief, whereas by the neutralizing 
view it is an intentional self-deception. 
2.7 Psychological teaching-learning contracts 
The term ‘teaching-learning contract’ is adopted from the work of Murdock and 
colleagues (2001, 2004), who first introduced the contract metaphor for students’ tendencies 
to justify cheating in terms of teacher-learner reciprocity. This term is modified as 
‘psychological’ in order to emphasize that teaching-learning contracts are, in the present 
work, subjective constructs held by students that may have no objective validity. The 
expectations for learning experiences that students include in their notions of reciprocal 
fairness may not be objectively valid. Similar to legal contracts that comprise mutual 
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obligations, or promises, agreed to by at least two parties (Mather, 1999), psychological 
teaching-learning contracts (PTLCs) comprise students’ expectations of, and reciprocal sense 
of moral obligation within, learning contexts. PTLCs are held to be implied socially, 
constructed psychologically, judged both intuitively and cognitively, and wired into the 
neural structure of the human brain. 
While contract metaphors have appeared in the literature of academic integrity for 
over a decade, little has been written about them. In addition to the three works cited above 
in relation to PTLCs (Brent & Atkisson, 2011; Murdock et al., 2001, 2004), Colnerud and 
Rosander (2009), who studied cheating among Swedish university students, used the contract 
metaphor to emphasize students’ obligations, as “defined by the curriculum and the courses 
and the forms of examinations defined by the university” (p. 514). Students who cheat fail, 
therefore, “to fulfill [their] side of the contract” (p. 514).  
Similar contract metaphors have also been described in literature on children and 
education more broadly. ‘Didactical contracts’, introduced by Brousseau (1984), pertain, for 
instance, to contract-like expectations that evolve between students and teachers within 
particular class contexts, that “serve to delimit ‘legitimate’ activity by the teacher”, such as 
precedents set for disciplinary action, and for the types of knowledge teachers require 
students to learn (e.g. lower- vs. higher-order) (Black & Wiliam, 1998, p. 56). PTLCs extend the 
concept of ‘didactical contracts’ to all of the beliefs and expectations of what should be 
entailed by the roles of teacher and student that are implied by broader socio-cultural 
contexts. While such beliefs and expectations may vary widely across societies and cultures, 
it is likely that teachers in most, if not all, cultures and societies, are expected to help their 
students. The contract-like nature of the duty to help children, and its many implications in 
the realm of parenting, was highlighted by Baumrind (1987), who referred to the ‘implicit 
contact’ between parent and child, according to which parental authority is, like teacher 
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authority, bestowed and exercised primarily for the benefit of children. When the parent-child 
contract is violated by parents over time, “children are less likely to attribute responsibility to 
themselves as moral agents” and may, therefore, not “feel obligated to abide by the explicit or 
implicit contracts they have with their parents or with society” (p. 111).  
All such contract metaphors emphasize the high premium that students, and arguably 
all people, place on reciprocal fairness. The notion of fairness is raised numerous times in the 
literature of cheating, and always with the same basic message: teachers who do not “play by 
the rules” tend to relieve students of the felt obligation to do the same (Murdock et al., 2001, 
p. 110; also Calabrese & Cochran, 1990; Evans et al., 1993; Jensen et al., 2002; McCabe & Katz, 
2009; Murdock et al., 2008; Thorkildsen, Golant, & Richesin, 2007). Shirk and Hoffman (1961) 
argued, in reference to cheating, that students who perceive unfairness on the part of the 
teacher may be “tempted to offer an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” (p.132). This 
reference to Hammurabi’s Law Codex (Roth, 1995), which may be the first expression of 
negative reciprocity under a formal system of law in human history (Fehr & Gächter, 1998), 
helps illustrate the universality of reciprocal fairness to conceptions of justice (Brüne et al., 
2013). 
Since King Hammurabi’s time (1792-1750 BCE), contractarian notions of reciprocal 
fairness have infused leading theories in numerous fields of social science such as natural 
jurisprudence (Grotius, 1625; Locke, 1689; Rawls, 1971; Rousseau, 1762), moral philosophy 
(Kant, 1797), and economics (Fehr & Gächter, 1998). The human sense of positive reciprocal 
fairness, or ‘reciprocal altruism’ (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002; Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & 
Tooby, 2013; Trivers, 1971), has more recently been implicated as an outcome of natural 
selection that permits two-party cooperation and recognition of social contract violations 
(Cosmides, 1989; Griggs & Cox, 1983; Cosmides & Tooby, 2013). The contention that social 
contract-based judgment is an evolved function of the brain is supported by findings in 
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neuroscience research that judgments of reciprocal fairness involve brain regions responsible 
both for cognition, such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Knoch et al., 2006), and for 
emotion, such as the limbic region (Greene et al., 2004; Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Greene, 2002). 
Sensibilities analogous to social contract awareness have also been observed in primates such 
as chimpanzees (de Waal, 1991, 2014), and capuchin monkeys (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003). De 
Waal (1991) observed, for instance, that chimpanzees engaged in ‘moralistic aggression’ in 
response to “dissatisfaction about the cost/benefit balance of [a] relationship (e.g. lack of 
reciprocation)” (p.342). Capuchin monkeys were found, similarly, to “respond negatively to 
previously acceptable rewards if a partner [got] a better deal”, which Brosnan and de Waal 
(2003, p. 299) interpreted as evidence of “social emotions… known as ‘passions’ by 
economists” that “guide human reactions to the effort, gains, losses and attitudes of others.”  
Researchers in the field of organizational behavior have found that employees who 
feel unfairly treated in the workplace often reciprocate with harmful behaviors such as 
unnecessary absenteeism (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), vandalism, and theft (Greenberg, 
1993; Skarlicki, & Folger, 1997). A similar ethos of negative reciprocity also emerges in 
qualitative research on why students cheat, such as a pair of ‘typical’ rationalizations offered 
by a secondary student interviewee of Stephens and Nicholson (2008): “This class sucks. I’m 
cheating the system” and “he doesn’t spend any time making up new tests, I don’t have to 
spend any time studying” (p. 367). What comes through from these quotes is not aggression, 
however, but passivity. The student has absolved himself of the moral obligation, and thus 
the ‘moral motivation’ (Schroeder et al., 2010), to be honest, in reciprocation of his teachers’ 
perceived poor performance. This is the sort of response expected to perceived PTLC 
violations by teachers: not aggression, but moral absolution. 
The role of PTLCs in cheating may have been overlooked in prior scholarship due to 
the overwhelming dominance of the rational-cognitive paradigm in educational research. 
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Studies of Kohlberg’s framework for the development of moral cognition indicate, for 
instance, that adolescents are seldom cognitively developed enough to engage in contractual 
reasoning, a ‘postconventional operation’ (Colby et al., 1983; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Rest, 
1986). Research in the solely cognitive paradigm has, however, not been sufficient to explain 
behavior-related anomalies such as the BBI, and the fact that cheating becomes more prevalent 
as children mature through high school, which runs counter to Kohlberg’s thesis that immoral 
behavior should decrease as individual moral cognition develops in tandem with age. The 
field of cheating psychology may, for these reasons, benefit from adopting an expanded 
conception of moral judgment.  
The dual-process paradigm of moral psychology allows for the possibility that an 
emotional-intuitive sense of morality is a key feature of non-rational psychological processes 
that are neither age- nor stage-dependent. As individuals develop cognitively, these non-
rational moral processes are brought increasingly under cognitive control (Haidt, 2007), albeit 
only to the extent that individuals choose to engage such control (Bandura, 1999; Thorkildsen 
et al., 2007). The ability to fully comprehend and articulate one’s non-rational sense of 
morality may, therefore, also depend heavily upon one’s level of cognitive development, 
potentially making it more difficult for less cognitively mature adolescents to express, or to 
even be fully aware of, the reasons why they cheat. The inability to articulate rational bases 
for ‘felt’ moral judgments has been referred to as ‘moral dumbfounding’ (Bjorklund, Haidt, & 
Murphy, 2000; Sneddon, 2007). Consider, as an example, the following statement in defense 
of cheating from an adolescent student interviewed by Galloway (2012):  
“…basically it’s just like, it’s not necessarily that we’re compromising our morals 
and values; it’s like you’re compromising for like a just reason. It’s like hard to 
say, but like you’re compromising it for sort of a good.” (p. 393) 
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PTLCs are hypothesized to embody both the expectations that students have, and the 
obligations they feel, in learning situations. The perception by a student that an academic 
context is unfair, inappropriate, or harmful to students may accompany a shift in his or her 
judgment of rules and authority figures, from the moral to the conventional domains. Rules 
perceived in the conventional domain may be violated without contrition. The BBI is recast, 
by this view, from an issue of why students behave in ways they know to be immoral, to the 
question of why, in certain situations, they fail to regard cheating as immoral. Brent and 
Atkisson (2011) argue that recognizing the potential for coherence in students’ justifications 
for cheating provides valuable insight into how the problem may be addressed by educators. 
“A rational framework for justifying cheating that has some coherence”, they write, “…might 
also mean that cheating behavior can be constrained by that rationality” (p. 656). Inasmuch as 
students’ justifications for cheating are valid within their own minds, and are genuinely 
“constrained by a legitimate set of expectations” (p. 656), their fundamental integrity is still 
intact. Such students can still, therefore, be trusted to learn and evolve when their concerns 
are addressed with equal earnestness. 
2.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter offered a critical review of published research on cheating. A detailed 
review of an on-going conversation in the literature about how cheating should be defined 
was reviewed first, in order to locate the most appropriate definitional basis for a study 
concerned with addressing the belief-behavior incongruence (BBI), an inherently moral issue. 
Definitions that emphasize the abstract, unifying properties of acts referred to as ‘cheating’ 
were identified as the most morally relevant.  
Numerous constructs were then reviewed that have appeared during the last 110 years 
of published empirical research on cheating, including personological variables (e.g. gender, 
grade-level, self-beliefs, and learner characteristics) and prominent situational variables 
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(pedagogical quality, interest, assessment, workload, and peer influence). Rational-cognitive 
models of deviant behavior, which have dominated the psychology of academic cheating 
since the 1970s, were reviewed in light of growing evidence that moral judgment often 
involves automatic, emotional-intuitive processes that are not consistent with a strictly 
rational-cognitive view. A ‘dual-process’ paradigm of moral psychology, associated with such 
scholars as Kahneman (2011) and Haidt (2007), was introduced that accommodates both 
rational-cognitive and emotional-intuitive factors that may explain variance in academic 
cheating. 
The neutralization framework, associated with the work of Sykes and Matza (1957), 
was criticized, in particular, for entailing the automatic assumption that every justification 
given by students for cheating is an opportunistic self-deception. This interpretation of the 
reasons students give for cheating, which ignores corroborating correlational and 
experimental evidence of its contextual antecedents, appears to have risen in popularity as a 
means of explaining how students cope with the cognitive dissonance theorized to result 
when their behaviors, such as cheating, contradict the abstract moral beliefs they profess to 
hold.  
A contractarian perspective for how students seem to justify cheating, raised in several 
studies, and related to other uses of contract metaphors found in research on how children 
and adolescents relate to adult authority, was identified as an alternative to neutralization 
theory for explaining why students’ beliefs and behaviors may, in some proportion of 
instances, appear to be incongruent, as a result of what are actually incongruences between 
their abstract moral beliefs and the moral validity they ascribe to rules within specific contexts. 
Contractarian metaphors for how students judge the justifiability of rule-breaking, in general, 
were grouped under the rubric ‘psychological teaching-learning contracts’ (PTLCs). PTLCs 
provide a plausible theoretical perspective on how students may come to judge rules, such as 
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those that forbid cheating, as purely conventional, and thus preclude any incongruence 
between their cheating behavior and moral beliefs. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EMPIRICAL RATIONALE 
 
Because they first broke the oath we swore together, there has been no injustice at 
all in our entering their land…. And there will be no injustice in what we are about 
to do now. 
-Archidamus’ prayer before the siege of Plataea, 429 BCE  
(Thucydides, c420 BCE) 
 
The psychological teaching-learning contract (PTLC) hypothesis of academic 
disintegrity is explicated in this chapter, and developed into a general PTLC framework, 
which is situated within the ecological view of learning as a dynamic system, as portrayed by 
the Presage, Process, Product Model (3-P Model; see Figure 3.1) (Biggs et al., 2001), a key 
conceptual model in student learning theory (Biggs & Tang, 2011). The dual-process paradigm 
of moral psychology is presented as the theoretical basis for positing contractarian moral 
judgment among adolescents, which would, according to the strictly rational-cognitive 
paradigm (e.g. Colby & Kohlberg, 1987), be beyond their developmental limits. Finally, a 
contractarian structural equation model of disintegrity is developed according to the general 
PTLC framework that will be tested in the present research program. This structural equation 
model (hereafter ‘PTLC model’) incorporates many of the personological and environmental 
antecedents of cheating that were emphasized in the preceding literature review. The set of 
specific hypotheses and constructs included in the PTLC model is also presented and justified.  
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3.1 Definitions 
Variation in how cheating is defined by students and teachers has led to disagreement 
among scholars about whether the concept should be measured as an abstraction or as an 
inventory of behaviors (Garavalia et al., 2007). The present study resolves this issue by 
classifying cheating as intentional academic deviance. Cheating is defined thus as any act that 
a student believes would result in negative consequences if detected, because it contravenes the spirit 
and/or letter of rules related to honorable academic conduct. ‘Accidental cheating’ is, by this 
definition, an ‘honest mistake’ that does not reflect intentional wrongdoing. When students 
describe behavior as ‘cheating’, they refer to acts that explicitly break rules by which they 
understand cheating to be defined. Self-reported cheating may or may not, in this sense, be 
immoral in the eyes of a student, but is nonetheless understood to be a rule violation. The 
study assumes that students are never under the impression that what is called ‘cheating’ is 
acceptable according to school or classroom rules.  
The concept of disintegrity, which includes cheating as well as acts that “lack integrity 
or subvert the goals of education”, but that are not labeled as cheating (Miller et al., 2011, p. 
170), will be used to expand the concept of academic dishonesty in the present work. 
Disintegrity includes behaviors such as surface learning strategies that do not violate rules, 
but that nonetheless involve falsifying knowledge, understanding, and skill in order to obtain 
grades. The term ‘legal cheating’, used in a similar sense by Kohn (2007b), is evidence that this 
perspective is emergent in cheating scholarship. Surface learning strategies, described in 
student learning theory as being oriented to the symbols of learning, instead of to its substance 
(Marton and Säljö, 1976), help, like cheating, to minimize effort, and over-represent actual 
intellectual accomplishment. Surface learning strategies are, in this sense, means of academic 
deception that, while not referred to as ‘cheating’, meet Miller et al.’s (2011) criteria for 
disintegrity, by subverting the goal of meaningful learning. 
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3.2 The PTLC hypothesis  
The overarching PTLC hypothesis is that the degree of moral obligation that students feel 
to work hard and be honest in a given class context fluctuates directly with how well they think the 
basic obligations of teachers and classes are met in that context. This wording intentionally includes 
non-teacher factors, such as external testing, resource availability, and administrative policies 
that are beyond teachers’ control. Referring, in this sense, to ‘classes’ and ‘academic contexts’ 
as though they bear moral responsibilities is meant to implicate the administrators at all levels 
of an educational bureaucracy whose effects are felt in classrooms.  
The language of the PTLC hypothesis also emphasizes the subjective nature of 
students’ judgments. A student’s view of his or her contractual relationship with a given class 
context is psychological, and may or may not be consistent with reality. That such judgments 
may be inconsistent with reality does not necessarily make them invalid to students who hold 
them, which is what distinguishes contractarian judgments of the moral validity of rules from 
neutralization techniques. Neutralizing the cognitive dissonance that one experiences when 
violating his or her own moral beliefs implies intentional self-deception, as argued in section 
2.6 of the preceding chapter, whereas violating rules that one does not recognize as being 
moral precludes any possibility of cognitive dissonance.  
Domain theory (Turiel, 1983, 2002, 2006) holds that adolescents tend to view rules as 
being either moral or conventional in character, and that their view of a given rule may shift 
within specific contexts (Thomson & Holland, 2002; Thornberg, 2008). The fact that students’ 
views on specific rules may shift between the moral and conventional domains suggests that 
their judgment of the morality of those rules is an on-going process within the dynamic system 
that learning entails. In dynamic learning systems, as illustrated by Biggs’ 3-P Model (Biggs, 
1987, 1993; Biggs et al., 2001) (see Figure 3.1), “all components interact to strive towards 
equilibrium” (Biggs, 1993, p. 76). This is schematized in the 3-P Model with double-headed 
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arrows between all components, such that every component interacts directly, and through 
all possible mediated pathways, with every other component. Applying this dynamic systems 
view to the overarching PTLC hypothesis casts the hypothesized reciprocity between (1) 
students’ perceptions of learning context quality and (2) their felt moral obligation as the 
outcome of on-going equilibration between students’ achievement behaviors (product 
variables) and perceptions of context (presage variables), through processes of moral 
judgment (process variables). Product variables in the present work include cheating and 
surface learning strategies, grouped together as ‘disintegrity’; as well as deep learning 
strategies, which involve striving for personal meaning and understanding that is genuine, 
i.e. learning with integrity. 
 
Figure 3.1. The Presage, Process, Product model of a dynamic learning system (Biggs et al., 
2001), within which the PTLC framework is situated. 
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Shifting one’s view of a given rule to the conventional domain entails an erosion of the 
moral validity of that rule. Rules in the conventional domain may be broken without moral 
qualm. Students who view rules that forbid cheating as conventional may, therefore, cheat 
without concern for their moral self-concept. Acknowledging that students may view 
integrity-related rules as conventional abandons the assumption implied by neutralization 
techniques that students apply their abstract moral beliefs to all educational contexts, such 
that acts of cheating result in cognitive dissonance that must then be neutralized. Students 
who break rules they hold to be conventional produce no incongruity between their moral 
beliefs and behaviors, or BBI, per se. The incongruity would, instead, be between their abstract 
moral beliefs, and their view of particular rules. 
3.2.1 The PTLC hypothesis within the dual-processing paradigm of moral psychology 
PTLCs propose to explain why a student’s view of rules might shift from the moral 
domain to the conventional domain as a result of judgments based on contractarian reciprocal 
fairness. Students are hypothesized, by this perspective, to judge their moral obligation to 
follow rules in a given learning context according to how well they think the context fulfills 
its moral obligations to them, i.e. its ‘quality’.  
Obligations created by promises are the quintessence of contractual relations in 
jurisprudence (Mather, 1999) and politics (Medina, 1990). Contractual obligations may be 
accepted by individuals explicitly, as in rental contracts, or may be implied by the cultural, 
social, or interpersonal frameworks within which individuals operate (MacNeil, 1974). 
Contracts of an implied nature have been referred to in jurisprudence as ‘relational contracts’ 
(MacNeil, 1974). The obligations that students and teachers have toward one another are 
overwhelmingly relational (Buckley et al., 2004). The role of the teacher, for instance, includes 
both explicit professional duties as well as social and cultural responsibilities related to 
protecting and promoting student welfare. Beyond the responsibilities of individual teachers, 
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formal academic contexts also carry obligations, such as to be worthwhile, credible, 
interesting, and safe. Students are, by contrast, obliged to follow explicit school and classroom 
rules, and to observe socio-cultural norms such as working hard and respecting teachers. A 
student’s personal sense of this set of mutual obligations is his or her PTLC. 
By assuming that social contract-based moral judgments are common among 
adolescents, the PTLC hypothesis moves beyond the strictly rational-cognitive paradigm of 
moral psychology associated with Bandura (1977, 1999) and Kohlberg (1958, 1968), which 
holds that contractarian judgment is beyond the developmental limits of most adolescents. A 
crucial aspect of the rationale for the PTLC hypothesis is, therefore, the assertion that social 
contract-based judgment is an evolved function of the human mind (Cosimdes & Tooby, 
2013). 
The ability to recognize social contract violations, as embodying the concept of 
reciprocal fairness, has been described as an “evolved ‘Darwinian algorithm’” (Cosmides, 
1989, p. 195) that operates with a high degree of automaticity and “independent of general 
cognitive resources”, standing “in shrill contrast with the classical view that states that all 
behavior is based on one general learning mechanism (i.e., general cognitive capacity, 
intelligence, rationality)” (Van Lier, Revlin, & De Neys, 2013, p. 2). Automaticity is, moreover, 
characteristic of emotional-intuitive judgment processes that have been traced to emotional 
centers of the brain such as the limbic region (Knoch et al., 2006). Dual-process theories of 
moral psychology generally assert that both emotion and rationality are involved in moral 
judgment (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Cushman et al., 2010; Narvaez, 2010), where rationality is 
necessary for marshaling the ‘rapid-fire’ of emotional-intuitive impulses (Greene et al., 2008; 
Kahneman, 2011; Mallon & Nichols, 2010). The assertion that social contract thinking actively 
involves both types of process is supported by its direct association in fMRI research with the 
left and right medial frontal gyri of the human frontal lobe (Fiddick, Spampinato, & Grafman, 
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2005), where the “integration of emotion into decision-making and planning” takes place 
(Greene & Haidt, 2002, p. 520). Adolescents may be especially vulnerable to faulty moral 
judgments, in general, inasmuch as their capacity for cognition is still developing. They may 
have less ready access, for instance, to the rational tools needed to analyze and possibly 
discredit the validity of perceived social contract violations, and/or to restrain their 
emotional-intuitive judgments of how to respond to social contract violations that they 
perceive as real. Adolescents may also, as argued in Chapter Two (see section 2.7), be prone 
to ‘moral dumbfounding’ (Bjorklund et al., 2000; Sneddon, 2007), or the inability to clearly 
articulate feelings, senses, and other non-rational experiences that they associate with moral 
judgments. 
The PTLC model avoids the pitfall of moral dumbfounding, by focusing exclusively 
on the end-products of judgment processes. Instead of asking respondents for their reasons 
and justifications for cheating, which they may or may not be equipped to provide, the PTLC 
model is itself a diagram of the actual hypothesized mechanism of contractarian moral 
judgment. It articulates, on students’ behalf, a contractarian heuristic for the justifiability of 
cheating, in terms of class context quality. Testing the PTLC model thus uses the lens of 
statistical regression to examine the validity of linkages among a suite of psychological factors 
that should exist if social contract thinking does, in fact, underlie students’ judgments of 
whether cheating is justifiable.  
Framed as an outcome of social contract-based judgment, student cheating is a primal 
response to a students’ perception that he or she is being cheated by academic contexts. 
Cosmides and Tooby (2013) explain that “‘Cheaters’… violate social contracts by taking the 
benefit offered without satisfying the requirement on which it was made contingent.” (p. 216). 
A student’s experience of perceiving a teacher as shirking or incompetent may, for instance, 
be the emotional-intuitive equivalent of seeing the teacher cheat. The perception that 
Chapter 3 Empirical Rationale│84 
 
  
authority figures, such as teachers and parents, violate their contractual obligations by doing 
insufficient good or undue harm, may lead young people to believe that their own moral 
obligations are no longer binding (Baumrind, 1987; Thornberg, 2008).  
A student who perceives a learning context to be unfair or of low quality may feel that 
cheating is justifiable, i.e. not immoral, even though he or she still recognizes that cheating is 
against the rules. The student’s perceptions of what is immoral or inappropriate in the 
academic context become, by extension, his or her justifications for cheating. A student who 
believes that a particular teacher performs poorly because he or she lacks effort, for example, 
might feel that cheating is justifiable because the teacher is cheating at his or her professional 
obligations. While this justification of cheating would be labeled ‘condemning the 
condemners’ under the neutralization framework, the PTLC perspective allows that it may 
stem from what is genuinely perceived to be a social contract violation. It is reasonable to 
expect that individuals are likely to react negatively to such perceptions and feelings, 
especially if they are cognitively ill-equipped to debunk them, which may help explain why 
the incidence of student cheating tends to increase as adolescence runs its course in high 
school, and to decline thereafter (Miller et al., 2007). 
The PTLC model is the first structural model of cheating psychology to be positioned 
expressly within the dual-process paradigm of moral psychology, in that it avoids moral 
dumbfounding among adolescents in an investigation of what is held to be an evolved, non-
rational process, i.e. social contract-based moral judgment. Mainstream research on moral 
cognition indicates that adolescence is a time of significant cognitive maturation when, by a 
dual-process view, non-rational processes involved in moral judgment should be under less 
cognitive control.  
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3.3 The general PTLC framework 
The PTLC perspective posits that the moral obligation students feel to follow rules is 
largely contingent upon whether their expectations for what constitutes a fair exchange 
between themselves and a given learning context are met. The basic structure of PTLCs is 
common to all contracts: counterparties take on obligations to one another (see Figure 3.2), 
and failure by either party to fulfill their obligations may reduce the obligations of the 
counterparty. For Medina (1990), “a contract is roughly understood as an agreement between 
two or more independent parties who voluntarily choose (consent) to abide by certain rules 
provided that the other party does not violate it” (p. 3). 
  Obligations borne by party 1      Obligations borne by party 2 
Figure 3.2. Basic structure of a contract. 
 
A key difference between PTLCs and legal contracts is that the former are purely 
psychological constructs. PTLCs are held to include, on one side, the relational variables by 
which students evaluate how well the obligations of academic contexts are fulfilled 
(obligations borne by Party 1), and on the other side, the degree of moral obligation that they 
judge appropriate to take upon themselves (obligations borne by Party 2) (see Figure 3.3).  
 Student’s perception of academic context quality        (+)    Student’s felt moral obligation 
Figure 3.3. The general PTLC framework 
 
The factors by which students evaluate academic contexts are held to be ‘relational’, 
in that they involve social exchange (MacNeil, 1974), and reflect how positively or negatively 
students relate to such contexts. The obligations borne by the student, are held, by contrast, 
to be subjective felt obligations.  
Hypothesis 1. The degree of obligation that students feel to work hard and be honest fluctuates 
positively with the perceived quality of an academic context (see Figure 3.3).  
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Students’ prior academic experiences lead them both to hold certain expectations of 
formal academic contexts, such as what constitutes fair treatment and competent pedagogy, 
and to understand what behaviors and attitudes are expected of them, such as respect for 
authority figures, exertion of effort, and honesty. According to domain theory (Turiel, 1983, 
2002, 2006) students may view the obligations they carry as being either moral or conventional 
in character. Feeling morally obliged to follow rules may reflect a student’s intrinsic 
motivation to act in a manner that is consistent with a positive self-concept (Mazar et al., 2008; 
Shalvi et al., 2011), whereas feeling little or no moral obligation to follow rules implies that a 
student has identified them with the conventional domain. Conventional obligations are 
externally enforced, and violating them poses no threat to a student’s moral self-concept.   
The PTLC framework poses students’ expectations of the quality of academic contexts 
as being reciprocal to their own senses of moral obligation. When students believe that a 
learning context fails to meet reasonable expectations for quality, they may feel that what 
should be expected of them is correspondingly reduced, thereby shifting their view of rules 
and responsibilities from the moral to the conventional domain. By a conventional view, rules 
that forbid cheating are legitimate only insomuch as they are enforced. Violating rules that 
forbid cheating but that are identified with the conventional domain should pose little or no 
threat to a student’s moral self-concept, but may instead be constrained by the perceived risk 
of detection and punishment.  
Hypothesis 2. Felt moral obligation is hypothesized to partially mediate the influence of how a 
student relates to a particular class context on whether he or she engages in 
disintegrity behaviors in that context. Students’ perceptions of class quality factors, 
such as teacher performance, evaluated in terms of ‘better’ or ‘worse’, reflect how 
positively or negatively students relate to academic contexts. As schematized in Figure 
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3.4, students who relate less positively to a given learning context will feel less moral 
obligation to be honest, and will, therefore, engage in more disintegrity.  
 
 
 
 
     Figure 3.4. The general PTLC framework as an antecedent to behavior 
 
The 3-P Model (see Figure 3.1) asserts that dynamic learning systems involve product 
components (e.g. behaviors), process components, and presage components, where the latter 
entail contextual and personological variables (see Figure 3.5). An individual student is held, 
by this view, to construct and monitor the terms of his or her relationships with teachers 
against a unique backdrop of personal factors such as demographics, personality structures, 
and self-beliefs.  
       Presage             Process             Product 
                      PTLC 
 
    Person                      Context               Moral obligation                     Disintegrity  
 
Figure 3.5. The general PTLC framework situated within the 3-P Model framework, 
emphasizing a left-to-right flow (Biggs, 1993; Biggs et al., 2001). 
While the 3-P Model depicts all components in dynamic equilibrium with each other, 
the left-to-right flow traditionally emphasized in student learning theory (Biggs, 1993) is also 
emphasized in the PTLC framework (see Figure 3.5). Personological factors are hypothesized, 
generally, to influence what expectations individual students evaluate most strictly, and 
according to what specific criteria; what degree of moral obligation they feel initially and how 
 
                             PTLC 
 
         Student perception of academic context                 Felt moral obligation               Disintegrity 
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resistant they are to relinquishing it; and what academic beliefs and behaviors have become 
habituated due to past experience.   
3.4 The hypothesized PTLC model  
The hypothesized PTLC model is theorized to occur within the broader scope of 
learning as a dynamic system, as depicted by Biggs’ (1987, 1993; Biggs et al., 2001) 3-P Model 
(see Figures 3.1 and 3.5). The principle mechanism of the hypothesized model, i.e. social 
contract-based judgment, is consistent with Biggs’ (1987) concept of process as involving 
“learning-related activity” (Biggs et al., 2001, p. 138), which mediates the influence of learners’ 
perceptions of academic situations, on achievement behaviors (e.g. ‘contextual approaches to 
learning’ in Figure 3.1).  
The ‘processes’ underlying social contract-based judgment are held, in the PTLC 
framework, to be both cognitive and non-cognitive, i.e. thoughts and feelings by which 
students adjudge the degree of moral obligation they bear to work hard and be honest within 
a given class context. As in the 3-P Model, these judgment processes are held to at least 
partially mediate the influence of personological and contextual perceptions on disintegrity 
(Figure 3.6). The PTLC is, as such, the hypothesized basis for context-specific moral flexibility 
(McCabe & Katz, 2009), or ‘situation ethics’ (Brent & Atkisson, 2011; Crittenden et al., 2009a; 
Fletcher, 1966), in that students may view cheating in certain situations as a justifiable 
violation of rules that have been reduced in their eyes to social conventions.  
The learning system portrayed by the 3-P Model complements the hypothesized 
multivariate PTLC model of disintegrity presented in Figure 3.6, in that (A) both involve 
dynamic interactions between presage, process and product variables; (B) behaviors 
categorized as disintegrity include surface learning strategies, which are a principal focus of 
the 3-P Model in student learning theory; and (C) both models involve equilibration, a basic 
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characteristic of dynamic systems (Biggs, 1993), occurring between presage perceptions of 
context (quality), and learning-related behaviors (disintegrity), as mediated by learning-
related processes (moral judgment).  
              Presage                    Process                   Product  
      Person                              Class context               Moral obligation         Behavior 
                Psychological teaching-learning contracts 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6. The hypothesized PTLC model situated within the 3-P Model framework (Biggs et 
al., 2001) for dynamic learning systems (see Figure 3.1). 
The presage category of the hypothesized model includes students’ perceptions of 
motivational goal structure, in addition to the quality of three broad aspects of academic 
contexts: (1) learning, (2) assessment, and (3) social-regulatory (i.e. rules enforcement and peer 
norms related to cheating). These perceptions of quality are depicted separately from 
motivational goal structures in Figure 3.6 to indicate the different roles they are hypothesized 
to play with respect to moral obligation. While motivational goal structure is theorized to 
encourage students to adopt either performance or mastery learning goals, students are not 
necessarily held to relate more positively to either type of goal. Students may, for example, 
feel positive about performance-oriented classes, and negative about mastery-oriented ones. 
Quality 
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context 
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Subject Self-
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Hon. Self-concept 
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The PTLC perspective is envisaged, therefore, to complement, but not accommodate, 
motivational goal structure. 
The Presage category also includes personological factors, located within students, that 
exert both direct and indirect effects on their perceptions of class context, and on the particular 
motivational goals and learning strategies they tend to adopt (Biggs, 1987; Biggs et al., 2001). 
Personological presage variables in the present model include demographics such as age, 
socio-economic status, gender, and English proficiency, as well as two self-belief factors: 
Subject self-concept and Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept. 
In the following subsections, the variables and measures used to populate each of the 
hypothesized PTLC model’s four components (behavior, moral obligation, context, and 
person) are introduced and justified. For the sake of clarity, these variables, and related 
hypotheses, are explained from right to left across the model, or ‘backwards’, from cheating 
and learning strategies, to their moral, situational, and personological antecedents. All 
questionnaire items are presented in Appendices B and C.  
3.4.1 Behavioral variables 
Self-reported cheating. The present study extends a body of self-report-based 
research on academic integrity conducted by Murdock and various colleagues (2001, 2004, 
2007, 2008), and Anderman and various colleagues (1998, 2004, 2010) that has focused on 
achievement goals and goal structures, in addition to learning context quality factors at the 
secondary school level. Cheating is measured in the present work with a three-item self-report 
scale developed by Midgley et al. (2000) that was used in secondary-level studies conducted 
by both Murdock et al. (2001) and Brown-Wright et al. (2013). This three-item measure is 
augmented with a single item from a conceptually similar scale used by Anderman and 
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colleagues (1998, 2004, 2010): “I have cheated on my Science work this year” (see Appendices 
B and C)  
While a number of scholars have pointed out the likelihood that self-report measures 
underestimate actual cheating due to socially acceptable responding (Miller, Shoptaugh, & 
Parkerson, 2008; Walker, 2010), others report that students are generally willing to admit 
cheating on questionnaires that are anonymous (McCabe, 2005; Rettinger & Kramer, 2009). 
Self-report scales appear, in fact, to be the only means available for measuring cheating by 
students on real assessments, in real class contexts, over the course of an academic year.  
Learning strategy. Approaches to learning involve both motivational components and 
strategic components, namely surface motivation vs. surface strategy, and deep motivation vs. 
deep strategy (Biggs et al., 2001).  In view of the relatively large amount of research, and 
inconsistency of findings, on how academic integrity relates to students’ achievement goal 
motivations (see section 2.3.4), the present study focuses exclusively on the strategic 
components of deep and surface approaches to learning.  
Surface learning strategies, by which students seek to obtain grades with minimal 
intellectual effort, are measured with a six-item instrument developed by Simon et al. (2004) 
as an aspect of the broader notion of disintegrity (Miller et al., 2011). Deep strategies reflect, 
by contrast, that students seek to truly understand, make personal connections to, and master 
academic material. Deep learning, measured with a seven-item instrument developed by 
Anderman et al. (1998), has integrity in the sense that it involves the construction of genuine 
personal meaning, and the integration of that meaning with a learner’s background 
knowledge (Ramsden, 1992). Surface and deep learning strategies are positioned in the PTLC 
model, therefore, as behavioral correlates of Self-reported cheating under ‘behaviors’ (see 
Figures 3.6 and 3.8).  
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Hypothesis 3: Surface learning strategies and Self-reported cheating will, as forms of disintegrity, 
share a large positive correlation with each other, and large negative correlations with 
Deep learning strategies. 
3.4.2 Moral obligation variables 
The hypothesized model is predicated on the claim made by domain theory (Turiel, 
1983, 2002, 2006) that rules may be viewed as either moral or conventional, and that children 
and adolescents may shift between these views in reference to rules in a given context. PTLCs 
offer a framework for the judgments that underlie such shifts, insomuch as students believe 
such judgments are valid. Students may interpret a teacher’s failure to fulfill his or her PTLC 
obligations (e.g. pedagogical effort and skill) as a type of cheating, in the sense that social 
contract violations are often interpreted as cheating (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013). Students who 
feel cheated by a teacher may reciprocally feel lower moral obligation to respect that teacher, 
the content of his or her class, and the legitimacy of his or her rules. Students may feel, in other 
words, that when teachers do a poor job, academic cheating becomes more justifiable. ‘More 
justifiable’, in this sense, is equivalent to ‘less immoral’, which implies that the obligation to 
be honest has shifted from the moral domain to the conventional domain. 
 Justifiability of cheating. Neutralization techniques are, like ‘defenses to crimes’ 
(Morawetz, 1986; Sykes & Matza, 1957), by which violations of law are defended in legal 
settings, dichotomized into excuses and justifications (Brent & Atkisson, 2011; Morawetz, 
1986; Scott & Lyman, 1968). Justifications, such as reasons for cheating that correspond to the 
neutralization category ‘condemnation of the condemners’ (see Table 2.1), are of principal 
interest to this study. An act is justifiable if it is right, reasonable, or defensible (New Oxford 
American Dictionary), even if it may otherwise be designated as delinquent or criminal 
(Morawetz, 1986). Inasmuch as academic honesty is morally imperative, therefore, 
justifications for cheating cannot be valid. That academic honesty is understood by most 
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students to be morally imperative is a key assumption of the neutralization view of cheating 
that leads to the expectation that cheating behaviors should be incongruent with cheaters’ 
abstract moral beliefs. Conversely, if justifications for cheating are valid in the mind of a 
student, then honesty, and the rules that forbid dishonesty, are not morally imperative. Thus, 
the four-item measure of Justifiability of cheating adapted in the present study from Murdock 
et al. (2004) is, in effect, a measure of the degree to which honesty is felt to be morally 
imperative. To the extent that cheating is seen to be justifiable, rules against it must be viewed 
as conventional, rather than moral. The overarching PTLC hypothesis holds, moreover, that 
shifting from a moral to a conventional view of rules reflects diminished commitment on the 
part of students to their PTLC obligations, which may come about when they feel cheated in 
academic contexts that fail to meet their expectations for pedagogical, assessment, social, and 
regulatory quality. Justifiability of cheating is hypothesized, therefore, to mediate the effect of 
perceptions of class quality on academic integrity (see Figures 3.6 and 3.8).  
Hypothesis 4: Students will judge cheating to be more justifiable in class contexts that fail to 
meet their expectations for quality. Perceptions of class quality will negatively predict 
Justifiability of cheating. 
Hypothesis 5: Students who judge cheating to be more justifiable will report more disintegrity, 
and less use of deep learning strategies. Justifiability of cheating will positively predict 
Self-reported cheating and Surface learning strategies and negatively predict Deep learning 
strategies. 
Appropriate workload. Appropriate workload will be measured in the present study 
using a five-item scale from the Course Experience Questionnaire (CEQ) (Wilson et al., 1997), 
which has been used to study surface and deep learning strategies in a large body of previous 
research associated with student learning theory (Biggs & Tang, 2011), to be discussed in more 
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detail in section 3.4.3. While the appropriateness of workload has traditionally been seen as a 
contextual predictor of both cheating (Smith et al., 1972; Jurdi et al., 2011a) and surface 
learning strategies (Ramsden & Entwistle, 1981; Wilson et al., 1997; Diseth, 2007), it will be 
positioned in the hypothesized model as a dimension of moral obligation that reflects student 
commitment (see Figures 3.6 and 3.8).  
As argued in the literature review (see section 2.4.4), an association between excessive 
workload and disintegrity may reflect either students’ concerns about their preparedness to 
succeed in a given class (Evans & Craig, 1990a; Galloway, 2012; Sisti, 2007; Zito & McQuillan, 
2011), diminished self-control as a function of cognitive overload (Greene et al., 2008), or low 
commitment to a particular learning context (Curry, 1984; Kember, 2004). This highlights the 
fact that perceptions of whether workload is appropriate may entail a more complex set of 
considerations than the sheer volume of required work (Kember, 2004). Higher-order factor 
analyses of tertiary students’ course evaluation data, collected using the CEQ, have indicated, 
for instance, that the appropriateness of workload is psychometrically distinct from 
environmental variables that are related to class quality, such as Good teaching and Appropriate 
assessment (Richardson, 1994; Trigwell & Prosser, 1991; Wilson et al., 1997). Whether the 
workload in a given class is perceived as ‘appropriate’ may, in fact, reflect the amount of time 
and effort that a student believes the class is worth. If a student’s ability and level of 
commitment are uniform across all classes, the appropriateness of workload should vary 
directly with the amount of time the work takes to complete. If every class required one hour 
of homework per week, they would all, by this view, be equally appropriate. If, however, a 
student finds certain subjects more conceptually challenging, as most students do, then 
appropriateness of workload should also vary according to ability. This is referred to here as 
the ‘ability’ aspect of appropriate workload. Students with lower aptitude for a given subject 
will have to devote more time and effort in order to achieve the same amount of success as 
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students with higher aptitude, which may lead to a perception that the workload of more 
challenging classes is heavier, and therefore less appropriate.  
Appropriateness of workload may also have a ‘commitment’ aspect. Students who 
relate more positively to a given class may feel more committed to it, and may perceive the 
workload as being more appropriate than students who feel less committed. This, in addition 
to aforementioned findings in prior research that Appropriate workload is psychometrically 
distinct from measures of class quality (Wilson et al., 1997), advocates for hypothesizing its 
relationship to cheating in terms of commitment, as a proxy for the moral obligation to work 
hard. The ‘commitment’ aspect of whether a student believes the workload in a given class is 
appropriate is, moreover, isolated from the ‘ability’ aspect of Appropriate workload in the 
hypothesized model, by controlling for Subject self-concept, a measure of self-perceived ability 
(see section 3.3.4).  
Hypothesized as an aspect of moral obligation, Appropriate workload is held to reflect 
students’ perceptions of how much work is appropriate to do for a given class. In terms of the 
PTLC framework, Appropriate workload is held to represent the amount of effort that is morally 
compelled by a student’s PTLC for a given class, which is hypothesized to fluctuate directly 
with how positively the student perceives contextual elements of the class, i.e. that constitute 
a useful, well-taught, well-managed, and fair academic experience. A class perceived to be 
useless, badly-taught, poorly-managed, and generally unfair should, by contrast, compel less 
effort, implying a shift from a moral to a conventional view of whether students should strive 
for meaningful learning in a given class. A conventional view of the duty to strive for 
meaningful learning might entail that effort should be minimized, i.e. surface learning 
strategies should be adopted to the extent that meaningful understanding is not explicitly 
required on assessment tasks. Appropriate workload will serve in the PTLC model, therefore, as 
a mediator for the effects of contextual factors on cheating and learning strategy.  
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Hypothesis 6: Students will perceive the workload to be less appropriate in class contexts that 
fail to meet their expectations for quality. Perceptions of class quality will positively 
predict Appropriate workload. 
Hypothesis 7: Students who perceive the workload in a given class to be less appropriate will 
report more disintegrity, and less usage of deep learning strategies. Appropriate workload 
will negatively predict Self-reported cheating and Surface learning strategies and positively 
predict Deep learning strategies. 
3.4.3 Learning context variables 
The central role that justifications and excuses play in cheating behavior is well 
recognized in the literature (e.g. Day et al., 2011; Murdock et al., 2001, 2004). Students are often 
observed to justify cheating by blaming class context factors such as teaching quality, 
assessment quality, and interest (Galloway, 2012; Olafson et al., 2013; Stephens & Gehlbach, 
2007; Taylor et al., 2002; Zito & McQuillan, 2011). Such justifications have been almost 
uniformly dismissed as techniques of neutralization (e.g. Diekhoff et al., 1996; Galloway, 2012; 
Haines et al., 1986; LaBeff et al., 1990; Murdock & Stephens, 2007; Rettinger & Kramer, 2009), 
despite being corroborated by correlational and experimental evidence. Higher incidence of 
cheating is statistically associated with assessments characterized as ‘high stakes’ (Jensen et 
al., 2002; Nichols & Berliner, 2007), or that are perceived as inauthentic or poorly designed 
(Heckler et al., 2013); with teacher quality perceived as poor (Anderman et al., 2010; Evans et 
al., 1993; Murdock et al., 2001; 2004; Shipley, 2009; Stearns, 2001); with classes and learning 
tasks perceived as useless and/or un-interesting (Baird, 1980; Ma et al., 2007; McCabe et al., 
2002; Sisti, 2007; Schraw et al., 2007); with the perception that cheating is the norm among 
peers or classmates (Bowers, 1964; Burrus et al., 2007; Carrell et al., 2006; Eisenberg, 2004; 
Galloway, 2012; Gino et al., 2009; Hartshorne & May, 1928; McCabe & Treviño, 1997; McCabe 
et al., 2008; Nora & Zhang, 2010; O’Rourke et al., 2010; Teodorescu & Andrei, 2009; Walker et 
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al., 1966); and with learning and assessment situations perceived as unfair (Brent & Atkisson, 
2011; Evans & Craig, 1990a; Evans et al., 1993; Jensen et al., 2002; McCabe et al., 2001, 2008; 
Rettinger, 2007; Vowell & Chen, 2004).  
Learner perceptions of context are organized into two parts in the PTLC model 
developed here (see Figure 3.6): (1) perceived fairness and quality, and (2) classroom goal 
structure. Each of these parts of the PTLC model includes dimensions of student experience 
that have been emphasized in research on both cheating and learning strategy. To answer 
calls for a more nuanced examination of the principal dimensions of learner experience such 
as teaching and assessment (Murdock et al., 2004; 2008), students’ evaluations of fairness and 
quality are modeled with eight measures. The present model also extends integrity research 
related to achievement goal theory (Ames & Archer, 1988; Anderman et al., 1998; 2010), by 
including measures for mastery and performance classroom goal structure.  
The Course Experience Questionnaire (CEQ) (Entwistle & Ramsden, 1983; Wilson et al., 
1997), which has been developed and used principally in the field of student learning theory 
(Biggs & Tang, 2011), is a multidimensional measure of students’ course evaluations that 
originated in a set of grounded exploratory studies at Lancaster University, UK (Entwistle & 
Ramsden, 1983). The CEQ is a theoretically coherent framework for student experience that 
has been related empirically to surface and deep learning strategies for more than thirty years, 
and is currently one of the most widely used measures of tertiary course experience in the 
world (Marsh, Ginns, Morin et al., 2011; Richardson, 2005). Factors measured by the CEQ such 
as Good teaching, Clear goals and standards, and Appropriate assessment are also aspects of 
academic experience that students often blame when they justify cheating, as outlined at the 
beginning of this subsection. This set of CEQ factors is augmented in the present work by one 
measure of the perceived usefulness of the curriculum of a given class, i.e. Usefulness of 
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curriculum (Rowe & Hill, 1998), as a proxy for student interest, as well as of two measures of 
assessment context: Transparency and Authenticity (Dorman & Knightley, 2006).  
CEQ in a secondary setting. The present study adapts the wording of CEQ scales to 
the experience of secondary school students. The original CEQ items (Wilson et al., 1997), are 
compared to their modified equivalents used in the present study in Appendix C. Table 3.1, 
below, broadly summarizes the evolution of the modern CEQ and demonstrates the 
consistency of its constructs over time. A vast, varied, and current body of research supports 
the validity and reliability of the CEQ at the tertiary level (e.g. Ginns et al., 2007; Lawless & 
Richardson, 2002; Ning & Downing, 2010; Ramsden, 1991; Richardson, 1994, 2005; Wilson et 
al., 1997).  Modified CEQ scales have also been adapted to the secondary level in the form of 
the School Experience Questionnaire (SEQ) (Ramsden, Bowden & Martin, 1988; Ramsden, 
Martin, & Bowden, 1989). As can be seen in Table 3.1, however, reliability estimates for three 
of the four SEQ scales reported by Ramsden et al. (1988) fall below .70. Reliability estimates 
of .70 - .80 are widely considered to be “adequate” for purposes of structural equation 
modeling (Kline, 2011, p. 70), by which standard the reliability of these SEQ scales is 
inadequate for structural equation modeling. CEQ measures (see also Table 3.1), which are 
analogous to the SEQ scales in question, but show substantially better reliability, will be used 
for the present study.  
Teacher quality.  The eight-item CEQ measure Good teaching examines the degree to 
which students perceive their teacher as supportive and able to deliver lessons effectively. 
Teacher quality has been associated in prior work with self-reported cheating (Anderman et 
al., 2010; Murdock et al., 2004, 2007; Shipley, 2009), the perceived likelihood of cheating (Evans 
& Craig, 1990a, 1990b; Evans et al., 1993), the acceptability and justifiability of cheating 
(Anderman et al., 1998; Day et al., 2011; Murdock et al., 2004, 2007). Teacher quality has also 
been associated with whether students use deep or surface learning strategies (Ramsden, 
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1991; Wilson et al., 1997; Diseth, 2007; Ning & Downing, 2010). Teachers who provide 
insufficient support for learning, who are perceived as unhelpful at explaining material, or as 
unable to guide students through potentially confusing ideas, may leave students feeling ‘on 
their own’ at overcoming academic challenges. Students may view poor teaching as a failure 
on the part of a teacher to fulfill his or her socially and professionally implied obligations. In 
viewing the student-teacher relationship as a social contract, the perception that a teacher 
neglects students, or undermines students’ efforts to succeed, may be interpreted as cheating 
on the part of the teacher (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013) that obviates the moral obligation 
students feel to work hard and be honest. 
 Clear goals and standards. The five-item CEQ measure Clear goals and standards 
pertains to the clarity of the specific purposes of work in a given class, the study requirements 
of its particular curriculum, and the criteria by which student performance will be assessed 
(Entwistle & Ramsden, 1983; Ramsden, 1991). The clarity of goals and standards is associated 
with both learning strategy (Diseth et al., 2010; Wilson et al., 1997) and cheating in secondary 
education settings (Brent & Atkisson, 2011; Evans & Craig, 1990a). Academic goals and 
standards express the intended purpose and meaning of student effort, and guide students’ 
judgments of their own progress. Learning contexts perceived as lacking clear goals and 
standards may convey insufficient benefit or undue harm to students by failing to inform 
them of how to direct their efforts to succeed at required work. Students may feel, as such, 
that when goals and standards are unclear, work requirements are invalid and can be flouted 
without violating moral imperatives.  
Usefulness of curriculum. The four-item measure Usefulness of curriculum (Rowe & 
Hill, 1998) is used to replace the SEQ measure Preparation for study in higher education, which 
achieved a reliability estimate of just .58 in Ramsden et al. (1988) (see Table 3.1). The Usefulness 
of curriculum measure was developed to query secondary student perceptions of the value of 
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the curriculum of a given class. It evinced good reliability (.86) in the study reported by Rowe 
and Hill (1998), and is employed in the present study as a proxy for students’ overall interest 
in Science class, the research setting for the present work. Intrinsic interest has been seen to 
characterize deep learning since the earliest days of student learning theory (Fransson, 1977; 
Marton, 1976), and has also been connected to higher levels of engagement and lower levels 
of cheating (Shraw et al., 2007). Viewing the subjects or topics covered in a class as ‘useless’ 
suggests a pronounced lack of interest. Being required to learn material perceived as useless 
also violates the basic assumption that formal education is meant to be helpful. Students may 
feel it is unjust to have to learn what they perceive to be useless, not merely because it is non-
beneficial, but because it wastes their time, which, in social contract terms, cheats the 
fundamental expectation that one’s education should promote student welfare. Students who 
feel cheated by useless learning experiences may take the conventional view that disintegrity 
is justifiable in order to achieve the grades by which they will nonetheless be judged to have 
succeeded or failed.  
Measures of learning context factors such as these (teacher quality, goal clarity, and 
curriculum usefulness) are employed in the present study to query respondents’ perceptions 
of the quality of their Science classes. A significant amount of research reviewed above 
suggests that how well or poorly students perceive learning contexts influences their cheating. 
The contractarian perspective asserted here holds that moral obligation is an important 
mechanism by which this influence is exerted. Moral obligation is hypothesized to mediate 
the relationship between student perceptions of class quality and cheating behavior, as shown 
above in Figures 3.5 and 3.8 (see also hypotheses 4 – 7).  
 Hypothesis 8: Students who perceive teacher quality as low, goals and standards as unclear, 
and the curriculum as useless in a given class will be more likely to engage in 
disintegrity, and less likely to engage in deep learning strategies. Good teaching, Clear 
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goals and standards, and Usefulness of curriculum will negatively predict Self-reported 
cheating and Surface learning strategies and positively predict Deep learning strategies. 
These predictive effects will be at least partially mediated by Justifiability of cheating. 
Table 3.1 presents sample items and alpha reliabilities of measures used on various 
versions of the CEQ since its development (Entwistle & Ramsden, 1983). The CEQ serves, in 
the present study, as a theoretically coherent measure of the principal dimensions of students’ 
evaluations of class context.  
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Table 3.1 
Development of the Course Experience Questionnaire over the past three decades. 
Course 
Perceptions 
Questionnaire 
Entwistle & 
Ramsden, 1983, 
p. 124 
Student 
Experience 
Questionnaire 
(SEQ) 
Ramsden,et al., 
1988, p.4 
 
CEQ 
Ramsden, 1991, 
p.134 
 
CEQ 
Wilson et al., 
1997 
 
SCEQ 
Ginns et al., 
2007, p.605 
This study 
Relationships 
with students: 
closeness of 
student/lecturer 
relationships; help 
and understanding 
show to students. 
Teaching support: 
the extent to which 
pupils think the 
teaching they 
experience is 
supportive of their 
learning  
( = .81) 
Good teaching: 
clarity of 
explanation, level 
at which material 
pitched, 
enthusiasm and 
help with study 
problems (p. 132) 
( = .87)  
Good teaching: 
same as Ramsden 
(1991) 
( = .86-.88) 
Good teaching: 
same as Ramsden 
(1991) 
( = .83) 
Good 
teaching: 
Wilson et al. 
(1997) 
Workload: 
pressure placed on 
students in terms 
of demands of the 
syllabus and 
assessment tasks 
 Appropriate 
workload: The 
sheer volume of 
work to be got 
through in this 
course means you 
can't comprehend 
it all thoroughly 
(neg.) 
( = .77) 
Appropriate 
workload: same 
as Ramsden 
(1991)  
( = .74-.75) 
Appropriate 
workload: same 
as Ramsden 
(1991) 
( = .76) 
Appropriate 
workload: 
Wilson et al. 
(1997) 
Clear goals and 
standards: extent 
to which standards 
expected of 
students are clear 
and unambiguous 
Structure, climate, 
and cohesiveness: 
the extent to which 
goals are clearly 
defined and pupils 
and staff share 
similar aims ( = 
.64) 
Clear goals: You 
usually have a clear 
idea of where 
you're going and 
what's expected of 
you in this course 
( = .80) 
Clear Goals and 
standards: same 
as Ramsden 
(1991) 
( = .82) 
Clear goals and 
standards: the 
staff made it clear 
right from the 
start what they 
expected from 
students.( = 
.80) 
Clear goals 
and standards: 
Wilson et al. 
(1997) 
 Formal 
achievement: the 
extent to which 
pupils feel they are 
bring encouraged to 
perform highly in 
external 
examinations ( = 
.68) 
Appropriate 
assessment: Staff 
here seem more 
interested in 
testing what we 
have memorised 
than understood 
(neg.)  
( = .71) 
Assessment: 
same as Ramsden 
(1991) 
( = .73-.74) 
Appropriate 
assessment: 
same as Ramsden 
(1991) 
( = .72) 
Appropriate 
assessment: 
Wilson et al. 
(1997) 
Freedom in 
learning: amount 
of discretion 
possessed by 
students in 
choosing and 
organizing 
academic work 
Independence in 
learning: the 
perceived stress on 
developing the 
capacity to learn 
independently ( = 
.64) 
Emphasis on 
independence: 
Students here are 
given a lot of choice 
in the work they 
have to do ( = .72) 
Independence: 
same as Ramsden 
(1991) 
( = .67-.68) 
  
Vocational 
relevance: 
perceived relevance 
of courses to 
students’ careers 
Preparation for 
study in higher 
education: the 
extent to which 
pupils feel they are 
being prepared for 
learning in higher 
education ( = .58) 
 Generic Skills: 
the extent to 
which graduates 
perceive their 
courses as 
developing a 
number of 
generic skills and 
abilities (p.36)  
( = .79-.80) 
Generic skills: 
Same as Wilson 
et al. (1997) 
( = .77) 
Usefulness of 
curriculum: 
Rowe & Hill 
(1998) 
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Classroom goal structure. Achievement goal theory has been studied in relation to 
cheating at three hierarchical levels in educational settings: the school, the classroom, and the 
individual student. The most consistent and significant association with cheating across much 
of the research upon which the present study builds has been at the classroom level, i.e. 
classroom goal structure (Anderman et al., 1998; Anderman & Midgley, 2004; Murdock et al., 
2001, 2004; Stephens & Gehlbach, 2007). Achievement goal theory traditionally portrays 
classroom goal structure as comprising the key factors by which a teacher directs students 
towards either mastery goals or performance goals. More than a decade of research has 
indicated that cheating tends to be positively related to perceptions of performance goal 
structure (e.g. Anderman et al., 1998), and/or negatively related to perceptions of mastery 
goal structure (e.g. Stephens & Gehlbach, 2007). Performance goal structures are held to 
influence students to orient themselves to performance goals (Meece et al., 2006), which, as 
reviewed in section 2.3.4, have been associated with higher levels of cheating (Anderman et 
al., 1998; Koul et al., 2009; Murdock et al., 2001; Olafson et al., 2013; Rettinger & Cramer, 2009; 
Stephens & Gehlbach, 2007) and surface learning strategies (Fellonar et al., 2007). Mastery goal 
orientations have, by contrast, been associated negatively with cheating (Anderman & 
Midgley, 2004; Murdock et al., 2001), and positively with deep learning strategies (Fellonar et 
al., 2007; Phan, 2008, 2009a, 2009b).  
Neither type of classroom goal structure is hypothesized to represent a breach of 
students’ PTLCs within a given class context. While many scholars have concluded, through 
decades of research, that performance goals are less desirable than mastery goals, it is not 
clear why students would, with any uniformity, perceive one goal structure as more moral 
than the other. Goal structures do, however, convey “messages about the purposes of 
instruction” (Anderman & Midgley, 2004, p. 501) that could affect whether students believe 
they are expected to learn as opposed to earn grades. Achievement goal structures might, in 
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other words, influence what duties students feel morally obliged to undertake in a given class. 
The emphasis on grade-achievement that characterizes performance goal structures may, in 
particular, convey to students that disintegrity is more justifiable if it produces better grades. 
Perceptions of mastery and performance goal structures, measured respectively in the 
present study by two, five-item scales developed by Midgley et al. (2000), were hypothesized 
to exert effects on self-reported cheating and surface learning strategies that were at least 
partially mediated by moral obligation (see Figures 3.6 and 3.8). Performance goal structures 
may increase the likelihood of cheating purely by intensifying competition for good grades, 
whereas mastery goal structures may be antithetical to cheating by encouraging a self-
referential view of achievement. 
Hypothesis 9 - 10: Students in performance goal-oriented class contexts will be encouraged to 
view cheating as more justifiable and workload as less appropriate. (9) Performance goal 
structure will positively predict Justifiability of cheating, and (10) negatively predict 
Appropriate workload.  
Hypothesis 11 - 12: Students in mastery goal-oriented class contexts will be encouraged to view 
cheating as less justifiable and workload as more appropriate. (11) Mastery goal structure 
will negatively predict Justifiability of cheating, and (12) positively predict Appropriate 
workload. 
Hypotheses 13 - 15: Students who perceive a performance goal structure in Science class will 
engage in more disintegrity and less deep learning, (13) Performance goal structure will 
positively predict Self-reported cheating, and (14) Surface learning strategies; and (15) will 
negatively predict Deep learning strategies. These effects will be at least partially 
mediated by moral obligation. 
Chapter 3 Empirical Rationale│105 
 
  
Hypotheses 16 - 18: Students who perceive a mastery goal structure in Science class will engage 
in less disintegrity and more deep learning. (16) Mastery goal structure will negatively 
predict Self-reported cheating, and (17) Surface learning strategies; and (18) positively 
predict Deep learning strategies. These effects will be at least partially mediated by moral 
obligation. 
3.4.4 Assessment context variables 
Assessment is included in the hypothesized model as an extension of the learning 
context that, itself, comprises multiple dimensions including appropriateness, authenticity, 
and transparency. The term assessment refers herein to teacher-evaluated assignments, where 
evaluation may take such forms as verbal or written comments, marks along continua, check 
marks, or letter grades. Assessments by this definition include homework assignments, 
papers, projects, portfolios, quizzes, tests and, where applicable, behavioral criteria such as 
participation and citizenship. 
The power of assessment to affect learning strategies has long been recognized by 
student learning theorists at the tertiary level (Segers & Dochy, 2006; Struyven, Dochy & 
Janssens, 2002). At the secondary level, a similar body of argument and evidence for the broad 
and potent influence of assessment on student experience and learning outcomes has 
coalesced in the literature of assessment for learning (AFL) (Black & Wiliam, 2006a, 2006b; 
Harlen, 2006). AFL has a strong tradition of considering assessment in multidimensional 
terms. Crooks (1988) concludes his review of assessment research with an appeal for 
assessment practices that (1) utilize timely feedback, (2) expressly facilitate student progress, 
and (3) encourage deep learning by emphasizing understanding, transferable learning, and 
thinking skills. More recently, Dorman and Knightley (2006) added to the AFL literature a 
five-dimensional model of student perceptions of assessment: 1. congruence with planned 
learning, 2. student consultation, 3. diversity, 4. authenticity, and 5. transparency. As shown 
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in Appendices B and C, the present study uses the latter two of Dorman and Knightley’s (2006) 
scales, in addition to the CEQ scale for Appropriate assessment (Wilson et al., 1997), in order to 
measure a nuanced picture of student perceptions of assessment. 
Appropriateness. The four-item CEQ scale Appropriate assessment measures students’ 
perceptions of how much freedom of intellectual self-expression and self-determination is 
permitted by the assessment methods in a given class. Assessments that emphasize rote 
memorization and ‘regurgitation’ are inappropriate by this conception; appropriate 
assessments entail higher-order thinking and acknowledge individual understanding. By 
denying students opportunities to think independently and demonstrate the fullness of their 
intellectual accomplishment, fact-focused and/or highly directive assessment tasks may 
characterize achievement in a manner that seems unjustly narrow. Students who feel that their 
achievement is under-represented, i.e. who feel ‘cheated’ of due credit, by assessment tasks 
perceived as inappropriate may feel that it is justifiable to reciprocate by representing 
themselves in dishonest ways. 
Transparency.  Drawing from Dorman and Knightley (2006), the seven-item measure 
Transparency of assessment is hypothesized to extend to the assessment context the dimension 
of Clear goals and standards from the learning context (see Figure 3.7), in that the goals of a 
given class are largely embodied by its assessments. Transparency reflects the “extent to 
which the purposes and forms of assessment tasks are well-defined and clear to the learner” 
(Dorman & Knightley, 2006, p. 52). A lack of transparency may give rise to the sense that an 
assessment is unfair, in that important information about it is not made available, such as 
what will be covered, how it will be conducted, and when it will take place. Students who feel 
that teachers are supposed to provide such information may feel that the ‘rules of the game’ 
change when teachers do not provide it. A student who feels that lacking such information 
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unfairly prejudices assessments of his or her achievement may judge that disintegrity is a 
justifiable countermeasure for attaining a fair grade. 
Authenticity: The term ‘authentic assessment’ describes assessments of knowledge, 
understandings, and skills that are perceived by students to be meaningful (Waldrip, Fisher, 
& Dorman, 2009). Authentic assessments signify accomplishment that is of genuine 
importance to students, as distinct from the importance of grades. The seven-item measure of 
Authenticity of assessment (Dorman & Knightley, 2006) extends to the assessment context the 
dimension of Usefulness of curriculum from the learning context (see Figure 3.7) (Rowe & Hill, 
1998). Students who are genuinely convinced that an assessment task misses the point of what 
they have learned, is irrelevant to their lives, or has been assigned as ‘busywork’ may take a 
conventional view that it serves solely to produce a grade. In the same sense that surface 
learners pursue the sign over what is signified (Marton & Säljö, 1976), students who perceive 
a learning task to be inauthentic may judge disintegrity to be justifiable for the purpose of 
obtaining a good grade, i.e. the sign, because they do not respect what it signifies. Moral 
obligation is hypothesized, as such, to mediate the effects of assessment authenticity on 
disintegrity in Figures 3.5 and 3.8 (see also hypotheses 4 – 7).  
Hypothesis 19: Students who perceive the assessment context in a given class to be 
inappropriate, inauthentic, and/or non-transparent will be more likely to engage in 
disintegrity, and less likely to engage in deep learning strategies. Appropriate assessment, 
Authenticity of assessment, and Transparency of assessment will negatively predict Self-
reported cheating and Surface learning strategies and positively predict Deep learning 
strategies. These effects will be at least partially mediated by moral obligation. 
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Figure 3.7 presents the dimensions of classroom teaching and assessment contexts 
included in the present study. Alignment of the dimensions of the two contexts (dashed lines) 
is meant to indicate theorized relationships between constructs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Perceived learning and assessment variables in the hypothesized model. 
3.4.5 Social-regulatory context 
Social and regulatory factors, such as the behavioral tone of a class, and whether rules 
are clear and appropriately enforced, are important non-academic aspects of the backdrop to 
learning and assessment in any academic context (Emmer & Stough, 2001). A large body of 
research, reviewed in section 2.4, indicates that students are more likely to cheat when 
classroom discipline is lax (e.g. Briggs et al., 2013; Houston, 1977; Tittle & Rowe, 1973; Whitley, 
1998), and when their peers demonstrate supportive attitudes towards cheating (e.g. Magnus 
et al., 2002; Nora & Zhang, 2010; Schraw et al., 2007).   
Peer norms. Peer norms play a prominent role in influencing cheating behavior 
(Carrell et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2009; McCabe & Treviño, 1997; Nora & Zhang, 2010; Stephens 
& Gehlbach, 2007; Walker et al., 1966). The seven-item scale Peer norms, developed by Mayhew 
et al. (2009), measures student perceptions of whether their peers believe cheating is 
justifiable. Peer norms perceived as favorable to cheating are hypothesized, according to 
Curriculum 
usefulness 
Good teaching 
Perceived assessment context 
   Perceived relational factors in an academic context  
Clear goals 
Authenticity 
Transparency 
Appropriateness 
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social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), to communicate un-favorable contextual 
perceptions and to define cheating as an appropriate in-group behavior. Peer norms is 
positioned, therefore, as a mediator in the hypothesized model, between perceptions of class 
quality, and the justifiability of cheating (see Figure 3.8).  
Social comparison theory (SCT) (Broeckelman-Post, 2008; Festinger, 1954), reviewed 
in section 2.4.5, asserts that opinions become increasingly uniform within groups as people 
appraise their own opinions against those of their peers. Individuals whose opinions differ 
from those of their peer group find themselves pressured either to bring their own opinions 
into line with the group, to change their peers’ opinions, or to leave the group. Evaluations by 
students of a given learning context arise, by this view, at least partly as a matter of group 
consensus. Several scholars have suggested similarly that peer norms mediate the influence 
of student experience upon determinations of whether or not to cheat (Teodorescu & Andrei, 
2009; Whitley, 1998). The context-specific moral flexibility associated with peer norms 
(McCabe & Katz, 2009) may, therefore, reflect the degree to which students think their peers 
have favorable attitudes towards cheating. 
Students see through their own eyes, judge according to their own standards, and are 
undoubtedly responsible for their own actions. When they infer that their peers think cheating 
is acceptable because a class is unfair or of low quality, however, they may themselves adopt 
more negative opinions of the class, and view cheating as more justifiable as a result. Peer 
norms is positioned, therefore, as a mediator of the effects of perceived class context on 
Justifiability of cheating and Self-reported cheating (see Figure 3.8). 
Hypothesis 20: Peer norms related to cheating will mediate the influence of perceived class 
context on whether individual students judge their own acts of cheating to be justifiable. 
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An individual’s perceptions of class context factors will negatively predict Peer norms, 
which will, in turn, positively predict Justifiability of cheating. 
Rules. A scale for ‘experience of school rules’, developed for secondary education 
research (Gregory, Cornell, Fan, et al., 2010), is adapted to classrooms in the present study. 
The modified six-item scale measures students’ perceptions of rules as clear, fair, and enforced 
effectively. Educators, like parents, exercise authority over students for the purpose of 
protecting and promoting student welfare (Baumrind, 1987). Rules that seem to make no 
sense, or that seem to be applied in harsh or arbitrary ways, may be viewed as failures of a 
teacher or a school to exercise authority for the benefit of students. Students may feel that 
rules applied in an inconsistent, spiteful, or arbitrary manner in a given class cease to be 
morally legitimate, and may furthermore reject the notion that they have a moral obligation 
to heed such rules (Thomson & Holland, 2002). When adolescent students feel that rules are 
inappropriate, unclear, or applied unjustly, they may come to view them as conventional in 
character (Murdock & Stephens, 2007; Thornberg, 2008), and not, therefore, morally binding.  
A second important aspect of students’ experience of classroom rules is whether the 
rules are enforced effectively enough to create a sense of real risk associated with cheating. 
While breaking moral imperatives carries internal consequences (Aronson, 1968; Blasi, 1980; 
Mazar et al., 2008), the risks of breaking conventional rules are external (Turiel, 1983, 2006). 
When students feel alienated in a given class, external consequences may be the last line of 
defense for the integrity of assessment processes. Students who view rules as conventional 
are more likely to break them when they are poorly enforced. Higher rates of cheating due to 
poor enforcement of rules in a given class may lead, in turn, to a ‘contagion’ effect by signaling 
to classmates that cheating is easy to get away with and potentially necessary in order to 
compete (Gino et al., 2009; Walker et al., 1966). The experience of classroom rules is 
hypothesized, therefore, to affect cheating both indirectly, as a function of whether students 
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view rules as morally legitimate in a given class context, i.e. as mediated by moral obligation 
(see Figures 3.5 and 3.8, and hypotheses 4 – 7), and directly, as a function of the perceived risk 
associated with cheating. 
Hypothesis 21: Students will cheat more when they perceive that rules are not enforced 
effectively, especially if they view rules against cheating as conventional. Experience of 
classroom rules will negatively predict Peer norms, Justifiability of cheating, and Self-reported 
cheating.  
3.4.6 Person 
Demographic variables and stable intra-psychic factors are mainstays of academic 
integrity literature (Anderman & Murdock, 2007), underscoring broad consensus behind the 
idea that individual differences interact with context to produce behavioral outcomes 
(Mischel, 2004). Intra-psychic factors related to cheating in the hypothesized model include 
two domain specific measures: Subject self-concept and Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept, in 
addition to six demographic variables: age, grade-level, gender, language(s) spoken in the 
home, and English language proficiency. 
Age and grade-level.  While cheating behavior is seen to vary somewhat predictably 
with age, the nature and extent of the relationship is bound up with a wide range of correlates 
that age shares with grade-level (Anderman & Midgley, 2004; Miller et al., 2007), such as 
physical and cognitive development, and changes in educational goals (Franklyn-Stokes & 
Newstead 1995; Newstead et al., 1996). In the present study, age and grade-level may serve 
as control variables for distinguishing between patterns of change rooted in physiological 
growth and maturation, and/or in educational context. Grade-level is viewed, in particular, 
as a potential source of factorial non-equivalence (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002) in the 
measurement model for Figure 3.8, based on the findings of Anderman & Midgley (2004) 
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related to changes in cheating behavior occurring over the Grade Eight – Grade Nine 
transition. 
Gender.  While research on the relationship between gender and academic integrity 
has generated mixed results, the most common finding is that females tend to look less 
favorably on cheating than males (Miller et al., 2007). A meta-analysis of 48 integrity studies 
conducted by Whitley et al. (1999) found an effect size of d = .21 for gender and cheating-
related attitudes, but a mere d = .08 for gender and actual cheating behavior. The present study 
treats gender as a potentially important independent variable for understanding 
personological patterns in academic contexts, and, like grade-level, as a potential source of 
factorial non-equivalence in the measurement model for Figure 3.8. 
English-language proficiency. Respondents will be asked to indicate their proficiency 
with English, as either fluent, high, intermediate, low, or beginner. Respondents’ ability to 
understand survey items may affect the meaning of their responses. Beginning English 
speakers might, for instance, provide idiosyncratic answer patterns because they 
misunderstand nuanced language. Respondents who rate themselves at a beginner or low level 
of English may need to be screened-out in order to clarify results. 
Subject (Science) self-concept. The five-item scale Subject self-concept (Marsh, Ellis, 
Parada, et al., 2005), pertains specifically to the subject of Science, in which cheating has often 
been found to be more common than in other subject areas (Meade, 1992; Miller et al., 2007; 
Murdock et al., 2001; Newstead et al., 1996; Schab, 1991).  
Subject-related self-concept, formed through self-evaluations of past performance, 
social comparison, and self-judgment (Bong & Clark, 1999; Bong & Skaalvik, 2003), reflects 
the ways in which students relate to a given subject area (Kornilova, Kornilov, & Chumakova, 
2009). A student’s belief in the likelihood of his or her performing successfully on academic 
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tasks appears to be a key influence on cheating behavior, as illustrated by the fact that 90% of 
the students surveyed by Nora and Zhang (2010) indicated that they would not cheat if they 
felt confident of success. The one study to have investigated the relationship between self-
concept and academic integrity at the secondary school level (Rost & Wild, 1994) reported a 
significant negative correlation (r = -.27, p < .05) in a population of 197 German high school 
students. The authors interpreted this effect to represent an affinity among students with high 
academic self-concept for “attributing their successes to internal sources” (p. 129), and a 
corresponding tendency among students with low academic self-concept to cheat as a means 
of coping with performance-related anxiety. Subject self-concept is hypothesized in the present 
work to positively predict favorable perceptions of class context, adaptive moral judgment, 
and more honest behavior. 
Hypotheses 22 – 25. Subject self-concept will positively predict (22) perceptions of academic 
relational variables (i.e. excluding Experience of school rules and Peer norms), (23) perceptions 
of Mastery goal structure, (24) Appropriate workload, and (25) the use of Deep learning strategies. 
Hypotheses 26 - 29. Subject self-concept will negatively predict (26) perceptions of Performance 
goal structure, and (27) Justifiability of cheating, (28) use of Surface learning strategies, and (29) 
Self-reported cheating. 
 Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept. The ten-item measure Honesty-trustworthiness 
self-concept, developed for the Self-Description Questionnaire II (Marsh, 1992), investigates 
student self-perception in relation to integrity. While self-concept is viewed as being relatively 
stable across contexts, it tends to be shaped more readily by experience than by personality 
structures (Bong & Skaalvik, 2003). One’s honesty-trustworthiness self-concept is expected, as 
a self-belief shaped by past-looking self-assessment, to embody the effects of past cheating 
behavior as well as moral identity, both of which have been prominent predictors of cheating 
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behavior in prior research (Gino et al., 2011; Harding et al., 2012; Mayhew et al., 2009; Wowra, 
2007b). The present study would be the first to use an integrity-related self-concept scale to 
directly investigate academic cheating at the secondary school level. Students with higher 
honesty-trustworthiness self-concept are hypothesized to be less likely to believe that cheating 
is acceptable among their peers, less likely to judge cheating to be justifiable, and less likely 
to cheat. 
Hypotheses 30 - 32. Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept will negatively predict (30) the perceived 
amenability of peer norms to cheating, i.e. Peer norms (31) Justifiability of cheating, and 
(32) Self-reported cheating. 
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               Person                                             Class context            Moral obligation       Behavior 
 
Figure 3.8. Model 1: The hypothesized PTLC structural model. SUB = Subject Self-Concept, HON = Honesty-Trustworthiness Self-Concept, PERF = Performance 
Goal Structure, MAST = Mastery Goal Structure, GOALS = Clear Goals and Standards, GTEACH = Good Teaching, APWKLD = Appropriate Workload, CURUSE = 
Usefulness of Curriculum, APPAS = Appropriate assessment; AUTH = Authenticity of Assessment, TRANS = Transparency of Assessment, EXRULE = Experience 
of Classroom Rules, PEER = Peer Norms Related to Cheating, DEEP = Deep Learning Strategies, SURF = Surface Learning Strategies, CHJUST = Justifiability of 
Cheating, CHEAT = Self-Reported Cheating. 
Motivational 
goal structure 
Pedagogical 
quality 
Assessment 
quality 
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The initial hypothesized PTLC model (Model 1). Figure 3.8 presents the initial 
multivariate PTLC structural equation model to be tested in the present research program. 
The model is organized into four broad components (person, class context, moral obligation, 
and behavior), which are populated, in total, with seventeen individual variables, among 
which seventy-five beta paths have been inserted to represent the thirty-two hypotheses given 
above. The complexity of this initial model is expected to diminish with the discovery of 
second-order factors that underlie contextual factors, as would be indicated by 
multicollinearity between their measures. CEQ scales (see Table 3.1) have, for instance, been 
found to produce a second-order structure for ‘teacher quality’ (Diseth, Palleson, Brunborg, 
& Larson, 2010; Richardson, 1994; Trigwell and Prosser, 1991; Wilson et al., 1997) that, if found 
in the present work, would allow the first-order measures to be related through that broader 
concept in the model. A second-order factor pertaining to ‘assessment quality’ is also 
anticipated, due to the inclusion of three assessment-related scales. 
3.5 Chapter summary 
 The conceptual model for psychological teaching-learning contracts (PTLCs) was 
developed in this chapter. The overarching PTLC hypothesis was explicated in relation to 
domain theory (Richardson et al., 2012; Turiel, 1983, 2002, 2006; Thomson & Holland, 2002; 
Thornberg, 2008), and within the view that learning systems are characterized by dynamic 
equilibrium, as depicted in the 3-P Model (see Figure 3.1). The PTLC hypothesis was then 
posed as the basis of a four-category PTLC framework that abandons the assumption that 
students apply their abstract moral beliefs rigidly across contexts, as would be necessary for 
the BBI to accompany acts of cheating.  
The PTLC hypothesis proffers an alternative account of cheating viewed as a 
conventional infraction that would not entail incongruity between moral beliefs and 
behaviors, but between moral beliefs and rules. Cheating acts viewed as conventional 
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infractions by the students who commit them fall outside the scope of the BBI, and do not, 
therefore, need to be neutralized. The PTLC hypothesis is based, instead, on the assumption 
that humans innately understand and respond to reciprocal fairness (Cosmides & Tooby, 
2013; Machery & Mallon, 2010), such that students may feel that cheating is justifiable when 
they think they have been cheated by teachers or teaching contexts. The perceived moral 
legitimacy of academic rules is, by this view, contingent upon the perceived moral legitimacy 
of academic contexts.  
 It was explained that the PTLC hypothesis marks a departure from the strictly rational-
cognitive paradigm of moral psychology that has dominated much of the prior research on 
academic cheating. Adolescent cognition is, according to the rational-cognitive paradigm, 
rarely advanced enough for social contract-based judgment (Rest, 1986). The PTLC finds 
solace, instead, in the dual-process paradigm of moral psychology (Cushman et al., 2010; 
Haidt, 2007), which allows that social contract-based judgment may involve irrational and 
non-cognitive mental processes. Social contract-based judgment may, in fact, be an evolved 
function of the human sense of reciprocal fairness, which would explain why humans tend to 
interpret social contract violations as ‘cheating’ (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 2013). 
Inasmuch as PTLCs are social contacts, therefore, it is plausible to juxtapose, in a contractarian 
framework, the obligation students ‘feel’ to be honest against what they may feel to be 
cheating by teachers, schools, or educational contexts. 
The general PTLC framework was next developed within the broader 3-P Model 
(Figures 3.1 and 3.5) based on the fundamental structure of a contract. It was argued that the 
failure of one party to fulfill contractual obligations could reciprocally relieve the 
counterparty from having to fulfill his or her corresponding obligations, such as refraining 
from certain types of behavior. The tendency to perceive and judge contract fulfillment, and 
to engage in disintegrity behaviors, was further held to depend on intrapersonal factors such 
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as personality and self-beliefs. The mutual obligations of teacher and learner, background 
personological factors, and integrity-related behaviors were assembled into a four-category 
framework (Person, Class context, Moral obligation, and Behavior; see Figure 3.5)  
Next, the hypothesized structural equation model to be tested in the present program 
of research was developed. This was done by populating each of the four components of the 
general PTLC framework with specific variables that have been emphasized in the literature 
on cheating. Measures of the specific variables included in the model were introduced and 
interrelated with hypotheses to be tested in the empirical phase of this research. The complete 
structural model was presented in Figure 3.8. 
The purpose of the PTLC framework is to articulate a mechanism that has been 
suggested in recent scholarly works for how students adjudge the moral imperative to follow 
rules. A clearer picture of the role that contractarian judgment plays in cheating behavior is 
envisaged to suggest measures by which educators can further the cause of academic honor 
in their schools and classrooms.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PILOT STUDY 
 
 
4.1 Purpose 
Two key purposes were addressed in the Pilot Study: (1) examination and, where 
necessary, modification of scale measures, and (2) identification of instances of 
multicollinearity and, where appropriate, either removal of constructs or creation of higher-
order factors. Pilot Study data was collected in parallel with data for Time 1 of the Main Study. 
Schools selected for the Pilot Study were located in four separate countries on three 
continents, with the intent to represent the diversity expected in Main Study sample. None of 
the data analyzed in the Pilot Study was included in analyses conducted in the Main Study.  
The questionnaire used to collect Time 1 data included seventeen measures drawn 
variously from the empirical literatures of both American secondary educational research and 
a mix of British and American tertiary educational research. Measures developed in secondary 
educational research contexts include Subject and Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept, 
Performance and Mastery goal structure, Authenticity and Transparency of assessment, Usefulness 
of curriculum, Justifiability of cheating, Experience of classroom rules, and Self-reported cheating; 
measures developed principally in British tertiary educational research contexts include Good 
teaching, Clear goals and standards, Appropriate assessment; and Peer norms was developed in an 
American tertiary research context. The wording of items that composed these measures was 
altered in numerous cases, in order to help convey their intended meaning to students at 
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American international secondary schools. While care was taken to preserve the original 
meaning of all items (see Appendix C), their psychometric validity and reliability could not 
be reasonably assured without first testing them on a sample similar to that used in the Main 
Study. The Pilot Study was conducted, therefore, in order to identify and correct factor misfit 
and multicollinearity in the measurement model, prior to the Main Study. 
4.2 Participants 
The Pilot Study sample (N = 96) included a mix of students aged 13 (16%), 14 (53%), 
15 (29%), and 16 (2%), of which 64 were male (67%) and 32 were female (33%). These students 
were drawn from four private international schools in Europe (32%), East Asia (33%), and 
Africa (32%). 61% of respondents indicated that the predominant language in their home was 
not English.  
Of the fifteen international schools that ultimately agreed to participate in the present 
research, the four chosen for the Pilot Study had, as a group, similar geographical distribution 
to the remaining eleven schools, which constituted the Main Study sample. This helped ensure 
that, for the sake of comparability, the Pilot and Main Study samples would entail similar 
ethnic and linguistic composition. Two of the schools in the Pilot Study were American 
international schools registered with the US State Department Office of Overseas Schools; one 
was a Japanese/English international school in Tokyo that follows a blend of the Japanese 
National Curriculum and the International Baccalaureate program (Doherty & Shield, 2012); 
and one was an all-boys boarding school that follows a modified British educational model.   
All participants and their parents signed consent forms that expressly stated their 
willingness to participate in a Pilot Study that would involve a single instance of data 
collection. These consent forms, and attendant participant information forms, were, along 
with the overall design of the Pilot Study, approved by the University of Sydney Human 
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Research Ethics Committee (Protocol Number 14193; see Appendix AG). Participants filled 
out online questionnaires hosted by surveymonkey.com that were designed to require an 
answer to every question. Not answering a question triggered a prompt requesting an answer 
before proceeding to the next question. Participants could stop taking the questionnaire at any 
point, but could not proceed to the end without answering each question in sequence. Data 
screening thus entailed eliminating all but complete questionnaires, from which no data was 
missing. 
4.3 Analysis 
 The psychometric properties of individual measures intended for the Main Study were 
assessed, as reported in this section, first with exploratory factor analysis (EFA), and then with 
confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). Problematic measures were modified.  
4.3.1 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is used to explore the latent structure of a data 
sample when the statistical relationships between observed variables are uncertain (Byrne, 
2012). Most of the measures employed in this study have not been tested in prior research 
conducted in international secondary schools. The wording of many items designed for these 
measures has, moreover, been slightly modified to meet the specific aims of the present study 
(see Appendix C). EFA estimation was, therefore, conducted for each measure, using the 
program FACTOR, version 7.00 (Lorenzo-Seva & Ferrando, 2006, 2007), to ensure that each 
measure represented a single, uni-dimensional factor. All EFAs were conducted with factor 
analysis using Pearson correlation matrices and parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) with marginally 
bootstrapped samples (Lattin, Carroll, & Green, 2003) to determine what number of factors 
should be extracted.  
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4.3.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a methodology for assessing a hypothesized 
latent variable structure by comparing its covariance matrix to the covariance structure 
observed in the data. Constructs showing uni-dimensionality in EFA were analyzed in the 
confirmatory mode with the Mplus, version 7 software package (Muthén & Muthén, 2012), 
using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors (Chou, Bentler & Satorra, 
1991). This procedure was used in the Pilot Study to assess one-factor congeneric models (see 
Figure 4.1) according common fit indices (see Table 4.1).  
Congeneric modeling, which is explained in more detail in section 5.5.2, was used, 
additionally, as a basis for creating weighted composite factor scores for all latent variables in 
the hypothesized model. Weighted composite scores reduce model complexity by converting 
respondents’ answers on the multiple indicators of a given measure into a single weighted 
average. Weighted composite scores were used to generate a bivariate correlation matrix in 
section 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.1. The congeneric model for the factor Subject self-concept. 
 Figure 4.1 presents a congeneric CFA model of the latent factor Subject self-concept. The 
factor includes five observed variables, for which the raw factor score coefficients are .156, 
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.249, .102, .360 and .219, respectively. Factor score coefficients represent the regression weights 
of individual items. Composite scores for Subject self-concept are calculated by first dividing 
each factor score by the sum of all five, which standardizes them to a scale of 1 (creating scores 
of .144, .229, .094, .331, and .202 respectively). Each standardized factor score coefficient is then 
multiplied by the corresponding score in an individual’s response set, according to the 
formula: Subject self-concept = (Sub2 * .144) + (Sub3 * .229) + (Sub5 * .094) + (Sub13 * .331) + 
(Sub15 * .202) (Holmes-Smith, 2012; Holmes-Smith & Rowe, 1994). Factor loadings for 
composite scores are computed as the square root of the Rho reliability statistic for the 
corresponding measure, and error variances are computed as 1 – Rho, for that measure. Fixing 
these values with the Mplus syntax shown in Appendix A expresses the latent variance of each 
factor in a simplified format, such that models of greater complexity can be fit with smaller 
samples (Holmes-Smith & Rowe, 1994; Raykov, 2009). 
4.4 Congeneric model fit criteria 
The purpose of the fit criteria used for congeneric analyses in the Pilot Study was to 
identify significant model misfit, in order to determine which scales and items were in greatest 
need of modification prior to the Main Study. To improve the certainty of identifying truly 
poor fit, cutoff thresholds were adopted (see Table 4.1) that lessened the likelihood that correct 
models would be rejected due to the idiosyncrasies of a small sample. This ran counter to logic 
of adopting stricter cutoff thresholds for ensuring good fit. The fit criteria in Table 4.1 were 
thus chosen to establish a more liberal standard for acceptable fit among simple congeneric 
models.  
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Table 4.1 
Cutoff criteria for congeneric models in the Pilot Study 
2 > .00 
 p of 2 > .05 
CFA Factor loading (λ) > .30 
RMSEA < .10 
Lower bound CI of RMSEA < .06 
CFI  > .95 
Rho > .60 
 
2 (Chi-squared). Non-significant 2 statistics indicate the exact fit of a hypothesized 
covariance structure of to the covariance structure observed in an actual data set (Kline, 2011). 
2 p-values are, however, more likely to be non-significant for smaller samples (Schumacker 
& Lomax, 2010). Significant p-values should, therefore, be more reliable indicators of poor fit 
to the small sample of data used for the present Pilot Study. Thus, to achieve the stated aim 
of identifying significantly poor fit, the threshold of p > .05 was adopted.  
Root mean-square error of approximation. RMSEA values tend to be inflated in small 
samples, especially for models with few degrees of freedom (Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby & 
Paxton, 2008; Hu & Bentler, 1999, Kline, 2011). A threshold of RMSEA < .10, interpreted by 
MacCallum et al. (1996) as “mediocre” (Byrne, 2012), was adopted as the cutoff threshold for 
the present study. A threshold of < .06 was additionally adopted for its lower-bound 90% 
confidence interval, which Sivo, Fan, Witta, and Willse (2006) found to reject no correct 
models in a sample of N = 150.  
Comparative fit index. CFI expresses the degree fit of a hypothesized covariance 
structure to the data on a scale of 0 to 1 (Bentler, 1990), and tends to vary directly with sample 
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size (Sivo et al. 2006; Hu & Bentler, 1999). A threshold of CFI > .95 was adopted for this study, 
based on  Sivo et al.’s (2006) finding that CFI > .95 rejected no correct models at N = 150.  
Reliability. Factor reliability was calculated in the present study as the Rho coefficient 
(“Rho”) (Raykov, 2009), a weighted reliability index, i.e. that accounts for the relative 
contribution of items in a measure. Judging by the common convention that reliability 
estimates below .60 are ‘very low’, .60-.69 are ‘low’, .70-.79 are ‘adequate’, .80-.89 are ‘very 
good’, and .90-1.00 are ‘excellent’ (Kline, 2011, p. 70), the threshold for reliability in the pilot 
study was set at .60. 
Factor loadings. While many scholars recommend a factor loading threshold of .400 
for retaining items in a factor model (Stevens, 2002; Field, 2009), a more relaxed threshold 
of .300 was adopted for the present study (9% of variance explained in the item by the latent 
factor).  
4.5 Psychometric properties of the central constructs for the Pilot Study 
In this section the psychometric properties of individual factors included in the 
hypothesized model were examined using both EFA and CFA of congeneric models. All 
measures that violated congeneric model fit criteria (highlighted values in Table 4.2) were 
analyzed independently in order to determine how the indicated misfit should be addressed 
prior to the Main Study.  
The small size of the Pilot Study sample (N = 96) and low number of degrees of 
freedom typical of single-factor congeneric models was seen to necessitate relaxing the 
thresholds for certain fit statistics in the preceding section. The small size of the Pilot Study 
sample additionally increased the likelihood that the statistical features of the models 
presented below would be idiosyncratic. This potential risk was reduced by retaining all 
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congeneric models that could be modified in theoretically defensible ways to satisfy the fit 
thresholds described above, for re-analysis at Time 1 of the Main Study. 
Table 4.2 
Summary of initial EFA and CFA fit statistics, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
            
 EFA  CFA 
       RMSEA   
 Scale (# items) 
Advised 
dimensions   
2 p df 
Loading 
range Value 
Low 
90%CI 
High 
90%CI CFI Rho 
Subject self-concept (5)  1  9.5 .091 5 .704-.885 .097 .000 .190 .98 .89 
Honesty-trust. self-concept (10)  2  EFA advised 2 dimensions 
Performance structure (5) 1  11.3 .046 5 .336-.638 .114 .014 .205 .87 .66 
Mastery structure (5) 1  2.3 .807 5 .613-.854 .000 .000 .089 1.00 .85 
Appropriate workload (5) 1  1.9 .859 5 .032-.947 .000 .000 .078 1.00 .56 
Good teaching (8) 1  17.6 .618 20 .493-.846 .000 .000 .076 1.00 .91 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) 1  1.1 .592 2 .667-.931 .000 .000 .167 1.00 .87 
Clear goals and standards (5) 1  3.2 .665 5 .546-.776 .000 .000 .112 1.00 .78 
Appropriate assessment (4) 1  6.8 .033 2 .200-.746 .159 .039 .296 .84 .58 
Transparency of assessment (7) 1  24.4 .031 14 .374-.811 .092 .028 .148 .93 .82 
Authenticity of assessment (7) 1  18.7 .178 14 .484-.782 .059 .000 .122 .96 .82 
Peer norms (7) 1  34.2 .002 14 .568-.841 .123 .071 .175 .91 .88 
Experience classroom rules (6) 1  15.2 .085 9 .494-.726 .085 .000 .156 .94 .76 
Surface learning strategies (6) 2  EFA advised 2 dimensions 
Deep learning strategies (7) 1  26.2 .025 14 .406-.800 .095 .034 .151 .93 .83 
Justifiability of cheating (4) 1  14.8 .001 2 .560-.964 .258 .146 .388 .90 .76 
Self-reported cheating (4) 1   5.1 .078 2 .750-.914 .127 .000 .269 .94  .89 
 
 
4.5.1 Honesty-Trustworthiness Self-Concept 
The ten-item scale Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept, developed by Marsh, Parker, 
and Barnes (1985), rendered two dimensions using EFA. The original scale contained ten 
items, of which five were reversed. Four of the five reversed items formed a second 
dimension in the EFA. The author of this scale has, himself, recently been critical of reversed 
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items (Marsh, Nagengast, & Morin, 2013). A single reversed item, Hon11, did, however, load 
with the non-reversed items in Dimension 1. As pointed out by Raykov (2012), a clear 
separation of loadings within a single scale suggests distinct factors, but with two items 
loading below .400, it was unclear what latent construct the selection of items in Dimension 
2 would be sufficient to represent. 
Table 4.3 
Honesty-Trustworthiness Self-Concept EFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 EFA  
 2 dimensions advised  
Item Dimension 1 R2  Dimension 2 R2 Item wording 
Hon1 .604 .36  .025 .00 People can really count on me to do the right 
thing. 
Hon4 (R) -.131 .02  .756 .57 Cheating on a test is OK if I do not get caught. 
Hon6 .683 .47  .036 .00 I always tell the truth. 
Hon7 (R) .283 .08  .336 .11 I sometimes take things that belong to other 
people. 
Hon8 .668 .45  .043 .00 When I make a promise I keep it. 
Hon9 .837 .70  -.232 .05 I am honest 
Hon10 .638 .41  .159 .03 I often tell lies. 
Hon11 (R) .654 .43  .219 .05 Honesty is very important to me. 
Hon12 (R) .082 .01  .820 .67 I sometimes cheat. 
Hon14 (R) .267 .07  .367 .13 I sometimes tell lies to stay out of trouble. 
 
Modification. Dimension 1, which included six of the original ten items including one 
reversed item, appeared to be the best approximation of the intended measure of honesty-
trustworthiness self-concept. Removing items Hon4, Hon7, Hon12 and Hon14 reduced 
Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept to a 6-item scale. In CFA, this modified factor 
demonstrated good reliability (Rho = .84), with a non-significant chi-squared statistic (2(9) = 
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11.1, p = .270), and otherwise good fit statistics (CFI = .99; RMSEA = .049, CIlower = .000), and 
strong factor loadings (.640 - .779).  
Table 4.4 
Honesty-trustworthiness Self-Concept CFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Hon1 .519 .102 .000 People can really count on me to do the right thing. 
Hon6 .616 .080 .000 I always tell the truth. 
Hon8 .594 .095 .000 When I make a promise I keep it. 
Hon9 .679 .100 .000 I am honest 
Hon10 .608 .122 .000 Honesty is very important to me. 
Hon11 .677 .108 .000 I often tell lies. (R) 
 
Theoretical considerations. The original Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept measure 
produced two dimensions that were characterized largely by whether item-wording 
expressed admissions of dishonesty (reversed items) or professions of honesty. All of the 
items in Dimension 2 in Table 4.3 are reversed. With the single exception of Hon11 (I tell lies), 
all of the items in Dimension 1 are positively worded professions of honesty. Items in 
Dimension 1 tend, moreover, to allude to more abstract notions of ‘being honest’, whereas 
items in Dimension 2 refer to specific acts such as ‘taking things that belong to other people’, 
‘telling lies to stay out of trouble’, and ‘cheating’. This conceptual disparity is consistent with 
the theoretical argument presented in the literature review that acts involving dishonesty may 
be contextualized in students’ minds as either conventional or moral. Specific infractions may, 
even when they involve blatant deception, be viewed as part of the conventional domain, and 
may, therefore, be dissociated from moral conceptions of honesty and dishonesty (Turiel, 
2002). This application of domain theory could help explain why the idea of ‘telling lies’ (item 
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Hon11: I often tell lies) is statistically distinct from ‘lying to stay out of trouble’ (item Hon14: 
I sometimes tell lies to stay out of trouble). The six items of Dimension 1 appear, like item 
Hon11, to pertain to conceptions of honesty as a moral abstraction, whereas the four items on 
Dimension 2 query students’ judgments of specific rule-breaking behaviors. 
Conclusion. Based on the foregoing statistical and theoretical reasoning, items 
composing Dimension 2 in Table 4.3, including Hon4, Hon7, Hon12 and Hon14, were 
removed from the Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept measure. Dimension 1, which appears 
to pertain to notions of honesty as a moral abstraction, was retained for the Main Study. 
4.5.2 Performance Goal Structure 
The five-item scale Performance goal structure rendered a single dimension in EFA, and 
demonstrated passable reliability (Rho = .66) and an acceptable range of factor loadings (.336 
- .638). In CFA, however, the chi-squared statistic was significant (2(5) = 11, p = .046), and 
most other fit indicators were also unacceptable (CFI = .87; RMSEA = .114, CIlower = .014). 
Modification. Removing the weakest item (Perf36) minimally improved reliability (Rho 
= .67), but significantly improved the fit of the congeneric model (2(2) = .263, p = .877; CFI = 
1.00; RMSEA = .000, CIlower = .000).  
Theoretical considerations: Item Perf36 describes a pattern of teacher behavior that could 
be read to suggest favoritism of ‘smart’ students (My science teacher calls on smart students 
more than on other students). Other items on this scale differ from item Perf36 in that they 
specify teacher behaviors that clearly express student comparisons, such as ‘telling’ students 
how they compare, ‘pointing out’ students who make good grades, and making ‘obvious’ 
those students who do not do well. Item Perf36 may have been a weak contributor to this 
factor because its language does not expressly frame ‘calling on smarter students’ as a 
performance comparison, as is done in the other four items. 
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Table 4.5 
Performance Goal Structure CFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 
Factor loadings 
(λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Perf36 .336 .133 .012 My Science teacher calls on smart students more than on other students. 
Perf61 .552 .129 .000 My Science teacher tells us how we compare to other students. 
Perf69 .638 .112 .000 My Science teacher points out those students who get good grades as an 
example to us all. 
Perf74 .477 .151 .002 My Science teacher makes it obvious when certain students are not doing 
well on their science work 
Perf75 .626 .114 .000 My Science teacher lets us know which students get the highest scores on a 
test 
 
Conclusion. The perception that a teacher ‘calls on smart students’ may not do as much 
to imply a performance goal structure as would the perceptions of explicit comparison-
making described in the other items on this measure. Item Perf36 contributed little in the way 
of variance to the overall factor, damaged congeneric model fit, and appeared, moreover, to 
provide little unique information about a teacher’s tendency to compare and/or favor high 
performing students. Item Perf36 was, therefore, excluded from the measure of Performance 
goal structure used in the Main Study. 
4.5.3 Appropriate Workload 
The five-item scale Appropriate workload rendered a single dimension in EFA, but 
demonstrated very low reliability (Rho = .56). In CFA, factor loadings fell, moreover, 
significantly outside the acceptable range (.032 - .947), with the estimate for item Apwkld49 
failing to achieve significance (λ = .032, p = .756). Despite these issues, the congeneric model 
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managed to achieve good fit (2(5) = 1.9, p = .859; RMSEA = .000, CIlower = .000; CFI = 1.00). Low 
reliability and the poor performance of items Apwkld49 and Apwkld21, which explained very 
little variance in the factor were, however, in need of correction prior to the Main Study. 
Modification. Removing the weakest item, Apwkld49, improved reliability (Rho=.64), 
while having little effect on other fit statistics (2 = .407, p = .816; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .000, 
CIlower = .000). The range of factor loadings (.291 - .956), remained unacceptable, however, due 
to the loading of item Apwkld21 (λ = .291, p = .016), which fell below the minimum value for 
factor loadings of .300.  Removing item Apwkld21 resulted in a small negative residual 
variance for item Apwkld52 (-.033), known as a ‘Heywood case’ (Byrne, 2012), that caused the 
residual covariance matrix to be non-positive definite. The Heywood case was addressed by 
fixing the residual variance of item Apwkld52 to .00001 (Muthen & Muthen, 2014). This 
resulted in model of fit similar the models tested above (2(2) = .396, p = .820; CFI = 1.00; 
RMSEA = .000, CIlower = .000; Rho = .67), but with a very imbalanced 3-item factor structure, 
composed of a factor loading of λ = 1.00 (Apwkld52), accompanied by factor loadings of less 
than half that magnitude for Apwkld30 (λ = .405) and Apwkld35 (λ = .460). 
Theoretical considerations: Item Apwkld49 queries respondents’ evaluations of the scope 
of coverage in a given class (It seems to me that my Science teacher tries to cover too much 
material). Coverage of material could imply breadth of curriculum, as distinct from workload. 
The fact that this item failed completely to load on the factor may indicate, further, that the 
evaluations of scope of coverage are distinct from evaluations of the amount of work, which is 
the construct’s intended conception (Entwistle & Ramsden, 1983). While the breadth or scope 
of material covered in a given class seems likely to correspond to how much work is assigned, 
the judgments of the appropriateness of that amount of work are inherently subjective. The 
possibility that the breadth of coverage in a given class is unrelated to students’ perceptions 
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of how much work is appropriate is, in fact, consistent with the treatment of this factor as a 
measure of students’ felt moral obligation to work hard in the hypothesized PTLC model. 
Table 4.6 
Appropriate Workload CFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Apwkld21 .295 .125 .018 There’s a lot of pressure on you as a student in my Science class. 
Apwkld30 .417 .114 .000 The large amount of work you have to do in my Science class means 
you can’t understand it all completely. 
Apwkld35(R)  .498 .119 .000 In my Science class, we are usually given enough time to understand 
the things we have to learn. 
Apwkld49 .032 .102 .756 It seems to me that my Science teacher tries to cover too much 
material. 
Apwkld52 .947 .168 .000 The amount of work in my Science class is too large. 
 
Item Apwkld21 queries respondents’ experience of ‘pressure on students’ in a given 
class. While in tertiary contexts, for which this measure was developed, the main source of 
‘pressure ‘ in a class may be workload, in secondary contexts the pressures exerted on students 
often emanate from a wider array of sources, such as peer and disciplinary regimes. As 
suggested by its consistently low loadings, item Apwkld21 may have only partly pertained to 
respondents’ notions of workload in the Pilot Study. 
Conclusion. The measure Appropriate workload demonstrated a number of psychometric 
problems. After removing two of the five original items, factor structure remained poorly 
balanced between the highest loading item (Apwkld52) and the other two, resulting in a 
Heywood case. Reliability estimates were also uniformly low (.56 - .67). These observations 
suggested, overall, that this measure of appropriate workload may not be appropriate for the 
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American international secondary school population. The measure was tentatively retained 
for further analysis at Time 1 of the Main Study. 
 
4.5.4 Appropriate Assessment 
The four-item scale Appropriate assessment achieved a single dimension in EFA, but 
demonstrated very low reliability (Rho = .58), and generally unacceptable congeneric fit. Chi-
squared was significant (2(2) = 6.8, p = .033); CFI = .84 and RMSEA = .160 both fell wide of 
their respective cutoff thresholds; and the factor loading of Appas76 fell below the threshold 
of .300 (λ = .200, p = .259). In sum, the four-item congeneric model for Appropriate assessment 
demonstrated very poor fit. 
Modification. The weakest item, Appas76 (It would be possible to succeed in my Science 
class just by studying for tests and quizzes the night before), seems to assume that tests and 
quizzes are the only bases for success in a given class. This is, however, seldom true in 
secondary Science classes, which frequently involve writing assignments, presentations, and 
laboratory work. The item could be read, moreover, to query whether a class is easy enough 
to pass with minimal effort, rather than whether a teacher’s assessments are appropriate. 
Removing this item improved Rho reliability to .64. Fit statistics were obtained in CFA by 
constraining the two most similar residual variances, items Appas16 (My Science teacher asks 
us too many questions just about facts) and Appas17 (To do well in my Science class, all you 
really need is a good memory) to be equal, which rendered good fit (2(1) = .257, p = .612; 
RMSEA = .000, CIlower = .000;  CFI = 1.00). The 3-item factor structure was, however, markedly 
imbalanced, with a factor loading of λ = .899 (Appas47), accompanied by loadings of λ = .496 
(Appas16) and λ = .360 (Appas17), and low reliability (Rho = .64).  
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Table 4.7 
Appropriate Assessment CFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Appas16 .586 .149 .000 My Science teacher asks us too many questions just about facts. 
Appas17 .410 .133 .002 To do well in my Science class, all you really need is a good memory 
Appas47 .746 .170 .000 My Science teacher seems to care more about what you’ve memorized 
that what you’ve understood. 
Appas76 .200 .177 .259 It would be possible to succeed in my Science class just by studying for 
tests and quizzes the night before. 
 
Conclusion. The measure Appropriate assessment demonstrated very poor initial fit to 
pilot data. Dropping the weakest-loading item produced excellent fit indices, but with low 
reliability and noted weakness in the factor loading range. While these observations suggest 
that the measure Appropriate assessment may not be suitable for the student population 
presently under consideration, it was tentatively retained for further analysis at Time 1 of the 
Main Study. 
4.5.5 Transparency of Assessment 
The seven-item scale Transparency of assessment achieved a single dimension in EFA, 
and demonstrated good reliability (Rho = .82). While in CFA, the factor’s RMSEA = .092 (CIlower 
= .028), and factor loadings (.372 - .811) were acceptable, its 2 statistic was significant (2(14) 
= 24.4, p = .031), and its CFI = .93 fell below the threshold of .95.  
Modification. Removing the weakest item, Trans41 (λ = .374, p = .000) had no effect on 
reliability (Rho = .82), but improved 2 to non-significance (2(9) = 16.3, p = .0612); and while 
the point-estimate for RMSEA was unaffected by this modification (RMSEA = .092), the lower 
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bound of its confidence interval fell to .000. CFI also improved from .93 to .95, and the range 
of factor loadings remained above the established limit (.447 - .801). 
Table 4.8 
Transparency of Assessment CFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Trans22 .441 .111 .000 I know what is needed to successfully accomplish graded 
assignments in my Science class. 
Trans28 .594 .057 .000 I understand the purpose of graded assignments in my Science class. 
Trans32 .811 .053 .000 I understand what is needed in all graded assignments in my Science 
class. 
Trans41 .374 .112 .000 I am told in advance WHY I am being asked to do graded 
assignments in my Science class. 
Trans45 .670 .082 .000 I am told WHAT science topics and information I will be graded on 
in my Science class. 
Trans63 .679 .083 .000 I am told in advance WHEN I will be graded in my Science class. 
Trans66 .772 .055 .000 I know in advance HOW I will be graded in my Science class. 
 
Theoretical considerations. Item Trans41 is one of two items on this scale that pertains to 
whether students understand the purposes of graded assignments in science class (I am told 
in advance WHY I am being asked to do graded assignments in my Science class). Item 
Trans28 asks students to respond to a very similar statement (I understand the purpose of 
graded assignments in my Science class). The key difference between these two items appears 
to be whether students are ‘told in advance’, or whether they more broadly ‘understand’ the 
purpose of graded assignments. Item Trans28 (λ = .594, p = .000) explained more than twice 
as much variance in the factor (R2 = .353) as Trans41 (R2 = .140), which may have reflected this 
broader language. 
Conclusion. Determining whether students are ‘told in advance’ appears to arbitrarily 
privilege a single aspect of how students may come to understand why graded assignments 
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are assigned. Item Trans41 contributed, as such, little in the way of variance or unique 
information about whether students understand the purpose of graded assignments in science 
class and was, therefore, eliminated from the Transparency of assessment measure used in the 
Main Study. 
4.5.6 Peer Norms Related to Cheating 
The seven-item measure Peer norms achieved a single dimension in EFA, and 
demonstrated good reliability (Rho = .88). In CFA, however, the fit of the congeneric model 
was unacceptable. The 2 statistic was highly significant (2(14) = 33.1, p = .003); and RMSEA 
= .123, and its lower confidence interval of .071, fell considerably wide of thresholds for 
appropriate fit in the Pilot Study. CFI = .91 also fell below the threshold of .95.  
Modification. Since the two weakest items in this model, Peer51 and Peer65, had 
identical factor loadings (λ = .568, p = .000), the removal of each was explored, separately. 
Removal of Peer51, which had the greatest positive effect on model fit, did not affect reliability 
(Rho = .88), but did improve CFI to .95; yet while both RMSEA and its lower confidence 
interval improved, the former still exceeded the threshold (RMSEA = .107, CILower = .036), and 
2 remained significant (2(9) = 18.9, p = .026).  
When peer65 was removed, while still retaining peer51, there was, again, no effect on 
reliability (Rho = .88). Other fit statistics, however, either deteriorated or demonstrated 
marginal improvement. 2 was still significant (2(9) = 22.9, p = .007); RMSEA increased 
(RMSEA = .127, CILower = .063); and CFI improved marginally, from .92 to .93. 
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Table 4.9 
Peer Norms CFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Peer24(R) .814 .041 .000 Most of my classmates think that I should NOT cheat in Science class. 
Peer31(R) .699 .071 .000 My classmates will look down on me if I cheat in Science class this 
year. 
Peer40(R) .706 .075 .000 None of my classmates think it is okay to cheat in my Science class. 
Peer51  .568 .077 .000 Most of my classmates expect me to cheat in my Science class this year. 
Peer55  .760 .055 .000 Most of my classmates in Science class this year would be willing to 
cheat on a Science test to avoid failing. 
Peer58 .841 .050 .000 If I cheated on a Science test this year, most of my classmates would 
think that’s okay. 
Peer65(R) .568 .108 .000 Most of my classmates would NOT think it’s okay if I cheated in 
Science class this year. 
 
The possibility of removing both Peer51 and Peer65 was explored next. Removal of 
both items had no effect on reliability (.88) but improved CFI to .96. The change in RMSEA 
was, however, still only a marginal improvement over the original 7-item factor model 
(RMSEA = .114, CILower = .011); and 2, while improved, was still significant (2(5) = 11.2, p = 
.048). 
The factor was next analyzed without each of the remaining non-reversed items, 
Peer55 and Peer58, in turn. As in the case of the four items removed from the Honesty-
trustworthiness self-concept measure, method effects are often associated with reversed items 
(Marsh et al., 2013). While CFA indicated that removing either Peer55 or Peer58, in addition 
to Peer51, resulted in acceptable fit, removing the combination of Peer51 and Peer55 generated 
the best fit, overall. While the reliability of this 5-item factor (.86) was slightly lower than the 
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original 7-item factor (.88), 2 improved dramatically (2(5) = 4.41, p = .492); and other fit 
statistics fell comfortably within established limits (RMSEA = .000, CILower = .011; CFI = 1.00).  
Theoretical considerations. Items Peer51 (Most of my classmates expect me to cheat in 
my Science class this year) and Peer55 (Most of my classmates in Science class this year would 
be willing to cheat on a Science test to avoid failing) both refer to anticipated behaviors, either 
on the part of the respondent or on the part of his or her peers. Every other item in the measure 
refers, by contrast, to how the respondent believes her or his peers would judge cheating. 
While all of these items share a common referent, i.e. cheating, they appear to represent two 
sides of the well-known discrepancy between behaviors and beliefs, or the ‘belief-behavior 
incongruity’ (BBI) (Bergman, 2002; Stephens & Nicholson, 2008). The significant 2 
distribution for the original 7-item model, indicated by both the highly significant 2 statistic 
and the inflated RMSEA statistic, appeared to reflect this incongruous combination of items 
that pertain to anticipated cheating behavior versus those that pertain to judgments of whether 
cheating is right or wrong. 
Conclusion. Items Peer51 and Peer55 appear to represent the behavioral component of 
the BBI, whereas the other items in the measure appear to pertain to beliefs. While both items 
had large and significant loadings on the overall factor, removing them greatly improved its 
2 distribution. Both items were, therefore, removed from the Peer Norms measure used in the 
Main Study. 
4.5.7 Experience of Classroom Rules 
The six-item scale Experience of classroom rules rendered a single dimension in EFA, and 
was acceptably reliable (Rho = .76). While in CFA, the congeneric model demonstrated 
satisfactory fit according to most measures (2(9) = 15.2, p = .085; RMSEA = .085, CIlower = .000), 
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and factor loadings that fell within an acceptable range (.494 - .726), an unacceptable degree 
of misfit was indicated by the CFI statistic (CFI = .94), which fell below the threshold of .95.  
Modification. Removing the item with the lowest loading, Exrule59 (see Table 4.10), 
increased CFI to .95 with no effect on reliability (.76) and minimal effect on other fit statistics 
(2(5) = 9.5, p = .092; RMSEA = .096, CIlower = .000). The range of factor loadings for the modified 
factor also remained above the threshold level (.557 - .686).  
Table 4.10 
Experience of Classroom Rules CFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Exrule20 .534 .092 .000 The rules in my Science class are fair. 
Exrule23 .592 .101 .000 My Science teacher makes sure that everyone follows the rules in class. 
Exrule27 .726 .088 .000 If a student breaks the rules in my Science class, the teacher will do 
something about it. 
Exrule43 .632 .105 .000 If a rule is broken in my Science class, students know what the teacher 
will do about it. 
Exrule54 .611 .091 .000 Everyone knows the rules for how students should behave in my 
Science class. 
Exrule59 .494 .105 .000 The punishment for breaking rules in my Science class is the same no 
matter who you are. 
 
Theoretical considerations. While Exrule59 shares in common with most other items on 
this measure the themes of fairness and consistency, it is the only item to explicitly mention 
punishment (The punishment for breaking rules in my Science class is the same no matter 
who you are). Item Exrule59 is, therefore, only able to characterize teachers who routinely 
punish students for breaking rules. The lack of clarity around how item Exrule59 pertains to 
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teachers who embrace positive and supportive forms of behaviour management (e.g. Sugai & 
Horner, 2002) may have been a source of misfit in the congeneric model for this measure.  
Conclusion. Querying students’ experience of punishment does not necessarily 
conform to their experience of rules in a given classroom. For students whose teachers strive 
to manage behavior in non-punitive ways, item Exrule59 may have been a source of model 
misfit. Item Exrule59 was, therefore, eliminated from the measure of Experience of classroom 
rules used in the Main Study. 
4.5.8 Surface Learning Strategies 
The measure Surface learning strategies, developed by Simon, Dewitte, and Lens (2004), 
rendered two dimensions in EFA. The original measure included six items describing three 
surface strategies: memorizing what is not understood, strategically skipping information, 
and rehearsing information so as to be able to reproduce it. The two items that formed 
Dimension 2, Surf82 and Surf90, described the third of these strategies, rehearsing (I study for 
Science class by rehearsing (repeating over and over) important information; and, I study for 
Science class by rehearsing and repeating the material over and over until I can write it exactly, 
word-for-word).  
Modification. While Dimension 1 appeared to be the better of the two measures of 
Surface learning strategies, it was not certain that removing both items Surf82 and Surf90 was 
necessary or helpful. For this reason, the advised number of dimensions was ascertained by 
EFA when each of the items in question was removed, respectively. When Surf82 was 
removed, 2 Dimensions were still advised. When Surf90 was removed, and Surf82 retained, 
however, a single dimension was advised. A CFA of this latter modification is discussed 
below. 
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The removal of item Surf90 rendered a factor of passable reliability (Rho=.61), and 
acceptable fit with respect to other statistics (2(5) = 6.74, p = .241; RMSEA = .060, CIlower < .000; 
CFI = .95). Factor loadings were, however, outside the acceptable range (.169-.801), with the 
estimate for item Surf82 failing to achieve significance (λ = .169, p = .222). 
Dimension 1 of the original EFA presented in Table 4.11, which excludes both Surf82 
and Surf90, rendered a factor of improved reliability (Rho = .65), acceptable fit (2(2) = 3.43, p 
= .180; RMSEA = .083, CIlower = .000; CFI = .96), and factor loadings within the acceptable range 
(.325 - .798). While both of the items that compose Dimension 2 were strongly correlated with 
each other, Dimension 2 was not appropriate for structural equation modelling for two 
Table 4.11 
Surface Learning Strategies EFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 EFA  
 2 dimensions advised  
Item 
Dimension 
1 
R2 
 
Dimension 
2 
R2 Item wording 
Surf82 .173 .03  .541 .29 I study for Science class by rehearsing and repeating 
the material over and over again until I can write it 
exactly, word-for-word. 
Surf87 .559 .31  .168 .03 I study for Science class by skipping parts I do not 
understand. 
Surf88 .362 .13  .283 .08 I study for Science class by memorizing things I do 
not understand. 
Surf90 -.153 .02  .629 .40 I study for Science class by rehearsing (repeating 
over and over) important information. 
Surf91 .777 .60  -.012 .00 I study for Science class by skipping over parts I 
think the teacher will not ask questions about. 
Surf97 .620 .38  -.151 .02 I study for Science by skipping parts I do not find 
important. 
Chapter 4 Pilot Study│142 
 
 
reasons: (1) it was not clear that these two items would suffice in terms of content validity for 
measuring rehearsing as a learning strategy; and (2) congeneric models with fewer than three 
items have negative degrees of freedom and cannot, therefore, be modelled straightforwardly. 
 
Table 4.12 
Surface Learning Strategies CFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Surf87 .520 .119 .000 I study for Science class by skipping parts I do not understand. 
Surf88 .325 .130 .013 I study for Science class by memorizing things I do not understand. 
Surf91 .798 .141 .000 I study for Science class by skipping over parts I think the teacher will 
not ask questions about. 
Surf97 .630 .084 .000 I study for Science by skipping parts I do not find important. 
 
Theoretical considerations. The four items composing Dimension 1 measure two 
common surface learning strategies: memorizing what is not understood, and skipping 
portions of assigned materials that are deemed unlikely to appear on tests, in order to 
minimize workload. Another prominent surface strategy instrument, the Study Process 
Questionnaire (SPQ) (Biggs et al., 2001), also consists, for the sake of comparison, exclusively 
of items describing memorization and minimizing the scope of study.  
Conclusion. Based on the foregoing statistical and theoretical reasoning, the Surface 
learning strategies measure used in the Main Study was reduced to Dimension 1 in Table 4.12, 
which includes items Surf87, Surf88, Surf91, and Surf97. 
4.5.9 Deep Learning Strategies 
The seven-item scale Deep learning strategies achieved a single dimension in EFA, and 
demonstrated good reliability (Rho = .83). In CFA, while RMSEA = .095, CIlower = .034, and the 
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range of factor loadings (.406 - .800) were acceptable, two statistics indicated misfit. The 2 
statistic was significant (2(14) = 26.2, p = .025); and CFI = .93 fell beneath the established 
threshold of .95. 
Table 4.13 
Deep Learning Strategies CFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Deep80 .406 .102 .000 
I spend some time thinking about how to do my Science work before I 
start it. 
Deep81 .673 .073 .000 I ask myself questions when I work on Science to make sure I understand. 
Deep83 .790 .053 .000 I try to connect new work in Science to what I’ve learned before. 
Deep85 .607 .102 .000 
When working on a Science problem, I try to see how it connects with 
something in everyday life. 
Deep93 .662 .073 .000 I take my time to figure out my work in Science. 
Deep94 .800 .045 .000 When I make mistakes in Science, I try to figure out why. 
Deep96 .496 .083 .000 If I can’t solve a Science problem one way, I try to use a different way. 
 
Modification. Removing the item that contributed the least variance to the overall factor 
(Deep80) (see Table 4.13) had no effect on reliability (.83), but did improve fit (2(9) = 10.9, p = 
.285); CFI = .99; RMSEA = .046, CIlower = .000). The range of factor loadings for the 6-item factor 
was, moreover, well above the threshold (.508 - .837). 
Theoretical considerations: Item Deep80 pertains to whether students plan how to do 
work in Science class (I spend some time thinking about how to do my Science work before I 
start it). Other items on this scale are, by contrast, more specific as to how a respondent ‘does’ 
work in terms of self-questioning, active connection-making, self-correction, and applications 
of time and effort to understanding. The strategies that students plan before doing school 
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work could, in fact, be of a deep or surface character. The activity of ‘thinking about how to 
do work’ may be too broad to necessarily connote deep learning strategies. 
Conclusion: The fact that students think about their work before they start it does not 
necessarily mean that they will engage in deep learning strategies. Item Deep80 appeared, 
therefore, to be a weak contributor to the overall factor in that students may spend time 
planning to do work in a variety of ways that are not ‘deep’. Item Deep80 was, as such, 
removed from the Deep learning strategies measure used in the Main Study.  
4.5.10 Justifiability of Cheating 
The four-item scale Justifiability of cheating achieved a single dimension in EFA, and 
demonstrated acceptable reliability (.76). In CFA, while factor loadings appeared robust (.560 
- .964), the 2 statistic for the congeneric model was highly significant (2(2) = 14.5,  p < .000); 
RMSEA and the lower bound of its confidence interval were also more than twice the 
threshold (RMSEA = .260, CIlower = .146); and CFI = .90 was also below the minimum of .95.   
Modification. The four-item measure for Justifiability of cheating presented in Table 4.14 
included items from the original measure (Chjust86 and Chjust99) that have been used in 
previous secondary-level studies conducted by Murdock and various colleagues (2004, 2008); 
a third item (Chjust79) that was adapted from a scale used by Anderman et al. (1998), upon 
which Murdock’s aforementioned research built; and a fourth item that was developed strictly 
for the purpose of this study (Chjust98). 
Removing the item that was developed a priori for use in this project (Chjust98) 
retained the three items that have been used successfully in prior, secondary-level research. 
This three-item measure demonstrated good reliability (.80), and a robust range of factor 
loadings (.554 - .930). Fit statistics for the three-item measure were obtained by constraining 
the residual variances of items Chujst79 and Chjust86, which were closest in magnitude, to be 
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equal. This produced a single degree of freedom, and rendered a congeneric model of 
excellent fit (2  = .690, p = .406; RMSEA = .000, CIlower = .000; CFI = 1.00). 
 
Theoretical considerations: Item Chjust98 queries the ‘understandability’ of cheating in 
the context of Science class, whereas the other three items on the Justifiability of cheating 
measure refer specifically to whether, in the respondent’s opinion, students have valid 
‘reasons’ to cheat in that context. In contrast, item Chjust98 was developed based on the 
assumption that cheating is ‘understandable’ to the extent that there are reasons to cheat. This 
assumption appears to have been flawed. Understandability may, in fact, draw upon a 
different realm of consideration than reasonability. Cheating might, for instance, be 
understandable in view of an individual’s established habits or susceptibility to temptation. 
It might be possible to understand why someone cheats, in other words, without agreeing that 
they have valid reasons for cheating. It is possible that the discrepant chi-squared distribution 
for this model, evidenced by both the highly significant chi-squared statistic and the inflated 
RMSEA statistic, reflected the conceptual disparity, created by the inclusion of item Cheat98, 
between understandability and reasonability.  
Table 4.14 
Justifiability of Cheating CFA, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Chjust79 .751 .041 .000 It’s reasonable to cheat in my Science class. 
Chjust86 .964 .049 .000 
Students would have a good reason to cheat on a test in my Science 
class. 
Chjust98 .743 .055 .000 I can understand why students would cheat in my Science class. 
Chjust99 .560 .099 .000 Students would be justified to cheat on an exam in my Science class. 
Chapter 4 Pilot Study│146 
 
 
Conclusion: Inasmuch as one can understand why someone cheats, without believing 
that their cheating is justifiable for valid reasons, the inclusion of an item that queries 
understandability appears to be poorly suited for this measure. Item Chjust98 was, therefore, 
removed from the Justifiability of cheating measure used in the Main Study. 
4.5.11 Self-Reported Cheating 
The four-item measure for Self-reported cheating achieved a single dimension in EFA, 
and demonstrated good reliability (Rho = .89). In CFA, factor loadings were robust (.750 - 
.914), and the 2 statistic was non-significant (2(2) = 5, p = .083). However, incremental fit 
indices of CFI = .94 and RMSEA = .127 fell short of established limits. 
 
Modification. The measure Self-reported cheating was originally composed of four items, 
of which three (Cheat84, Cheat92, and Cheat95) constituted a measure developed by Midgley 
et al. (2000) that has been used in prior studies (Murdock et al., 2001; Brown-Wright et al., 
2013). A fourth item (Cheat89), adapted from a measure used in secondary-level studies by 
Anderman and various colleagues (1998, 2004, 2010), was added as a safeguard against 
possible measure dysfunction (see Appendix C). 
Table 4.15 
Self-Reported Cheating CFA,  Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Cheat84 .809 .074 .000 I sometimes cheat on Science tests this year. 
Cheat89 .802 .084 .000 I have cheated in Science class this year. 
Cheat92 .914 .063 .000 I sometimes cheat on my Science work this year. 
Cheat95 .750 .095 .000 I have cheated on Science class work by copying answers from other 
students this year. 
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Removing item Cheat89 reverted to the original three-item measure developed by 
Midgley et al. (2000), which had good reliability (.87), and robust factor loadings (.750 - .914). 
Fit statistics for the three-item measure were obtained by constraining the residual variances 
of items Cheat84 and Cheat95, which were closest in magnitude, to be equal. This produced a 
single degree of freedom, and rendered a congeneric model of excellent fit (2(1) = .016, p = 
.900; RMSEA = .000, CIlower = .000;  CFI = 1.00). 
Conclusion. Item Cheat89, which was added for the purposes of the present study, 
served only to detract from the measure Self-reported cheating originally developed by Midgley 
et al. (2000), and was, therefore, excluded from the Main Study. 
4.5.12 Summary of fit statistics for modified measures 
The purpose of the congeneric model analyses presented in this section was to identify 
prominent model misfit and modify measures accordingly, so as to avoid, inasmuch as 
possible, the need for post-hoc modifications during the Main Study. Based on the foregoing 
analyses, seventeen of the 99 items on the original questionnaire instrument were eliminated 
for the Main Study. 
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Table 4.16 
Modified measures: Summary of EFA and CFA fit statistics, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
            
 EFA  CFA 
       RMSEA   
 Scale (# items) 
Advised 
dimensions   2 p df 
Loading 
range Value 
Low 
90%CI 
High 
90%CI CFI Rho 
Subject self-concept (5)  1  9.3 .099 5 .704-.885 .097 .000 .190 .98 .89 
Honesty-trust. self-concept* (6) 1  11.1 .270 9 .640-.779 .049 .000 .131 .99 .84 
Performance structure* (4) 1  .263 .877 2 .423-.674 .000 .000 .100 1.00 .67 
Mastery structure (5) 1  2.2 .815 5 .613-.854 .000 .000 .089 1.00 .85 
Appropriate workload* (3) 1  .396 .820 1 .405-1.00 .000 .000 .121 1.00 .67 
Good teaching (8) 1  16.9 .661 20 .493-.846 .000 .000 .076 1.00 .91 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) 1  1.0 .600 2 .667-.931 .000 .000 .167 1.00 .87 
Clear goals and standards (5) 1  3.1 .678 5 .546-.776 .000 .000 .112 1.00 .78 
Appropriate assessment* (3) 1  .257 .612 1 .360-.899 .000 .000 .215 1.00 .64 
Transparency of assessment* (6) 1  16.3 .061 9 .460-.831 .092 .000 .162 .95 .82 
Authenticity of assessment (7) 1  18.1 .204 14 .484-.782 .060 .000 .122 .97 .82 
Peer norms* (5) 1  4.4 .492 5 .534-.713 .000 .000 .133 1.00 .86 
Experience classroom rules* (5) 1  9.5 .092 5 .557-.686 .096 .000 .156 .95 .76 
Surface learning strategies* (4) 1  3.4 .180 2 .325-.798 .086 .000 .237 .96 .66 
Deep learning strategies* (6) 1  10.9 .285 14 .508-.806 .046 .000 .129 .99 .83 
Justifiability of cheating* (3) 1  .690 .460 1 .664-881 .000 .000 .252 1.00 .80 
Self-reported cheating* (3) 1   .480 .785 2 .750-.914 .000 .000 .131 1.00 .87 
* Modified scales  
 
4.6 Correlational analysis  
The correlation matrix presented in Table 4.17 was estimated next in order to identify 
multicollinearity between variables. Very high correlations between variables, or 
multicollinearity, can lead to spurious results in SEM by falsely inflating beta paths (Field, 
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2009; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). Instances of high multicollinearity (r > .750) in Table 4.17 
were thus addressed by either dropping measures or including them in a higher-order factor 
structures. 
A complete correlation matrix of seventeen latent variables cannot be estimated as a 
structural model with only 96 cases, because the number of free model parameters would 
exceed the number of cases. The correlation matrix in Table 4.17 was, therefore, estimated in 
SPSS using composite scores, which meant that latent factor loadings and error variances were 
not used. Field (2009) suggests that correlations of r > .800 should be considered 
multicollinear. For the purposes of this analysis, however, in which the omission of factor 
loadings and error variances is likely to reduce the magnitude of correlations between factors, 
the threshold for what was considered multicollinear correlations was lowered to r > .750.  
The matrix in Table 4.17 presents all bivariate correlations among seventeen composite 
latent factors. Seven of these factors appeared to form a cluster with correlations of .750 or 
greater (highlighted in Table 4.17), including Clear goals and standards (Goals), Mastery 
classroom structure (Mast), Authenticity of assessment (Auth), Transparency of assessment (Trans), 
Experience of classroom rules (Exrule), Appropriate assessment (Appas), and Good teaching 
(Gteach). The factors in this cluster will either be dropped from the model due to the 
redundancy implied by extreme multicollinearity, or be fitted into a higher-order factor 
structure. 
Chapter 4 Pilot Study│150 
 
 
Table 4.17 
Bivariate Correlations among Variables in Model 1, Pilot Study (N = 96) 
 SUB HON PERF MAST GOALS GTEACH APWKLD CURUSE APPAS AUTH TRANS EXRULE PEER DEEP SURF CHJUST 
SUB 1                
HON .256* 1               
PERF -.037 .059 1              
MAST .400** .331** .119 1             
GOALS .416** .335** .010 .786** 1            
GTEACH .344** .312** .122 .877** .851** 1           
APWKLD .499** .172 -.058 .513** .485** .432** 1          
CURUSE .425** .265** .102 .670** .589** .606** .456** 1         
APPAS .176 .083 -.334* .811** .813** .792** .486** .455** 1        
AUTH .405** .314** .030 .726** .742** .765** .370** .679** .707** 1       
TRANS .383** .323** .061 .719** .792** .785** .494** .658** .755** .785** 1      
EXRULE .316** .425** .007 .703** .765** .777** .344** .572** -.273** .767** .752** 1     
PEER -.118 -.142 .016 -.280** -.361** -.353** -.368** -.340** -.306* -.398** -.393** -.400** 1    
DEEP .464** .293** .098 .624** .551** .612** .480** .602** .711** .594** .611** .575** -.270** 1   
SURF -.470** -.192 .111 -.259* -.298** -.271** -.331** -.202* -.446* -.318** -.315** -.271** .038 -.413** 1  
CHJUST -.369** -.365** .014 -.519** -.590** -.569** -.497** -.475** -.466** -.559** -.630** -.626** .633** -.591** .269** 1 
CHEAT -.213* -.262** .005 -.363** -.449** -.435** -.324** -.376** -.355* -.462** -.524** -.486** .517** -.440** .302** .709** 
 *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
SUB= Subject Self-Concept, HON= Honesty-Trustworthiness Self-Concept, PERF= Performance Goal Structure, MAST= Mastery Goal Structure, GOALS= Clear 
Goals and Standards, GTEACH= Good Teaching, APWKLD= Appropriate Workload, CURUSE= Usefulness of Curriculum, APPAS = Appropriate assessment; 
AUTH= Authenticity of Assessment, TRANS= Transparency of Assessment, EXRULE= Experience of Classroom Rules, PEER= Peer Norms Related to Cheating, 
DEEP= Deep Learning Strategies, SURF= Surface Learning Strategies, CHJUST= Justifiability of Cheating, CHEAT= Self-Reported Cheating. 
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4.6.1 Higher-order factor analysis  
A higher-order latent factor represents the hypothesis that two or more first-order 
latent factors, or those measured with observed variables, can be explained in terms of a 
single, shared source of variance (see Figure 4.2). Higher-order factors are often hypothesized 
for multicollinear groups of factors, where the large amounts of statistical overlap among 
them are believed to reflect the higher-order variance source. Higher-order factors are, as 
such, measured indirectly, by way of the first-order variables they explain (Kline, 2011). 
A second-order factor model for all seven multicollinear variables in Table 4.17, 
estimated with weighted composite scores, demonstrated unacceptably high RMSEA (2(14) 
= 32, p = .004; RMSEA = .116, CIlower = .063; CFI = .97; SRMR = .034). Good teaching was the 
defining variable in this structure, with an unstandardized loading of λ = 1.000. Mastery goal 
structure and Clear goals and standards, which had the second and third highest loadings (λ = 
.944 and λ = .856), contributed little unique variance, however, due to high multicollinearity 
with Good teaching (r = .877 and r = .851, respectively). Removing these latter two factors 
improved parsimony, but did not improve RMSEA (.132). Of the five remaining factors, 
Appropriate assessment had the lowest reliability (.64) and weakest factor loadings in the 
preceding congeneric analyses. Dropping Appropriate assessment rendered an excellent 
second-order model (2(2) = .892, p = .640; RMSEA = .000, CIlower = .000; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = 
.006) (see Figure 4.2). The four factors retained in this model captured three distinct 
dimensions of ‘teacher quality’: pedagogical skill, assessment quality, and behavior 
management. 
 Small sample correction. The second-order factor structure reported above for Teacher 
quality was next cross-validated by estimating it with all observed variables (instead of 
composite scores). This entailed 82 free model parameters, which biased fit statistics due to 
the small sample size (2(295) = 468; RMSEA = .078, CIlower = .065; CFI = .85; SRMR = .065) 
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(Herzog et al., 2007). The Swain-R, version 1.2 small sample adjustment software package 
(Boomsma & Herzog, 2013) was used to correct this bias, and demonstrate that the model for 
Teacher quality fit the pilot data when estimated with all observed variables (2(295) = 420; 
RMSEA = .067, CIlower = .051; CFI = .90; SRMR = .065). 
 Target coefficient. The second-order model for Teacher quality was next tested for its 
ability to account for the covariances between the four first-order factors it comprised, using 
a fit index introduced by Marsh and Hocevar (1985) known as the ‘target coefficient’ (see also 
Cheung, 2000; Cheung & Ng, 2000; Spencer, Barrett & Turner, 2003). The target coefficient 
(TC) for a second-order model is calculated as “the ratio of the chi-square of the first-order 
model to the chi-square value of the more restrictive [second-order] model” (Marsh and 
Hocevar, 1985, p. 571). The TC is scaled, as such, from 0 – 1, where a value of 1 indicates that 
the second-order structure accounts perfectly for the covariance among factors in the first-
order model. Comparing the chi-squared value of 2(293) = 468.119 (Swain corrected 2(293) 
= 419.53) for the four-factor, first-order model to the chi-squared value of 2(295) = 467.970 
(Swain corrected 2(295) = 419.54) for the second-order factor model produced a TC of 1.00, 
which strongly supported the structural validity of Teacher quality. 
 
Figure 4.2. The confirmatory factor model for the higher-order factor Teacher quality. 
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The measures Mastery goal structure and Clear goals and standards contributed very little 
unique variance to the initial second-order factor structure, due to their extremely high 
correlations with Good teaching. Removing these two items improved parsimony, but rendered 
a second-order factor structure with unacceptably high RMSEA. When the measure 
Appropriate assessment was additionally removed, the second-order factor achieved good fit to 
the pilot data. The four remaining first-order factors formed a parsimonious second-order 
structure that represented three distinct dimensions of teacher quality: pedagogical skill, 
assessment quality, and behavior management.  
4.7 Model 2  
 The originally hypothesized PTLC model (Model 1) was revised significantly based 
on the foregoing Pilot Study. The revised PTLC model was dubbed Model 2; see Figure 4.3). 
         Presage                  Process             Product  
        Person   Context   Moral obligation         Behavior 
 
Figure 4.3. Model 2: The revised hypothesized PTLC structural model, situated within the 3-P 
Model framework (Biggs, 1993; Biggs et al., 2001), including all modifications made based on 
the results of congeneric modeling and analysis of the bivariate correlation matrix.  
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Removing Appropriate assessment, Mastery goal structure, and Clear goals and standards, 
from Model 1 reduced the number of first-order factors in Model 2 to fourteen. Multicollinear 
relations between Authenticity and Transparency of assessment, Good teaching, and Experience of 
classroom rules were additionally modeled as a single higher-order factor.  
4.8 Chapter summary 
 The purpose of the Pilot Study was to test and refine the set of measures included in 
the original hypothesized PTLC model. Analysis proceeded in two stages: (1) congeneric 
model analysis, (2) correlational analysis, and (3) higher-order factor analysis. The congeneric 
model of each measure included on the original questionnaire instrument for this study was 
tested for fit, and, where necessary, modified. Modified congeneric models were then used to 
create weighted composite scores for the purpose of estimating a correlation matrix for the 
measurement model.  
 Correlational analysis in section 4.6 identified a cluster of seven multicollinear factors 
that appeared to represent aspects of students’ perceptions of teacher quality. Two of these 
factors were removed due to extreme multicollinearity. A third (Appropriate assessment) was 
removed as a likely source of misfit in the second-order model. The resulting second-order 
factor structure, dubbed ‘Teacher quality’, was retained in Model 2.
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CHAPTER 5  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used in the present study to test a set of 
causal hypotheses implied by the PTLC perspective on academic disintegrity developed in 
Chapter Three. Data was collected from a diverse sample of secondary students at American-
curriculum international schools located outside of the United States, at two time points, 
separated by approximately twelve months. These data were used to assess the psychometric 
properties of the hypothesized measurement model, and to estimate the hypothesized 
structural model. Following cross-sectional analyses, matched samples from Times 1 and 2 
were used to estimate an autoregressive longitudinal model.  
5.1 Causal language 
The use of causal language in SEM studies has been identified as a significant problem 
in educational research (Robinson, Levin, Thomas, et al., 2007). Scholars generally agree that 
non-experimental methodologies, such as SEM, are inappropriate for inferring causality 
(Biddle & Martin, 1987; Kline, 2009; Martin, 2011). Yet the use of causal language in reference 
to structural models is widespread for a variety of more and less appropriate reasons (Biddle 
& Martin, 1987; Robinson et al., 2007). Mueller and Hancock (2010) argue that an appropriate 
basis for using causal language in SEM research is when it “is done from within the context of the 
particular causal theory proposed and the possibility/probability of alternative explanations is 
raised unequivocally [italics in original]” (p.382). Causal language may, in other words, be 
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appropriate when grounded in a defensible causal theory that has directly informed a 
structural model. Discussing a model in causal terms may be more appropriate, for instance, 
when the hypotheses it tests arise from experimental studies in which (1) cause-effect relations 
have been isolated from third variable effects, (2) the temporal precedence of the cause over 
the effect is established, and (3) the direction of causality (A  B; not A  B) is determined 
(Kline, 2011; Mulaik, 2009; Pearl, 2000). 
Experimental studies heavily inform the PTLC model. These studies indicate that 
dishonest behavior is determined in part by moral self-concept (Ariely, 2012; Gino et al., 2011; 
Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2011), and in academic spheres by perceptions of teacher 
quality (Day et al., 2011; Murdock & Anderman, 2006; Murdock et al., 2004, 2007), extrinsic 
and performance goal structures (Lobel & Levanon, 1988; Mills, 1958; Shelton & Hill, 1969; 
Taylor & Lewit, 1966), and perceived peer behaviors (Gino et al., 2009; Walker et al., 1966). 
The implications of these findings were incorporated in the hypothesized model as measures 
for Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept, the higher order factor for Teacher quality, Performance 
goal structure, and Peer norms, respectively. These factors were hypothesized, moreover, to 
predict the degree of moral obligation students feel to work hard and be honest in a manner 
consistent with non-rational contractarian intuition. This overarching hypothesis is supported 
by experimental findings that judgments of morality and justice tend to be heavily influenced 
by non-rational mental processes (Boles et al., 2000; Gino & Pierce, 2009; Gneezy, 2005; Pillutla 
& Murninghan, 1996; Shalvi et al., 2012), such as social contract thinking (Cosmides, 1989; 
Knoch et al., 2006).  
The present study was designed to test hypotheses that reflect relations theorized to 
be of a causal nature. While its non-experimental, passive-observational SEM research design 
was not appropriate for inferring causality, the hypothetical model was heavily grounded in 
prior experimental research. This considerably strengthened the rationale for advised use of 
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causal language in the present study by meeting Mueller and Hancock’s (2010) 
abovementioned stipulation that such language be situated within the context of causal 
theory. 
5.2 Outline of empirical analyses 
The first analyses of data related to this research were conducted in a planned pilot 
study (see Chapter Four) focused on ensuring the psychometric validity and reliability of 
measures in the hypothesized measurement model. Measures that demonstrated poor fit or 
reliability, or that were multicollinear with other measures, were either modified, dropped, 
or combined into second-order factors. The result of these changes to Model 1 was dubbed 
Model 2 (see Figure 4.3).  
Structural modeling of Main Study data utilized a two-phase approach described by 
Mueller and Hancock (2010). In Phase One, basic descriptive properties of latent factor 
measures comprised by Model 2 were analyzed, both individually and in groups, using 
version 21 of the SPSS statistics package and version 7.11 of the Mplus statistical modeling 
program. The reliability of individual measures was assessed with a method devised by 
Raykov (2004, 2009) that takes into account the weighted contributions of individual scale 
items. Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were then conducted of one-factor, ‘congeneric’, 
models, followed by analyses of the full multivariate measurement model. CFA was also used 
to test multi-group factorial invariance across gender and grade-level groups, and finally to 
identify differences in factor means related to demographic variables such as English 
proficiency and parental educational attainment, in a multiple-indicators multiple-causes 
(MIMIC) model. 
Congeneric factor model misfit detected in Phase One was addressed by either 
dropping or modifying measures. Prevalent differences in factor means occurring across 
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groups were addressed by incorporating grouping variables into the hypothesized model. 
These changes to Model 2 resulted in Model 3 (see Figure 6.1).  
Phase Two of the modeling process involved analysis of the structural characteristics 
of Model 3. Factorial non-invariance across gender groups detected in Phase One prompted 
analyzing the model with gender-specific data prior to estimating it with the combined, or 
‘co-ed’ sample. Prominent differences between male and female structural models were noted 
at Times 1 and 2. 
5.2.1 Missing data 
Questionnaires were administered online and by paper. Respondents to online 
questionnaires provided uniformly complete data sets, as attempting to leave an item 
unanswered triggered a prompt to respond, and prevented a respondent’s progress to the 
next question. Incomplete electronic questionnaires occurred only when participants simply 
quit at some point during the questionnaire, leaving the subsequent sections blank. There was 
a limited amount of missing data on paper-based questionnaires. Sixty paper-based 
questionnaires including missing data were completed at Time 1, and 20 at Time 2. Data 
screening at both times entailed eliminating a handful of obviously invalid answer sets (e.g., 
all 5s), and all incomplete electronic questionnaires. Data missing from paper-based 
questionnaires was imputed using the Multiple Imputation function in SPSS. 
Paper-based data were first tested, at both times, to ensure that data was missing at 
random. When the randomness of missing data was tested for these samples as wholes, 
Little’s ‘missing completely at random’ (MCAR) test was highly significant, indicating that 
data was not missing at random. When the data from paper-based questionnaires were 
analyzed separately, however, Little’s MCAR test was non-significant at both Time 1 (2 = 
71.417, df = 1846, p = 1.000) and Time 2 (2 = .000, df = 176, p = 1.000). This indicated that, among 
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paper-based questionnaires, data was missing completely at random. Missing data 
imputation could, therefore, proceed. 
5.3 Participants 
5.3.1 Time 1 sample 
Time 1 data was collected by questionnaire during May and June of 2012 (the end of 
the 2011-2012 school year for participating schools). 493 students completed questionnaires, 
of which 201 were male, 292 were female; 277 were in Grade Eight, and 216 were in Grade 
Nine (see Table 5.1). All eleven participating schools were American-curriculum international 
schools, hereafter ‘American international schools’ or ‘international schools’, listed with the 
US Office of Overseas Schools, of which seven received direct assistance from the US State 
Department. All participating schools were also accredited by widely-recognized accrediting 
agencies in the United States. American international schools were chosen for the present 
research because their broad ethnic diversity would enhance the generalizability of findings; 
their administrative autonomy would make them more readily accessible; and because the 
doctoral researcher for this project was intimately familiar with the American international 
school community, having served as a teacher and administrator in such schools throughout 
most of the prior decade. American international schools in the present study were located in 
nine countries, including two in Eastern Africa, one in Western Europe, two in Eastern 
Europe, three in Eastern Asia, and one in Western Asia. The names of these countries cannot 
be given as it would compromise the schools’ identities.  
Students at Eastern Asian schools were disproportionately represented in the present 
study, accounting for 71% of the Time 1 sample, as compared to 9% from Eastern Africa, 9% 
from Western Asia, 9% from Eastern Europe, and 2% from Western Europe. The effect of this 
regional bias was mitigated, however, by the multicultural makeup of individual 
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international schools. International schools generally cater to a more nationally and ethnically 
diverse population than host country schools. Less than 38% of respondents reported, for 
instance, that an Eastern Asian language was the primary language spoken in their homes 
(Chinese dialects: 22%, Korean: 10%, Japanese: 5%, Tagalog: .4%, and Vietnamese: .4%), as 
compared to 44% who listed English as the primary language in their homes, and 18% who 
listed one of twenty other languages from outside of Eastern Asia. Inasmuch as linguistic 
diversity indicates ethnic and national diversity, the disproportionate representation of 
schools in Eastern Asia did not carry over to the ethnic and national makeup of the sample. 
The American international schools in this study adhere, moreover, to curricular programs of 
American and European origin, rather than those of their host countries. Examples include 
the American Education Reaches Out (AERO) curriculum, the College Board’s Advance Placement 
Programs, and the International Baccalaureate program. The Time 1 sample was, in sum, 
broadly representative of ethnically and nationally diverse American international schools. 
5.3.2 Time 2 sample 
Time 2 data was collected in May and June of 2013 from 297 students who had also 
completed a questionnaire at Time 1. The retention rate from Time 1 was 60%. The loss of 40% 
of the sample, year-over-year, is largely attributable to administrative turnover that occurred 
at several participating schools. Incoming heads of school and divisional leaders appear, in 
some cases, to have not been fully aware, or enthusiastic, of their school’s participation in the 
project. In such cases, students may not have been given sufficient advanced notice that the 
questionnaire was coming up, and/or may have encountered scheduling conflicts that 
prevented them from participating. 
All eleven American international schools represented at Time 1 were also represented 
at Time 2. Sample composition at Time 2 resembled that at Time 1 in terms of the ratio of 
males (39%) to females (61%), the regional distribution of respondents (73% in Eastern Asia), 
Chapter 5 Methdology│161 
 
and parental educational attainment (see Table 5.1). The incidence of languages most spoken 
in the home shifted, however, away from Eastern Asian languages, which were listed by 
approximately 34% of respondents (Chinese dialects: 20%, Korean: 7%, Japanese: 6%, Tagalog: 
1%; Vietnamese: .3%), in favor of English, which was listed by approximately 53% of 
respondents. A correspondingly higher proportion of Time 2 respondents also rated their 
English skills as fluent (48%), as compared to Time 1 (37%), suggesting that Time 1 
respondents who were less confident of their English language skills were less likely to 
participate at Time 2. 
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Table 5.1 
Characteristics of the Time 1, Time 2, and Longitudinal samples 
 
  
Time 1 sample 
(N = 493) 
Time 2 sample  
(N = 297) 
Longitudinal sample  
(N = 225) 
 Grade level 
Grade Eight 277 (56%) N/A  
Grade Nine 216 (44%) 150 (50%) 123 (55%) 
Grade Ten N/A 147 (50%) 102 (45%) 
 Gender 
Male 201 (41%) 115 (39%) 72 (32%) 
Female 292 (59%) 182 (61%) 153 (68%) 
 School location 
E. Asia 349 (71%) 218 (73%) 165 (73%) 
E. Africa 44 (9%) 25 (8%) 19 (8%) 
W. Asia 44 (9%) 11 (4%) 7 (3%) 
E. Europe 44 (9%) 33 (11%) 24 (11%) 
W. Europe 12 (2%) 10 (3%) 10 (4%) 
 Self-rated English language proficiency 
Fluent 184 (37%) 141 (48%) 72 (32%) 
High proficiency 203 (41%) 103 (35%) 128 (57%) 
Intermediate proficiency 96 (20%) 45 (15%) 19 (8%) 
Low proficiency 7 (1%) 6 (2%) 6 (3%) 
Beginner 1 (.002%) 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 
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Table 5.1, continued 
Characteristics of the Time 1, Time 2 and longitudinal samples 
  
Time 1 sample 
(N = 493) 
Time 2 sample 
(N = 297) 
Longitudinal sample 
(N = 225) 
 Language spoken most at home 
English 217 (44%) 157 (53%) 122 (54%) 
Chinese 109 (22%) 58 (20%) 41 (18%) 
Korean 51 (10%) 22 (7%) 12 (5%) 
Japanese 22 (5%) 19 (6%) 17 (8%) 
Arabic 22 (5%) 4 (1%) 2 (1%) 
French 8 (2%) 3 (1%) 2 (1%) 
Other 64 (13%) 34 (12%) 29 (13%) 
 Maternal educational attainment 
Advanced degree 135 (27%) 80 (27%) 67 (30%) 
University of college degree 241 (49%) 145 (49%) 109 (48%) 
Trade or apprenticeship training 4 (1%) 2 (1%) 3 (1%) 
High school diploma or certificate 36 (7%) 36 (12%) 31 (14%) 
Less than a High school diploma 9 (2%) 7 (2%) 4 (2%) 
I don't know 68 (14%) 27 (9%) 11 (5%) 
 Paternal educational attainment 
Advanced degree 252 (51%) 148 (50%) 113 (50%) 
University of college degree 168 (34%) 113 (38%) 91 (40%) 
Trade or apprenticeship training 3 (1%) 3 (1%) 2 (1%) 
High school diploma or certificate 14 (3%) 7 (2%) 6 (3%) 
Less than a High school diploma 4 (1%) 2 (1%) 1 (.4%) 
I don't know 52 (11%) 24 (8%) 12 (5%) 
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5.3.3 Longitudinal sample 
Students in the longitudinal sample transitioned to higher grade levels, either from 
Grade Eight to Grade Nine, or Grade Nine to Grade Ten, between Times 1 and 2. Of the 297 
respondents to the Time 2 questionnaire, 225 provided personal identification codes that 
could be matched with their responses at Time 1. This sample included students from nine of 
the original eleven schools, but remained consistent with the cross-sectional samples in terms 
of grade-level ratio (55% Grade Eight/Nine students, 45% Grade Nine/Ten students), 
regional distribution (73% Eastern Asia), and parental educational attainment (see Table 5.1). 
It is important to note that in all nine participating schools, Grade Eight and Grade Nine are 
encompassed by different divisions, Middle School and High School, respectively. Students 
who transitioned from Grade Eight to Grade Nine during the course of the study thus also 
experienced a broader environmental transition, from Middle School to High School, whereas 
students who transitioned from Grade Nine to Grade Ten did so within the High School 
environment.  
The proportion of respondents in the longitudinal sample who indicated that English 
was the language most spoken in their homes (53%) remained consistent with the Time 2 
sample (54%), while the proportion who rated their English language skills as ‘fluent’ was 
markedly lower among longitudinal respondents (32%). The gender ratio in the longitudinal 
sample also differed from the cross-sectional samples, with fewer males represented (32%) 
than females (68%). Table 5.1 presents a comparison of these sample characteristics. 
5.4 Procedure and participation 
Approval for this research was granted by The University of Sydney Human Research 
Ethics Committee (HREC) (Protocol Number 14193; see Appendix AG), on the basis of the 
project’s scientific merit and appropriate planning for the safety and dignity of all 
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participants. Schools and individual participants were guaranteed, inter alia, both anonymity, 
and the right to withdraw from the project at any time, without repercussion.  
Senior school administrators at approximately thirty international schools were 
contacted initially by phone, followed by email and postal correspondence. Schools that 
agreed to participate asked their students in Grades Eight and Nine to sign, and have their 
parents sign, a consent form on which they either opted-in or opted-out of the two-year study. 
The consent forms of students who opted-in were returned to the University of Sydney.  
Questionnaires were administered at participating schools in 2012 and 2013, during 
late May and early June, which is the end of the American school year. Questionnaire 
administration was conducted either online, through SurveyMonkey.com, or by hardcopy. 
Nine schools opted to use the online format, accounting for 88% of the Time 1 sample, whereas 
two schools opted for hardcopies, accounting for 12% of the Time 1 sample. 
Time 2 questionnaire modification. With the permission of HREC, thirty-three items 
that had been eliminated either during the Pilot Study (see Chapter Four), or during 
preliminary measurement analyses conducted at Time 1 of the Main Study, were dropped 
from the questionnaire used at Time 2, and twenty-three new items were added (marked with 
asterisks in Appendix D). The twenty-three new items included eleven items composing three 
psychological need satisfaction measures (autonomy, relatedness, and competence) (Reeve & 
Tseng, 2011), that have been developed in the field of self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 
2011; Jang, Reeve, Ryan, & Kim, 2009), and twelve potential candidate-items for measures that 
demonstrated marginal fit in the Pilot Study, including Surface learning strategies, Appropriate 
workload and Justifiability of cheating. Analysis of these items is strictly exploratory and is not 
reported in the present study. 
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This reduced, in total, the number of items on the questionnaire from 105 at Time 1 
(see Appendix B) to ninety-five at Time 2 (see Appendix D). Schools were notified of the 
change in advance of administering the Time 2 questionnaire. Items added to the Time 2 
questionnaire are marked with an asterisk in Appendix D.  
5.5 Modeling approach 
5.5.1 Preliminary analyses 
Many of the measures employed in the present study had not been included 
previously in structural equation models or in research at the secondary level. Each of these 
measures was selected, based on a prior track record of good psychometric performance, to 
represent an important aspect of the hypothesized model. Given their novelty within 
structural modeling research of secondary school phenomena, the overall plan of the present 
study incorporated extensive preliminary analyses, including a pilot study, as well as 
modification or exclusion of measures where necessary, in order to ensure the validity of 
constructs incorporated in the hypothesized model. 
Congeneric modeling. One-factor congeneric models were of crucial importance to the 
present study because they served as the basis for calculating weighted composite scores 
(Holmes-Smith & Rowe, 1994; Rowe & Hill, 1998). Composite scores were necessary in the 
present study to estimate models for which ratios of sample size (N) to free model parameters 
(q), or ‘N:q ratios’, would otherwise have been inadequate. Unacceptable fit of congeneric 
models was addressed either with post-hoc modifications such as allowing observed indicator 
error terms to co-vary, or by dropping malfunctioning factors from the study. Post-hoc 
modifications were avoided wherever possible, however, as they cast doubt on the 
generalizability of structural model results, especially when the structural model is tested 
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with the same data used to modify the latent variables (Bandalos & Finney, 2010; Byrne, 2012; 
Kline, 2011).  
5.5.2 Modeling procedure  
Structural equation modeling was used to test the hypothesized PTLC model. Cross-
sectional data was analyzed separately at each of two time points, and then used to estimate 
a matched-samples longitudinal model. Model analysis followed a two-phase approach, in 
which the validity and reliability of measurement models were tested first, including analyses 
both of one-factor congeneric models and of the multivariate measurement model, and 
hypothesized structural models were tested second (Mueller & Hancock, 2010). 
Confirmatory factor analysis. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is a method of 
assessing the construct validity, or ‘fit’, of a latent measurement model to a particular data set. 
CFA will be used in the present study to assess both congeneric factor models, and 
multivariate measurement models. 
CFA tests a priori measurement hypotheses in which observed variables are generally 
allowed to load only on the latent construct they were designed to measure. Construct 
validity, which entails how well a measurement model represents an intended construct or 
constructs, is assessed by comparing the variance-covariance structure of the hypothesized 
latent model to the variance-covariance structure freely observed in the data (Byrne, 2012). A 
higher degree of similarity between these two variance-covariance structures indicates better 
‘fit’ of the hypothesized latent model to the data, and bolsters the argument that the measure 
or measures in question are valid (Byrne, 2012). The degree of misfit of a measurement model 
is reported by a variety of fit statistics (discussed in detail in section 5.8, below). CFAs of 
multivariate models are strict tests of the models’ a priori measurement hypotheses, because 
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the included factors must fit the data, as a group, while also retaining their predicted factorial 
structure with respect to one another. 
Congeneric CFA. One important type of measurement structure analyzed with CFA in 
the present study was the one-factor congeneric model. One-factor congeneric model analysis 
is a special case of CFA, in which the fit of an individual latent model is interrogated. A poorly-
fitting congeneric model casts doubt on the validity of both the construct it represents, and 
any statistical relations between it and the other factors in a hypothesized structural model. 
Verifying that individual measures adequately represent their intended constructs ultimately 
informs the validity of the multivariate models they compose.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Figure 5.1. A three-indicator congeneric model. 
 
A simple, three-indicator congeneric model is provided in Figure 5.1. The three 
indicators, represented by x’s, are hypothesized to reflect a single unobservable, or ‘latent’ 
variable, represented by ξ. The congeneric model in Figure 5.1 can also be expressed as a set 
of three linear expressions of the form xi =  λiξ + δi, where the λ’s are the regression terms, or 
loadings, of the observed variables on the latent variable, and the δ’s represent the random 
error associated with each observed variable. These three linear equations may be condensed, 
furthermore, to a single equation by using matrices to group observed variables (x’s), factor 
loadings (λ’s), and error term variances (δ’s), respectively (see equation 1). 
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(1) 
In addition to the regression equation for the congeneric model exampled above, a 
variance-covariance matrix known as the Theta-delta matrix is estimated for the model’s error 
terms. The Theta-delta matrix for the congeneric model in Figure 5.1 (see Figure 5.2) includes 
estimates of error term variances along the diagonal, and error term covariances beneath the 
diagonal. Error covariances are usually constrained to zero, as shown in Figure 5.2, but may 
be permitted, or ‘freed’, when there is a strong theoretical or methodological reason for doing 
so (Kline, 2011).  
 
Figure 5.2. A Theta-delta (Θδ) matrix, containing 
variances and covariances for the error terms of 
observed indicator variables. 
 
Multivariate CFA. In multivariate CFA, a measurement model that includes more than 
one latent variable is assessed in terms of its fit to a particular data set. This is done by 
estimating all factors in the set simultaneously, while freeing all possible inter-factor 
covariance parameters. Researchers may also, under special circumstances, permit observed 
variables, represented as x’s in Figure 5.1, to load onto more than one latent variable, or ‘cross-
load’. Each observed variable is, however, normally restricted to loading only on the latent 
variable it was designed to measure.  
 
x1 λ1            δ1 
x2    = λ1      ξ   +   δ2 
x3 λ3            δ3 
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Higher-order CFA. A special case of multivariate CFA involves the inclusion of higher 
order factors (Gray, 1997). Higher-order latent factors are hypothesized to give rise to groups 
of lower-order latent variables, in the same sense that first-order latent factors are 
hypothesized to give rise to observable variables. Higher-order factors may be hypothesized 
a priori, in order to explain groups of theoretically similar lower-order factors, or may be fitted 
a posteriori as a means of accounting for clusters of highly correlated, or multicollinear, factors 
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). Higher-order factors serve in SEM to specify theoretically 
sound underlying causes for large statistical associations between latent variables. 
5.5.3 Multi-group measurement invariance 
Research samples in the social sciences typically comprise multiple subgroups (e.g. 
gender, grade-level, political affiliation, language). The tendency for questionnaire measures 
to function differently across subgroups, and thus to convey variations in meaning depending 
on the subgroup in question, is an increasingly recognized problem in SEM literature (Byrne, 
2012). The assumption of measurement invariance becomes especially important when the 
interpretation of between-group differences is a research objective (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; 
Meade, Johnson, & Braddy, 2008; Byrne & van de Vijver, 2010).  
Multi-group measurement invariance is also an important assumption of employing 
single-indicator weighted composite scores in place of multiple-indicator factor models 
(Holmes-Smith, 2012). Weighted composite scores are computed from factor score coefficients 
derived from the sample as a whole, and used to represent the variance of multiple-indicator 
factors as single scores. Inasmuch as patterns of responding on a given measure are 
inconsistent between the subgroups of a sample, weighted composite scores may 
misrepresent the factors’ operational meanings within the model.  
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A number of published works indicate the likelihood of two potential sub-groups with 
respect to academic cheating among secondary students: (1) grade-level (e.g. Brandes, 1986; 
Anderman & Midgley, 2004; Galloway, 2012; Schab, 1969, 1991), and (2) gender (e.g. Calabrese 
& Cochran, 1990; Canning, 1956; Davis, 1973; Finn & Frone, 2004; Galloway, 2012; Schab, 
1980). A third potential concern was longitudinal invariance, or whether factorial structure 
was equivalent for respondents at Times 1 and 2. 
The strategy for assessing multi-group measurement invariance involves testing a 
succession of measurement models, in which increasingly restrictive sets of parameters are 
held invariant across groups. The sequence typically begins with fitting baseline models for each 
of the subgroups, separately. A configural model is typically tested next, in which the form, or 
configuration, of indicators and factors is held constant across both groups, simultaneously, 
while allowing parameter estimation to occur uniquely for each group. Subsequent models 
most commonly test the invariance of factor loadings (metric model) and observed variable 
intercepts (scalar model) (Byrne, 2012; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). A fourth model tested in 
the present study held factor variances equal across groups, in order to assess the 
appropriateness of representing them with composite scores.  
A difference in fit between the configural model and any of the subsequent invariance 
model indicates that the groups in question are not perfectly invariant. Factorial invariance is 
not, however, treated as a zero-sum phenomenon, but as a matter of degree (Byrne et al., 1989; 
Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Marsh & Hocevar, 1985). A decline in CFI of less than .01 (i.e. CFI 
< -.01) is widely cited as a standard for assuming that a measurement model is invariant 
(Cheung & Rensvold, 2002; Kline, 2011). This standard will be applied in the present study. 
Differential item functioning analysis. A second means of analyzing measurement 
invariance between groups that was utilized in this study is differential item functioning (DIF) 
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analysis (Wang & Wang, 2012). DIF analysis is used to analyze group differences by regressing 
all factor indicators in a given measurement model on grouping variables, such as male = 0 
and female = 1. Factors whose item means differ significantly by group membership are 
functioning at least somewhat differently across groups. DIF analysis thus enables the 
identification of where, specifically, factorial non-invariance is concentrated within a 
measurement model. This is consistent with arguments by Byrne, Muthén, and Shavelson 
(1989) in favor of methods “for pinpointing the source of inequality within the offending 
matrix” (p. 457). Identifying where group differences occur at the item-level enables 
assessment of their relative importance within a model. Group differences in factorial 
structure that are concentrated in outcome variables may, for instance, be of greater concern 
than in other variables in a given model.  
5.5.4 Covariate analyses 
Covariates will be modeled at Times 1 and 2 using a ‘multiple-indicators multiple-
causes’ (MIMIC) methodology. MIMIC models (see Figure 5.3) entail regressing a set of latent 
variables on a set of covariates and interaction terms, in order to investigate mean-level 
differences between groups (Grayson, Mackinnon, Jorn, et al., 2000; Wang & Wang, 2012). It 
is important to distinguish between the two types of mean difference discussed in this chapter: 
(1) those that occur at the level of whole factors, which imply group differences in extent (e.g. 
males tend to rate their teachers more favorably than females) and (2) those that occur at the 
level of individual items, as might imply differences in factor structure, or in factors’ 
operational definitions (e.g. males tend to emphasize different qualities than females in rating 
teachers). Groups may have different factor means for factors that are structurally and 
functionally invariant between them, and vice versa. 
Figure 5.3 presents an example MIMIC model in which two latent factors (Subject self-
concept and Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept) are regressed on a set of covariates and two-
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way interaction terms. MIMIC models tested at Times 1 and 2 included the full multivariate 
measurement model regressed on a set of covariates including three demographic variables 
(English proficiency, maternal educational attainment, and paternal educational attainment) 
and two dichotomous grouping variables, gender and grade-level, dummy coded 
respectively as 1 = males, 2 = females; and 1 = Grade Eight, 2 = Grade Nine. MIMIC models 
also included all possible two-way interactions between these covariates. To avoid the 
potential for multicollinearity among covariates and interaction variables (Aiken & West, 
1990), the three demographic variables mentioned above were mean-centered (M = 0, SD = 1) 
prior to the calculation of interaction terms.   
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Figure 5.3. An example of a multiple-indicators multiple-causes (MIMIC) model. Grade = 
grade-level; English = English proficiency; Mom_ed = mother’s educational attainment; 
Dad_ed = father’s educational attainment; X indicates two-way interaction terms. 
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5.6 Modeling approach: Phase 2 
5.6.1 Structural modeling 
Once the validity of constructs in the measurement model was established with CFA-
based analyses, the hypothesized model proceeded to the structural phase of the modeling 
process (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Mueller & Hancock, 2010). Structural models combine 
the measurement components of factor analysis, as shown in Figure 5.4, with inter-factor 
regression equations, or beta paths. The use of variance-covariance matrices allows 
simultaneous estimation of numerous inter-factor regression hypotheses among latent factors, 
such as psychological variables.  
 
Figure 5.4. An example of a simple structural model with inter-factor regression hypotheses 
modeled as beta paths (βCA, βCB) 
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  The measurement portion of the model in Figure 5.4 consists of two exogenous latent 
variables, A and B, measured by four observed variables each (x1 – x8), and one endogenous 
latent variable, C, also measured by four observed variables (y1 – y4). Error terms (δ and ɛ, 
respectively) are calculated for all observed variables, as well as for the exogenous and 
endogenous latent variables (φ and ζ, respectively). The structural part of this model, which 
includes the beta paths from A and B to C is, therefore, purged of measurement error (Muthén, 
2002). Differences in model fit due to the insertion of structural paths among constructs are, 
therefore, attributable to how well such paths fit the data, such that good model fit provides 
strong support for the hypothesized structural relations. 
The model in Figure 5.4 can also be written as a set of fourteen linear regression 
equations. Twelve of these equations, of the form Obsi = λi(Latent) + Errori, describe the 
measurement portion of the model, where Latent represents the latent variables (A, B, or C); 
Obs represents the observed indicator variables (x’s or y’s); λ represents the observed 
variable’s loadings onto their respective factors; and Error represents the error, or ‘residual’, 
terms of the observed indicator variables (Coote, 2011).  
5.6.2 Longitudinal modeling 
Cross-sectional models, as illustrated in Figure 5.4, above, offer snapshots of construct 
measures and structural associations at specific points in time, but afford little opportunity to 
explore processes of change or to isolate potential causal agents (MacCallum & Austin, 2000; 
Martin, 2011). Modeling data at multiple time points, or longitudinally, can, by contrast, 
illustrate growth processes, help isolate causal agents, and provide a more justifiable basis for 
prescriptive statements (Farrel, 1994; MacCallum & Austin, 2000; Martin, 2011).  
Repeated-measures longitudinal models fall into two broad categories. Growth curve 
models, the first category, are used to explore linear and nonlinear change trajectories in 
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variables over time. Autoregressive models, the second category, involve regressing 
constructs at later time points on their counterpart measures at earlier time points (McArdle 
& Aber, 1990). This provides a more rigorous test of the predictive validity of a cross-sectional 
model at later times by removing prior variance as a function of autoregressive paths 
(MacCallum & Austin, 2000). Removing prior variance, as may emanate from underlying 
personological variables such as personality structures and self-beliefs not otherwise included 
in the model, better isolates the strength of effects that is unique to the latter time point. 
Autoregressive models also afford the opportunity to test whether autoregressive paths are 
salient over predictive effects operating within later time points.  
The salience of an effect refers to its predominance over other effects in predicting an 
outcome variable. While strong causal claims are principally the domain of replicable 
experimental manipulation, finding that longitudinal effects on a construct measured at later 
time points are stronger than, or ‘salient over’, effects operating within the later time point, or 
vice versa, suggests they have temporal precedence, which may also evince causal agency 
(Pearl, 2000), and justify prescriptive statements (Martin, 2011). Longitudinal modeling of 
phenomena in complex, real-world settings can, as such, complement experimental 
methodologies for investigating causal hypotheses. 
The model of cheating behavior hypothesized in the present study reflects resurgent 
emphasis in integrity literature in the effects of relational factors on academic integrity. To 
this end, an autoregressive, repeated-measures longitudinal design, of the general form 
presented in Figure 5.5, afforded the opportunity to test the relative effects of contextual and 
personological variables in relation to academic integrity.  
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Figure 5.5. An example of a simple longitudinal structural model, in which variance in latent constructs at Time 1 (T1) is accounted for at Time 
2 (T2).               Prior variance paths;          Hypothesized paths. 
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5.7 Sample size 
An important consideration in structural equation modeling research is the adequacy 
of sample size, which tends in the present study towards the smaller end of the acceptable 
range, both in absolute terms (Ntime1 = 493; Ntime2 = 297; NLong. = 225), and in terms of the 
complexity of the structural models tested, which ranges from 178 and 399 free model 
parameters. Low sample sizes tend to negatively bias model fit indices, and can cast doubt on 
the trustworthiness of model results (Herzog, Boomsma, & Reinecke, 2007; Jackson, 2003; 
Kline, 2011). Two means of addressing the potential negative effects of small sample size are 
used herein. Firstly, a small sample-size adjustment to fit indices will be conducted on more 
complex models using the Swain-R, version 1.2 software package (Boomsma & Herzog, 2009, 
2013). Secondly, more complex models will be estimated with single-variable weighted 
composite scores computed according to the methodology developed by Holmes-Smith and 
Rowe (1994; Holmes-Smith, 2012: Course notes) 
5.7.1 Recommended sample size 
Recommendations for appropriate sample size are split between those that emphasize 
N:q ratios, or the ratios of sample size (N) to free model parameters (q), and those that 
emphasize the size of the overall sample. Kline (2011) asserts that N:q ratios should be the 
principal focus for analyses that use the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator. The present 
study uses a version of ML with robust standard errors (MLR) (Chou, Bentler & Satorra, 1991) 
for models estimated with observed indicator variables, and ML for models estimated with 
normalized composite variables. N:q ratio was, therefore, an important consideration 
throughout the program of empirical analysis. Recommendations for appropriate N:q ratios 
range from 20:1 (Costello & Osborne, 2005), to 10:1 (Raykov & Marcoulides, 2006), to 5:1 
(Bentler & Chou, 1987), whereas recommendations for appropriate overall sample size range 
from 100 (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Ding, Velicer & Harlow, 1995), to 5,000 (Hu, Bentler & 
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Kano, 1992). Falling short of such recommendations may cast doubt on the “trustworthiness 
of results” (Kline, 2011, p. 12). 
5.7.2 Swain R small sample correction 
The fit of complex structural equation models tends to be penalized when small 
samples are used (Herzog, Boomsma, & Reinecke, 2007). The bias caused by small sample size 
is corrected in the present study with the Swain-R, version 1.2 software package (Boomsma & 
Herzog, 2013). The Swain small sample correction uses degrees of freedom, sample size, 
number of observed variables, and 2 values of both the specified and baseline models, to 
generate a Swain correction factor (SCF) between 0-1. The Swain correction factor is then used 
to correct the model chi-squared, and associated fit statistics, such as CFI, TLI and RMSEA.  
Small sample corrections will be applied to models such as multivariate confirmatory 
factor analyses and structural models estimated with observed indicator variables. The SCF, 
which represents the amount by which the chi-squared value is adjusted, will be reported 
whenever a Swain correction is applied.  
5.7.3 Normalized weighted composite scores 
Normalized weighted composite scores were employed extensively in the present 
study in order to fit complex models with comparatively small samples. Such composite 
scores sum the values of observed indicators used to measure latent factors. They are 
calculated, in the present study, from factor score coefficients that reflect the unique 
proportional contribution, or ‘weight’, of each observed indicator to the overall variance of a 
latent factor (Holmes-Smith & Rowe, 1994; Holmes-Smith, 2012; Rowe & Hill, 1998).  
Normal equivalent deviates. Composite scores were then transformed to normal 
equivalent deviates (NEDs) in SPSS, based on the recommendations of Rowe (2002, 2004). 
NEDs retain the rank order of scores, standard deviations, and means of ‘raw’ composite 
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factors, while ensuring that they are measured on a common metric, which improves the 
comparability of effect sizes (Rowe, 2002, 2004; Dolmans & Ginns, 2005). The syntax for 
generating NEDs in SPSS is provided in Appendix A.  
 
Figure 5.6. The congeneric model for Subject self-concept at Time 1, as a basis for 
computing weighted composite scores. 
Weighted composite score computation. Figure 5.6 presents a congeneric CFA model 
of the latent factor Subject self-concept as a basis for computing weighted composite scores. The 
factor at Time 1 includes five observed variables, for which the raw factor score coefficients 
are .156, .249, .102, .360 and .219, respectively. Composite scores for Subject self-concept are 
calculated by first dividing each factor score by the sum of all five factor coefficients, which 
standardizes them to a scale of 1 (creating scores of .144, .229, .094, .331, and .202 respectively). 
Each standardized factor coefficient is then multiplied by the corresponding score in an 
individual’s response set, according to the formula: Subject self-concept = (Sub2 * .144) + (Sub3 
* .229) + (Sub5 * .094) + (Sub13 * .331) + (Sub15 * .202) (Holmes-Smith, 2012; Holmes-Smith & 
Rowe, 1994). The factor loading for each composite score is then computed as the square root 
of the Rho reliability statistic for the corresponding measure, and each error variance is 
computed as 1 – Rho, for that measure.  
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Rho reliability is a ‘weighted’ index, in that it takes into account the proportional 
contributions on individual scale items, as discussed in further detail in section 5.8.7. Fixing 
the factor loading and error variance with the Mplus syntax shown in Appendix A expresses 
the latent variance of each factor in a simplified format, such that models of greater complexity 
can be fitted with smaller samples (Holmes-Smith & Rowe, 1994). 
Composite scores reduce the number of free parameters that must be estimated in a 
given model, which allows more complex models to be estimated with smaller samples. They 
were relied upon in the present study, especially when estimating models whose N:q ratios 
would otherwise have been less than 1. While models will, wherever possible, be estimated 
with observed indicator variables, composite score model results will also be reported for the 
sake of comparison. Comparing the results of these two methods of model estimation is 
intended to help approximate, with respect to data in the present study, the extent to which 
models estimated exclusively with composite scores, such as the longitudinal structural 
model, would be different if estimated with observed indicator variables. These differences 
were summarized in terms of range of differences (RΔβ), mean difference (MΔ│β│), and absolute 
mean difference (M│Δβ│) in beta coefficient magnitude. Differences in levels of significance 
were also noted. 
5.8 Measures of model fit 
The fit of structural equation models is generally indicated by multiple ‘fit indices’ 
that, often derived from 2 values, approximate particular aspects of model fit such as the size 
of residual terms (e.g. RMSEA and SRMR), and the fit of the specified model as compared to 
that of a null model in which covariances between variables are constrained to zero (e.g. CFI 
and TLI). 2 tests, by contrast, the exact fit of a specified model to a sample of data. 2 is 
generally considered an overly-sensitive test of model fit especially when sample size exceeds 
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200 (Bollen, 1989; Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). Because large samples are generally desirable 
in structural modeling analyses, model fit is commonly judged with approximate fit indices.  
Fit indices are generally expressed in terms of value scales, such as scales of 0 – 1 (e.g. 
CFI and SRMR) or 0 - ∞ (e.g. RMSEA), and do not entail tests of statistical significance. The 
prevalence of fit indices in SEM literature raises the question, therefore, of what values should 
be taken to indicate acceptable model fit. The need for standards that can discern between 
well- and poor-fitting models has given rise to so-called ‘golden rules’ or ‘rules of thumb’, 
according to which the acceptability of model fit can be quickly determined. Golden rules 
have been criticized, however, for encouraging a dogmatic approach to model assessment that 
too often leads researches and reviewers to ignore issues of model-complexity, sample size, 
and the specific purposes that various analyses are intended to serve (Hu & Bentler, 1999; 
Kline, 2011; Markland, 2007; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004; Nye & Drasgow, 2011). Kline (2011) 
exhorts researchers to “refrain from blindly applying threshold values [italics in original]” (p. 199). 
Marsh et al. (2004) argue likewise that researchers should assess model fit “in relation to the 
specific details of their research” and beware the problem of false-negative results that “a 
single cutoff value for each index that generalizes across different sample sizes (N) and 
different situations” has the potential to cause (pp. 321 – 322). 
In short, different types of model analysis often require different fit criteria. For the 
Pilot Study reported in Chapter Four, fit criteria were loosened considerably in comparison to 
the threshold values recommended by scholars such as Schumacker and Lomax (2010). 
Relaxing standards served the purpose of identifying fit that was truly poor among relatively 
simple congeneric models, fitted with a small sample (N = 96). Fit criteria tend to be less 
trustworthy when smaller samples are used (Sivo et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2008; Kline, 2011). 
Attempting to identify fit that is truly poor in a small sample, i.e. that falls far enough outside 
of desirable limits as to indicate problems with high certainty, demands different criteria than 
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attempting to determine whether the fit of a model is truly good, in a large sample, as should 
probably be stricter. 
Two broad types of model are analyzed in the ‘Main Study’: congeneric models and 
multivariate models. This distinction is noted because fit indices are often sensitive to model 
complexity, especially in relation to sample size, as expressed by the N:q ratio (Herzog, 
Boomsma, & Reincke, 2007). It makes little sense to apply the same fit index thresholds to both 
simple congeneric models and complex multivariate models, in the same sample. Two 
different sets of fit criteria were, therefore, followed throughout the Main Study (see Table 
5.2). These criteria adopt common standards for assessing model fit, while appropriately 
reflecting large differences in model complexity. 
5.8.1 2 test of model fit 
The 2 statistic indicates whether a model demonstrates exact fit, i.e. equality between 
the covariance matrix implied by the model (Σ) and the sample covariance matrix (S) (Kline, 
2011). A 2 statistic that is significant at the p < .05 level indicates that fit between these two 
matrices is significantly in-exact, whereas a non-significant 2 indicates exact fit. The 2 statistic 
is most appropriate as an indicator of fit for relatively simple models of normally distributed 
data. For models of data with varying degrees of normality, however, 2 statistics are unlikely 
to indicate exact fit because “the underlying distribution is not 2 distributed” (Byrne, 2012, 
p. 69). A non-significant 2 statistic was, therefore, a desideratum for the fit of single-factor 
and multivariate models estimated with normalized, single-indicator composite scores in the 
present study. Significant 2 statistics for these models may indicate substantial model misfit 
when coinciding with other inadequate fit indices.  
The significance of 2 statistics was considered, by contrast, an inappropriate 
desideratum for multivariate models estimated with observed indicator variables. Such 
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models are unlikely to achieve non-significant 2 statistics because they entail, cumulatively, 
large amounts of non-normality, and are estimated with samples that are usually larger than 
200 (Byrne, 2012). 
Table 5.2 
Desiderata for model fit and reliability 
  
Single-factor 
Congeneric 
models 
 
 
Multivariate models 
 p of 2 > .05  N/A 
CFI > .95  .90 
TLI > .90  .90 
RMSEA < .08  .08 
Lower bound CI of RMSEA > .05  .05 
Upper bound CI of RMSEA < .10  .10 
pclose > N/A  .50 
SRMR < .08  .08 
Factor loadings > .300  .300 
Reliability (coefficient Rho) > .70  N/A 
  
5.8.2 Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
CFI is a 2-derived measure of approximate fit that indicates the relative improvement 
of a specified research model over a statistical baseline model, on a scale of 0 – 1 (Kline, 2011). 
The widely cited desideratum of CFI > .95, which traces back to seminal recommendations by 
Hu and Bentler (1999), has been questioned more recently (Marsh, Hau & Wen, 2004; Fan & 
Sivo, 2005). The CFI > .95 threshold appears to be most appropriate for less complex models 
of data that is more normal. The CFI > .95 recommendation of Hu and Bentler (1999) was 
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based, for instance, on analyses of measurement models that incorporated just 15 observed 
indicator variables across three latent factors, with an average of 35 free model parameters. 
The models Hu and Bentler (1999) referred to as ‘complex’ differed from models referred to 
as ‘simple’, moreover, by the inclusion of three cross-loadings. These multivariate models are 
not, as such, especially comparable to multivariate models analyzed in the present study, 
which tended to have high model complexity (approximately 180+ free model parameters) 
and comparatively small sample sizes. Marsh, Hau, & Wen (2004) argue that a CFI value of 
.90 may often be a more appropriate fit threshold, especially for models of greater complexity 
estimated with smaller samples. The desideratum of CFI > .90 was, therefore, adopted for 
multivariate analyses in the present study, in contrast the abovementioned desideratum of .95 
for one-factor congeneric models (see Table 5.2). 
5.8.3 Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) 
TLI is, like CFI, a 2-derived measure of approximate fit. TLI and CFI differ, however, 
in two important ways. Firstly, TLI values are non-normed, meaning that they can exceed 1.0, 
whereas CFI values cannot. Secondly, TLI punishes models that lack parsimony, especially as 
caused by inclusion of “parameters that contribute minimally to the improvement in model 
fit” (Byrne, 2012, p. 71). A number of models in the present study are, in fact, expected to lack 
parsimony, including large congeneric models, such as the eight-indicator model for Good 
teaching, and complex multivariate models that are designed to test dozens of hypotheses 
simultaneously. The minimum value of TLI > .90, proposed by Schumacker and Lomax (2010), 
was thus applied in the present analysis to both one-factor and multivariate models.  
5.8.4 Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
RMSEA is a 2-derived approximate fit index for ‘badness-of-fit’, in that larger RMSEA 
values reflect higher degrees of difference between the model-implied covariance matrix and 
the sample covariance matrix (Kline, 2011).  The desired value for RMSEA point estimates was 
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set at a lower level for analyses of congeneric (.08) and multivariate models (.06) in the Main 
Study than in the Pilot Study (.10). More complex models with more degrees of freedom and 
larger sample sizes tend to generate lower RMSEA values (Chen, Curran, Bollen, et al., 2008) 
because the denominator of RMSEA is the product of model degrees of freedom and sample 
size, minus one (df (N – 1)). It is also necessary, therefore, to maintain different threshold 
criteria for one-factor congeneric models versus multivariate models, in order to reflect 
differences in their complexity when, at a given time point, sample size is constant. While 
scholars have recently argued against calculating RMSEA for models with few degrees of 
freedom (Kenny, Kaniskan & McCoach, 2011), RMSEA remains a conventional and widely 
recognized test of fit. A more forgiving desired value of .08 was, therefore, adopted for one-
factor models, whereas the stricter desideratum of .06 was applied to multivariate models (see 
Table 5.2). 
RMSEA confidence intervals. As discussed in Chapter Four (see section 4.4.2), 
confidence intervals (CIs) are important indicators of the precision of RMSEA; wide 
confidence intervals tend to indicate low precision and vice versa. RMSEA confidence intervals 
are, like RMSEA itself, affected by both sample size and model complexity (Byrne, 2012). 
Differences in complexity between the congeneric vs. multi-factor measurement model may 
bring about corresponding differences in the breadth of CIs, resulting in smaller lower-bound 
CI estimates. The cutoff threshold for lower-bound 90% CIs may, moreover, be held to a 
stricter standard, i.e. lower value, than the RMSEA statistic. 
The upper-bound confidence interval for RMSEA can be considered a test of the 
hypothesis that the model does not fit, or the ‘poor-fit hypothesis‘, whereas the lower-bound 
confidence interval tests the hypothesis that the model does fit, or the ‘good-fit hypothesis’ 
(Kline, 2011). 90% upper-bound CI values of less than .10 reject the hypothesis of poor fit, 
whereas 90% lower-bound CI values greater than .05 reject the hypothesis of good fit. These 
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values conform to widely accepted conventions in structural equation modeling (Kline, 2011). 
It is important to note, however, that 90% confidence intervals may simultaneously reject 
neither of these fit hypotheses. The lower-bound CI may, in other words, be lower than .05 
while the upper-bound CI is also greater than .01, for the same model. Such results suggest 
significant amounts of sampling error. When accompanied by an acceptable point-estimate of 
RMSEA < .08, excessive RMSEA confidence intervals do not reject the model.  
RMSEA probability of close fit. The ‘probability of close fit’ (pclose), indicates the 
probability that RMSEA < .05, and is considered an important indicator of whether an RMSEA 
estimate should be accepted (Kenny, 2014a). The threshold for the RMSEA statistic is, as 
explained above, set to .08 for simple, congeneric models, because RMSEA estimates tend to 
be inflated for models with fewer degrees of freedom. The question of whether RMSEA < .05 
is relevant, therefore, only for the full measurement model. As indicated in Table 5.2, a pclose 
threshold of > .5, which indicates a 50% or greater probability that RMSEA is less than or equal 
to .05, will be applied to multivariate models.   
5.8.5 Standardized Root mean square residual (SRMR) 
SRMR provides a summary measure of variance-covariance matrix residuals for a 
given model, and has been shown to be sensitive to both sample size and skew (Nye & 
Drasgow, 2011). Analyses conducted by Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that acceptable model 
fit is indicated by an SRMR value of < .08. A follow-up study conducted by Marsh et al. (2004) 
found, similarly, that mis-specified three-factor models with no cross-loadings (i.e. ‘simple’ 
models) were rejected 100% of the time by a cutoff of SRMR < .08. SRMR is, moreover, 
inversely sensitive to sample size. Marsh et al. (2004) found, for instance, that the SRMR value 
for a correctly-specified model increased from 0.0 to 0.047 when the sample size decreased 
from N = 250 to N = 150. A threshold of SRMR < .08 was thus adopted both for one-factor 
congeneric models and for multivariate models. 
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5.8.6 Factor loadings 
Factor loading values express the contribution made by observed indicator variables 
to the variance of the latent variables they were designed to measure. The minimum threshold 
for factor loadings in the present study of .300 is equivalent to a cutoff for variance explained 
of 9% (Banalos & Finney, 2010). Observed variables that explain less than nine percent of the 
variance of their target factor are, in essence, extraneous to the measure, and may be a 
significant source of poor fit.  
5.8.7 Measure reliability (Rho) 
Acceptable scale reliability is an especially important criterion for estimating 
multivariate models with weighted composite scores (Holmes-Smith & Rowe 1994; Raykov, 
2009). As recommend by Holmes-Smith & Rowe (1994), reliability was estimated with a unit-
weighted, or ‘maximized’, reliability coefficient, Rho (ρ), with syntax for Mplus devised by 
Raykov (2004, 2009). Unlike alpha reliability (Cronbach, 1951), which assumes that the items 
of a given scale are tau-equivalent (Raykov, 1997), or “that the components measure the same 
underlying latent dimension with the same units of measurement” (Raykov, 2004, p. 301), 
coefficient Rho accounts for differences in the relative contributions of individual scale 
components (Raykov, 2009).  
Rho reliability coefficients were used, as shown in Appendix A, to directly calculate 
the factor loadings and error variances of composite scores. These factor loadings and error 
variances were then fixed, using Mplus syntax also given in Appendix A, in order to represent 
true latent variables in multivariate analyses. A threshold of .70 was, therefore, a key 
desideratum for the reliability in the present study, following the oft-cited guideline that 
reliability scores of .70 are “adequate” (Kline, 2011, p. 70), in that 30% or less of the variance 
represented is due to random error. While researchers frequently include constructs with 
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reliability scores as low as .60, it was considered desirable to either modify or drop measures 
from the hypothesized model that exhibited reliability lower than .70.  
5.9 Post-hoc modification 
Structural equation modeling is a confirmatory statistical methodology, albeit with 
recognized exploratory applications (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2009; Byrne, 2012; Jöreskog, 
1993; Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010). One type of exploratory application includes post-hoc 
modifications to the measurement and/or structural elements of a model that was otherwise 
hypothesized a priori. Because measures in this study were used on a uniquely diverse 
population of students at international secondary schools located in 9 different countries, the 
likelihood of needing such modifications was anticipated.  
Post-hoc modifications are often made by researchers in order to improve model fit. 
They also tend to cast doubt on the validity of model results, especially when they lack a 
strong theoretical rationale, and when they fail to be cross-validated with multiple data sets. 
It was often preferable, therefore, to drop factors from the measurement model that 
demonstrated unacceptably poor congeneric fit, unless modifications could be made from a 
strong theoretical or methodological basis, and could be cross-validated on multiple data sets.  
Post-hoc modifications to the structural elements of hypothesized models also tend to 
be looked upon with suspicion (Byrne, 2012). Such modifications may, however, recognize 
empirical realities that were not, and perhaps could not have been, anticipated a priori. Such 
modifications were also generally avoided in the present study, unless they enjoyed a strong 
theoretical rationale and could be cross-validated in multiple data sets. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES OF TIME ONE DATA  
 
 
Analyses of Time 1 data built upon the results of the Pilot Study, wherein factors 
demonstrating poor fit or multicollinearity were either modified, dropped from the study, or 
fit into higher-order factor structures. These changes resulted in a revised hypothesized 
model, or ‘Model 2’. Model 2 was assessed for purposes of the Main Study, beginning with 
the congeneric fit of individual factors and basic descriptive statistics. The retained set of 
factors proceeded to multivariate measurement model analyses. A lack of factorial invariance 
across gender groups that was detected in the measurement model prompted separate 
structural model analyses of Model 2 for males and females, prior to estimating Model 2 for 
the sample as a whole. 
Low N:q ratios were addressed in two ways. Firstly, the small sample size correction 
developed by Herzog and Boomsma (2009), introduced in section 5.7.2, was applied to 
multivariate models estimated with all observed indicator variables. Secondly, each 
multivariate model was re-estimated with weighted composite scores (see section 5.7.3), 
which improved N:q ratios by reducing the number of free model parameters (q). The results 
of composite score models were compared to their counterparts estimated with observed 
indicators variables, as a means of cross-validating these two methodologies. 
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6.1 Psychometric analysis of one-factor congeneric models 
Congeneric model fit is an important prerequisite for combining the variance 
contributed to a latent variable by multiple observed indicator variables used to measure it, 
into a single weighted composite score (Holmes-Smith & Rowe, 1994; Holmes-Smith, 2012). 
Significant problems with congeneric fit and reliability identified at Time 1 resulted in 
measures being either dropped from the study or, where appropriate, modified using pilot 
data. No post-hoc modifications were made based on Time 1 modification indices. This was 
done to avoid damaging the generalizability of model results. Modifications to psychometric 
measures that are based on a single data set run a higher risk of being idiosyncratic to that 
data set (Bandalos & Finney, 2010).  
While eight congeneric models in Table 6.1 fell short of meeting all fit desiderata 
established in Chapter Five (see Table 5.2), two of these models (Self-reported cheating and 
Surface learning strategies) missed only with respect to the upper 90% confidence interval of 
RMSEA (CIupper < .10). This statistic for Self-reported cheating (.166) violated the established 
threshold of .10, thus supporting the hypothesis that the model would not fit, or the ‘poor-fit 
hypothesis’ (Kline, 2011). This result was inconclusive, however, because the lower 90% 
confidence interval for RMSEA (CIlower = .013) was acceptably small, which simultaneously 
supported the ‘good-fit hypothesis’. The point-estimate for RMSEA fell, moreover, precisely 
on the threshold for acceptable fit (.080). A similar pattern for RMSEA confidence intervals 
and point estimates was observed with respect to Surface learning strategies (RMSEA = .080, 
CIlower =.030; CIupper = .140), where confidence intervals simultaneously supported good- and 
poor-fit hypotheses, and the point-estimate fell precisely on the established threshold. The 
support provided by the RMSEA confidence intervals for contradictory fit hypotheses, 
together with the fact that both RMSEA point-estimates met minimum criteria, suggested that 
these two constructs were borderline, but adequate. 
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Table 6.1 
Congeneric model results: Time 1 (N = 493) 
 Congeneric CFA  
     RMSEA     
 Scale (# items) 2 p df 
Loading 
range 
Value 
Low 
CI 
High 
CI 
CFI  TLI SRMR Rho 
Subject self-concept (5)  2.51 .775 5 .715-.845 .000 .000 .042 1.00 1.01 .006 .91 
Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) 10.55 .308 9 .414-.885 .019 .000 .056 1.00 1.00 .018 .82 
Performance structure (4) 2.97 .226 2 .547-.844 .031 .000 .100 1.00 .99 .015 .74 
Appropriate workload (3) .166 .684 1 .417-827 .000 .000 .089 1.00 1.02 .010 .62 
Good teaching (8) 54.21 .000 20 .410-.756 .059 .040 .078 .97 .95 .032 .86 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) .069 .966 2 .702-.905 .000 .000 .000 1.00 1.01 .001 .89 
Transparency of assessment (6) 72.46 .000 9 .592-.682 .120 .095 .146 .88 .81 .057 .81 
Authenticity of assessment (7) 65.71 .000 14 .464-.740 .087 .066 .108 .93 .89 .048 .81 
Peer norms (5) 6.25 .282 5 .534-.713 .023 .000 .070 1.00 .99 .015 .78 
Experience of classroom rules (5) 34.88 .000 5 .450-.696 .110 .077 .146 .92 .83 .044 .75 
Surface learning strategies (4) 8.35 .015 2 .324-.878 .080 .030 .140 .98 .93 .025 .71 
Deep learning strategies (6) 38.80 .000 9 .601-.735 .082 .057 .109 .95 .91 .038 .82 
Justifiability of cheating (3) .065 .798 1 .552-.811 .000 .000 .076 1.00 1.02 .003 .73 
Self-reported cheating (3) 4.15 .042 1 .763-.895 .080 .013 .166 .99 .96 .060 .87 
Note. 2 = chi-squared; p = significance level; df = degrees of freedom; CI = confidence interval; Rho = 
Rho reliability coefficient; highlights = index threshold violations. 
2 values for both Self-reported cheating and Surface learning strategies, as well as for Good 
teaching, were significant at the p < .05 level, which indicated a lack of exact fit. 2 is not, on its 
own, an appropriate basis for rejecting models, however, especially those with non-normal 
distributions and where sample sizes exceed N = 200 (Bollen, 1989; Schumacker & Lomax, 
2010; Byrne, 2012). Significant 2 statistics and excessive RMSEA confidence intervals were 
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approached in the present study as potential indicators of poor fit that may lead to model 
rejection only in concert with other inadequate fit indices.  
Self-reported cheating, Surface learning strategies, and Good teaching will, for the reasons 
given above, not be modified or dropped from the study. The remaining five congeneric 
models in Table 6.1, for which fit was more problematic (Appropriate workload, Experience of 
classroom rules, Deep learning strategies, Transparency of assessment, and Authenticity of 
assessment), are discussed below.  
Appropriate workload. This factor was retained on a tentative basis for analysis in the 
Main Study, in light of multiple problems with its congeneric model identified during the 
Pilot Study. These problems necessitated removing two of the measure’s original five items 
due to low factor loadings, and fixing the residual variance of item Apwkld52 to .00001 in 
order to address a Heywood case. Factor structure was additionally imbalanced by a factor 
loading of λ = 1.00 for item Apwkld52 in comparison to loadings of λ = .405 and λ = .460 for 
items Apwkld30 and Apwkld35, and scale reliability was low (.67).  
A similarly imbalanced pattern of factor loadings emerged for the congeneric model 
for Appropriate workload at Time 1 of the Main Study (λ = .834, λ = .421, λ = .491, respectively), 
in addition to a scale reliability estimate (.62) that violated the desired threshold of .70. While 
the fit of the model to the data was excellent (2(1) = .136, p = .684; RMSEA = .000, CIlower = 
.000, SRMR = .089; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.02; SRMR = .010), such low reliability is problematic 
because factor loadings and error variances for composite scores, used extensively throughout 
this study, are calculated directly from reliability estimates. In view of these problems, the 
measure Appropriate workload was dropped from the hypothesized model.   
Experience of classroom rules. The congeneric model for Experience of classroom rules 
failed the RMSEA test of close-fit, with respect to the point-estimate and both 90% confidence 
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intervals (RMSEA = .110, CIs = .077 - .146). These RMSEA estimates were significantly worse 
than in the Pilot Study (RMSEA = .096, CIs = .000 - .156). The model also had a large and highly 
significant chi-squared statistic (2(5) = 34.88, p = .000) and failed to achieve acceptable levels 
for CFI (.92) or TLI (.83). Experience of classroom rules was dropped from the hypothesized 
structural model due to these observations.  
Deep learning strategies. The congeneric model for Deep learning strategies failed the 
RMSEA test of close-fit in all respects (RMSEA = .082, CIs = .057 - .109), and had a large and 
highly significant chi-squared statistic (2(9) = 38.80, p = .000). The same measure achieved 
good fit in the Pilot Study only after being modified by the removal of item Deep80, which 
appears to have been an example of a non-replicable post-hoc modification. The poor fit of this 
model at Time 1 was unlikely to be remedied in a generalizable manner through additional 
post-hoc modifications. Deep learning strategies was, therefore, dropped from the hypothesized 
structural model.  
Assessment factors. Congeneric models for both the Transparency and Authenticity of 
assessment failed the RMSEA test of close fit and fell short of cutoff thresholds for CFI and TLI. 
These findings, in addition to large and highly-significant chi-squared statistics for both 
factors, made it impossible to retain them in the study without modification.  
Assessment, the principal venue for academic cheating, is theorized to play an 
important role in how learning contexts affect cheating. Of the three measures of assessment 
experience included in the original questionnaire, Appropriate Assessment (Wilson et al., 1997; 
Marsh, Ginns, Morin et al., 2011), was dropped during the Pilot Study due to psychometric 
dysfunction. Transparency and Authenticity of assessment, taken from the Perceptions of 
Assessment Task Inventory (Dorman & Knightley, 2006), performed well in the Pilot Study, but 
not at Time 1. Both measures had large and highly significant 2 statistics (2(9) = 72.46, p=.000 
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and 2(14) = 65.71, p=.000, respectively), and poor approximate fit statistics (Transparency: 
RMSEA = .120, CIs = .095 - .146; CFI = .88; TLI = .81. Authenticity: RMSEA = .087, CIs = .066 - 
.108; CFI = .93; TLI = .89). 
Because these measures derive from the same secondary-level instrument, and 
pertain, by design, to dimensions of the same broad phenomenon, assessment experience, the 
possibility of using Pilot Study data to create a hybrid of the two measures was explored. 
Deriving a hybrid measure using pilot data, and cross-validating it with Time 1 data, ran less 
risk of capitalizing on the idiosyncrasies of either respective data set. 
6.1.1 Assessment quality: Integration and cross-validation of measures 
Measurement of students’ perceptions of assessment was a highly desirable, if not 
indispensable, dimension of the second-order factor ‘Teacher quality’. Assessment is seen to 
both guide teaching and learning processes (Black & Wiliam, 1998; Taras, 2010), and to affect 
whether students cheat (Berliner, 2011; Galloway, 2012; Sisti, 2007). Transparency and 
Authenticity of assessment could not be retained in the hypothesized model in their original 
form due to the level of psychometric dysfunction observed with respect to their congeneric 
models (see Table 6.1). A new assessment measure that combined items from both scales was, 
therefore, created using pilot data, and cross-validated with Time 1 data. Transparency and 
Authenticity of assessment were multicollinear in the Pilot Study (r = .785) and at Time 1 (r = 
.901), suggesting that they already captured much of the same assessment-related variance. A 
measure composed of items from these measures was likely to retain a very similar 
operational definition.  
Creating a hybrid measure for Assessment quality. While factor structure can be 
explored either by exploratory or confirmatory factor analytical techniques, confirmatory 
analyses are more appropriate in cases where considerable research has already been 
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conducted on a factor’s structure (Bandalos & Finney, 2010). Because the measures of 
Authenticity and Transparency of assessment have received considerable prior attention as 
measures on the Perceptions of Assessment Tasks Inventory (PATI) developed by Dorman and 
Knightley (2006; see also Alkharusi, Aldahafri, Alnabhani, & Alkalbani, 2013), both 
exploratory and confirmatory methods were used to identify possible combinations of items 
from the two assessment scales that could serve as a hybrid measure.  
EFA was conducted on all thirteen (13) items of the two scales, combined, using 
Pearson correlations in the program Factor version 7.0 (Lorenzo-Sevo & Ferrando, 2007) to see 
what coherent structures would emerge. A factor was identified with a large Eigenvalue 
(5.509) that comprised six items with loadings greater than .400: Trans32, Trans45, Trans63, 
Tans66, Auth44, and Auth78. This factor rendered marginal fit in CFA, using pilot data (2(9) 
= 44.896, p=.000; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .090, CIlower = .000; SRMR = .040). 
Running all thirteen items in CFA using Mplus version 7.11 (Muthén & Muthén, 2013) 
also produced a borderline factor structure (2(65) = 104.66; CFI = .90; RMSEA = .080, CIlower = 
.050; SRMR = .069). Eliminating the three lowest-loading items of each constituent scale 
rendered a seven-item structure that included three Transparency of Assessment items (Trans28, 
Trans32, Trans66), and four Authenticity of Assessment items (Auth44, Auth60, Auth71, 
Auth78). The fit of this seven-item measure was the best of the three integrated scales tested 
with pilot data (2(14) = 23.025, p=.060; RMSEA=.082, CIlower=.000, SRMR=.048; CFI=.95), 
keeping in mind that < .01 was the threshold for RMSEA in the Pilot Study. Scale reliability 
was also good (Rho = .88). The content validity of this seven-item measure, dubbed Assessment 
quality, was next carefully assessed. 
Theoretical considerations. Items on the integrated factor appeared to reflect, overall, the 
degree of congruence, or discrepancy, between what students believe they should be learning 
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in a given class, and what they see emphasized on assessment tasks (see Table 6.2). 
Assessment tasks that miss the important substantive purposes of learning may appear both 
non-transparent and inauthentic.  
Table 6.2 
Integrated factor: Assessment quality, Pilot Study data (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Auth78 .692 .076 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments examine my ability to 
answer important questions. 
Auth71 .643 .077 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments test my ability to use 
what I’ve learned. 
Auth60 .719 .096 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments are useful. 
Auth44 .798 .043 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments check my 
understanding of topics. 
Trans28 .676 .071 .000 I understand the purpose of graded assignments in my Science 
class. 
Trans32 .740 .060 .000 I understand what is needed in all graded assignments in my 
Science class. 
Trans66 .776 .058 .000 I know in advance HOW I will be graded in my Science class. 
  
The original scale for Transparency of assessment, provided in Table 6.3, below, appears 
to reflect four aspects of graded assignments, including two substantive aspects: (1) 
understanding the purpose of assignments (Trans28), (2) understanding what is needed to 
succeed (Trans22, Trans32, and Trans45); and two administrative aspects: (3) understanding 
how assignments are graded (Trans66), and (4) knowing when graded assignments will be 
given (Trans63). The first two of these aspects are substantive, in that they pertain to a 
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student’s understanding of the nature of assignments, including what is required to succeed 
at them. The third and fourth aspects are administrative, in that they pertain to grading policy 
and scheduling. 
The three items of Transparency of assessment included in the integrated factor (see bold 
items in Table 6.3, below) reflect three dimensions of the original scale, identified above: (1) 
the purposes of graded assignments (Trans28), (2) what is needed to succeed (Trans32), and 
(3) how assignments will be graded (Trans66).  
Table 6.3 
Transparency of assessment, Pilot Study data (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Trans22 .460 .112 .000 
I know what is needed to successfully accomplish graded 
assignments in my Science class. 
Trans28 .581 .059 .000 
I understand the purpose of graded assignments in my 
Science class. 
Trans32 .831 .053 .000 
I understand what is needed in all graded assignments in my 
Science class. 
Trans45 .678 .080 .000 
I am told in advance WHAT science topics and information I 
will be graded on in my Science class. 
Trans63 .659 .092 .000 I am told in advance WHEN I will be graded in my Science class. 
Trans66 .759 .060 .000 I know in advance HOW I will be graded in my Science class. 
Note: Bold items are included in the integrated factor. 
Whether students understand the purpose of a graded assignment (Trans28) is 
inherently related to the deeper issue of whether they understand what is needed, or what it 
requires of them (Trans32), in that learning and ability are often assessed in terms of a 
student’s ability to meet requirements such as demonstrating, remembering, or solving. The 
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question of how, or according to what criteria, assessments will be graded (Trans66) appears 
to extend student concern over what academic requirements they face in assessment 
situations to the administrative issue of how success will be judged. Discrepancies between 
what students think they should be learning in a given class, and what they see the teacher 
emphasizing on assessment tasks, may cause students to feel that the purposes of the class are 
less transparent. This might be summarized as whether the ‘nature of success’ is transparent.  
It is not surprising that, when combined with Dorman and Knightley’s (2006) measure 
for Authenticity of assessment, which emphasizes the relevance of assessment tasks to learners’ 
lives and interests, items from the Transparency scale pertaining to substance and purpose 
would be elevated. It is also unsurprising that the fourth aspect of transparency identified 
above with respect to the original scale, which pertains to the relatively non-substantive issue 
of scheduling (Trans63), fell out of this factor structure. 
Four of the seven items in the measure Assessment quality come from Authenticity of 
assessment (bold items in Table 6.4, above). Items of the original Authenticity of assessment scale 
measure two broad aspects of the value of graded assignments to learners: (1) the real-world 
value of the material they cover (Auth29, Auth37, Auth60), and (2) their effectiveness at 
assessing student achievement (Auth44, Auth60, Auth71, Auth78). Firstly, the value of the 
material covered by assignments is conceptualized in terms of its (A) meaningfulness 
(Auth29), (B) pertinence to the real world (Auth37 and Auth48), and (C) usefulness (Auth60). 
Secondly, the effectiveness of assignments at assessing student achievement is expressed in 
terms of (D) ‘checking my understanding of topics’ (Auth44 and Auth71), and (E) ‘testing my 
ability to use what I’ve learned’ (Auth60). A final item, Auth78, queries whether assignments 
check students’ ability to answer ‘important questions’, which appears to split the difference 
between the value of the material covered by assignments and how well assignments measure 
real achievement (aspects 1 and 2, above). 
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Table 6.4 
Authenticity of assessment, Pilot Study data (N = 96) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
auth29 .629 .083 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments are meaningful. 
auth37 .489 .094 .000 I find that in my Science class, graded assignments relate to 
the real world. 
auth44 .573 .099 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments check my 
understanding of topics. 
auth48 .484 .106 .000 I am asked to apply my learning to real world situations in my 
Science class. 
auth60 .678 .082 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments are useful. 
auth71 .779 .117 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments test my ability to 
use what I have learned. 
auth78 .782 .046 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments examine my ability 
to answer important questions 
Note: Bold items are included in the integrated factor. 
 
The integrated, seven-item factor for Assessment quality in Table 6.2 emphasizes two 
key aspects of assessment. The first of these aspects, the ‘usefulness’ conception of an 
assessment’s value (Auth60), is emphasized in terms of assessing student mastery (Auth44), 
student ability to use what is learned (Auth61), and ability to answer questions perceived by 
students as important (Auth66). The second aspect of assessment emphasized by the emergent 
factor structure relates to whether students understand the purpose of an assessment 
(Trans28), know what is needed to succeed at assessments (Trans32) and know how they will 
be graded (Trans66).  
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Conclusion. The integrated seven-item scale for Assessment quality was adopted 
tentatively, pending successful cross-validation with Time 1 data. The integrated scale 
appears to measure a broader conception of the quality of assessment than either of the scales 
from which it was derived. The integrated factor derived using Pilot Study data, was next 
cross-validated at Time 1. 
Table 6.5 
Cross-validation of the integrated factor for Assessment quality with Time 1 data (N = 493) 
 CFA  
 Factor loadings (λ)  
Item Est. S.E. p Item wording 
Auth78 .673 .036 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments examine my ability to answer 
important questions. 
Auth71 .634 .041 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments test my ability to use what I’ve 
learned. 
Auth60 .734 .030 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments are useful. 
Auth44 .719 .032 .000 In my Science class, graded assignments check my understanding of 
topics. 
Trans28 .637 .036 .000 I understand the purpose of graded assignments in my Science class. 
Trans32 .612 .043 .000 I understand what is needed in all graded assignments in my Science 
class. 
Trans66 .620 .043 .000 I know in advance HOW I will be graded in my Science class. 
 
Cross-validation of Assessment quality at Time 1. The fit of Assessment quality to 
Time 1 data (N = 493) was acceptable. While chi-squared was significant (2(14) = 26.639, 
p=.021), tests of close and approximate fit were at appropriate levels (RMSEA = .043, CIlower = 
.016, CFI = .98; TLI = .97; SRMR = .029), and reliability was good (Rho = .84) (see Table 6.5). 
Assessment quality was used, as such, to measure student experiences of assessment in the 
Main Study in place of measures for Transparency of assessment and Authenticity of assessment.  
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6.2 Basic descriptive statistics 
 Table 6.6 reports congeneric model fit and basic descriptive statistics for all latent 
factors retained in the Main Study. Factor means, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis 
reported in the right-most columns of the table were derived in SPSS version 21 from weighted 
composite scores. Composite scores were calculated from the factor score coefficients 
associated with each congeneric model, using the methodology of Holmes-Smith and Rowe 
(1994). The acronyms, definitions and valences of all factors are provided in Appendix E. 
All ten first-order factors retained in the hypothesized model were well within the 
recommended criteria for normality, of 7.0 for kurtosis and 2.0 for skewness (Curran, West & 
Finch, 1997). Appropriate levels of normality were also observed at the item level, as can be 
seen in the comparison of the item-level descriptive statistics at Time 1 with those of the Pilot 
Study (see Appendix F). The congeneric models reported in Table 6.6 also demonstrate 
acceptable scale reliability, and satisfactory fit to Time 1 data.  
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Table 6.6 
Round One congeneric model results, Time 1 (N = 493) 
        
 Congeneric CFA      
      RMSEA         
 Scale (# items) 2 p df 
Loading 
range 
Mean 
Loading value 
Low 
CI 
High 
CI CFI TLI SRMR Rho Mean SD Skew 
Kurt-
osis 
Subject self-concept (5)  2.51 .775 5 .715-.845 .812 .000 .000 .042 1.00 1.01 .006 .91 2.48 .929 .364 -.420 
Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) 10.6 .308 9 .414-.885 .651 .019 .000 .056 1.00 1.00 .018 .82 2.01 .658 .840 1.25 
Performance structure (4) 2.97 .226 2 .547-.844 .638 .031 .000 .100 1.00 1.00 .015 .74 3.33 1.00 -.148 -.733 
Good teaching (8) 54.2 .000 20 .410-.756 .654 .059 .040 .078 .97 1.00 .032 .86 2.47 .802 .769 .636 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) .069 .966 2 .702-.905 .820 .000 .000 .000 1.00 1.01 .001 .89 2.50 .970 .531 -.171 
Assessment quality (7) 26.6 .021 14 .612-.734 .661 .043 .016 .067 .98 .97 .982 .85 2.19 .658 .506 .573 
Peer norms (5) 6.25 .282 5 .534-.713 .645 .023 .000 .070 1.00 .99 .015 .78 3.56 .888 -.405 -.376 
Surface learning strategies (4) 8.35 .015 2 .324-.878 .611 .080 .030 .140 .98 .93 .025 .71 3.58 .968 .287 .719 
Justifiability of cheating (3) .065 .798 1 .552-.811 .693 .000 .000 .076 1.00 1.02 .003 .73 4.05 .913 .875 .226 
Self-reported cheating (3) 4.15 .042 1 .763-.895 .826 .080 .013 .166 .99 .96 .060 .87 4.30 .926 -1.26 .715 
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6.3 Higher-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
CFA was conducted on the set of constructs presented in Table 6.6, which constituted 
the central measurement model. Ten of the constructs in Table 6.6 are first-order factors, 
whereas one, Teacher quality, is a second-order factor. CFA of measurement models that 
include higher-order factors is also referred to as ‘higher-order factor analysis’ (HCFA), which 
signals the presence of beta paths between the higher order and first order constructs (Gray, 
1997), 
While the measurement model achieved adequate fit (2(1089) = 1850; RMSEA = .038, 
CIs = .035 - .041, pclose= 1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .054; N:q = 2.8), complex structural 
equation models like this one, with 49 observed variables and 178 free model parameters, tend 
to be penalized when tested against smaller samples (Herzog, Boomsma, & Reinecke, 2007). 
The size of the present sample N = 493, affords an N:q ratio of just 2.8 subjects per free 
parameter. Using the Swain-R small sample correction function (Boomsma & Herzog, 2009, 
2013) a more accurate assessment of fit was reached (2(1089) = 1783; RMSEA = .036, CIs = .033 
- .039, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .92; CFI = .93; SRMR = .054; N:q = 2.8; Swain correction factor (SCF) 
= .964).  
All observed indicator variables appeared to be well-explained within the Time 1 
measurement model by the latent factors they were designed to measure. The correlations 
between these latent factors accounted adequately for any inter-relatedness between the 49 
observed indicator variables in the model, such that no cross-loadings or inter-factor residual 
co-variances were necessary to achieve good fit. Strong within-model construct validity was 
demonstrated both by the higher-order factor, Teacher quality, which explains 67% of variance 
in Good teaching and 84% of the variance in Assessment quality, and by first-order factors in the 
model, with mean factor loadings within a range of .611-.867 (see Table 6.7). 
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Table 6.7 
Factor loadings of the measurement model HCFA, Time 1 (N = 493) 
 
Note. Measurement model fit: 2(1089) = 1783; RMSEA = .036, CIs = .033 - .039, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .92; 
CFI = .93; SRMR = .054; Swain correction factor (SCF) = .96. 
 
6.3.1 Correlation analysis 
All correlations between factors in the multivariate measurement model (see Table 6.8) 
conform to the direction (sign) anticipated by the hypothetical model. The magnitudes of 
correlation coefficients in Table 6.8 are also consistent with those calculated in the Pilot Study 
(see Table 4.17). Time 1 correlation coefficients were larger, on average, than those in the Pilot 
Study by MΔ│r│ = .027, with a mean absolute difference of M│Δr│ = .120, across a range of R│Δr│ 
= .014-.352. 
Main Study, Time 1  
(N = 493) Scale (# items) Loading range 
Mean 
loading 
Person Subject self-concept (5) .714 - .847 .812 
 Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) .417 - .871 .653 
Context Performance structure (4) .565 - .791 .642 
 Usefulness of curriculum (4) .720 - .896 .823 
 TEACHER .819 - .918 .867 
           Good teaching (8) .401 - .759 .653 
           Assessment quality (7) .619 - .727 .662 
 Peer norms (5) .526 - .726 .642 
Moral obligation Justifiability of cheating (3) .526 - .798 .687 
Behavior Surface learning strategies (4) .354 - .808 .621 
 Self-reported cheating (3) .762 - .877 .826 
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A key similarity between correlation matrices at Time 1 and the Pilot Study was the 
presence of correlations exceeding .700 between Good teaching and measures of assessment, as 
well as between Justifiability of cheating and Self-reported cheating. The strong association 
between Good teaching and Assessment quality in Table 6.6 (r = .752) was close in magnitude to 
correlations in the Pilot Study between Good teaching and both Transparency of assessment (r = 
.785) and Authenticity of assessment (r = .765). The factors Good teaching, Transparency of 
assessment, Authenticity of assessment, and Experience of school rules were found, in the Pilot 
Study, to fit within a second-order factor structure for Teacher quality. The breadth of Teacher 
quality was reduced to a 2-factor composition at Time 1, by the loss of Experience of classroom 
rules and the integration of Authenticity and Transparency of assessment.  
Higher-order factor analysis. Retaining only two first-order factors in the structure of 
Teacher quality posed a challenge to assessing its second-order fit, in that factor models cannot 
be identified with only two constituent variables. A factor model is ‘not identified’ when it 
does not include “enough constraints on the model and data to obtain” its unique parameter 
estimates, such as chi-squared statistics (Schumacker & Lomax, 2010, p. 57). The target 
coefficient (Marsh & Hocevar, 2003) that was used to test the structural validity of Teacher 
quality in the Pilot Study (see Section 4.6.1) could not, therefore, be used because the chi-
squared values needed to calculate it could not be generated. Two alternative means of 
assessing the fit of Teacher quality were employed instead. Firstly, the multivariate 
measurement model was tested both with, and without, imposing the second-order structure 
on Good teaching and Assessment quality. This comparison found no difference (Δ = .000) in CFI, 
TLI, or RMSEA. 
Secondly, Teacher quality was regressed on ‘maternal educational attainment’, a 
covariate with small, non-significant correlations with Assessment quality (β = -.042) and Good 
teaching (β = -.010), and that explained negligible variance in Teacher quality (β = .052; R2 = 
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.1%). Regressing Teacher quality on maternal educational attainment used the latter in a 
manner similar to an ‘instrumental variable’, which may, in multiple regression, help 
“identifying models that cannot be estimated” (Kenny, 2014b). This model of Teacher quality 
met desirable criteria for the fit of multivariate analyses (2(102) = 211; RMSEA = .047, CIs = 
.038 - .055, pclose = .728; TLI = .94; CFI = .95; SRMR = .041; N:q = 10). 
The correlation between Justifiability of cheating and Self-reported cheating (r = .766) is 
larger in Table 6.8 than it was in the Pilot Study (r = .709). A second-order factor structure for 
these two variables does not, however, appear to be appropriate. Judgment, as measured by 
Justifiability of cheating is categorically distinct from behavior such as cheating. It is unlikely 
that these factors represent the same underlying factor, but rather that the likelihood of 
cheating behavior is heavily influenced by whether cheating is viewed as justifiable. 
Justifiability of cheating is better modeled, therefore, as a predictor of Self-reported cheating than 
as the reflector variable of a second-order structure held to explain both. The large amount of 
statistical overlap between these two variables appears to support the key overarching 
hypothesis that students are more likely to cheat when they feel less moral obligation to be 
honest.  
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 Table 6.8 
Higher-order CFA correlation matrix, Time 1 (N = 493) 
  SUB HON PERF GTEACH CURUSE ASSESS PEER SURF CHJUST CHEAT 
 SUB 1          
 HON .173** 1         
 PERF -.022 -.077 1        
 GTEACH .389*** .177* -.093 1       
 CURUSE .492*** .138** .006 .583*** 1      
 ASSESS .437*** .199*** -.104 .752*** .653*** 1     
 PEER -.137* -.218*** .202** -.332*** -.253*** -.372*** 1    
 SURF -.308*** -.275*** .328*** -.289*** -.299*** -.325*** .377*** 1   
 CHJUST -.151* -.379*** .366*** -.392*** -.328*** -.439*** .600*** .574*** 1  
 CHEAT -.295*** -.466*** .253*** -.274*** -.235*** -.307*** .492*** .524*** .766*** 1 
 TEACHER .475*** .217*** -.114 .819*** .712*** .918*** -.405*** -.353*** -.478*** -.334*** 
 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = 
Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; 
SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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6.4 Invariance of the central measurement model 
 The body of research on academic integrity reviewed for the purpose of this study 
suggests that cheating may differ among two sub-groups within secondary school 
populations: gender (e.g. Finn & Frone, 2004; Galloway, 2012), and grade-level (e.g. 
Anderman & Midgley, 2004; Galloway, 2012). After establishing that the measurement model 
fit the data of each group in question, three invariance models were tested (Meade et al., 2008): 
(1) the configural model, for which factor structure was held invariant, (2) the metric model, for 
which factor loadings were additionally held invariant, and (3) the scalar model, for which 
observed variable intercepts were additionally held invariant. Results of these models are 
presented in Table 6.9. The equivalence of factor variance, an important criterion for 
representing factors with composite scores, was also examined (see ‘Inv. Model 4’ and ‘Inv. 
Model 2b’ in Table 6.9).  
 Small sample correction. The degree of factorial invariance was measured in terms of the 
change in CFI vis-à-vis the configural model, when each new constraint was added (Meade et 
al., 2008; Kline, 2011). Model fit was, however, negatively affected by low N:q ratios in the 
present analysis (Herzog, Boomsma, & Reinecke, 2007). It is crucial to note, moreover, that the 
Swain R small sample size correction devised by Herzog and Boomsma (2009) does not work for 
multi-group models (A. Boomsma, personal communication, 25 March 2014). Unbiased 
estimates of model fit indices could not be calculated for invariance models for this reason.   
An invariance test model, often referred to in the singular, actually entails testing 
models for multiple groups simultaneously. This increases the complexity of the analysis 
while also effectively employing smaller (group) samples. Sub-groups under consideration at 
Time 1 were small enough (201 males, 292 females, 216 Grade Eight students, and 277 Grade 
Nine students) to seriously bias CFI and chi-squared for a complex model. These sample sizes 
approached the lower limit (~200) of what should be used to test complex models (Barrett, 
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2007). Low N:q ratios are, as demonstrated by the application of small sample corrections to 
multivariate analyses throughout the present work, likely to cause considerable bias to CFI 
estimates (see also Sivo et al., 2006). When the measurement model was tested on the sample 
of male data (N = 201), for example (see section 6.7), the corrected CFI estimate was .93, as 
compared to the uncorrected estimate of .89, a difference of ΔCFI = .04. The correction of bias 
in CFI estimates would likely be ΔCFI = .04 or greater for invariance models, as well, due to 
the larger number of free model parameters (q), and resulting lower N:q ratios. Following 
arguments that fit index thresholds should be appropriate to “the specific details” of a given 
analysis (Marsh et al., 2004, p. 321; see also Hu and Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004; 
Markland, 2007; Kline, 2011; Nye & Drasgow, 2011), the CFI threshold for multivariate 
models, given as .90 in Chapter Five (see Table 5.2), was lowered for invariance models to CFI 
> .86, a difference of ΔCFI = -.04. A CFI value of .86 for an invariance model would, with group 
sample sizes close to 200 and as many as 320 free model parameters, almost certainly have 
exceeded .90 if a small sample correction had been possible. Lowering the CFI threshold for 
invariance models does not, moreover, change the fact that non-invariance is judged as a 
decline in CFI more than .01. 
Results. The fit of baseline models for grade-level and gender, reported in Table 6.9, 
and that of invariance test models, for which no small sample correction could be performed, 
was acceptable. An overall decline of ΔCFI = -.006 in the fit of grade-level models indicated 
an acceptable level of measurement invariance across these groups. Gender non-invariance 
with respect to the y-intercepts of observed variables was, however, indicated by a decrement 
in model fit of ΔCFI = -.014 between models 1 and 3, which exceeded the threshold of ΔCFI < 
-.01. This meant that the y-intercepts of observed variables, or the y-values when x = 0 for their 
respective linear equations, differed between gender groups (Byrne, 2012; Cheung & 
Rensvold, 2002). Since dispersions of factor data, i.e. factor variances, were equivalent 
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between genders, differences in the y-intercepts of observed variables, appeared to reflect 
underlying differences in mean values, as would cause observed variable vectors to shift up 
or down.  
Note. FS = Factor structure (configural invariance), FL = Factor loadings (metric invariance), VI = 
observed variable intercepts (scalar invariance), FV = Factor variances. 
Constraining latent factor variance, or the dispersion of the data encompassed by a 
latent factor (Field, 2009), across genders in Model 4, increased the total difference in CFI to 
ΔCFI = -.016, reflecting a difference of just ΔCFI = -.002 over Model 3. Removing the constraint 
on observed variable intercepts, while retaining the constraint on factor variances, resulted in 
Model 2b. This final model was labeled ‘2b’ because factor variances were constrained in 
Table 6.9 
Invariance of the measurement model across grade-level and gender, Time 1 
 Grade-level invariance  Gender invariance 
  2 df RMSEA CFI SRMR   2 df RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Baseline models            
Grade Eight 1602 1089 .041 .90 .063  Female 1560 1089 .039 .92 .061 
Grade Nine  1416 1089 .037 .93 .066  Male 1385 1089 .037 .93 .068 
Inv. model 1      Inv. model 1      
FS 3260 2177 .045 .890 .064 FS 3181 2177 .043 .896 .064 
Inv. model 2      Inv. model 2      
Model 1 + FL 3308 2217 .045 .890 .066 Model 1 + FL 3231 2217 .043 .895 .066 
Inv. model 3      Inv. model 3      
Model 2 +  VI 3410 2266 .045 .884 .068 Model 2 +  VI 3405 2266 .045 .882 .071 
Inv. model 4      Inv. model 4      
Model 3 + FV 3425 2277 .045 .884 .073 Model 3 + FV 3435 2277 .045 .880 .083 
Inv. Model 2b      Inv. Model 2b      
Model 2 + FV 3324 2228 .045 .889 .071 Model 2 + FV 3259 2228 .043 .894 .079 
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addition to the constraints imposed in Model 2 (i.e. factor configuration and factor loadings). 
Model 2b resulted in a decrement of ΔCFI = -.001 over Model 2, and ΔCFI = -.002 over the 
configural model (Model 1). This strongly endorsed the equivalence of factor variance and 
loadings across genders. Equivalent factor loadings and variances indicate that item 
weightings are consistent across groups within a data set, such that factors employed in 
covariance modeling may be appropriately represented as weighted composites. 
The scalar non-invariance detected across gender groups indicates differences in the 
y-intercepts of observed variables. Under the condition of equivalent factor variances, 
differences in the y-intercepts of observed variables are likely to reflect underlying differences 
in those variables’ mean values, where higher means should shift variable vectors upward, 
and vice versa. Group differences are explored next at the level of observed variables, or 
‘items’.   
6.4.1 Differential item functioning analysis. 
Differential item functioning (DIF) analysis (Grayson et al., 2000; Wang & Wang, 2012) 
was used to investigate the source(s) of scalar non-invariance in the multivariate 
measurement model, at the item level. DIF analysis was conducted by regressing all indicators 
on grouping variables for gender and grade-level (1 = male, 2 = female; 1 = Grade Eight, 2 = 
Grade Nine). While the measurement model has already been shown to be acceptably 
invariant across grade-level, this grouping was included for purposes of comparison.   
 The fit of the DIF model was good (2(1089) = 1773; RMSEA = .036, CIs = .033 - .039, 
pclose = 1.00; TLI = .92; CFI = .93; SRMR = .052; N:q  = 1.7; SCF = .961). Significant grade-level 
differences, reported as beta coefficients, were identified in 11 of the 49 observed indicator 
items of the measurement model (see Table 6.10). Nine were highly significant (p < .01). The 
mean absolute magnitude of these differences was M│β│= .136, with an absolute value range 
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of R│β│ = .096 - .176. Grade-level differences were most concentrated in the Peer norms scale, 
with three significant effects occurring there (.161, -.141, and -.140). Five significant grade-
level differences were dispersed across the measures of other classroom context measures, 
within a range of .096 - .176. Three significant grade-level differences were observed in 
measures at the right side of the structural model, including one item of the Surface learning 
strategies scale (-.144), and two items of the Justifiability of cheating scale (-.096 and -.148). 
Gender differences achieved significance in 21 of the 49 items of the measurement 
model, or approximately twice as many as grade-level. Fifteen were highly significant at p < 
.01. The mean absolute magnitude of these differences was M│β│= .146, with a range of 
absolute value range R│β│ = .088 - .269. Gender differences were most concentrated at the left 
side of the model, with the four largest magnitudes (β > .200) occurring on the Subject self-
concept scale. The six-item scale for Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept entailed, by contrast, 
two small significant gender differences (-.110, -.158). Nine additional significant item-level 
gender differences were observed in measures of learning context variables (Performance goal 
structure, Good teaching, Assessment quality, and Peer norms), within a range of .088 - .174. Five 
small but significant gender differences were also observed at the right of the hypothesized 
structural model, in all three items of the Justifiability of cheating scale (-.149, .162, .162), and 
two of the three items of the Self-reported cheating scale (.143, .133).  
Results of DIF analysis revealed a dispersion of low-level gender differences in the 
measurement model. Among the 21 gender differences that were statistically significant, 
magnitudes were generally small, which is of greater interest than whether they were 
significant. Significance is largely a function of statistical power, or whether non-zero effects 
can be detected (MacCallum, Browne, & Cai, 2006). If the sample size, and thus the statistical 
power, is increased sufficiently in any study, Kline (2011) points out, “virtually all effects that 
are not nil will be statistically significant” (p. 13). Small statistical differences can, even when 
Chapter 6 Cross-sectional Analyses of Time One Data│215 
     
significant, be expected to exert proportionately minor effects on the interpretability of model 
results.  
While gender differences were found to be excessive on a cumulative basis, as 
indicated by the change in CFI between the configural and scalar models (-.014; see Table 6.9), 
their effects at the item-level were found to be small and well dispersed. Six of the 21 affected 
items, or approximately one-third, occurred in measures for Subject self-concept and Honesty-
trustworthiness self-concept, including all four of the largest differences (β > .200). While non-
invariance is of concern at any point in a structural model, the effects of these two constructs 
on the outcome variables, Surface learning strategies and Self-reported cheating, were mediated 
multiple times in the hypothesized model, and had, as such, less direct impact on outcome 
variables, in terms of variance explained, than constructs further to the right.  
While the scalar non-invariance detected between genders in the foregoing two 
analyses was relatively low and dispersed in the measurement model, its presence advocated 
further examination. A conservative approach was adopted in which the hypothesized 
structural model was estimated with each gender’s specific data, prior to being estimated with 
data from the full, ‘co-ed’ sample.  
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Table 6.10 
Differential item functioning analysis for gender and grade-level 
Item Gender Grade  Item Gender Grade  Item Gender Grade  Item Gender Grade 
SUB2 .269*** .004  PERF74 .152** .029  CURUSE64 .061 .057  SURF87 .078 .022 
SUB3 .117* -.027  PERF75 .148** .007  TRANS28 .082 .018  SURF88 -.043 -.069 
SUB5 .218*** -.057  GTEACH18 .098* .060  TRANS32 .063 .127**  SURF91 .023 -.144** 
SUB13 .258*** -.052  GTEACH33 .100* .078  TRANS66 .067 .021  SURF97 .007 -.061 
SUB15 .230*** .032  GTEACH39 .127** -.038  AUTH44 .005 .071  CHJUST79 -.149** -.096* 
HON_1 -.110* -.034  GTEACH50 .088* .068  AUTH60 .040 .035  CHJUST86 .162*** -.148** 
HON6 -.026 .064  GTEACH62 -.001 .176***  AUTH71 .031 .043  CHJUST99 .162*** -.050 
HON8 -.040 -.055  GTEACH67 .040 .032  AUTH78 .030 .096*  CHEAT84 .143*** -.062 
HON9 -.022 -.021  GTEACH68 -.055 .072  PEER24 .043 .163***  CHEAT92 .133*** -.054 
HON10 -.158*** -.026  GTEACH77 -.026 .125**  PEER31 .163*** -.055  CHEAT95 .082 -.083 
HON11 -.077 -.008  CURUSE19 .127** .138**  PEER40 .076 -.141**     
PERF61 .078 .000  CURUSE53 .052 .080  PEER58 .174*** -.140**     
PERF69 .081 .047  CURUSE56 .005 .060  PEER65 .074 -.088     
 
Note. (N = 493) SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, 
ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability 
of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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6.5 MIMIC modeling: Demographic effects (N = 422) 
A ‘multiple-indicators multiple-causes’ (MIMIC) analysis was conducted to 
investigate the mean-level effects of gender, grade-level, self-rated English proficiency, 
maternal educational attainment, paternal educational attainment, and all two-way 
interactions between these variables.  
Model fit. Of the 493 usable questionnaires received at Time 1, 71 included incomplete 
demographic information, leaving a sample size of N = 422 for the purpose of MIMIC analysis. 
A single MIMIC model estimated with all indicators achieved borderline fit (2(1689) = 2544; 
RMSEA = .035, CIs = .032 - .037, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .89; CFI = .90; SRMR = .049; N:q = 1.3; SCF 
= .942), with an N:q ratio of just 1.3. Lower N:q ratios are generally associated with lower 
statistical power, or a lower likelihood of detecting parameters that are different than zero. To 
increase statistical power, the MIMIC analysis was conducted as two separate models. The 
first of these included the five covariates listed above, (2(1289) = 2036; RMSEA = .037, CIs = 
.034 - .040, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .054; N:q = 1.8; SCF = .953), and the second 
included all two-way interactions between these variables (2(1489) = 2266; RMSEA = .035, 
CIs = .032 - .038, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .051; N:q = 1.5; SCF = .948). Both 
models achieved acceptable fit. However, with 230 (N:q = 1.8) and 275 free parameters (N:q = 
1.5), respectively, statistical power remained a concern. Results of these analyses are presented 
in Appendix G. 
To maximize statistical power, both MIMIC models were re-estimated with composite 
scores calculated according to the methodology described by Holmes-Smith and Rowe (1994), 
and normalized in accordance with Rowe’s (2002, 2004) recommendations. The first of these 
models included the five covariates listed above (2(12) = 16; RMSEA = .029, CIs = .000 - .061, 
pclose = .842; TLI = .97; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .010; N:q = 4.1); and the second included all two-
way interactions of these variables (2(17) = 23; RMSEA = .028, CIs = .000 - .056, pclose = .897; 
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TLI = .96; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .010; N:q = 2.9). Both models demonstrated excellent fit. N:q 
ratios were substantially improved by the reduction of free model parameters to 103 (N:q = 
4.1), and 148 (N:q = 2.9), respectively. The results of the MIMIC models estimated with 
composite scores are reported in Tables 6.11a and 6.11b. The degree of difference between the 
models estimated with composite scores and those estimated with observed indicator 
variables is briefly summarized next. 
Beta coefficients in the composite score model were larger, on average, by MΔ│β│ = 
.0005, with a mean absolute difference of M│Δβ│ = .015, and an absolute difference range of 
R│Δβ│ = .000 - .054. All effects that achieved significance in the MIMIC model estimated with 
observed indicator variables remained significant in the model estimated with composite 
scores. Two additional differences in Subject self-concept, related to (1) English language 
proficiency (β = .102, p = .033) and (2) the two-way interaction between gender and grade-
level (β = .114, p = .043), achieved significance only in the composite score model.  
Results. Gender predicted five significant mean differences among the additional 
eight first-order factors, and one second-order factor in the measurement model. The largest 
of these differences occurred with respect to Subject self-concept (Science), which was higher 
for male respondents (β = .252, p < .001). A two-way interaction between gender and grade-
level in relation to the same factor (β = .114, p < .05) suggests that male respondents in Grade 
Eight had higher Subject self-concept in Science class than female respondents in Grade Nine. 
Males were also more likely to perceive a Performance goal structure (β = .123, p < .05) and Peer 
norms favorable to cheating (β = .218, p < .001), to believe in the Justifiability of cheating (β = 
.182, p < .01), and to engage in more Self-reported cheating (β = .136, p < .05), all in the context 
of Science class. 
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Grade-level predicted five significant mean differences among factors in the 
measurement model. Grade Eight respondents reported higher (more favorable) mean scores 
for perceptions of Teacher quality (β = .151, p < .01) and Usefulness of curriculum (β = .141, p < 
.01) than Grade Nine respondents. Grade Eight respondents were also less likely to perceive 
Peer norms favorable to cheating (β = -.227, p < .001), to believe in the Justifiability of cheating (β 
= -.172, p < .01), and to use Surface learning strategies (β = -.149, p < .01). 
English language proficiency predicted three significant mean differences. 
Respondents who indicated being more proficient with English had higher mean scores for 
Subject self-concept (β = .102, p < .05), whereas respondents with lower self-rated English 
proficiency were more likely to perceive a Performance goal structure in Science class (β = -.110, 
p < .05), and to use Surface learning strategies (β = -.149, p < .01). The effect of the two-way 
interaction of gender and English on both Surface learning strategies (β = -.215, p < .05) and 
perceptions of a Performance goal structure (β = -.218, p < .05) indicated, additionally, that each 
was more prevalent among male respondents with lower self-rated English proficiency. 
Parental educational attainment also predicted mean differences in latent constructs 
in the MIMIC model. Subject self-concept was predicted positively by both maternal (β = .108, 
p < .05) and paternal educational attainment (β = .111, p < .05). The positive effect of higher 
maternal educational attainment on Subject self-concept also appeared to improve among 
respondents who indicated better English language proficiency (β = .123, p < .05). This may, 
however, be more common among female respondents, since paternal educational attainment 
was associated among male respondents with more use of Surface learning strategies (β = -.226, 
p < .05). The positive effect of higher paternal educational attainment on Subject self-concept, 
appears, by contrast, to have been especially beneficial among Grade Eight respondents (β = 
.202, p < .05). Respondents who indicated that both parents were more educated were, 
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moreover, less likely to report perceiving a Performance goal structure in Science class (β = -.163, 
p < .05), and more likely to report perceiving the class curriculum as useful (β = .138, p < .05).  
Among these results, gender and grade-level emerge, again, as important variables in 
the Time 1 data set. Together, they accounted for ten of the fifteen one-way effects, and six of 
the eight two-way effects detected in this analysis. Male respondents were, in particular, more 
likely to report that cheating was justifiable, that their peers viewed cheating as acceptable, 
and that they had cheated in Science class that year. Grade Nine respondents indicated, 
similarly, that cheating was more acceptable among their peers and more justifiable in Science 
class, than did their Grade Eight counterparts. Grade Nine respondents also reported more 
prevalent use of surface learning strategies. The fact that these mean differences occur in 
constructs at the right side of the hypothesized structural model, including both outcome 
variables, and, in several cases, exceeding β = .200, advocates for including them as control 
variables in the hypothesized structural model (see Figure 6.1). 
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Table 6.11a 
MIMIC results: standardized beta coefficients for covariates, Time 1 (N = 422) 
 Gen Gra Eng Mom Dad 
Person      
Subject self-concept .252*** -.001 .102* .108* .111* 
Honesty-trust. self-concept -.033 -.028 .063 .021 .024 
Learning context      
Performance goal structure .123* .020 -.110* .025 -.084 
Teacher .078 .151** -.031 -.001 .033 
Usefulness of curriculum .056 .141** .043 -.005 -.026 
Peer cheating norms .218*** -.227*** .028 -.018 .029 
Moral obligation      
Justifiability of cheating .182** -.172** -.033 .113 -.102 
Behavior      
Surface learning strategies .008 -.149** -.149** .034 -.080 
Self-reported cheating .136* -.085 -.041 .040 -.057 
 
Note. Model fit: 2(12) = 16; RMSEA = .029, CIs = .000 - .061, pclose = .842; TLI = .97; CFI = 1.00; SRMR 
= .010; N:q = 4.1. Gen = Gender, Gra = Grade-level, Eng = English proficiency, Mom = Maternal 
educational attainment, Dad = Paternal educational attainment, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .000. 
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Table 6.11b 
MIMIC results: standardized beta coefficients for two-way interaction variables, Time 1 (N = 422) 
 GenXGra GenXEng GenXMom GenXDad GraXEng GraXMom GraXDad EngXMom EngXDad MomXDad 
Person           
Subject self-concept .114* .136 .100 -.090 -.043 -.038 .202* .123* .016 .020 
Honesty-trust. self-concept -.054 -.076 .085 -.060 .138 -.049 .063 -.038 -.037 .000 
Learning context           
Performance goal structure .117 -.218* .114 -.103 .075 -.097 .119 .092 .042 -.163* 
Teacher .083 .083 .071 -.092 -.109 -.093 .129 .029 .064 .056 
Usefulness of curriculum .049 .045 .015 -.167 -.018 -.075 .118 .028 .081 .138* 
Peer cheating norms .033 -.094 -.060 .033 .109 .061 .018 .018 .007 -.059 
Moral obligation           
Justifiability of cheating .039 -.155 .117 .094 .134 -.035 -.124 .039 .006 -.067 
Behavior           
Surface learning strategies -.024 -.215* .000 -.226* .143 .088 .100 -.044 .052 -.071 
Self-reported cheating .025 -.144 .015 -.070 .146 .020 .021 .024 -.005 -.041 
 
Note. Model fit 2(17) = 23; RMSEA = .028, CIs = .000 - .056, pclose = .897; TLI = .96; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .010; N:q = 2.9. Gen = Gender, Gra = Grade-level, Eng = 
English proficiency, Mom = Maternal educational attainment, Dad = Paternal educational attainment. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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6.6 Revised hypothesized structural model (Model 3) 
Following the hypothesis that relational variables in classrooms, such as teacher 
quality, may be thought of as aspects of a teaching-learning contract, the original 
hypothesized model for this project, Model 1, included seventeen factors, of which ten were 
intended to measure students’ perceptions of various aspects of the learning environment. 
The effects of these relational variables on academic integrity were hypothesized to be 
mediated by moral obligation, measured as the justifiability of cheating and perceptions of 
whether the workload in a given class was appropriate. Measures of deep and surface learning 
strategy use were also included, along with cheating, as outcome variables. Including these 
learning strategy variables entertained the proposition that deep learning strategies entail 
greater integrity, in terms of meaningful learning, than surface strategies, and that surface 
strategies could be grouped together with cheating under the rubric ‘disintegrity’ (Miller et 
al., 2011). 
Model 2. Three of the above-mentioned constructs were dropped from the 
hypothesized model during the Pilot Study reported in Chapter Four due to multicollinearity 
that exceeded r = .850 with Good Teaching (see section 4.7), including Appropriate assessment, 
Mastery goal structure, and Clear goals and standards. Four additional measures of learning 
context, Good teaching, Authenticity of assessment, Transparency of assessment, and Experiences of 
classroom rules that demonstrated more moderate levels of multicollinearity (r = .750 – 800), 
were combined into the second-order factor structure Teacher quality. The remaining set of 
fourteen first-order factors and one second-order factor were designated ‘Model 2’ (see Figure 
4.3) and proceeded to Time 1 of the Main Study. 
Model 3. Analysis of one-factor congeneric models, conducted as a preliminary step in 
the modeling approach at Time 1 of the Main Study, identified significant psychometric 
dysfunction in five of the remaining fourteen first-order factors. Appropriate workload, 
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Experience of classroom rules and Deep learning strategies were dropped from the study due to 
congeneric model misfit, whereas Authenticity of assessment and Transparency of assessment 
were integrated, using pilot data, into a new seven-item factor structure. These changes 
reduced the number of first-order factors in the hypothesized model to ten, in addition to the 
second-order factor Teacher quality. DIF and MIMIC analyses of group mean differences 
additionally revealed a number of prominent effects related to gender and grade-level. These 
covariates were, therefore, introduced as control variables to the hypothesized model. The 
model resulting from these changes was designated ‘Model 3’ (see Figure 6.1). It is important 
to emphasize that none of the constructs in Model 3 were modified using Time 1 data.  
 
Figure 6.1. Diagram of Model 3. Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-
concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of 
assessment; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for 
cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-
reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level. 
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6.7 Male sample model, Time 1 (N = 201) 
The analysis of invariance reported earlier in this chapter detected scalar non-
invariance in the response patterns of male versus female participants. While the degree of this 
invariance was relatively limited in scope, it could cast doubt on the validity of the model 
estimated with the whole sample. To address this issue, gender-specific models were 
estimated in order to gauge the magnitude and import of differences caused by the scalar non-
invariance. Each model was estimated initially using all observed indicator variables (see 
Tables 6.12 and Figure 6.2), and then re-estimated using weighted composite scores, which 
afforded higher N:q ratios. Composite score model results are presented in Table I1 of 
Appendix I. Differences in effect sizes estimated with composite score models versus those 
estimated with observed indicator variables are summarized below. 
6.7.1 Measurement model analysis: Time 1 male sample data 
Following the two-step approach to modeling applied throughout the present study, 
the fit and reliability of one-factor congeneric models were tested first. These models, reported 
in Table H1 of Appendix H were all found to have acceptable psychometric properties, with 
the exception of Surface learning strategies, for which RMSEA (.090) exceeded the desired 
threshold of .080. The model did not, however, fail the close-fit hypothesis, expressed by the 
lower bound confidence interval of RMSEA, nor did it fall short on any other fit criteria, 
including a non-significant 2 (2(2) = 5.6, p = .06).  
The full multivariate measurement model was tested next against the male component 
of the Time 1 sample (N = 201), and found to demonstrate good fit (2(1089) = 1385; RMSEA 
= .37, CIs = .031 - .043, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .92; CFI = .93; SRMR = .068; N:q = 1.1; SCF = .911). 
The correlation matrix for this measurement model is provided in Table J1 of Appendix J.  
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6.7.2 Structural analysis: Time 1 male sample data 
The revised hypothesized structural model, or Model 3 (see Figure 6.1), also achieved 
satisfactory fit to the male component of Time 1 data (2(1135) = 1447; RMSEA = .037, CIs = 
.031 - .043, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .92; CFI = .92; SRMR = .068; N:q = 1.1; SCF = .907). Effects in this 
model (see Figure 6.2) explained 74% of the variance in Self-reported cheating, 55% of the 
variance in Surface learning strategies, and 49% of the variance in Justifiability of cheating. Of 27 
hypothesized regression paths, the fourteen that achieved statistical significance are 
presented in Figure 6.2. (Dashed arrows in Figure 6.2 represent effects that achieved 
significance when the model was estimated with the full sample.) The correlation matrix for 
this structural model is provided in Table J2 of Appendix J. 
The pattern of effects involving class context factors was centered on Justifiability of 
cheating. Effects of class context factors on Self-reported cheating and Surface learning strategies 
were overwhelmingly mediated by Justifiability of cheating, and to a lesser extent by Peer norms. 
Justifiability of cheating was also the strongest predictor of both outcome variables (β = .771, p 
< .001 and β = .641, p < .001, respectively). All effects of context on Self-reported cheating were, 
indeed, fully mediated by Justifiability of cheating, whereas Performance goal structure was the 
only contextual variable to exert a direct effect on Surface learning strategies (β = .254, p < .05). 
The substantial zero-order correlation between Surface learning strategies and Self-reported 
cheating (r = .507; see Table J2 of Appendix J) was, moreover, fully accounted for in the model 
(r = -.050, NS) by the predictive effects of Justifiability of cheating and Subject self-concept, thus 
lending the first empirical support to the hypothesis that cheating and surface learning are 
types of disintegrity. 
Usefulness of curriculum exerted, by contrast, no significant effects in the model. While 
its high correlation with Teacher quality (r = .761, p < .001) suggested that it could be 
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incorporated with the second-order factor structure, attempts to do this were detrimental to 
the fit of the overall measurement model. 
Table 6.12 
Model 3: beta coefficients estimated with observed indicator variables, Time 1 male data (N = 201) 
 
 
Predictors 
 Grade Sub Hon Perf Curuse Teacher Peer Chjust 
Sub -.010        
Hon .014 ---       
Perf .036 -.097 ---      
Curuse .070 .522*** --- ---     
Teacher .042 .460*** --- --- ---    
Peer -.250** --- -.139 -.037 .308 -.562*   
Chjust -.120 .126 -.231* .305*** -.156 -.185 .341***  
Surf .060 -.259* --- .254* -.122 .291 --- .614*** 
Cheat .087 -.178* -.231** -.100 .131 .106 .124 .771** 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance 
goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good 
teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = 
Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = 
Grade-level. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.   
 
Peer norms was also an important mediator in the model. The effect of Peer norms on 
Justifiability of cheating (β = .341, p < .001) fully mediated the effect of Teacher quality. It is likely, 
however, that the direct path from Teacher quality to Justifiability of cheating (β = .185, p = .353) 
is non-zero and would have achieved statistical significance in a larger sample of males, as it 
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would later be observed to do in the model estimated with the full, co-ed sample (N = 493) 
(see Figure 6.4). 
The effects of personological variables Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept and Subject 
self-concept formed a pattern within the model that clearly differed from that of class context 
variables. While the effects of class context on disintegrity were overwhelmingly mediated by 
Justifiability of cheating, personological variables exerted direct effects on both measures of 
disintegrity, and on intervening measures of class context and moral obligation. The effect of 
Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept on Self-reported cheating (β = -.231, p < .01) was, for instance, 
nearly identical to its effect on Justifiability of cheating (β = -.231, p < .05). The effects of Subject 
self-concept on Surface learning strategies (β = -.259, p < .05) and Self-reported cheating (β = -.178, 
p < .05) were, by contrast, largely unmediated, despite its effect on Teacher quality (β = -.460, p 
< .001), which may have carried through in small part to the outcome variables by way of Peer 
norms and Justifiability of cheating. The only significant effect of grade-level in the model was 
on Peer norms (β = -.250, p < .01), suggesting that male respondents in Grade Nine were more 
likely to believe that cheating in Science class was acceptable among their peers.  
Weighted composite score estimation. Estimating the hypothesized model with all 
observed indicator variables (188 free model parameters) with a sample of 201 male subjects 
achieves an N:q ratio of just 1.1. Using composite scores to estimate the model, instead, trebled 
the N:q ratio to 3.3 by reducing the number of free parameters to 61. The CFA for the composite 
score model yielded excellent fit to the male data sample (2(7) = 14.6, p = .04; RMSEA = .074, 
CIs = .014 - .127, pclose = .198; TLI = .92; CFI = .99; SRMR = .019; N:q = 3.5). The hypothesized 
structural model was also an excellent fit (2(14) = 18.4, p = .19; RMSEA = .039, CIs = .000 - 
.084, pclose = .601; TLI = .97; CFI = .99; SRMR = .022; N:q = 3.3), explaining 76% of the variance 
in Self-reported cheating, 58% of the variance in Surface learning strategies, and 54% of the 
variance in Justifiability of cheating, an increase over the model estimated with all observed 
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indicators of ΔR2 = 2%, ΔR2 = 3%, and ΔR2 = 5%, respectively. The mean effect size of the model 
was larger when estimated with composite scores by MΔβ = .024, with a mean absolute 
difference of M│Δβ│ = .05, and absolute difference range of R│Δβ│ = .000 - .129. All regression 
paths that were significant in the model estimated with observed indicator variables remained 
significant when estimated with composite scores, with the exception of the path from Subject 
self-concept to Self-reported cheating (β = .146, p = .143). This path may have failed to achieve 
significance in the composite score model due to the increased magnitudes of nearby paths, 
such as that from Justifiability of cheating to Self-reported cheating (β = .811, p < .001). All 
structural regression coefficients for the composite score model for male respondents at Time 
1 are presented in Table I1 of Appendix I.
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Figure 6.2. Male sample results for Model 3, Time 1 (N = 201). 2(1135) = 1447; RMSEA = .037, CIs = .031 - .043, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .92; CFI = .92; SRMR = 
.068; N:q = 1.1; SCF = .907. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = 
Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; 
CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < 
.001.  - - - - paths are significant in the model estimated for the co-ed sample (Figure 6.4). 
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6.8 Female sample model, Time 1 (N = 292) 
 The hypothesized structural model was estimated next with the female component of 
the Time 1 data set (N = 292). Results are compared to those of the model tested against the 
male data set.  
6.8.1 Measurement model analysis: Time 1 female sample data 
Analysis of one-factor congeneric models yielded acceptable psychometric properties 
for all factors, reported in Table H2 of Appendix H. Scale reliabilities also fell within an 
acceptable range, with the exception of Justifiability of cheating (Rho = .67), meaning that, 
among female respondents, more than 30% of the variance captured by this measure was due 
to random error (Kline, 2011). This violation of the established threshold of Rho > .70 is 
somewhat detrimental to the construct validity of Justifiability of cheating, in that Rho values 
are used to fix the factor loadings and error variances of latent composite scores. The deficit 
is relatively small (-.03), however, and random error is explicitly estimated in structural 
equation modeling, in the form of error terms (Kline, 2011).  
The multivariate measurement model was estimated next using observed indicator 
variables, and found to have satisfactory fit (2(1089) = .1560; RMSEA = .039, CIs = .034 - .043, 
pclose = 1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .061; N:q = 1.6; SCF = .939). The correlation matrix 
for the measurement model is provided in Table K1 of Appendix K. 
6.8.2 Structural analysis: Time 1 female sample data 
Structural Model 3 also demonstrated satisfactory fit to the female data set (2(1135) = 
1663; RMSEA = .040, CIs = .036 - .048, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .91; SRMR = .066; N:q = 1.6; 
SCF = .940) explaining 63% of the variance in Self-reported cheating, 36% of the variance in 
Surface learning strategies, and 62% of the variance in Justifiability of cheating. The correlation 
matrix for the structural model is provided in Table K2 of Appendix K. 
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As in the male data set, Justifiability of cheating was the strongest predictor of both 
outcome variables, Surface learning strategies (β = .404, p < .001) and Self-reported cheating (β = 
.732, p < .001). Justifiability of cheating also fully mediated the effects of learning context on both 
outcome variables, such that, unlike the male sample model, even the direct effect of 
Performance goal structure on Surface learning strategies was non-significant. The substantial 
zero-order correlation between Surface learning strategies and Self-reported cheating (r = .532; see 
Table K2 of Appendix K) was also, again, non-significant in the female sample model (r = .188, 
NS), due principally to the variance they shared through Justifiability of cheating. 
While the effect of Peer norms on Justifiability of cheating (β = .461, p < .001) was 
substantially stronger in the female data set than in the male data set (Δβ = .120), the mediating 
role it played in the effect of Teacher quality on Justifiability of cheating was, among females, 
only partial. The effect of Teacher quality on Peer norms (β = -.423, p < .001) was, additionally, 
weaker among female respondents (Δβ = .139). 
 As observed in the male sample model, Subject self-concept demonstrated a pattern of 
effects among females that was distinct from that of class context variables. Its effects on both 
disintegrity measures were largely unmediated in each gender-specific model. Its effect on 
Self-reported cheating (β = -.334, p < .001) was, however, nearly twice as strong among females 
as among males, whereas its effect on Surface learning strategies (β = .176, p < .05) was 
commensurate to that observed among males.  
The effect of Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept on Justifiability of cheating (β = -.262, p 
< .001) was also commensurate to that among males, whereas its effect on Self-reported cheating 
was, by contrast, non-significant among females. Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept did not, 
in fact, predict Peer norms in either gender-specific model, but did predict it in the co-ed model, 
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which may reflect the lower levels of statistical power achieved with these smaller, gender-
specific samples (MacCallum et al., 2006). 
Usefulness of curriculum exerted no significant beta effects in either the female sample 
model or the male sample model. The correlation between Usefulness of curriculum and Teacher 
quality (r = .536, p < .001) was also substantially lower among female respondents than among 
male respondents, further justifying the decision not to incorporate Usefulness of curriculum in 
the latter second-order factor structure. 
Table 6.13 
Model 3: beta coefficients estimated with observed indicator variables female data, Time 1 (N = 292) 
 
  
Predictors 
 Grade Sub Hon Perf Curuse Teacher Peer Chjust 
Sub -.043        
Hon -.033 ---       
Perf .048 -.051 ---      
Curuse .124* .478*** --- ---     
Teacher .181* .468*** --- --- ---    
Peer -.072 --- .116 .244** -.048 -.423***   
Chjust -.008 .025 -.262*** .166* .002 -.291* .461***  
Surf -.109 -.176* --- .079 -.054 -.060 --- .404*** 
Cheat -.035 -.334*** -.070 .040 .046 .104 -.104 .732*** 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance 
goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good 
teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = 
Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = 
Grade-level. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Summary of gender-specific model differences. Three potentially important areas of 
difference between gender-specific models were noted in the foregoing comparative analysis. 
Firstly, the effects of Performance goal structure were more oriented to Justifiability of cheating 
and Surface learning strategies among males, and more oriented to Peer norms among females. 
Secondly, the effect of Teacher quality was fully mediated by Peer norms among males, whereas 
Teacher quality exerted a significant direct effect on Justifiability of cheating among females. 
Thirdly, Self-reported cheating was predicted by both Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept and 
Subject self-concept among males, whereas this pattern shifted entirely in favor of Subject self-
concept among females.  
Weighted composite score estimation. Using composite scores to estimate the female 
sample model (N = 292) increased the N:q ratio for the measurement and structural models to 
5.0 and 4.8, respectively. The fit of the measurement model was excellent (2(7) = 7.5, p = .38; 
RMSEA = .016, CIs = .000 - .075, pclose = .770; TLI = 1.00; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .010; N:q = 5.0), 
whereas the fit of the structural model showed some decline, but remained good (2(14) = 
25.7, p = .03; RMSEA = .053, CIs = .017 - .086, pclose = .391; TLI = .94; CFI = .99; SRMR = .035; 
N:q = 4.8). The structural model explained 69% of the variance in Self-reported cheating, 47% of 
the variance in Surface learning strategies, and 66% of the variance in Justifiability of cheating, an 
increase over the model estimated with all observed indicators of ΔR2 = 6%, ΔR2 = 11%, and 
ΔR2 = 3%, respectively. The mean effect size of the model was MΔβ = .026 larger when 
estimated with composite scores, with a mean absolute difference of M│Δβ│ = .05, and absolute 
difference range of R│Δβ│ = .000 - .138. The largest of these differences in path magnitude (Δβ 
= .138) represented an increase in the estimated effect of Justifiability of cheating on Surface 
learning strategies, which appears to explain the correspondingly large increase in variance 
explained in the latter factor (ΔR2 = 11%, noted above). All regression paths that were 
significant in the model estimated with observed indicator variables remained so when 
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estimated with composite scores. One additional path, from Honesty-trustworthiness self-
concept to Peer norms (β = -.148, p = .030) achieved significance only in the composite score 
model. All structural regression coefficients for the composite score model for female 
respondents at Time 1 are presented in Table I2 of Appendix I.
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Figure 6.3. Female sample results for Model 3, Time 1 (N = 292). 2(1135) = 1663; RMSEA = .040, CIs = .036 - .048, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .91; SRMR = 
.066; N:q = 1.6; SCF = .940. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = 
Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST 
= Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level.   - - - - paths are significant in the 
model estimated for the whole sample (Figure 6.4). 
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6.9 Co-ed sample structural model: Time 1 (N = 493) 
The measurement model for the co-ed sample underwent detailed analysis in sections 
6.1 – 6.5 of this chapter, and was found, overall, to have good validity and reliability. Analyses 
of multi-group factorial invariance raised a concern about potential differences between 
gender groups, due to scalar non-invariance. Several differences were noted in Section 6.8 
between the model fitted for male respondents and that fitted for female respondents. Most 
of these differences reflected changes in the magnitudes of beta coefficients, however, which 
is more suggestive of mean-level differences than of differences in the operational definitions 
of the factor measures. 
The fit of the structural model to the co-ed sample (N = 493) was acceptable (2(1175) 
= 1962; RMSEA = .037, CIs = .034 - .040, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .056; N:q = 
2.5; SCF = .962), explaining 67% of the variance in Self-reported cheating, 41% of the variance in 
Surface learning strategies, and 55% of the variance in Justifiability of cheating. Detailed output 
related to this model is provided in Appendix L. 
As seen in both gender-specific models, two distinctive effect patterns emerged in 
Model 3 for the co-ed sample. The first of these patterns involved the effects of contextual 
variables, which were overwhelmingly mediated by Justifiability of cheating. The only 
exception to this pattern was the effect of Performance goal structure on Surface learning strategies 
(β = .157, p < .05), which also appeared in the male sample model (see Figure 6.2). The effects 
of Justifiability of cheating on Surface learning strategies (β = .505, p < .001) and Self-reported 
cheating (β = .730 p < .001) were again sufficient, in conjunction with the effects of Subject self-
concept, to reduce an otherwise substantial zero-order correlation between the two outcome 
variables (r = .512; see Table 6.8) to non-significance (r = .079, NS; see Appendix L).  
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As observed in the gender-specific models, the greatest effect on Justifiability of cheating 
in the co-ed model was exerted by Peer norms (β = .379, p < .001). Peer norms was, in turn, most 
affected by Teacher quality (β = -.396, p < .001), the indirect effect of which was β = -.150, p < 
.001 (see indirect effects for the Time 1 co-ed model in Appendix M). Teacher quality also 
exerted substantial indirect effects on Self-reported cheating (β = -.314, p < .001) and Surface 
learning strategies (β = -.202, p < .01), by way of Peer norms and Justifiability of cheating. It is 
helpful to re-emphasize here that the causal language used to discuss these results is 
supported both by strong theory and by the results of experimental manipulations discussed 
in the literature review and summarized again in Chapter Five (see section 5.1). 
Usefulness of curriculum failed again to exert any significant predictive effects in the 
model. A stepwise regression was conducted to investigate how the strength of its effects on 
downstream variables changed as additional constructs were added to the model. The 
downstream outcome variables in this analysis were: (1) Peer norms, (2) Justifiability of cheating, 
(3) Surface learning strategies, and (4) Self-reported cheating (see Appendix N). Usefulness of 
curriculum predicted all four variables in bivariate regression models, and tended to become 
non-significant when Good teaching was added to the equation. This pattern was seen with 
respect to Peer norms, Justifiability of cheating, and Surface learning strategies. In the stepwise 
regression used to predict Self-reported cheating, however, the beta path from Usefulness of 
curriculum became non-significant when Subject self-concept was added to the equation. The 
role of Subject self-concept as a control variable in the co-ed structural equation model (Model 
3), made it less likely, however, that it was having the same sort of negating effect on 
Usefulness of curriculum in Model 3 that it had in stepwise regression, where all predictors were 
simply correlated. The effects of Usefulness of curriculum on downstream variables in Model 3 
appeared, instead, to be curtailed by a large correlation with Teacher quality (r = .619), which 
is suggestive of complete mediation. Teacher quality was next positioned as a mediator for 
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Usefulness of curriculum by regressing it on the latter in an equivalent model (see Appendix P 
and section 6.9.1) (Kline, 2011), which achieved identical fit to Model 3 (Δ2(1) = 0).  
Table 6.14 
Co-ed sample model: beta coefficients estimated with observed indicator variables, Time 1 (N = 493) 
 
 
Predictors 
  Grade Gender Sub Hon Perf Curuse Teacher Peer Chjust 
Sub -.030 .268***        
Hon -.014 -.086 ---       
Perf .039 .180** -.072 ---      
Curuse .103* -.072 .514*** --- ---     
Teacher .123** -.054 .493*** --- --- ---    
Peer -.154** .166** --- -.135* .132* .049 -.396***   
Chjust -.057 .097* .071 -.242*** .237*** -.064 -.249* .379***  
Surf -.048 -.051 -.216** --- .157* -.073 .077 --- .505*** 
Cheat .014 .028 -.258*** -.160** -.035 .062 .146 .057 .730*** 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance 
goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good 
teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = 
Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = 
Grade-level; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
The second effect pattern in the co-ed model involved personological variables: the 
effects of Subject self-concept on Surface learning strategies (β = -.216, p < .01) and Self-reported 
cheating (β = -.258, p < .001); and of Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept on Self-reported cheating 
(β = -.160, p < .01). These effects bypassed complete mediation by Justifiability of cheating and 
Peer norms that was observed with respect to class context effects. The effect of Subject self-
Chapter 6 Cross-sectional Analyses of Time One Data│240 
     
concept on Teacher quality (β = .493, p < .001), and the effects of Honesty-trustworthiness self-
concept on Peer norms (β = -.135, p < .05) and Justifiability of cheating (β = -.242, p < .001), were, 
however, transmitted to the outcome variables as significant indirect effects: Honesty-
trustworthiness self-concept on Self-reported cheating (β = -.221, p < .001), and Subject self-concept 
on Surface learning strategies (β = -.097, p < .05) (see Appendix M). 
 
Weighted composite score estimation. Using composite scores to estimate Model 3 
with the co-ed sample (N = 493) increased the N:q ratio for the structural model to 7. The fit of 
the measurement model to the co-ed data set was excellent (2(7) = 13.8, p = .054; RMSEA = 
.045, CIs = .000 - .079, pclose = .552; TLI = .97; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .011; N:q = 8.5). The fit of the 
hypothesized structural model was also excellent (2(15) = 26.8, p = .03; RMSEA = .040, CIs = 
.012 - .064, pclose = .728; TLI = .97; CFI = .99; SRMR = .021; N:q = 7), explaining 72% of the 
variance in Self-reported cheating, 47% of the variance in Surface learning strategies, and 60% of 
the variance in Justifiability of cheating, a difference compared to the model estimated with all 
observed indicators of ΔR2 = 5%, ΔR2 = 6%, and ΔR2 = 5%, respectively. The mean effect size 
of the model was MΔβ = .001 larger when estimated with composite scores, with a mean 
absolute difference of M│Δβ│ = .03, and absolute difference range of R│Δβ│ = .000 - .083. The 
overall pattern of significant regression paths in the model estimated with composite scores 
was very similar to that in the model estimated with observed indicator variables. One path 
that achieved low/borderline statistical significance in the latter model, from Performance goal 
structure to Peer norms (β = .132, p = .035), became non-significant when estimated with 
composite scores (β = .098, p = .114). The failure of this path to achieve significance in the 
composite score model might reflect the relative increases in magnitude of nearby paths, such 
as the path from Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept on Peer norms (Δβ = .015) and from Teacher 
quality to Justifiability of cheating (Δβ = .072). All structural regression coefficients for the 
composite score model for the Time 1 co-ed sample are presented in Appendix O.
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Figure 6.4. Co-ed sample results for Model 3, Time 1 (N = 493).2(1175) = 1962; RMSEA = .037, CIs = .034 - .040, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .056; 
N:q = 2.5; SCF = .962. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher 
quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = 
Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level. 
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6.9.1 Equivalent models 
 Three ‘equivalent structural models’ (Kline, 2011; MacCallum & Austin, 2000) are 
examined below. Firstly, the absence of predictive effects exerted by Usefulness of curriculum 
in Model 3 suggests the possibility that it should be positioned as a predictor, rather than a 
correlate, of Teacher quality (Equivalent Model 1). Secondly, the decision to position Peer norms 
as a mediator between class context variables and Justifiability of cheating was based on the 
theoretical assertions of social comparison theory (Broeckelman-Post, 2008; Festinger, 1954), 
discussed in Chapters Two (see section 2.4.5) and Three (see section 3.4.5). Lacking a strong 
body of empirical research to justify this decision, however, the possibility that Peer norms 
would produce better model fit as either a correlate (Equivalent Model 2) or a predictor 
(Equivalent Model 3) of class context factors was tested. 
 Equivalent Model 1: Usefulness of curriculum as a predictor of Teacher quality: 
Usefulness of curriculum was positioned in Equivalent Model 1 as a predictor of Teacher quality 
(see Appendix P). The fit of this model was identical to that of Model 3 2(1176) = 1962; RMSEA 
= .037, CIs = .034 - .040, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .059; N:q = 2.5; SCF = .962. 
The amounts of variance explained in Self-reported cheating (67%), Justifiability of cheating (55%), 
Surface learning strategies (41%) were also identical to Model 3. A notable difference in this 
equivalent model over Model 3 was the strong mediating role Usefulness of curriculum played 
between Subject self-concept and Teacher quality. While this mediation effect appears to suggest 
that students judge teachers largely based on whether they think their class curricula are 
worthwhile, no literature could be found to support the directionality of this effect. There was, 
moreover, no difference in 2 between Equivalent model 1 and Model 3.  
Equivalent Model 2: Peer norms as correlate of class context. Peer norms was 
positioned in Equivalent Model 2 as a correlate of Teacher quality, Usefulness of curriculum, and 
Performance goal structure; and predicted by Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept (see Appendix 
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Q). This model fit the data well (2(1175) = 1971; RMSEA = .037, CIs = .034 - .040, pclose = 1.00; 
TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .059; N:q = 2.5; SCF = .962) and explained amounts of variance in 
Self-reported cheating (67%), Justifiability of cheating (54%), and Surface learning strategies (40%) 
that were almost identical to Model 3, albeit with slightly less variance explained in each of 
latter two constructs of ΔR2 = -.01, respectively. Differences in fit, as well as path strength and 
significance were similarly minor. Because both models have the same degrees of freedom 
(1175), however, the larger 2 value of Equivalent Model 1 indicates a small decrement in fit 
over Model 3 (2(1175) = 1962). 
Equivalent model 3: Peer norms as predictor of class context. Peer norms was 
positioned in Equivalent Model 3 as a predictor of Teacher quality, Usefulness of curriculum, and 
Performance goal structure; and as predicted by Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept (see 
Appendix R). This model fit the data well (2(1175) = 1965; RMSEA = .037, CIs = .034 - .042, 
pclose = 1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .056; N:q = 2.5; SCF = .962), and explained amounts 
of variance in Self-reported cheating (67%), Justifiability of cheating (55%), Surface learning 
strategies (41%) that were identical to Model 3. The beta path from Honesty-trustworthiness self-
concept to Peer norms increased in strength and significance from β = -.131, p < .05 in the 
hypothesized model to β = -.221, p < .001 in Equivalent Model 3. With the same degrees of 
freedom, however, the slightly larger 2 value associated with Equivalent Model 3 indicated 
that its fit was roughly equivalent to that of Model 3 (2(1175) = 1962). 
Equivalent model 4: Peer norms as a correlate of Justifiability of cheating. While the 
theoretical basis for including Peer norms in the present study comes from the proposition in 
Social comparison theory that individuals’ judgments are shaped by what they perceive of 
their peers’ judgments, the possibility was entertained that when students judge cheating to 
be justifiable they also become more likely to believe their peers feel the same way. This 
hypothesis was modeled by positioning Peer norms as a correlate of Justifiability of cheating in 
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Equivalent Model 4. The fit of this model was identical to that of Model 3 (Figure 6.4) (2(1175) 
= 1962; RMSEA = .037, CIs = .034 - .042, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .056; N:q = 
2.5; SCF = .962). Path coefficients observed in this model were identical to those in Figure 6.4 
with the exception of inflated direct effects of Teacher quality and Performance goal structure on 
Justifiability of cheating (βs = -.400 and .287, p < .001, respectively), due to the absence of 
mediation by Peer norms. The correlation between Peer norms and Justifiability of cheating (r = 
.439, p < .001) was consistent with the corresponding bivariate correlation in the measurement 
model (r = .600, p < .001; see Table 6.8). Both models also explained the same amount of 
variance in Self-reported cheating. The variance explained in Justifiability of cheating was, 
however, considerably lower in Equivalent Model 4 (44%) than in the hypothesized PTLC 
model (55%). This, together with the stronger theoretical basis for positioning Peer norms as a 
mediator of the effects of class context on Justifiability of cheating (see Section 3.4.5), argued in 
favor of retaining the model in Figure 6.4. 
6.10 Chapter summary 
Analyses in this chapter provided the first explicit tests of two recent theoretical 
developments related to cheating: (1) a contractarian perspective that posits a reciprocal 
relationship between students’ perception of the quality of a given class context and their 
sense of moral obligation to be honest in that context, and (2) that surface learning behaviors 
may be grouped together with academic cheating under the term ‘disintegrity’.  
Several of the measures selected to test these hypotheses were new to secondary 
populations and, in some cases, new to structural equation modeling. The set of fourteen first-
order factors that emerged from the Pilot Study was dubbed Model 2. When this set of factors 
was examined at Time 1 of the Main Study, problems with congeneric model fit were 
addressed either by dropping measures or by using pilot data to modify them. This rendered 
a measurement model comprising ten first-order factors and one second-order factor. This 
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measurement model was subjected, additionally, to multi-group invariance analysis, DIF 
analysis, and MIMIC analysis, by which prominent group differences were identified. 
Substantial mean differences observed between gender and grade-level groups prompted 
their inclusion as control variables in the hypothesized structural model, dubbed Model 3. No 
post-hoc modifications made solely on the basis of Time 1 data were included in Model 3.  
A low level of scalar non-invariance between gender groups was found to operate 
across a number of measures. This prompted comparative analyses of gender-specific 
versions of Model 3. Prominent differences in the pattern of beta effects were noted with 
respect to Performance goal structure, Teacher quality, and Subject self-concept. Model 3 was then 
tested against the co-ed sample as a whole. All three of these models fit the data well, and 
were largely consistent with one another. 
Weighted composite scores were used to estimate four models at Time 1 (MIMIC, male 
structural, female structural, and co-ed structural). Composite score estimation offered the 
opportunity to examine models with higher N:q ratios than estimation with observed 
indicator variables afforded. While differences in the effect sizes of models estimated by these 
two methods were consistently small, effect sizes in composite score models tended to be 
slightly larger than their observed variable counterparts. Such differences are consistent with 
improved statistical power, which is expected to accompany larger N:q ratios (MacCallum et 
al., 2006). 
The hypothesized model tested in this chapter subjected a number of insights related 
to academic integrity gained through prior experimental research to a ‘real-world’ 
examination. The fact that the study builds largely from experimental research provides a 
strong basis for causal interpretations of results. Two patterns were observed in both gender-
specific models and the co-ed model. The first of these entailed the complete mediation of 
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most class context effects on outcome variables by Justifiability of cheating, which was, in turn, 
the strongest predictor of these outcomes in the model. The second pattern entailed the two 
personological factors, Subject self-concept and Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept, exerting 
direct effects on outcome variables that were, at most, partially mediated by intervening 
variables such as Justifiability of cheating. These cross-sectional findings are, taken together, 
consistent with the differential effects of person and situation that have often been observed 
in the literature, and provide support for the contractarian perspective that the moral 
obligation students feel to be honest tends to fluctuate positively with their assessments of the 
quality of a given class context.
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES OF TIME TWO DATA  
 
 
 The object of Time 2 analyses was to re-evaluate the hypothesized measurement and 
structural models tested at Time 1, one year later. Time 2 analyses followed the overall 
analytical procedure followed at Time 1, including congeneric and multivariate measurement 
modeling followed by tests of multi-group factorial invariance. The structural model was also 
tested against each gender-specific data set, respectively, as well as against the co-ed sample 
as a whole.  
7.1 Basic descriptive statistics 
 Means, standard deviations, distributional statistics, and reliability estimates of all 
congeneric factor models at Time 2 are reported in Table 7.1. Standard deviations, factor 
means, and Rho reliability estimates observed for Time 2 were very similar to those of Time 
1. Time 2 means were larger, on average, by MΔM = .004, whereas standard deviations tended 
to be slightly smaller, with an average difference of MΔSD = -.022. Time 2 measures also 
demonstrated slightly better Rho reliability, on average, (MΔρ = +.035), with an absolute 
difference range of R│Δρ│ = .01 - .14.  
Time 2 data was less skewed than Time 1 data, on average (M│ΔS│ = .066), with an 
absolute difference range of R│ΔS│ = .031 - .392, but more kurtotic (M│ΔK│ = .042), with an 
absolute value range of R│ΔK│ = .013 - .826.  Several specific differences in measures of 
skewness and kurtosis between Times 1 and 2 are worthy of note. Data for Performance goal 
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structure and Surface learning strategies were more than twice as skewed at Time 2 (ΔS = .219 
and ΔS = .338, respectively), whereas the data for Good teaching at Time 2 was approximately 
half as skewed (ΔS = -.392). Data for Assessment quality, Peer norms, and Surface learning 
strategies were, moreover, less than half as kurtotic at Time 2 (ΔK = -.315, ΔK = -.296, and ΔK = 
-.343, respectively). All measures for skewness and kurtosis at Time 2 fell within the 
recommended limits of kurtosis = 7.0, and skewness = 2.0 (Curran, West & Finch, 1997). 
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Table 7.1 
Comparison of descriptive statistics from Time 1 and Time 2   
 Mean  SD  Skew  Kurtosis  Rho 
 T2 T1  T2 T1  T2 T1  T2 T1  T2 T1 
Subject self-concept 2.31 2.48  .997 .929  .499 .364  -.407 -.420  .92 .91 
Honesty-trust. self-concept 1.99 2.01  .742 .658  1.22 .840  2.08 1.254  .96 .82 
Performance structure 3.50 3.33  .986 1.00  -.367 -.148  -.627 -.733  .79 .74 
Good teaching 2.45 2.47  .821 .802  .377 .769  -.473 .636  .88 .86 
Usefulness of curriculum 2.45 2.50  .974 .970  .500 .531  -.213 -.171  .92 .89 
Assessment quality 2.15 2.19  .681 .658  .414 .506  .258 .573  .80 .85 
Peer norms 3.70 3.56  .893 .888  -.477 -.405  -.080 -.376  .85 .78 
Surface learning strategies 3.57 3.58  .940 .968  -.625 -.287  .208 -.719  .76 .71 
Justifiability of cheating 4.07 4.05  .890 .913  -.785 -.875  -.117 .226  .77 .73 
Self-reported cheating 4.28 4.30  1.01 .926  -1.38 -1.256  .941 .715  .86 .87 
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7.2 Congeneric model fit of factors in the central measurement model 
Seven of the ten congeneric models presented in Table 7.2 demonstrated satisfactory 
fit to Time 2 data, whereas fit criteria for three models fell wide of thresholds established for 
the Main Study. The three misfit models were Performance goal structure, Assessment quality, 
and Surface learning strategies, of which only the latter was found to merit modification. The 
misfit of Surface learning strategies appeared to be caused by a method effect resulting from the 
similar wording of two items, and their close physical proximity on the questionnaire 
instrument (see section 7.2.3). Surface learning strategies was modified in order to represent this 
empirical reality. 
7.2.1 Performance goal structure 
The congeneric model for Performance goal structure demonstrated slight weakness 
with respect to two approximate fit indices, RMSEA and TLI.  While the RMSEA point 
estimate (.109) and upper-bound confidence interval (.185) exceeded established thresholds 
of .080 and .10, respectively, its lower-bound confidence interval (.044) fell below the .050 
threshold, which supported the good-fit hypothesis (Kline, 2011). The TLI estimate of .89 was, 
moreover, only slightly below the threshold of .90, and was also accompanied by a 
comparatively robust CFI estimate of .96. Together, these fit estimates appeared to indicate a 
degree of misfit to the data that was small and ultimately acceptable within the framework of 
the existing study. Modifying Performance goal structure or dropping it from Model 3 would 
have been grossly disproportionate to the degree of its misfit. 
7.2.2 Assessment quality 
While the congeneric model for Assessment quality demonstrated weakness in RMSEA, 
which was excessive across both confidence intervals (.063 and .119) and the point-estimate 
(.090), its performance with respect to TLI (.91) was acceptable, and CFI (.94) was only slightly 
Chapter 7 Cross-Sectional Analyses of Time Two Data│251 
 
lower than the threshold of .95. Assessment quality was, moreover, incorporated within the 
second-order factor structure Teacher quality.  
Teacher quality. The two-factor model for Teacher quality was estimated, as at Time 1, 
by regressing it on the covariate ‘maternal educational attainment’, in order to identify the 
beta matrix. Maternal educational attainment had negligible correlations with both Assessment 
quality (r = -.023) and Good teaching (r = -.069), and explained negligible variance in the second-
order factor (R2 = .1%). As such, its role in identifying the second-order model was 
instrumental (Kenny, 2014b). The fit of Teacher quality met all desiderata for multivariate 
models (2(103) = 200; RMSEA = .056, CIs = .045 - .068, pclose = .177; TLI = .93; CFI = .94; SRMR 
= .043; N:q = 6.2). Because Assessment quality functions in Model 3 as a component of Teacher 
quality, which demonstrated good overall fit, it was not modified or dropped from the study.  
7.2.3 Surface learning strategies 
The pattern of fit statistics for Surface learning strategies involved weakness in RMSEA 
across both the point estimate (.126) and confidence intervals (.062 - .201), as well as in TLI 
(.88). While these values fell only slightly wide of those for Assessment quality, misfit in Surface 
learning strategies was not mitigated by inclusion in a second-order factor structure.  
The two largest Lagrange multiplier values to appear in the Modification Indices for 
Surface learning strategies were of equal magnitude (8.42), indicating residual covariances 
between items Surf97 with Surf88, and Surf91 with Surf87 (see wording in Chapter Four, 
section 4.5.8). The latter of these covariances, Surf91 with Surf87, also achieved the largest 
Lagrange multiplier value for Surface learning strategies at Time 1 (5.49). Examination of these 
items revealed both similar wording and close physical proximity on the questionnaire. Both 
item Surf91 (I study for Science class by skipping over parts I think the teacher will not ask 
questions about) and Surf97 (I study for Science class by skipping parts I do not find 
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important), query the tendency to skip parts of study material based on assessments of 
whether those parts are important, either to the teacher or to themselves. The fact that these 
items were separated by only 4 lines on the questionnaire instrument likely increased the 
variance they shared for purely methodological reasons. This ‘method effect’ appeared to be 
an empirically real property of the data for this factor, and was modeled, therefore, by freeing 
the indicated covariance of Surf91 with Surf87, which improved most aspects of model fit to 
acceptable levels (2(1) = 3.9; RMSEA = .099, CIs = .008 - .210; TLI = .93; CFI = .98; SRMR = 
.019). While the point-estimate for RMSEA remained above the threshold established in 
Chapter Five (see Table 5.2), its lower confidence interval (.008) advocated for good fit, as did 
all other indices reported above. 
Freeing the covariance between items Surf91 and Surf87 was also observed to improve 
the congeneric fit of Surface learning strategies at Time 1 (2(1) = 2.3; RMSEA = .052; CIs = .000 
- .143; TLI = .97; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .015), while having negligible effect on the fit of the Time 
1 multivariate measurement model (ΔCFI = .00; ΔTLI = .00).  
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Table 7.2 
Time 2 congeneric model results, Time 2 (N = 297) 
 CFA  
     RMSEA     
 Scale (# items) 2 p df 
Loading 
range 
Value Low CI High CI CFI TLI SRMR Rho 
Subject self-concept (5)  3.934 .559 5 .675-.898 .000 .000 .071 1.00 1 .008 .92 
Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) 20.5 .015 9 .524-.888 .066 .027 .104 .98 .97 .030 .96 
Performance structure (4) 9.04 .011 2 .568-.873 .109 .044 .185 .96 .89 .029 .79 
Good teaching (8) 44.9 .001 20 .324-.828 .065 .039 .090 .97 .95 .034 .88 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) .367 .834 2 .774-.927 .000 .000 .067 1.00 1.01 .003 .92 
Assessment quality 47.69 .000 14 .675-.775 .090 .063 .119 .94 .91 0.04 .80 
Peer norms (5) 5.027 .413 5 .617-.881 .004 .000 .081 1.00 1 .016 .85 
Surface learning strategies (4) 11.415 .033 2 .349-.842 .126 .062 .201 .96 .88 .036 .76 
Justifiability of cheating (3) .000 .992 1 .693-.813 .000 .000 .000 1.00 1.03 .000 .77 
Self-reported cheating (3) .038 .8454 1 .690-.960 .000 .000 .083 1.00 1.02 .010 .86 
     Note. 2  = chi-squared; p = significance level; df = degrees of freedom; CI = confidence interval; Rho = Rho reliability coefficient; highlights = index threshold violations.
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7.3 Multivariate higher-order confirmatory factor analysis 
 An examination was next conducted of the validity of the multivariate measurement 
model at Time 2, which included ten first-order factors (see Table 7.2) and one second-order 
factor (i.e. Teacher quality). The Time 2 measurement model also included a free covariance 
parameter between items Surf91 and Surf87 of the Surface learning strategies measure. While 
the initial fit of the multivariate measurement model was acceptable (2(1088) = 1796; RMSEA 
= .047, CIs = .043 - .051, pclose = .915; TLI = .89; CFI = .90; SRMR = .068), a more accurate 
estimate was obtained by applying Boomsma and Herzog’s (2013) small sample correction 
(2(1088) = 1689; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .039 - .047, pclose = .998; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = 
.068; SCF = .940).  
Good fit of the model indicated that all factors were well-defined with respect to each 
other. The variances of observed indicator items were adequately accounted for by the factors 
they were designed to measure, without the need for cross-loading single items onto multiple 
factors or for freeing inter-factor residual covariances. Mean factor loadings reported in Table 
7.3 fell within a range of .644 - .892, which was comparable to the range of mean loadings at 
Time 1 (.611 - .867). The second-order factor, Teacher quality, once again demonstrated excellent 
within-model construct validity, explaining 66% of variance in Good teaching and 94% of the 
variance in Assessment quality, as compared to 67% and 84%, respectively, at Time 1.  
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  Note. Measurement model fit: 2(1088) = 1689; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .039 - .047, pclose = .998; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .068; SCF = .940 
Table 7.3 
Comparison of factor loadings of the measurement model HCFA, Time 2 vs Time 1 
  Time 2 HCFA  Time 1 HCFA 
  Loading Loading  Loading Loading 
  Scale (# items) range mean  range mean 
Person Subject self-concept (5)  .674 - .897 .839  .714 - .847 .812 
 Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) .530 - .885 .706  .417 - .871 .653 
Context Performance structure (4) .594 -.829 .689  .565 - .791 .642 
 Usefulness of curriculum (4) .791 - .919 .867  .720 - .896 .823 
 Teacher quality .812 - .971 .892  .819 - .918 .867 
        Good teaching (8) .330 - .820 .687  .401 - .759 .653 
        Assessment quality (7) .687 - .770 .724  .619 - .727 .662 
  Peer norms (5) .628 - .888 .730  .526 - .726 .642 
Moral obligation Justifiability of cheating (3) .666 - .755 .724  .526 - .798 .687 
Behavior Surface learning strategies (4) .413 - .758 .644  .354 - .808 .621 
  Self-reported cheating (3) .729 - .920 .814  .762 - .877 .826 
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7.3.1 Correlation analysis 
 The correlation matrix for the measurement model presented in Table 7.3 was 
examined with respect to the strength and pattern of significant correlations at Time 2, 
compared to Time 1. Overall, this set of correlations remained consistent with the 
hypothesized structural model, and strongly resembled the Time 1 correlation matrix in most 
respects, including the signs, strengths and significance levels of correlation coefficients. 
Several differences were noted, however, including a shift in the pattern of correlations related 
to Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept away from Self-reported cheating, and in favor of Teacher 
quality. 
 The largest correlation between first-order factors was, as at Time 1, between Good 
teaching and Assessment quality (r = .788, p < .001), whereas the correlation observed between 
Justifiability of cheating and Self-reported cheating is lower at Time 2 (r = .723, p < .001) than it 
was at Time 1 (r = .766, p < .001).  Overall, the absolute correlation coefficients between the 
Time 1 and 2 matrices differ by a mean value of MΔ│r│ = .004, with an absolute mean difference 
of M│Δr│ = .072, and an absolute mean difference range of R│Δr│= .000 - .225. Within this range, 
three Time 2 correlations differed from their Time 1 counterparts by more than │Δr│ = .200, 
including those of Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept with both Assessment quality and Teacher 
quality, which were larger at Time 2, by │Δr│ = .225 and │Δr│ = .219, respectively, and the 
correlation of Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept with Self-reported cheating, which was smaller 
at Time 2 by │Δr│ = .202. This pattern of differences suggested an overall re-orientation of 
Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept at Time 2 away from Self-reported cheating, where the 
correlation weakened substantially, and in favor of the first-order components of Teacher 
quality (Good teaching and Assessment quality), where correlations were stronger. This pattern 
was also observed with respect to the Time 2 structural model for female respondents, as 
discussed in section 7.7. 
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 Three correlation coefficients that achieved significance at Time 1 were non-
significant at Time 2. Correlations of Performance goal structure with Peer norms (r = -.013, NS) 
and Self-reported cheating (r = .090, NS); and of Subject self-concept with Peer norms (-.119, NS) at 
Time 2 achieved significance at Time 1 (r = .202, p < .01; r = .253, p < .001; and r = -.137, p = .05, 
respectively). Additionally, the correlations at Time 2 of Performance goal structure with 
Usefulness of curriculum (r = .155, p < .05) and Subject self-concept (r = .192, p < .01) were non-
significant at Time 1 (r = .006 and r = -.022, NS, respectively).  
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Table 7.4 
Higher-order CFA correlation matrix, Time 2 (N = 297) 
  SUB HON PERF GTEACH CURUSE ASSESS PEER SURF CHJUST CHEAT 
 SUB 1.00          
 HON .277*** 1.00         
 PERF .192** -.084 1.00        
 GTEACH .386*** .354*** .103 1.00       
 CURUSE .530*** .229*** .155* .534*** 1.00      
 ASSESS .461*** .424*** .123 .788*** .638*** 1.00     
 PEER -.119 -.309*** -.013 -.384*** -.360*** -.436*** 1.00    
 SURF -.286*** -.252*** .223** -.259** -.321*** -.310*** .178* 1.00   
 CHJUST -.192** -.257*** .359*** -.315*** -.274*** -.377*** .471*** .633*** 1.00  
 CHEAT -.261*** -.264*** .090 -.311*** -.339*** -.372*** .436*** .445*** .723*** 1.00 
 TEACHER .475*** .436*** .127 .812*** .657*** .971*** -.473*** -.319*** -.388*** -.383*** 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality (ASSESS = 
Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching); CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; 
SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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7.4 Invariance of the central measurement model 
 The invariance of factor measures between gender and grade-level groups at Time 2 
was analyzed for significant underlying diversity within the Time 2 sample. Time 1 invariance 
analyses detected a number of small but significant differences in item-level mean values 
between grade-level and gender groups. Of these two groups, only gender differences were 
sufficient to violate the threshold for multivariate model invariance of ΔCFI = │.01│ (Cheung 
& Rensvold, 2002). CFI was observed to diminish by -.014 at Time 1 when all observed variable 
intercepts in the full measurement model were held invariant across male and female groups, 
which prompted the analysis of gender-specific structural models. Gender differences in 
factor loadings and factor variances at Time 1 were, in contrast to observed variable intercepts, 
acceptably small, which met key invariance criteria for use of composite scores for estimating 
structural models (Holmes-Smith, 2012).  
Multi-group invariance testing of the full measurement model could not be conducted 
at Time 2 due to sample size limitations. The Time 2 sample size (N = 297) included 115 males 
and 182 females; 147 Grade Nine respondents and 150 Grade Ten respondents. These numbers 
fell below the recommended size of groups in multi-group analysis of N = 200 (Meade et al., 
2008). Attempting to also test the measurement model on two of these groups simultaneously 
would have involved approximately 376 free model parameters, reducing the N:q ratio to less 
than 1. 
Multi-group measurement invariance is explored at Time 2 with differential item 
functioning (DIF) analysis (Grayson et al., 2000; Wang & Wang, 2012). The DIF model, in 
which all 49 observed indicator variables were regressed on gender (1 = male, 2 = female) and 
grade-level (1 = Grade Eight, 2 = Grade Nine), demonstrated good fit to the Time 2 data 
(2(1088) = 1684; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .039 - .047, pclose = .998; TLI = .90; CFI = .92; SRMR = 
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.063; N:q = 1.1; SCF = .935). The degree of non-invariance across gender and grade-level groups 
was similar, overall, to that observed at Time 1.  
As shown in Table 7.5, gender was associated with 27 significant item-level 
differences, and grade-level with 18 item-level differences. While fewer significant differences 
across groups were observed at Time 1 (21 for gender and 11 for grade-level), the number of 
highly significant effects, at p > .01, was identical (15 and 9, respectively). The absolute mean 
effects of gender M│β│= .170 and grade-level M│β│= .156 were also only slightly higher than 
those observed at Time 1 (M│β│ = .146 and M│β│ = .136, respectively). The number of beta 
coefficients greater than β = .200 was also nearly the same at both time points. Six differences 
related to gender had coefficients greater than .200 at Time 2 versus four at Time 1; and 1 
difference related to grade-level had a coefficient greater than .200 at Time 2 versus none at 
Time 1.  
This slight increase in non-invariance, especially across gender groups, justified the 
decision made at Time 1 to analyze gender-specific models, while a similarly low level of 
invariance related to grade-level, characterized by the same number of highly significant 
effects within a similar range of effects, provided no appreciably greater impetus for carrying 
out special analyses by grade-level. The need to analyze gender-specific models was, in fact, 
further emphasized at Time 2 by the concentration of item-level gender differences in items 
used to measure factors related to cheating (Peer norms, Justifiability of cheating, and Self-
reported cheating). As at Time 1, gender differences were also concentrated in measures of 
Subject self-concept and Performance goal structure. Grade-level differences were found to be 
concentrated, by contrast, principally in items used to measure learning context variables, 
especially Good teaching and Assessment quality, but were absent from factors related to 
cheating. The analysis of gender-specific models conducted at Time 1 was, for these reasons, 
conducted again at Time 2. 
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Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = 
Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; 
SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
Table 7.5 
Differential item functioning analysis for gender and grade-level 
Item Gender Grade  Item Gender Grade  Item Gender Grade  Item Gender Grade 
SUB2 .261*** -.121*  PERF74 .242*** -.075  CURUSE64 .098 -.140*  SURF87 .111 .080 
SUB3 .151** -.028  PERF75 .154** -.099  TRANS28 .025 -.127*  SURF88 -.119* .126* 
SUB5 .194*** -.147**  GTEACH18 .164** -.137*  TRANS32 .087 -.087  SURF91 .035 .058 
SUB13 .261*** -.078  GTEACH33 .093 -.154**  TRANS66 .033 -.187**  SURF97 .150* .068 
SUB15 .158** -.006  GTEACH39 .123* -.169**  AUTH44 .051 -.090  CHJUST79 .208*** .010 
HON_1 .050 -.032  GTEACH50 .085 -.133*  AUTH60 .073 -.101  CHJUST86 .133* .023 
HON6 .034 .049  GTEACH62 .080 -.159**  AUTH71 .046 -.171**  CHJUST99 .223*** .055 
HON8 .081 -.056  GTEACH67 .125* -.276***  AUTH78 .040 -.120*  CHEAT84 .175** .025 
HON9 -.024 .023  GTEACH68 -.036 -.076  PEER24 .072 .043  CHEAT92 .182** .103 
HON10 -.096 .036  GTEACH77 .132* -.194***  PEER31 .131* .019  CHEAT95 .107 .059 
HON11 -.092 -.073  CURUSE19 .121* -.177**  PEER40 .151** .066     
PERF61 .202*** -.100  CURUSE53 .118* -.144*  PEER58 .167** .006     
PERF69 .224*** -.127*  CURUSE56 .086 .086  PEER65 .139* .045     
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7.5 MIMIC modeling: Demographic effects (N = 267) 
As at Time 1, a multiple-indicators multiple-causes, or ‘MIMIC’ analysis, was 
conducted by estimating two separate models. In the first of these models, all latent factors 
were regressed on all covariates measured in the study, including gender, grade-level, self-
rated English proficiency, maternal educational attainment, and paternal educational 
attainment. In the second of these models, all latent factors were regressed on all possible two-
way interactions between the aforementioned covariates. It is important to note that 30 of the 
297 respondents at Time 2 did not provide complete demographic information. This rendered 
a sample of N = 267 for the purposes of MIMIC analysis. Both models were estimated with 
composite scores to maximize N:q ratios. It is also important to emphasize that non-invariance 
between gender and grade-level groups on the measures of various factors, as reported in 
Table 7.5, introduces ambiguity to the interpretation of the mean differences observed in this 
analysis (Byrne & van de Vijver, 2010). 
Model fit. While satisfactory fit was achieved when all observed variables were used to 
estimate both the first model, involving covariates (2(1288) = 1865; RMSEA = .041; CIs = .037 
- .045, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .064; N:q = 1.2; SCF = .925), and the second 
model, involving two-way interactions (2(1488) = 2052; RMSEA = .038; CIs = .034 - .042, pclose 
= 1.00; TLI = .90; CFI = .92; SRMR = .060; N:q = .97; SCF = .917), these models involved very 
low N:q ratios, 1.2 and 0.97, respectively. The second model could not, in fact, be estimated 
with certainty due to a non-positive definite first-order derivative matrix caused by the N:q 
ratio of less than one. The use of composite scores allowed both models to be estimated by 
increasing their N:q ratios. 
Estimated with composite scores, the first MIMIC model, which included all five 
covariates, achieved excellent fit (2(13) = 16; RMSEA = .027; CIs = .000 - .070, pclose = .771; TLI 
= .98; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .013; N:q = 2.6). The N:q ratio of 2.6 was approximately twice that of 
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the same model estimated with observed indicator variables (above). Effect size differences 
between the two methods of estimation were minimal. The mean effect size of the composite 
score model was MΔ│β│ = .0002 larger, differing in absolute terms by M│Δβ│ = .012, with a range 
of absolute differences of R│Δβ│ = .000 - .039. All effects that achieved significance in the MIMIC 
model estimated with observed indicator variables remained significant in the model 
estimated with composite scores, with one exception. The effect of grade-level on Performance 
goal structure fell from just-significant in the model estimated with observed indicator 
variables (β = .130, p = .049) to non-significant in the composite score model (β = .123, p = .067). 
The second MIMIC model, which included all ten two-way interaction variables, also 
fit the data well when estimated with composite scores (2(18) = 27; RMSEA = .043; CIs = .000 
- .075, pclose = .600; TLI = .91; CFI = .99; SRMR = .010; N:q = 1.8). The N:q ratio of 1.8 was, again, 
nearly twice that of the model estimated with observed indicator variables.  
Differences between the model estimated with observed indicator variables and the 
composite model could not be analyzed because the N:q ratio was less than one in the former 
instance. However, differences in effect size observed between these estimation methods have 
been consistently small in analyses of five preceding models in the present study. Effect sizes 
in these five models tended to be larger when estimated with composite scores, by Δβ = .01, 
on average, with a mean absolute difference of M│Δβ│ = .03. It was reasonable to expect, 
therefore, that effects obtained by estimating the Time 2 MIMIC model with composite scores 
would differ to a similarly small extent from what its effects would have been if estimated 
with observed indicator variables. 
 Results. Among the 17 significant mean differences found in the MIMIC analysis at 
Time 2 (see Tables 7.6a and 7.6b), more than half were related either to gender (6 effects), or 
the two-way interaction between English proficiency and gender (3 effects). The pattern of 
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gender effects at Time 2 was, in fact, very similar to that at Time 1, with the single exception 
of the effect of gender on Teacher quality, which achieved significance only at Time 2 (β = .141, 
p < .05). This indicated that males tended to judge their teachers more favorably than females 
at Time 2. Male respondents also reported higher Subject self-concept (β = .252, p < .001), a 
stronger sense of Performance goal structure (β = .123, p < .05), a greater belief that Peer norms 
favored cheating (β = .218, p < .001), a greater likelihood to believe in the Justifiability of cheating 
(β = .182, p < .01), and greater engagement in Self-reported cheating (β = .136, p < .05), all within 
the context of Science class.  
The fact that all factor-level gender differences at both time points were higher for 
male respondents is suggestive of a method effect in which males were simply more likely to 
give higher answers than females. Differences at the item level (see DIF analyses in sections 
6.4.1 and 7.4) are, however, not so consistent that they can be explained as a blanket tendency 
among males to simply circle higher Likert values. The measure Peer norms, for instance, 
included four reversed items (Peer24, Peer31, Peer40 and Peer60; see item wording in Table 
4.9), of which male respondents gave significantly lower responses at Time 1 for Peer31 (see 
Table 6.10), and at Time 2 for Peer31, Peer40, and Peer65 (see Table 7.5).  Males also gave 
significantly higher answers at both time points for the only non-reverse item in the Peer norms 
measure, Peer58, which suggests that they were, in fact, more likely than their female 
counterparts to believe their peers to be more amenable to cheating. Mean differences detected 
in Subject self-concept were similarly corroborated by a reversed item (Sub15; see Item 2 in 
Section B of Appendix B), for which males gave significantly lower responses than females at 
both time points. Unambiguous interpretations of these mean differences cannot be made on 
the basis of this analysis, however, due both to gender non-invariance in the measurement 
model, and to the effects of the interaction between gender and English proficiency that are 
next discussed.  
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While, at Time 1, English proficiency was found to predict significant differences in 
Subject self-concept (β = .102, p < .05), Performance goal structure (β = -.110, p < .05), and Surface 
learning strategies (β = -.149, p < .01), none of these differences persisted at Time 2. Differences 
predicted at Time 2 by the two-way interaction between gender and English proficiency in 
Surface learning strategies (β = -.167, p < .05), Justifiability of cheating (β = -.250, p < .01), and Self-
reported cheating (β = -.185, p < .05) suggest, instead, that these were more prevalent among 
male respondents whose self-rated English language proficiency was lower. Only the first of 
these three effects was also found at Time 1. Additionally, two-way interactions between 
English proficiency and both grade-level and paternal educational attainment indicate that 
the effect of lower self-rated English proficiency on Self-reported cheating was higher among 
respondents at Grade Ten than at Grade Nine (β = -.304, p < .05), and among respondents 
whose paternal educational attainment was lower (β = -.187, p < .01). 
In comparison to the five significant grade-level differences found at Time 1, only the 
effect of grade-level on Teacher quality (β = .178, p < .01) remained significant at Time 2. This 
difference indicates that Grade Nine students rated their Science teachers more highly than 
Grade Ten students. Again, however, significant differences related to several two-way 
interactions variables involving grade-level, noted below, qualify interpretation of its direct 
effects. 
 The only significant difference associated with maternal educational attainment at 
Time 1, which was observed in Subject self-concept (β = .108, p < .05), failed to persist at Time 
2. Only its effect on Performance goal structure achieved significance at Time 2 (β = -.165, p < 
.05), indicating that respondents whose mothers had reached a higher level of institutional 
education tended to be less likely to perceive performance goal structures in Science class. No 
two-way interactions involving maternal educational attainment achieved significance at 
Time 2.  
Chapter 7 Cross-Sectional Analyses of Time Two Data│266 
 
 The effect of paternal educational attainment was more pervasive at Time 2 than at 
Time 1. The only significant difference predicted by paternal educational attainment at Time 
1, also in Subject self-concept (β = .111, p < .05), was stronger at Time 2 (β = .196, p < .01). Two 
additional differences predicted by paternal educational attainment at Time 2 included 
Usefulness of curriculum (β = .138, p < .05), and Self-reported cheating (β = -.213, p < .01). These 
three differences suggest, in sum, that respondents whose fathers had more formal education 
tended (1) to have higher self-concept in relation to Science, (2) to perceive the curriculum in 
Science class as more useful, and (3) to cheat less. The effect of the two-way interaction 
between paternal educational attainment and grade-level on Self-reported cheating (β = -.318, p 
< .05) suggests, however, that among students with lower parental educational attainment, 
cheating was more likely in Grade Ten than in Grade Nine. Respondents indicating lower 
paternal educational attainment were also, as noted above, more likely to report cheating 
when they also had lower self-rated English proficiency.  
 In summary, the pattern of demographic effects observed at Time 2 marked a decline, 
over Time 2, in the prominence of grade-level effects in addition to a slight increase in effects 
associated with gender and paternal educational attainment. As at Time 1, males at Time 2 
tended to report higher self-concept in relation to Science class and more favorable judgments 
of the teacher, in conjunction with more prevalent pro-cheating attitudes and more 
disintegrity behavior. This conjunction of positive perceptions and dishonest attitudes and 
behaviors, which is surprising in the light of a large amount of published literature in addition 
to results in the present study that point to the opposite pattern, might reflect that males were 
also more likely, at Times 1 and 2, to perceive a performance goal structure. Performance goals 
tend to convey that good grades and favorable peer-comparisons are more important relative 
to actual learning, and may, as such, encourage more cheating, even among students who 
view a class context favorably.   
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Table 7.6a 
MIMIC results: standardized beta coefficients for covariates, Time 2 (N = 267) 
 Gen Gra Eng Mom Dad 
Person      
Subject self-concept .230*** -.078 .024 .055 .196** 
Honesty-trust. self-concept .016 .004 .076 .110 .047 
Learning context      
Performance goal structure .248*** -.123 -.087 -.165* -.043 
Teacher .141* -.178** .044 -.085 .098 
Usefulness of curriculum .111 -.119 .062 -.111 .138* 
Peer cheating norms .169** -.055 .038 .102 -.103 
Moral obligation      
Justifiability of cheating .227** .046 -.056 .017 .150 
Behavior      
Surface learning strategies .081 .095 -.055 -.107 -.143 
Self-reported cheating .183** .126 .041 -.006 -.213** 
 
Note. Model fit: (2(13) = 16; RMSEA = .027; CIs = .000 - .070, pclose = .771; TLI = .98; CFI = 1.00; 
SRMR = .013). Gen = Gender, Gra = Grade-level, Eng = English proficiency, Mom = Maternal 
educational attainment, Dad = Paternal educational attainment, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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Table 7.6b 
MIMIC results: standardized beta coefficients for two-way interaction variables, Time 2 (N = 267) 
  GenXGra GenXEng GenXMom GenXDad GraXEng GraXMom GraXDad EngXMom EngXDad MomXDad 
Person           
Subject self-concept -.112 -.123 -.070 .193 .167 .129 .071 -.111 .009 .052 
Honesty-trust. self-concept -.068 -.001 -.021 .057 .213 .172 -.018 .191 -.046 -.119 
Learning context           
Performance goal structure -.126 -.138 -.195 .059 .146 .043 -.092 -.110 -.061 -.001 
Teacher -.013 .075 -.150 -.014 -.039 .065 .143 .097 -.032 -.097 
Usefulness of curriculum -.082 .025 -.207 -.058 -.032 .101 .220 .080 .022 -.038 
Peer cheating norms -.093 -.086 -.067 -.084 .008 .197 -.010 .154 -.046 -.005 
Moral obligation           
Justifiability of cheating -.132 -.250** -.075 -.031 -.156 .109 -.200 .115 -.079 .015 
Behavior           
Surface learning strategies -.069 -.167* .057 .027 .083 -.154 -.197 -.174 -.094 .077 
Self-reported cheating -.067 -.185* -.034 .044 -.304* .028 -.318* .205 -.187** .022 
 
Note. Model fit: (2(18) = 27; RMSEA = .043; CIs = .000 - .075, pclose = .600; TLI = .91; CFI = .99; SRMR = .010). Gen = Gender, Gra = Grade-level, Eng = English 
proficiency, Mom = Maternal educational attainment, Dad = Paternal educational attainment, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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7.6 Male sample structural model (N = 115) 
 Due to the small size of the male and female components of the Time 2 sample (N = 
115 and N = 182, respectively), neither could be estimated with observed indicator variables, 
because of N:q ratios less than 1. Both gender-specific models were estimated, for this reason, 
with composite scores. 
7.6.1 Measurement model analysis: Time 2 male sample data 
Assessments of congeneric model fit, reported in Table T1 of Appendix T were 
generally satisfactory for the male component of the Time 2 sample. Indications of weakness 
were, however, found with respect to Good teaching and Assessment quality. The model for Good 
teaching included a factor loading of λ = .109 (item gteach68), which fell below the threshold 
of .300. This observation was not of critical concern, however, in view of the otherwise good 
fit of the congeneric model for Good teaching 2(20) = 31.8, p = .046; RMSEA = .072, CIs = .010 - 
.117; pclose = .210; TLI = .94; CFI = .96; SRMR = .044; Rho = .86).  
The fit of the congeneric model for Assessment quality (2(14) = 30.6, p = .01; RMSEA = 
.102, CIs = .052 - .151; pclose = .045; TLI = .90; CFI = .93; SRMR = .046; Rho = .91) was similar to 
that observed in the co-ed Time 2 sample (see Table 7.2). Weakness was observed in both 
RMSEA (.102) and CFI (.93). These estimates were, however, still reasonably close to the 
desired levels of .080 and .95, respectively. RMSEA values as high as < .10 have, for instance, 
been considered acceptable (MacCallum et al., 1996), as have CFI values as low as .90 (Marsh 
et al., 2004). These signs of weakness were also mitigated by appropriate TLI and SRMR 
values, robust factor loadings (Rλ = .70 - .80), and excellent reliability (.91). 
The multivariate measurement model was next estimated using composite scores, and 
achieved excellent fit (2(8) = 9.7, p = .29; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .000 - .123, pclose = .484; TLI = 
.98; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .016; N:q = 2). A small negative residual on Assessment quality (-.038), 
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or a ‘Heywood case’ (Byrne, 2012), was addressed by setting its residual variance equal to 
.00001 with syntax prescribed by Muthén and Muthén (2014). The correlation matrix for the 
male measurement model is presented in Appendix U. 
7.6.2 Structural analysis: Time 2 male sample data 
The revised hypothetical structural model, or Model 3 (see Figure 6.1), also 
demonstrated excellent fit to the male data (2(15) = 22.8, p = .09; RMSEA = .067, CIs = .000 - 
.120, pclose = .278; TLI = .94; CFI = .98; SRMR = .042; N:q = 2). Variance explained at Time 2 in 
the two outcome variables, Self-reported cheating (81%) and Surface learning strategies (71%), was 
greater than that observed in the Time 1 male sample model by ΔR2 = 6% and ΔR2 = 13%, 
respectively. The amount of variance explained at Time 2 in Justifiability of cheating (36%) was 
less, by contrast, than at Time 1 (ΔR2 = -18%). 
The pattern of structural effects for males at Time 2 retained most of the key 
characteristics that were observed at Time 1. The strongest effects on Surface learning strategies 
and Self-reported cheating were exerted by Justifiability of cheating (β = .754, p < .001 and β = .776, 
p < .001, respectively), which mediated most of the effects of class context. The role of Peer 
norms as a complete mediator of Teacher quality among males (β = -.450, p < .001) was also 
observed at Time 1, and Usefulness of curriculum failed, again, to exert any significant 
predictive effects in the model. This overall pattern of effects continued, therefore, to indicate 
that respondents who rated the quality of their Science teacher as lower were more likely (1) 
to believe that cheating was acceptable among their peers, and (2) to believe, in turn, that 
cheating in Science class was more justifiable. 
 The role of Performance goal structure at Time 1 differed in several ways among males, 
as compared to Time 2. Performance goal structure emerged as the strongest predictor of 
Justifiability of cheating among males at Time 2 (β = .452, p = .001), and exerted a significant 
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direct effect on Self-reported cheating (β = .297, p = .05).  These differences appeared, however, 
to be partly attributable to suppression effects, as discussed in more detail below. Another 
prominent difference in the male sample model at Time 2 was the significant effect of Subject 
self-concept on Performance goal structure (β = .264, p = .05). This parameter was non-significant 
in all Time 1 models.  
The tendency, observed among males at Time 1, of personological variables to exert 
direct effects on outcome variables, thus bypassing complete mediation by Peer norms and 
Justifiability of cheating, was weaker among male respondents at Time 2. While the effect of 
Subject self-concept on Surface learning strategies remained significant at Time 2 (β = -.294, p < 
.05), its effect on Self-reported cheating did not (β = -.045, NS). The effect of Honesty-
trustworthiness self-concept on Self-reported cheating also did not remain significant among Time 
2 males (β = -.040, NS), whereas its effect on Justifiability of cheating did (β = -.272, p < .05).  
Suppression effects. The effect of Performance goal structure on Justifiability of cheating 
(β = .452, p < .001) was nearly 50% larger among male respondents at Time 2 than at Time 1, 
as well as being nearly two-thirds larger than its corresponding bivariate correlation at Time 
2 (r = .287; see Appendix U). This appears to have been the result of third variable suppression 
(Tzelgov & Henik, 1991). Suppressor variables increase the magnitudes of independent 
variable effects on dependent variables by explaining, or ‘suppressing’, “outcome-irrelevant 
variance in” the predictor (Pandey & Elliot, 2010, p. 29; see also Conger, 1974; Horst, 1941). 
Suppressor variables are often uncorrelated with the dependent variable, and are thus more 
common in models that, like Model 3, have large numbers of non-significant parameters 
(Pandey & Elliott, 2010). Other predictors of Justifiability of cheating in the Model 3 appear, in 
other words, to have ‘suppressed’ variance in Performance goal structure that was extraneous 
to its relationship with Justifiability of cheating, thereby inflating the regression weight. To test 
the hypothesis that the path coefficient in question was being suppressed, the paths from all 
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other predictors of Justifiability of cheating were constrained to zero. When this was done, the 
effect of Performance goal structure fell perfectly in line with its corresponding bivariate 
correlation (β = .286, p = .001). As the beta paths from its co-predictors of Justifiability of cheating 
were then freed, one-by-one, the effect in question increased steadily back to the inflated value 
of β = .452. No single suppressor variable was identified. 
Another substantial suppression effect was observed in the beta path from Performance 
goal structure to Self-reported cheating (β = -.297, p < .05), which was nearly twice the size of its 
corresponding bivariate correlation (r = -.159). Small suppression effects in the male sample 
model were also observed in the beta paths from Subject self-concept to Surface learning strategies 
(β = -.294, p < .05), and Peer norms to Justifiability of cheating (β = .335, p < .05), as indicated by 
the fact that they were larger than their corresponding bivariate correlations, r = -.290 and r = 
.324, respectively. 
A prominent suppression effect was also observed with respect to the effect of Teacher 
quality on Surface learning strategies (β = .344, p < .05; see the dot-dashed line in Figure 7.1). This 
effect size was much larger than its corresponding bivariate correlations (r = -.001), and of 
opposite sign, which is indicative of negative confounding in the context of ‘inconsistent 
mediation’ (Davis, 1985). The inflation of these beta coefficients appeared, in other words, to 
involve a suppression effect within the context of ‘inconsistent mediation’, in which a 
mediated effect carries the opposite sign of the direct effect (Beslow & Day, 1980; Conger, 
1974; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). While the beta coefficient in question could be 
interpreted to mean that Teacher quality positively predicts Surface learning strategies when 
controlling for other variables, it is not clear that this is warranted, nor that this effect is 
anything more than an artifact of statistical distortion in a low-power analysis. 
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Results of the male sample model at Time 2 were generally questionable due both to a 
small sample size (N = 115) and to the emergence of several prominent suppression effects. It 
is instructive, however, that key aspects of the overall pattern of results among males at Time 
1 persisted at Time 2, such as the mediating roles of Justifiability of cheating and Peer norms, and 
the direct effects of Subject self-concept on contextual and outcome variables.  
Table 7.7 
Model 3: Standardized beta coefficients estimated with composite scores, Time 2 male data (N = 115) 
 
 
Predictors 
  Grade Sub Hon Perf Curuse Teacher Peer Chjust 
Sub -.036        
Hon .002 ---       
Perf .199* .264* ---      
Curuse -.113 .528*** --- ---     
Teacher -.113 .460*** --- --- ---    
Peer -.262** --- -.122 -.174 -.167 -.470***   
Chjust .056 -.077 -.271* .452*** -.003 -.046 .335*  
Surf .206* -.294* --- .109 -.050 † .344* --- .754*** 
Cheat .035 -.045 -.040 -.297* -.088 .052 .189 .776*** 
Note. † denotes suppression in the context of inconsistent mediation, as discussed above. SUB = Subject self-concept; 
HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher 
quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of 
curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning 
strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level. 
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Figure 7.1. Male sample results for Model 3, Time 2 (N = 115). Male sample MODEL with COMPOSITES 2(15) = 21; RMSEA = .060, CIs = .000 - .114, pclose = 
.351; TLI = .93; CFI = .98; SRMR = .050; N:q = 2. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; 
TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; 
CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating;   - - - - paths are significant in the male sample model 
estimated at Time1 (Figure 6.2) ; —. .—. .—. .  suppression effects in the context of inconsistent mediation; Bold arrows are suppression effects.
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7.7 Female sample structural model (N = 182) 
The results of estimating Model 3 with the female component (N = 182) of the Time 2 
sample are presented in the present section. Composite scores were used for the following 
analyses because estimating Model 3 with observed indicator variables involved more free 
parameters than there were subjects in the sample. N:q ratios of less than one cause non-
positive definite model matrices, which invalidate results. 
7.7.1 Measurement model analysis: Time 2 female sample data 
Congeneric model analyses for the female component of the Time 2 sample (see Table 
T2 of Appendix T) identified weakness in four factors. These factors, Performance goal structure, 
Assessment quality, Surface learning strategies, and Self-reported cheating, all had high RMSEA 
point estimates (.165, .086, .112, and .083, respectively). The lower-bound RMSEA confidence 
intervals for the latter three fell, however, below the threshold of .050. These three factors also 
met desired thresholds for CFI and TLI, with the minor exception of an estimate of CFI = .94 
for Assessment quality, which was counterbalanced by a satisfactory TLI value (.92). The fit of 
Performance goal structure was a more significant concern, as discussed below. 
Self-reported cheating had, additionally, an SRMR value of .113, which exceeded the 
threshold of < .080. An exploration of the residuals for this model identified large 
discrepancies in their size across indicator variables. Two of its three items, Cheat84 and 
Cheat95, had significantly larger residuals (δ = .546 and δ = .499, respectively) than the third 
item, Cheat92 (δ = .008). These differences were also reflected in the items’ standard factor 
score coefficients (.01, .01, and .98, respectively), such that the operational meaning of Self-
reported cheating among females at Time 2 was defined by item Cheat92 (I sometimes cheat on 
my Science class work, this year). Standardized factor scores for females at Time 1 were, by 
contrast, more equitable (Cheat84 = .21; Cheat92 = .50; Cheat95= .29).  
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Performance goal structure demonstrated substantial weakness, including a large 
RMSEA point estimate (.165) and confidence intervals (.083 - .261), low TLI (.76), and low CFI 
(.92). While this factor performed well among females at Time 1, modification indices 
associated with the female sample model at Time 2 indicated the need for two error 
covariances, with equivalent Lagrange multiplier values (12.1): Perf69 with Perf74, and Perf61 
with Perf75. Exclusion of these statistical relationships was the most likely cause of the low 
value of TLI (.76), which includes a penalty for lack of parsimony (Byrne, 2012). Specifying 
either covariance parameter produces nearly perfect fit with a TLI value of 1.03. Neither 
modification was made, however, as they were likely idiosyncratic to the female component 
at Time 2, exacerbated by small sample size, and would stabilize in the larger sample.  
The multivariate measurement model for female respondents at Time 2, estimated 
with composite scores, was excellent (2(7) = 5.6, p = .58; RMSEA = .000, CIs = .000 - .080, pclose 
= .810; TLI = 1.02; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = .011; N:q = 3.1). The correlation matrix for the 
measurement model, presented in Table V1 of Appendix V, was consistent with the 
hypothesized variable relationships in Model 3, in both strength and sign.  
7.7.2 Structural analysis: Time 2 female sample data 
The revised hypothesized structural model, or Model 3, also estimated with composite 
scores, was found to be weak on two key indices (2(14) = 40, p < .001; RMSEA = .101, CIs = 
.065 - .138, pclose = .012; TLI = .80; CFI = .95; SRMR = .054; N:q = 3). The TLI value of .80 as well 
as the RMSEA point-estimate of .101 and accompanying confidence intervals of .083 - .261 fell 
considerably wide of desired values. An exploration of modification indices for Model 3 found 
that the largest Lagrange multiplier among those that were consistent with the broader set of 
structural hypotheses in the overall model (17.7) advocated for a path from Honesty-
trustworthiness self-concept to Teacher quality, which appeared to indicate that respondents who 
viewed themselves as more honest and trustworthy also tended to appraise their Science 
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teachers more positively. This is consistent with correlations observed between Honesty-
trustworthiness self-concept and Teacher quality among male (r = .393) and female respondents 
(r = .458) at Time 2 (see Table V1 of Appendix V), as well as female respondents at Time 1 (r 
= .328) (see Table K1 of Appendix K). Similar correlations between these two variables were 
also found in the co-ed samples at Time 1 (r = .217), Time 2 (r = .436), and in the Pilot Study (r 
= .482). A relationship between Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept and perceptions of teacher 
quality has also been noted elsewhere (Hay, 2000; Martin, Marsh, McInerney, & Green, 2006). 
Martin et al. (2006) found, for instance, a correlation of r = .390 between Honesty-trustworthiness 
self-concept and high school students’ appraisals of their teachers.  
A theoretical rationale for these observations is that they reflect cynicism, which entails 
believing that others are selfish and dishonest, or being “unable to take what someone says at 
face-value” (Mills & Keil, 2005, p. 385). One who sees him- or herself as less honest and 
trustworthy may, as these correlations suggest, also be less likely to trust others. Feeling 
doubtful about teachers would appear tantamount to holding them in lower esteem with 
respect to such things as subject knowledge, equitability, and work ethic, which should result 
in lower appraisals of their overall quality, and vice versa. 
Cynicism is associated with factors such as stress, exhaustion, and burnout in 
academic settings, which have been observed to be (1) more common among females than 
males (Galbraith & Merrill, 2012; Simon, Carr, Mccullough, et al., 2004), and (2) to increase 
with age during adolescence (Galbraith & Merrill, 2012). Both of these observations from the 
literature on cynicism would be consistent with finding that cynicism had become more 
prevalent among female respondents at Time 2. This interpretation was further corroborated 
by Time 2 DIF analyses (see Table 7.5), which revealed no gender differences in items used to 
measure Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept or Assessment quality, whereas four of the eight 
items used to measure Good teaching were significantly affected by gender (Rβ = .123 - .164). 
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Males gave Science teachers higher ratings with respect to feedback (Gteach18 and Gteach39), 
making Science interesting (Gteach67), and trying to get the best out of students (Gteach77). 
MIMIC analyses presented in Table 7.6a also found no mean difference between genders on 
Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept (.016, NS), but a significant mean difference in Teacher 
quality (β = .141, p < .05). This suggests, again, that male respondents tended to view their 
Science teachers more positively than female respondents. 
7.7.3 Analysis of Model 4 
The observed theoretical and empirical support for a regression path from Honesty-
trustworthiness self-concept to Teacher quality led to the decision to free that parameter in the 
model, resulting in ‘Model 4’. It must be acknowledged that freeing this parameter is a 
substantial post-hoc modification to the pattern of structural paths in the hypothesized model. 
Lacking the opportunity to cross-validate this modification on a separate sample, the risk that 
it capitalizes on idiosyncrasies of the Time 2 data set must be noted.  
Model  4 was found to fit Time 2 female data well (2(13) = 21, p = .07; RMSEA = .058, 
= .000 - .102, pclose = .344; TLI = .93; CFI = .98; SRMR = .030; N:q = 3), explaining more than 
half of the variance in Self-reported cheating (53%), Surface learning strategies (58%), and 
Justifiability of cheating (57%). These amounts of variance explained differed from the Time 1 
female sample model by ΔR2 = -10%, ΔR2 = 22% and ΔR2 = -6%, respectively. Beta coefficients 
for this model are presented in Table 7.8. 
The effect of Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept on Teacher quality (β = .311, p < .001) 
was highly significant and consistent with its corresponding bivariate correlation (r = .412). 
The pattern of effects presented in Figure 7.2 also differed from the Time 1 female sample in 
that neither Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept nor Subject self-concept exerted a significant 
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effect on either outcome variable. Both appeared, instead, to be mediated by intervening 
variables such as Teacher quality and Justifiability of cheating.  
Table 7.8 
Model 4: Standardized beta coefficients estimated with composite scores, Time 2 female data (N = 182) 
 Predictors 
 N = 182 Grade Sub Hon Perf Curuse Teacher Peer Chjust 
Sub .016        
Hon -.150* ---       
Perf -.093 .011 ---      
Curuse -.102 .529*** --- ---     
Teacher -.224** .425*** .311*** --- ---    
Peer -.054 --- -.174 .102 -.076 -.270   
Chjust .020 -.172 .192* .237** .033 -.417** .414***  
Surf -.026 -.181 --- .129 -.048 -.346* --- .321** 
Cheat .057 -.093 -.158 -.002 -.044 .099 -.047 -.706*** 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance 
goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; 
CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of 
cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < 
.001.  
Another aspect of the female sample model at Time 2 that was not observed at Time 1 
was the lack of any significant predictor for Peer norms. Both Performance goal structure and 
Teacher quality exerted unmediated, direct effects on Justifiability of cheating (β = .237, p < .01 
and β = -.417, p < .01, respectively). So while Peer norms, itself, also predicted Justifiability of 
cheating with a magnitude similar to that in all previous models (β = .414, p < .001), it did not, 
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unlike previous models, play a significant mediating role with respect to Teacher quality and 
Performance goal structure.  
Teacher quality also directly predicted Surface learning strategies (β = -.346, p < .05), with 
a magnitude greater than that of Justifiability of cheating (β = .321, p < .01), thus indicating that 
its effect on cheating operated independently of moral obligation. The direct effect of Teacher 
quality on Surface learning strategies also supports the interpretation of the effect of Honesty-
trustworthiness self-concept on Teacher quality as representing cynicism. Cynicism, which 
involves doubting the integrity of others (Mills & Keil, 2005), has long been held to “lead 
directly to surface learning” (Biggs, 1991, p. 219).  The hypothesis that teacher evaluations 
were affected by cynicism is, therefore, consistent with the observed direct, inverse 
relationship between Teacher quality and Surface learning strategies. The mediating role played 
by Justifiability of cheating in previous models remained prominent, however, especially with 
respect to Self-reported cheating (β = .706, p < .001). All beta coefficients in the Time 2 female 
sample model were consistent with their corresponding bivariate correlations. No 
suppression effects were observed. 
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Figure 7.2. Female sample results for Model 4, Time 1 (N = 186). 2(13) = 21; RMSEA = .058, = .000 - .102, pclose = .344; TLI = .93; CFI = .98; SRMR = .030; 
N:q = 3. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS 
= Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; 
SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  - - - - - paths were significant in the female sample model 
estimated at Time 1 (see Figure 6.3); —. .—. .—  new path, added to the hypothesized model for females at Time 2. 
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7.8 Co-ed sample structural model: Time 2 (N = 297) 
Detailed analyses of the measurement properties of the hypothesized model, reported 
in sections 7.1 – 7.5, demonstrated that the multivariate measurement model, and the 
individual factors it comprises, were sufficiently valid and reliable at Time 2 to proceed with 
analysis of the hypothesized structural model.  
Results of invariance reported in section 7.4 cross-validated those conducted at Time 
1 (see section 6.4), thus justifying concerns over gender invariance. While differences in the 
gender-specific structural models presented in sections 7.6 and 7.7 appear to be more 
pronounced than those observed at Time 1 (Sections 6.6 and 6.7), most key characteristics 
observed in Time 1 structural models remained intact, such as the prominent mediating roles 
of Justifiability of cheating and Peer norms. A major difference between the gender-specific 
models was the need, in the female sample model, to free a regression parameter from 
Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept to Teacher quality. The addition of this parameter resulted 
in Model 4 (see Figure 7.2). The results of Model 4 estimated with the full, co-ed sample for 
Time 2 (N = 297) are reported below. 
Analysis of Model 4  
Estimating Model 4 with observed indicator variables produced acceptable fit to the 
co-ed data set at Time 2 (2(1173) = 1821; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .039 - .047, pclose = .999; TLI = 
.90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .069; N:q = 1.5; SCF = .937), explaining 57% of the variance in Self-
reported cheating, 51% of the variance in Surface learning strategies, and 43% of the variance in 
Justifiability of cheating, which differed from Time 1 estimates by ΔR2 = -.10, ΔR2 = .10, and ΔR2 
= -.04, respectively. Beta coefficients for this model are presented in Table 7.9, and the full 
model output is provided in Appendix W. 
Chapter 7 Cross-Sectional Analyses of Time Two Data│283 
 
The mediating role that Justifiability of cheating played at Time 1, between the 
personological and contextual variables to the left of the model, and both outcome variables 
to the right of the model, was prominent again at Time 2. A substantial correlation between 
Surface learning strategies and Self-reported cheating (r = .445) became non-significant in the 
model (r = -.060, NS) principally due to the variance they shared through Justifiability of 
cheating, which was the only variable to exert a significant direct effect on Self-reported cheating. 
Variance from contextual factors was overwhelmingly channeled into Justifiability of cheating, 
which exerted, in turn, large and highly significant effects on both Surface learning strategies (β 
= .586, p < .001) and Self-reported cheating (β = .687, p < .001). An exception to the pattern 
observed at Time 1 was that the significant direct effect of Performance goal structure on Surface 
learning strategies (β = .157, p < .05), disappeared at Time 2 (β = .094, NS). The effect of 
Performance goal structure on Justifiability of cheating was larger, by contrast, at Time 2 (β = .388, 
p < .001) than at Time 1 (β = .237, p < .001), conveying substantial indirect effects to both Self-
reported cheating (β = .267, p < .01) and Surface learning strategies (β = .227, p < .01) (see Time 2 
indirect effects in Appendix X). 
The role of Peer norms at Time 1 as a partial mediator for the effects of both Performance 
goal structure and Teacher quality on Justifiability of cheating shifted, at Time 2, to one of 
negligible mediation of Performance goal structure (β = -.040, NS), and complete mediation of 
Teacher quality (β = -.412, p < .001), of which a significant indirect effect carried through to 
Justifiability of cheating (β = .121, p < .01). Teacher quality also exerted a substantial but non-
significant direct effect on Justifiability of cheating (β = -.229, p = .077) that has been principally 
associated with female sample models in the present study, and a substantial indirect effect 
on Self-reported cheating (β = .267, p < .01), by way of Peer norms  Justifiability of cheating. 
Usefulness of Curriculum was, again, predictively inert in Model 4. Stepwise regression 
was conducted with respect to all predictors of Peer norms, Justifiability of cheating, Surface 
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learning strategies, and Self-reported cheating (see Appendix Y). Results were similar to those of 
the stepwise regression performed at Time 1, with the exception that at Time 2 the 
disappearance of effects exerted by Usefulness of curriculum was associated exclusively with 
the addition of Teacher quality. In all four stepwise regression models, the large correlation 
between these two variables (r = .546 in Figure 7.3) appeared to mute the independent effects 
of Usefulness of curriculum as if Teacher quality were acting as a complete mediator. As at Time 
1, an equivalent model tested with Teacher quality regressed, as a mediator, on Usefulness of 
Curriculum (see Appendix AA; and section 7.8.1) demonstrated equivalent fit to Model 4 
(Δ2(1) = 1). 
Personological factors predicted downstream variables principally by way of their 
effects on learning context factors. The only significant direct effect of self-concept on an 
outcome variable at Time 2 was exerted by Subject self-concept on Surface learning strategies (β 
= -.192, p < .05). Both self-concept variables exerted significant indirect downstream effects, 
including from Subject self-concept to Self-reported cheating (β = -.235, p < .001) and Surface 
learning strategies (β = -.176, p < .01), and from Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept to Justifiability 
of cheating (β = -.135, p < .01) and Peer norms (β = -.126, p < .01). 
A major difference in the pattern of effects observed at Time 2 versus at Time 1 was the 
inclusion of the path from Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept to Teacher quality (β = .306, p < 
.001). The magnitude of this effect was consistent with that observed in the female sample 
model at Time 2 (β = .311, p < .001), and with the zero-order correlation between these two 
factors in the Time 1 measurement model (r = .217; see Table 6.8). As the only significant direct 
effect exerted by Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept at Time 2, this new path conveyed 
variance to Teacher quality that was transmitted as the abovementioned indirect effects (see 
Appendix X) to further downstream variables. It is worth noting that the effects of Honesty-
trustworthiness self-concept on Self-reported cheating (β = -.043, NS), Justifiability of cheating (β = -
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.001, NS), and Peer norms (β = -.095, NS) were also small and non-significant when the path to 
Teacher quality was constrained to zero.  
Table 7.9 
Model 4: Standardized beta coefficients estimated with observed variables, Time 2 co-ed data (N = 297) 
 Predictors 
 N = 297 Grade Gender Sub Hon Perf Curuse Teacher Peer Chjust 
Sub -.099 .241***        
Hon .013 -.028 ---       
Perf -.136* .257*** .113 ---      
Curuse -.103* -.009 .523*** --- ---     
Teacher -.177** .020 .369*** .306*** --- ---    
Peer -.156** .238*** --- -.095 -.040 -.107 -.412***   
Chjust .045 .149* -.144 -.001 .388*** -.009 -.229 .295**  
Surf .080 -.003 -.192* --- .094 -.116 .060 --- .586*** 
Cheat .064 .044 -.065 -.053 -.153 -.093 .063 .087 .687*** 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance 
goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; 
CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of 
cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < 
.001.  
Weighted composite score estimation. To address the low N:q ratio of the model estimated 
with observed indicator variables (1.5), composite scores were used to re-estimate the model. 
The N:q ratio for the structural model estimated with composite scores improved to 4.3, and 
the model’s fit to the co-ed data set was excellent (2(8) = 13.7, p = .09; RMSEA = .049, CIs = 
.000 - .092, pclose = .458; TLI = .97; CFI = .99; SRMR = .014; N:q = 4.3). A Heywood case involving 
a small negative residual variance for Assessment quality (-.094) was corrected by setting the 
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residual variance equal to .00001 (Muthen & Muthen, 2014). The fit of the hypothesized 
structural model was otherwise very good (2(15) = 33.7, p = .004; RMSEA = .065, CI s= .035 - 
.094, pclose = .182; TLI = .92; CFI = .98; SRMR = .025; N:q = 4), explaining 63% of the variance 
in Self-reported cheating, 56% of the variance in Surface learning strategies, and 43% of the 
variance in Justifiability of cheating. These estimates differed from the model estimated with all 
observed indicators by ΔR2 = 6%, ΔR2 = 5%, and ΔR2 = 0%, respectively. The mean effect size 
of the model was larger by MΔβ = .001 when estimated with composite scores, with a mean 
absolute difference of │ΔβM│ = .02, and absolute difference range of │Δβ│ = .000 - .098. The 
pattern of significant and non-significant paths in the model estimated with composite scores 
was identical to that estimated with observed indicator variables (see Appendix Z). 
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Figure 7.3. Co-ed sample results for Model 4, Time 2 (N = 297). 2(1173) = 1821; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .039 - .047, pclose = .999; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .069; 
N:q = 1.5; SCF = .937. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, 
ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of 
cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. - - - - paths were significant for the co-ed sample 
at Time 1 (see figure 6.4). 
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7.8.1 Equivalent models 
The four equivalent models tested at Time 1 (see section 6.9.1) were re-tested at Time 2. 
Usefulness of curriculum was again positioned as a predictor of Teacher quality in Equivalent Model 
1 (see Appendix AA), which achieved acceptable fit (2(1174) = 1822; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .039 - 
.047, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .069; N:q = 1.5; SCF = .937) that was virtually 
identical to that of the hypothesized PTLC model (Model 4; see Figure 7.3) (Δ2(1) = 1, NS). Peer 
norms was positioned as a correlate of class context in Equivalent Model 2 (see Appendix AB), 
and as a predictor of class context in Equivalent Model 3 (see Appendix AC). Both models 
explained the same amount of variance in Self-reported cheating (57%), Justifiability of cheating 
(42%), and Surface learning strategies (50%), but with a small decrement in variance explained in 
each of latter two constructs of ΔR2 = -.01, respectively, as compared to the hypothesized PTLC 
model. Acceptable fit was achieved both by Equivalence Model 2 (2(1173) = 1818; RMSEA = .043, 
CIs = .039 - .047, pclose = .999; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .068; N:q = 1.5; SCF = .937) and by 
Equivalent Model 3 (2(1173) = 1820; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .039 - .047, pclose = .999; TLI = .90; CFI 
= .91; SRMR = .068; N:q = 1.5; SCF = .937).  
An Equivalent Model 4 was additionally tested, in which Peer norms was positioned as a 
correlate of Justifiability of cheating. As was the case at Time 1 (see Section 6.9.1), the most 
prominent difference between Equivalent Model 4 and the hypothesized PTLC model was in the 
amount of variance explained in Justifiability of cheating (37% and 43%, respectively). The models 
otherwise demonstrated identical fit to the data (2(1173) = 1821; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .039 - .047, 
pclose = .999; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .069; N:q = 1.5; SCF = .937), explained the same amount 
of variance in Self-reported cheating (57%), and differed structurally only with respect to the effects 
on Justifiability of cheating of Performance goal structure (β = .377, p < .001) and Teacher quality (β = -
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.350, p < .01), with a correlation between Peer norms and Justifiability of cheating in Equivalent 
Model 4 (r = .308, p < .01) that was consistent with the corresponding bivariate correlation in the 
Time 2 measurement model (see Table 7.4). 
Having the same degrees of freedom as the hypothesized PTLC model, Equivalent Model 
2 (2(1173) = 1818) demonstrated the best fit of the five models considered above. The 
improvement in fit demonstrated by Equivalent Model 2 over the hypothesized PTLC model 
(Δ2(0) = -3) was not, however, sufficient to justify adopting Equivalent Model 2 as the central 
structural model for the present study, especially in light of the fact that Equivalent Model 2 
demonstrated worse fit than the hypothesized PTLC model at Time 1 (see Figure 6.4). 
7.9 Chapter summary  
Time 2 data (N = 297) was used in this chapter to analyze the factorial validity, multi-
group invariance, and demographic characteristics of hypothesized PTLC measurement and 
structural models. Several of these models were estimated separately with both observed 
indicator variables and composite scores. Composite scores generally more than doubled the N:q 
ratios achieved with observed indicator variables, but with minimal difference observed among 
effect sizes.  
DIF analysis, used at Time 2 to assess multi-group invariance, cross-validated the gender 
differences in factorial structure observed at Time 1, especially with respect to Subject self-concept, 
Justifiability of cheating and Self-reported cheating. Gender-specific models were estimated for this 
reason prior to estimating the co-ed model. While hypothesized Model 3 demonstrated 
acceptable fit to the male data set (N = 115), modification indices associated with the female 
sample model (N = 182) indicated the need for a beta path from Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept 
to Teacher quality. Correlations between Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept and Teacher quality had 
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been noted in earlier work, and were interpreted in the present study as reflecting cynicism, 
which literature cited in section 7.7.2 indicates is more common among female secondary 
students, and tends to increase with age during adolescence. The addition of this parameter 
resulted in Model 4. 
The overall pattern of effects that emerged when Model 4 was tested against the co-ed 
data set (N = 297) was very similar to the co-ed model at Time 1 with respect to contextual effects, 
but notably different with respect to personological effects. The pronounced mediating roles 
played by Justifiability of cheating and Peer norms at Time 1, persisted at Time 2. All effects of class 
context on both outcome variables were, in fact, mediated by Justifiability of cheating in the Time 2 
co-ed model, including the effect of Performance goal structure on Surface learning strategies, which 
was significant at Time 1. Additionally, substantial bivariate correlations between Surface learning 
strategies and Self-reported cheating fell to non-significance in all models at Times 1 and 2. This 
appeared to happen in the co-ed model at Time 2 because the two variables were sharing variance 
through Justifiability of cheating, the only significant predictor of Self-reported cheating, which 
supports the proposed grouping of cheating and surface learning under the term disintegrity 
(Miller et al., 2011)  
The pattern of personological effects was, by contrast, more heavily mediated in the co-
ed model at Time 2 than that at Time 1. The combined number of direct effects on downstream 
variables exerted by Subject self-concept and Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept fell from seven at 
Time 1, to three at Time 2. The effects of both of these variables in the Time 2 model appeared, 
moreover, to be transmitted principally by Teacher quality to Peer norms. 
The three structural models examined in this chapter (male, female, and co-ed) all 
supported the PTLC hypothesis that contextual and personological variables affect cheating 
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largely as a function of moral obligation. The two distinctive patterns of effects noted at Time 1, 
involving (1) personological variables exerting direct effects on outcome variables and (2) 
contextual variables being overwhelmingly mediated by Peer norms and Justifiability of cheating, 
appeared to consolidate at Time 2. Personological variables at Time 2 were also overwhelmingly 
mediated by downstream variables, including Teacher quality, Peer norms, and Justifiability of 
cheating. Finally, the fact that substantial bivariate correlations between Self-reported cheating and 
Surface learning strategies became non-significant in all of the models tested at Times 1 and 2 
supports Miller et al.’s (2011) contention that cheating and surface learning should both be 
considered forms of disintegrity. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
LONGITUDINAL ANALYSES 
 
 
This chapter presents the longitudinal analysis of Model 4 with data provided by N = 225 
respondents at Time 1, that were matched, using anonymous identification codes, with data from 
the same respondents at Time 2. The goals of longitudinal analysis were to (1) test the consistency 
of hypothesized effect patterns over time, and (2) control for Time 1 variance in Time 2 measures 
included in Model 4. The latter of these goals, controlling for prior variance in Time 2 measures, 
addressed two important concerns about the validity of self-report questionnaire studies: firstly, 
that self-report measures of how individuals perceive contexts “are not objective… and are 
influenced by individual differences” (Bing, Davidson, Vitell, et al., 2012, p. 33); and secondly, 
that self-reports of cheating-related attitudes and behaviors may be biased by respondents 
presenting themselves in socially appropriate ways, even on anonymous questionnaires (Johnson 
& Richter, 2004; Martin, Rao, & Sloan, 2009; Miller et al., 2008; Walker, 2010). Both of these 
concerns are addressed by longitudinally purging extraneous within-person variance that may 
carry across time and context due to individual tendencies, self-beliefs, and personality factors. 
Longitudinal design rendered, in this manner, a closer approximation of Model 4 effects that were 
unique to Time 2 contexts.  
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8.1 Longitudinal measurement model analysis 
The large number of free model parameters included in the longitudinal model (see Figure 
8.1) could be estimated with N = 225 cases only by using weighted composite scores. Six models 
in preceding chapters estimated separately with weighted composite scores and observed 
indicator variables demonstrated that the two estimation methods conform closely with respect 
to data in the present study, in terms of effect patterns, effect magnitudes, and variance explained. 
These six models included MIMIC analyses at Time 1 and 2, gender-specific and co-ed models at 
Time 1, and the co-ed model at Time 2. When estimated with weighted composite scores, beta 
coefficients were found to be approximately .011 larger, overall, with an absolute mean difference 
of .03. The amount of variance explained in outcome variables also tended to be slightly larger in 
models estimated with composite scores, with average absolute differences of │ΔR2│ = 3% in 
Justifiability of cheating, │ΔR2│ = 6% in Surface learning strategies, and │ΔR2│ = 5% in Self-reported 
cheating. This evidence suggests that using composite scores to estimate models with data 
collected for the present study renders approximately equivalent effect sizes, but with higher 
statistical power and improved model fit.  
8.1.1 Congeneric model analysis.  
The majority of congeneric models presented in Table 8.1 demonstrated satisfactory fit to 
Time 1 and Time 2 subsets of the longitudinal data. This excluded consideration of whether 
upper-bound RMSEA confidence intervals exceeded .01, unless they were accompanied by 
RMSEA point-estimates that exceeded .08. A notably weak congeneric model at Time 2 was 
Assessment quality, which demonstrated poor approximate fit to the longitudinal sample at both 
Time 1 (2(14) = 43; CFI = .92; TLI = .88; RMSEA = .096, CIs = .064 - .129; SRMR = .048; Rho = .84) 
and Time 2 (2(14) = 57.2; CFI = .92; TLI = .88; RMSEA = .117, CIs = .086 - .149; SRMR = .048; Rho 
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= .89). Weakness in this factor was indicated with respect to Time 1 and 2 subsets of the 
longitudinal data by high RMSEA point-estimates and confidence intervals, as well as by low CFI 
and TLI estimates. Acceptable fit with respect to SRMR, and good Rho reliability at both time 
points suggested, however, that misfit observed in this congeneric model might be mitigated by 
inclusion in the second-order factor structure Teacher quality. The fit of the second-order factor 
model for Teacher quality to the longitudinal data set was next examined. 
Teacher quality. The fit of the second-order factor Teacher quality to longitudinal data was 
assessed in two ways. Firstly, CFA results of the multivariate measurement model were 
compared with, and without, specifying the second-order factor. Secondly, second-order 
structure was estimated with Time 1 and Time 2 data, respectively, by regressing it, for the 
purpose of model identification, on the covariate ‘maternal educational attainment’. Maternal 
educational attainment, which had negligible statistical associations with both Teacher quality (β 
= .061 and β = .064, NS, respectively) and its first-order components (R│β│ = .047 - .064), was thus 
used as an instrumental variable, in order to identify the two-factor structure of the second-order 
model (Kenny, 2014b).  
Specifying the second-order factor improved the fit of the multivariate measurement 
model very slightly with respect to Time 2 longitudinal data (ΔCFI = .001), and made no difference 
to fit with respect to Time 1 longitudinal data (ΔCFI = .000). The models that employed maternal 
educational attainment in order to identify Teacher quality also achieved satisfactory fit at Time 1 
(2(102) = 165; CFI = .94; TLI = .93; RMSEA = .053, CIs = .038 - .068; SRMR = .049) and at Time 2 
(2(103) = 195; CFI = .93; TLI = .92; RMSEA = .064, CIs = .050 - .078; SRMR = .047).  
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These results indicated that Teacher quality fit the longitudinal data. The questionable fit 
of Assessment quality to longitudinal data did not, therefore, merit post-hoc modification or 
exclusion from the model because Teacher quality was the measurement structure within which it 
functioned in Model 4.  
Surface learning strategies, Peer norms, and Performance goal structure. The weak 
approximate fit to Time 1 data of Peer norms (RMSEA = .097; CFI = .93; TLI = .87) and Surface 
learning strategies (RMSEA = .112; TLI = .86) was offset in both cases by acceptable lower-bound 
RMSEA confidence intervals, appropriate SRMR values, and adequate scale reliability (see Table 
8.1). In the case of Surface learning strategies, CFI was also acceptable (.95).  
At Time 2, Peer norms fit the data well on all criteria, whereas Surface learning strategies 
had, again, a high RMSEA point-estimate (.088), albeit with an acceptable lower-bound 
confidence interval and better overall fit than it demonstrated at Time 1, including a non-
significant chi-squared value (2(2) = 5.48, p = .065; CFI = .98; TLI = .94; RMSEA = .088, CIs = .000 
- .180; SRMR = .030; Rho = .76). A nearly identical pattern of fit statistics was also observed at 
Time 2 for Performance goal structure, which had a high RMSEA point-estimate (.094), but 
otherwise good fit (2(2) = 5.97, p = .051; CFI = .98; TLI = .92; RMSEA = .094, CIs = .000 - .185; 
SRMR = .029; Rho = .76).
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Table 8.1 
Congeneric model results longitudinal sample (N = 225) 
Time 1 data set 
 CFA  
    Loading RMSEA     
 Scale (# items) 2 p df range value low CI High CI CFI TLI SRMR Rho 
Subject self-concept (5)  8.57 .128 5 .72-.86 .056 .000 .119 .99 .99 .016 .92 
Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) 11.63 .235 9 .41-.85 .036 .000 .088 .99 .99 .025 .82 
Performance structure (4) 3.93 .141 2 .48-.82 .065 .000 .162 .98 .95 025 .72 
Good teaching (8) 34.28 .024 20 .42-.79 .056 .020 .088 .97 .96 .037 .87 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) 2.18 .337 2 .72-.94 .020 .000 .135 1.00 1.00 .011 .91 
Assessment quality (7) 43.00 .000 14 .56-.72 .096 .064 .129 .92 .88 .048 .84 
Peer norms (5) 15.67 .008 5 .45-.76 .097 .045 .154 .93 .87 .035 .74 
Surface learning strategies (4) 7.61 .022 2 .29-.86 .112 .036 .201 .95 .86 .034 .71 
Justifiability of cheating (3) .451 .502 1 .61-.86 .000 .000 .153 1.00 1.02 .012 .79 
Self-reported cheating (3) 2.32 .128 1 .77-.91 .076 .000 .211 .99 .97 .073 .86 
Time 2 data set 
Subject self-concept (5)  4.79 .442 5 .70-.92 .000 .000 .091 1.00 1.00 .011 .92 
Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) 20.14 .017 9 .50-.88 .074 .030 .118 .97 .95 .036 .85 
Performance structure (4) 5.97 .051 2 .53-.88 .094 .000 .185 .98 .92 .029 .79 
Good teaching (8) 33.57 .030 20 .30-.83 .055 000 .086 .98 .97 .031 .88 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) .517 .772 2 .78-.94 .000 .000 .088 1.00 1.01 .003 .93 
Assessment quality (7) 57.15 .000 14 .69-.78 .117 .086 .149 .92 .88 .048 .89 
Peer norms (5) 3.02 .696 5 .59-.91 .000 .000 .070 1.00 1.02 .015 .85 
Surface learning strategies (4) 5.48 .065 2 .35-.85 .088 .000 .180 .98 .94 .030 .76 
Justifiability of cheating (3) .009 .925 1 .65-.82 .000 .000 .061 1.00 1.05 .003 .78 
Self-reported cheating (3) .046 .830 1 .62-.96 .000 .000 .105 1.00 1.03 .015 .84 
Note. 2 = chi-squared; p = significance level; df = degrees of freedom; CI = confidence interval; Rho = Rho reliability coefficient; highlights = index threshold violation.
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8.1.2 Multivariate measurement model analysis 
The twenty-factor longitudinal measurement model demonstrated excellent fit (2(33) = 
43.337; CFI = .99; TLI = .97 RMSEA = .037, CIs = .000 - .065, pclose = .745; SRMR = .017; N:q = 1.1). 
Bivariate correlations reported in Table 8.2 were consistent, in terms of magnitude and direction, 
with the correlation matrices estimated for cross-sectional data sets in Chapters Six and Seven. 
Correlational analysis. Ten correlation coefficients reported in Table 8.2 could be 
considered excessive, at r > .750. The largest six of these correlations, with a range of Rr = .776 - 
.995, were between first-order measures of Good teaching and Assessment quality, respectively, and 
with the second-order factor Teacher quality that comprised them. These six large correlations 
further validated the decision to model Good teaching and Assessment quality as a single factor.  
Correlations at Time 2 between Justifiability of cheating and both Surface learning strategies 
and Self-reported cheating were of nearly identical magnitude (r = .758 and r = .759, respectively). 
This conformed to a pattern of large statistical associations between these factors that was 
observed throughout the present study. It would be inappropriate to model these relationships 
with a higher-order factor structure, however, because of the categorical difference between 
psychological processes, as measured by Justifiability of cheating (e.g. moral judgment), and 
behavioral activities such as surface learning and cheating. These large correlations appear, 
instead, to support the hypothesis that the justifiability of cheating is a key psychological driver 
of disintegrity behaviors.  
The final two large correlations observed in Table 8.2 were between the Time 1 measures 
of Subject self-concept and Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept, and their respective Time 2 
counterparts (r = .796 and r = .754). These longitudinal correlations suggest that each factor in 
question represented a source of within-person variance that remained consistent over time. The 
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sources of variance tapped by these measures appeared, additionally, to be distinct from one 
another, as indicated by their comparatively small bivariate correlations at Time 1 (r = .206, p < 
.01) and Time 2 (r = .212, p < .01). 
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Table 8.2 
Higher-order CFA correlation matrix for the longitudinal model (N = 225) 
 SUB1 HON1 PERF1 GTEACH1 CURUSE1 ASSESS1 PEER1 SURF1 CHJUST1 CHEAT1 TEACHER1 
SUB1 -----           
HON1 .218** -----          
PERF1 .128 -.019 -----         
GTEACH1 .405*** .287*** -.112 -----        
CURUSE1 .507*** .182* .109 .609*** -----       
ASSESS1 .434*** .307*** -.121 .787*** .653 -----      
PEER1 -.189* -.419*** .236*** -.468*** -.247** -.501*** -----     
SURF1 -.356 -.374*** .271** -.371*** -.349*** -.397*** .517*** -----    
CHJUST1 -.161* -.434*** .428*** -.451*** -.329*** -.483*** .695*** .708*** -----   
CHEAT1 -.313*** -.539*** .236** -.402*** -.256** -.430*** .586*** .642*** .675*** -----  
TEACHER1 .472*** .335*** -.131 .857*** .711*** .918*** -.546*** -.433*** -.526*** -.469*** ----- 
SUB2 .796*** .206** .084 .286*** .407*** .306*** -.118 -.379*** -.109 -.286*** .333*** 
HON2 .212** .754*** -.010 .179** .127 .191* -.191 -.280** -.206* -.428*** .208** 
PERF2 .000 -.189* .340*** -.008 -.007 -.009 .065 .261** .287*** .272** -.009 
GTEACH2 .260** .208* -.018 .325*** .274* .348** -.256* -.221** -.107 -.184* .379*** 
CURUSE2 .355*** .189* .075 .280** .444*** .300*** -.161* -.258** -.125 -.189* .326*** 
ASSESS2 .332*** .265*** -.023 .415*** .349*** .444*** -.179* -.258*** -.125 -.189** .484*** 
PEER2 -.142 -.238** .073 -.296*** -.256*** -.317*** .573*** .239** .318*** .267*** -.346*** 
SURF2 -.176* -.269** .133 -.156 -.208** -.167** .195* .632*** .353*** .360*** -.182*** 
CHJUST2 -.199* -.341*** .189* -.290* -.259** -.310*** .413*** .506*** .561*** .527*** -.338*** 
CHEAT2 -.240** -.243** .152 -.124 -.185* -.133* .260** .374*** .296*** .440*** -.145 
TEACHER2 .334*** .267*** -.023 .417*** .351*** .446*** -.179* -.283*** -.138 -.236** .486*** 
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Table 8.2, continued 
Higher-order CFA correlation matrix for the longitudinal model 
  SUB2 HON2 PERF2 GTEACH2 CURUSE2 ASSESS2 PEER2 SURF2 CHJUST2 CHEAT2 
SUB2 -----          
HON2 .244** -----         
PERF2 .121 -.096 -----        
GTEACH2 .407*** .312*** .089 -----       
CURUSE2 .579*** .221** .152* .522*** -----      
ASSESS2 .519*** .398*** .113 .776*** .666*** -----     
PEER2 -.184* -.355*** -.049 -.360*** -.334 -.460*** -----    
SURF2 -.335*** -.329*** .374*** -.308*** -.382*** -.393*** .243** -----   
CHJUST2 -.276*** -.292*** .369*** -.281*** -.335*** -.359*** .454*** .758*** -----  
CHEAT2 -.369*** -.318*** .130 -.285*** -.377*** -.363*** .460*** .587*** .759*** ----- 
TEACHER2 .522*** .400*** .114 .780*** .669*** .995*** -.462*** -.395*** -.360*** .365*** 
 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, 
ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = 
Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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8.2 Demographics: Longitudinal matched-samples t-tests 
MIMIC models were used in previous chapters to identify a number of mean differences 
between grade-level groups. It is similarly of interest to examine how factor means changed 
within groups during the year between Time 1 and Time 2 data collections. Over this period, 
Grade Eight students matriculated to Grade Nine, marking a transition from a Middle School 
environment to a High School environment; and Grade Nine Students matriculated, within the 
high school environment, to Grade Ten. Changes in factor means over these grade-level 
transitions were examined with matched-samples t-tests instead of a MIMIC model, due to 
sample size restrictions (see Appendix AD).  
Following the transition from Grade Eight to Grade Nine, students reported using surface 
learning strategies more often (t = 2.67, p = .009), having worse impressions of their Science 
teachers (t = -2.04, p = .044), and being more aware of performance goal structures in Science class 
t = -2.65, p = .009). While the mean difference in Self-reported cheating for this group was non-
significant over the Grade 8 – 9 transition (t = 1.57, NS), it is important to note that the proportion 
of students who reported cheating at all in Science class during the preceding year, or the 
‘incidence’, increased from 48% in Grade Eight to 56% in Grade Nine.  
Following the transition from Grade 9 to Grade 10, students reported an overall 
improvement in Subject self-concept (t = 4.45, p < .000), Usefulness of curriculum (t = 2.96, p = .004), 
and on both constituent measures of Teacher quality: Good teaching (t = 3.92, p < .000) and 
Assessment qualtiy (t = 4.04, p < .000). While these positive changes did not accompany a significant 
mean difference in Self-reported cheating (t = -.489, NS), the incidence of cheating fell from 57% in 
Grade Nine to 47% in Grade Ten. This stands in contrast to the more common finding that the 
incidence of cheating increases across the high school years (Galloway, 2012; Miller et al., 2007). 
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8.3 Invariance analysis of the longitudinal measurement model 
  While the persistence of effect patterns over time is of principal concern to the present 
study, differences between Times 1 and 2 are also potentially of interest. Interpreting such 
differences treats Times 1 and 2 as separate groups, despite the use of matched samples, and rests, 
therefore, on the assumption that factor structure is invariant between them (Cheung & Rensvold, 
2002). The assumption of factorial invariance was tested with respect to Time 1 and Time 2 data 
by treating each data set (N = 225) as if it represented a different group of people. This effectively 
doubled the size of the longitudinal sample to N = 450 for the purpose of invariance analysis, but 
only just surpassed the minimum recommended size for sub-groups, or N = 200 (Meade et al., 
2008). CFA was used to make initial estimates of the fit of each cross-sectional measurement 
model, reported as ‘baseline models’ in Table 8.3. Then, as in prior chapters, an increasingly strict 
series of equality constraints was applied to both models, simultaneously.  
The greater complexity of tests of invariance, over CFAs can be seen by comparing the 
number of free model parameters in baseline CFAs (186) in Table 8.3 to that in the invariance 
models (273 – 322). While the longitudinal sample was large enough to execute such complex 
analyses, it was not sufficient to obtain good approximate fit, nor was Boomsma and Herzog’s 
(2014) small sample correction function, used in prior chapters to reduce bias associated with low 
N:q ratios, viable for multi-group analyses (A. Boomsma, personal communication, 25 March 
2014). As argued in section 6.4, CFI > .86 is a conservative CFI threshold for invariance analyses 
in the present study that involve approximately two-thirds more free model parameters than 
baseline CFAs, but with group sample sizes approaching 200. Lowering the CFI threshold for 
invariance models was done in the knowledge that (A) both baseline CFAs demonstrated 
acceptable fit, (B) all invariance models reported in Table 8.3 achieved acceptable values for 
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RMSEA and SRMR, and (C) invariance testing is generally less concerned with overall model fit 
than with changes in approximate fit associated with the imposition of equality constraints. 
Table 8.3 
Longitudinal invariance of the measurement model 
 Longitudinal invariance 
  2 df RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Baseline CFAs      
Time 1 1485 1088 .040 .92 .065 
Time 2 1695 1088 .050 .90 .076 
Inv. model 1      
FS 3456 2176 .051 .879 .071 
Inv. model 2      
Model 1 + FL 3525 2215 .051 .876 .074 
Inv. model 3      
Model 2 +  VI 3676 2264 .053 .867 .077 
Inv. model 4      
Model 3 + FV 3692 2275 .053 .866 .079 
Inv. model 2b      
Model 2 + FV 3541 2226 .051 .876 .077 
 
Note. FS = Factor structure (configural invariance), FL = Factor loadings (metric invariance), VI = 
observed variable intercepts (scalar invariance), FV = Factor variances. 
 Results. The longitudinal invariance of factor configuration (configural invariance), factor 
loadings (metric invariance), observed variable intercepts (scalar invariance), and factor variances 
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are indicated by changes in CFI (ΔCFI) reported in Table 8.3. Holding observed variable intercepts 
equal across groups (Inv. Model 3) was associated with a decrement of ΔCFI = -.012 vis-à-vis the 
configural model (Inv. Model 1). This decrement exceeded the desired threshold of ΔCFI < 
│.010│, indicating a lack of scalar invariance in the multivariate measurement model. 
 Inasmuch as factorial non-invariance implies that the operational meanings of factors 
vary between groups (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002), the scalar invariance observed in Table 8.3 
implied that the interpretation of mean-level differences in measures used at Times 1 and 2 
should be regarded as ambiguous (Byrne & van de Vijver, 2010; Byrne, 2012). The primary 
purposes of longitudinal modeling were, however, to test for the consistency of effect patterns 
over time, and to control for Time 1 variance in Time 2 factors. So while it had to be 
acknowledged that some item vectors at Time 1 appeared to intersect with the y-axis at 
different values than at Time 2, of greater concern was the observed invariance of factor 
loadings and factor variances. 
When factor loadings (i.e. the loadings of items onto the factors they measure) were 
constrained to be equal in Inv. Model 2, CFI fell by just ΔCFI = -.003 with respect to the 
configural model (Inv. Model 1), which indicated that factor loadings were invariant between 
the two time points (metric invariance). No change in CFI was observed, additionally, between 
Inv. Model 2 and Inv. Model 2b, when equality constraints on factor variances were added to 
Inv. Model 2, but observed indicator intercepts were allowed to vary freely, which resulted in 
Inv. Model 2b. This indicated factor variances were also longitudinally equivalent.  
While the small but significant degree of observed scalar non-invariance introduced 
ambiguity to the interpretation of differences between Time 1 and Time 2 data, multi-group 
metric invariance and equivalent factor variances supported the calculation and use of 
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composite scores to estimate the longitudinal model. Differences in the longitudinal 
functioning of questionnaire items were next examined at the item-level with DIF analysis. 
8.3.1 Differential item functioning analysis 
Differential item functioning (DIF) analysis was used to explore item-level differences in 
how factors were functioning at Times 1 and 2, in order to identify where within the measurement 
model factorial non-invariance was concentrated (Wang & Wang, 2012). The DIF analysis was 
conducted by regressing all observed indicator variables, or items, on a grouping variable for 
time (Time 1 = 1, Time 2 = 2). This model demonstrated satisfactory fit (2(1081) = 1867; CFI = .92; 
TLI = .91; RMSEA = .040, CIs = .037 - .45, pclose = 1.00; SRMR = .057; N:q = 1.9; SCF = 958). 
Significant effects identified in this model, indicated by asterisks in Table 8.4, were concentrated 
principally in measures of class context. A single, item-level difference was also observed in item 
Surf91 (β = -.096, p < .05) of the Surface learning strategies measure. Eight significant differences 
were identified in total, with a mean absolute beta coefficient of M│β│ = .136, and an absolute 
range of R│β│ = .096 - .218. Of these differences, five were highly significant at the p < .01 level. 
The only difference to exceed .200 in magnitude was in item Gteach18 of the Good teaching 
measure. The signs associated with differences in Good teaching and Assessment quality items 
indicated more favorable mean scores for teachers at Time 2, than at Time 1, which comports with 
grade-level differences observed by the DIF analysis conducted at Time 2. No item on the 
Justifiability of cheating and Self-reported cheating measures appeared to differ between Times 1 and 
2. 
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Table 8.4 
Longitudinal differential item functioning analysis 
Item Time  Item Time  Item Time  Item Time 
SUB2 -.042  PERF74 .138**  CURUSE64 .012  SURF87 -.029 
SUB3 -.062  PERF75 .063  TRANS28 -.115*  SURF88 .014 
SUB5 -.096  GTEACH18 -.218***  TRANS32 -.086  SURF91 -.096* 
SUB13 -.079  GTEACH33 .004  TRANS66 -.085  SURF97 -.029 
SUB15 .020  GTEACH39 -.053  AUTH44 .008  CHJUST79 .010 
HON1 -.003  GTEACH50 -.081  AUTH60 -.135**  CHJUST86 -.028 
HON6 -.036  GTEACH62 -.102*  AUTH71 -.161***  CHJUST99 .046 
HON8 -.011  GTEACH67 -.032  AUTH78 .069  CHEAT84 -.019 
HON9 -.023  GTEACH68 .090  PEER24 .125**  CHEAT92 -.009 
HON10 .011  GTEACH77 -.033  PEER31 .074  CHEAT95 -.008 
HON11 .071  CURUSE19 -.073  PEER40 .037    
PERF61 -.010  CURUSE53 -.089  PEER58 -.069    
PERF69  .050   CURUSE56  .013   PEER65  .079       
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal 
structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good teaching; 
CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; 
SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
The longitudinal measurement model appears, in sum, sufficiently invariant to proceed 
with the calculation of composite scores and the longitudinal analysis of Model 4. The level of 
longitudinal non-invariance observed in the measurement model (see Table 8.3) was generally 
low, and confined to observed variable intercepts. DIF analysis showed, moreover, that group 
differences in item-level means were concentrated primarily in measures of class context. 
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8.4 Hypothesized longitudinal model 
 The hypothetical longitudinal model presented in Figure 8.1 comprises an iteration of 
Model 4 estimated with Time 2 data that is regressed on a second iteration of Model 4 estimated 
with Time 1 data. Both iterations were estimated with matched data provided by the same 225 
participants. The dot-dashed lines that crosscut the longitudinal model represent regression paths 
that control for Time 1 variance in Time 2 measures.  
Model 4 includes two post-hoc modifications to the hypothesized structure. Firstly, a path 
from Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept was added at Time 2 based on analyses of female data in 
Chapter Seven (see section 7.7). This statistical relationship was also found to be significant at 
Time 1 and in the Pilot Study. Secondly, a residual covariance was included between items Surf91 
and Surf97 of the measure Surface learning strategies to represent a method effect between items of 
similar wording and in close proximity to one another on the questionnaire. This residual 
covariance was included in the congeneric model for Surface learning strategies tested on the 
longitudinal sample (see Table 8.1), from which factor score coefficients were derived for the 
calculation of weighted composite scores. Gender and grade-level were also added to the 
hypothesized model as control variables at Time 1, based on MIMIC model results. These 
modifications were included in both iterations of Model 4 that compose the longitudinal 
structural model presented in Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1. Hypothetical longitudinal model. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; 
TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for 
cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Abbreviations of Time 1 measures are 
followed by 1, and Time 2 measures by 2.   . — . —. — denotes longitudinal regression paths. 
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8.5 Longitudinal structural model analysis (N = 225) 
Having established the validity of the longitudinal measurement model, the longitudinal 
structural model was estimated using weighted composite scores. Results of this analysis are 
reported in Figure 8.2 and Table 8.5, and discussed in detail, below.  
The longitudinal model demonstrated excellent fit to the data (2(119) = 180; CFI = .97; TLI 
= .94; RMSEA = .048, CIs = .033 - .061, pclose = .560; SRMR = .043; N:q = 1.5), explaining large 
amounts of variance in Time 2 measures of Self-reported cheating (61%), Surface learning strategies 
(61%), and Justifiability of cheating (49%). The eighteen parameters, including sixteen beta paths 
and two correlations, that achieved significance in the longitudinal model are presented in figure 
8.2. If an effect was significant in one cross-sectional iteration but not the other, its non-significant 
counterpart is depicted as a dashed line. Unstandardized parameter estimates, covariance and 
correlation matrices, and various other longitudinal model data and descriptive statistics are 
provided in Appendix AE. 
Patterns of significant effects in the Time 1 and Time 2 iterations of the longitudinal model 
closely resembled patterns observed in the corresponding co-ed cross-sectional models, hereafter 
‘cross-sectional models’, analyzed in Chapters Six and Seven. Controlling for prior variance in 
Time 2 variables modestly reduced most effect sizes in comparison with the Time 2 cross-sectional 
model. An exception to this trend was the path from Performance goal structure to Surface learning 
strategies (β = .187, p < .05), which was significant in the longitudinal model, but non-significant 
in the Time 2 cross-sectional model (β = -.092, NS). The effect of Subject self-concept on Surface 
learning strategies became, by contrast, non-significant in the Time 2 iteration of the longitudinal 
model (β = -.025, NS), whereas it was significant in the Time 2 cross-sectional model (β = -.192, p 
< .05) (see Figure 7.3). 
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The largest autoregressive effects in the model were observed between Subject self-concept 
and Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept at Time 1 and their Time 2 counterparts (β = .779, and β = 
.742, respectively), which indicates substantial consistency in these aspects of self-perception over 
time and between contexts. Longitudinal effects for all other predictor variables were moderate 
to small, falling within a range of R│β│ = .054 – .386. The smallest autoregressive effect observed 
in the model was for Self-reported cheating (β = .054, NS). This suggests that the moderate 
correlation (r = .440, p <.001) between its Time 1 and Time 2 measures (see Table 8.2) was 
accounted for by regressing the Time 2 measure on its only significant predictor, Justifiability of 
cheating (β = .639, p < .001). The effect of Justifiability of cheating on Self-reported cheating at Time 2 
was, in other words, ‘salient’ over the effect exerted by Self-reported cheating at Time 1 (Martin, 
2011). The effect of Justifiability of cheating on Surface learning strategies (β = .472, p < .001) at Time 
2 was also salient over the longitudinal effect of Surface learning strategies at Time 1 (β = .237, p < 
.05). Substantial bivariate correlations between Self-reported cheating and Surface learning strategies 
at both times (r = .642, and r = .587) were, moreover, non-significant in the model (r = .215, and r 
= .115), due principally to the effects of Justifiability of cheating. Within-person differences and 
contextual factors at Time 2 also affected disintegrity as a function of whether students viewed it 
as justifiable. These observations provide strong support for the assertion that cheating and 
surface leaning are forms of disintegrity (Miller et al., 2011), and for the assertion that contextual 
factors are preeminent influences on cheating behavior as a function of moral obligation.  
The longitudinal relationship between measures of Justifiability of cheating (β = .274, p < 
.05) was also exceeded, both in magnitude and significance, by the Time 2 effect of Performance 
goal structure (β = .331, p < .01). This is consistent with key assertions of achievement goal theory 
(Anderman et al., 1998; Anderman & Murdock, 2006), as well as with experiments that have 
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demonstrated a positive causal relationship between extrinsic motivation and cheating (Lobel & 
Levanon, 1988; Mills, 1958; Shelton & Hill, 1969; Taylor & Lewit, 1966).  
Teacher quality exerted large to moderate effects on Peer norms at Times 1 and 2 (β = -.544, 
p < .001 and β = -.357, p < .001, respectively), which predicted, in turn, Justifiability of cheating (β = 
.452, p < .001 and β = .240, p < .05).  The causal path running from Teacher quality to Peer norms to 
Justifiability of cheating has been a consistent feature of structural models throughout the present 
research, with the only notable exception being the failure of Teacher quality to predict Peer norms 
among female respondents at Time 2 (see Figure 7.2). This causal path is also consistent with 
experimental findings that perceptions of teacher quality affect the justifiability of cheating 
(Murdock et al., 2004, 2007), and that peer norms affect cheating behavior (Gino et al., 2009; 
Walker et al., 1966). 
Indirect effects. Indirect effects of Teacher quality were conveyed by Peer norms to 
Justifiability of cheating, both cross-sectionally, at Times 1 and 2, and longitudinally (see Appendix 
AF). Teacher quality at Time 1 exerted significant indirect effects on Justifiability of cheating at Time 
2 via two pathways: (1) Teacher1  Peer1  Peer2  Chjust2; and (2) Teacher1  Peer1  
Chjust1  Chjust2. Justifiability of cheating at Time 2 was also indirectly affected by Time 1 
measures of Peer norms, Performance goal structure, Subject self-concept, and Honesty-trustworthiness 
self-concept. Significant indirect effects from all five of these Time 1 measures were also conveyed 
to Self-reported cheating at Time 2 by Justifiability of cheating.  
The overall pattern of indirect effects in the longitudinal model suggests that cheating 
behavior at Time 1 was related to cheating behavior at Time 2 through six, longitudinal third-
variable associations: (1) Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept, (2) Subject self-concept, (3) Teacher 
quality, (4) Performance goal structure, (5) Peer norms, and (6) Justifiability of cheating. The correlation 
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of past cheating behavior to future cheating behavior in the present study appears, in other 
words, to reflect the ways students tended to perceive themselves and their Science class contexts 
at Time 1 that carried over to Time 2, and that affected Self-reported cheating in a similar manner 
at both times. 
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Figutre oind 
Figure 8.2.Longitudinal model estimated with composite variables (N = 225). 2(119) = 167; CFI = .97; TLI = .94 RMSEA = .042, CIs = .026 - .057, pclose = .799; 
SRMR = .043; N:q = 1.5. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher 
quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = 
Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Abbreviations of Time 1 measures are followed by 1, and Time 
2 measures by 2. 
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Table 8.5 
Longitudinal model effects: standardized beta coefficients estimated with weighted composites 
 Covariates Time 1 predictors Time 2 predictors 
N = 297 Grade Gender  Sub1 Hon1 Perf1 Teacher1 Curuse1 Peer1 Chjust1 Surf1 Cheat1  Sub2 Hon2 Perf2 Teacher2 Curuse2 Peer2 Chjust2 
Sub1 .014 .288***                 
Hon1 -.011 -.068 ---                
Perf1 .058 .100 .087 ---               
Teacher1 .100 -.076 .441*** .174** ---              
Curuse1 .051 -.132* .544*** --- --- ---             
Peer1 -.072 .137 --- -.223** .122 -.544*** .163            
Chjust1 .003 .088 .023 -.194** .331*** -.050 -.197 .452***           
Surf1 .008 -.083 -.250** --- .028 .107 -.057 --- .700***          
Cheat1 -.026 .088 -.230** -.251** .021 -.089 .133 .083 .459** ---         
Sub2 -.150** .054 .779***                
Hon2 -.017 .050  .742***        ---       
Perf2 -.100 .173*   .386***       .016 ---      
Teacher2 -.193** .136*    .335***      .280*** .214*** ---     
Curuse2 -.146* .039     .285*     .415*** --- --- ---    
Peer2 -.142* .187**      .386***    --- -.144 -.106 -.357*** -.051   
Chjust2 .072 .086       .274*   -.111 -.041 .331** -.077 -.145 .240*  
Surf2 .082 .020        .237***  -.025 --- .187* -.077 -.127 --- .472*** 
Cheat2 .074 -.001         .054 -.135 -.034 -.096 .103 -.060 .157 .639*** 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = 
Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; 
SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating. Abbreviations of Time 1 measures are followed by 1, and of Time 2 measures by 2. 
Longitudinal effects are arranged as a diagonal in the lower left quadrant of the table.
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8.6 Chapter summary 
The matched-samples longitudinal model examined in this chapter, which comprised 
of two iterations of Model 4, achieved satisfactory fit using weighted composite scores. 
Composite scores have, in six prior models in the present study, generated effect sizes, 
significance levels, and R2 estimates that were very similar to those in models estimated with 
observed indicator variables. Composite scores were relied upon in the longitudinal analysis 
because the number of free model parameters would otherwise have exceeded the number of 
observations, resulting in non-positive definitive model matrices. 
A small but significant degree of longitudinal scalar non-invariance (in observed 
variable intercepts) was identified that should call into question interpretations of differences 
between the Time 1 and 2 iterations of the longitudinal model. The extent of this invariance 
was not great, however, nor was analyzing differences one of the principal purposes of the 
longitudinal model. Of greatest concern to the longitudinal analysis was the observed multi-
group equivalence of factor loadings and variances. DIF analysis determined, additionally, 
that the measures most affected by non-invariance between Times 1 and 2 were the two first-
order components of Teacher quality, i.e. Good teaching and Assessment quality. Factorial non-
invariance in the longitudinal measurement model could not be attributed to changes in 
sample composition between Times 1 and 2, because the longitudinal sample was composed 
of matched observations. Longitudinal non-invariance in measures of Teacher quality appears, 
instead, to have reflected the fact that respondents were rating different individual teachers 
at each time point.  
Control of prior variance in Time 2 measures was achieved by regressing them on their 
counterpart measures at Time 1. Attenuated effect sizes in the Time 2 iteration, as compared 
to the Time 2 cross-sectional model, reflected the improved isolation of respondents’ 
experiences of Science class contexts from individual differences that would otherwise have 
Chapter 8 Longitudinal Analysis │316 
 
 
contributed extraneous variance. All longitudinal effects in the model were significant, except 
for that of Self-reported cheating, which was explained almost exclusively by Justifiability of 
cheating. The longitudinal effect of Justifiability of cheating at Time 1 on its counterpart measure 
at Time 2 was, moreover, subordinate to the contextual effect of Performance goal structure at 
Time 2, and just slightly larger than the contextual effect of Peer norms at Time 2. These 
observations are consistent with theory and research that suggests cheating-related attitudes 
and behaviors tend to be context-specific (e.g. Murdock et al., 2001, 2004) and to become more 
likely in performance goal settings (Anderman, 1998; Lobel & Levanon, 1988; Mills, 1958; 
Murdock & Anderman, 2006; Shelton & Hill, 1969; Taylor & Lewit, 1966).  
The fact that Peer norms completely mediated the effect of Teacher quality on Justifiability 
of cheating is consistent with evidence from earlier studies that cheating-related attitudes and 
behaviors among one’s peers substantially influences one’s own cheating-related attitudes 
and behaviors (Gino et al., 2009; Walker et al., 1966), especially inasmuch as individuals tend 
to formulate opinions and judgments in conformity with the opinions and judgments of their 
peers (Broeckleman-Post, 2008; Festinger, 1954). 
The longitudinal model also provided an opportunity to test the degree of consistency 
between the Time 1 and Time 2 iterations. The most consistent broad characteristic of Model 
4 at both time points was the pattern of contextual effects on both outcome variables. These 
were overwhelmingly mediated by Justifiability of cheating, and, to a lesser extent, by Peer 
norms. The most prominent difference observed between the Time 1 and Time 2 iterations of 
the longitudinal model involved the apparent consolidation of two separate and distinct effect 
patterns for personological factors and contextual factors, respectively, at Time 1, into a 
unitary pattern at Time 2, in which all effects were mediated by Justifiability of cheating. This 
change may have occurred due either to respondents’ increased ages and cognitive 
developmental levels at Time 2 (i.e. a maturation effect), to changes they experience at higher 
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grade-levels (i.e. a transition effect), or due to their thoughts about morality and academic 
integrity having been affected by taking the questionnaire at Time 1 (i.e. a Hawthorne effect) 
(Kline, 2009). The validity of interpretations of differences between Time 1 and 2 data is 
tempered, however, by the relatively small but significant degree of longitudinal scalar non-
invariance detected in the measurement model.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
An action beneficial to the welfare of society as a whole or of a fellow human being 
would not be considered moral if it were performed under hypnosis or under 
physical constraints but only if it were performed willingly, in response to values 
that are understood and accepted by the agent. Here lies the reason for the 
emphasis on judgment… Without judgment, an action, no matter how beneficial, 
would not be moral. 
 —Augusto Blasi, 1980, p. 4 
 
Results are reviewed in this chapter in relation to key hypotheses of the psychological 
teaching-learning contract (PTLC) perspective on disintegrity. The scholarly literatures and 
sub-disciplines to which such findings pertain, and their implications for educational practice, 
are also discussed. The PTLC model was tested longitudinally across the Grade Eight-to-Nine 
transition, with data from a diverse sample of students in eleven American international 
schools located in Eastern and Western Europe, Eastern and Western Asia, and Eastern Africa.  
The present work is the first empirical study of the contractarian nature of student 
cheating, and the PTLC model is the first structural model to expressly reflect a dual-process 
conception of the psychology of academic cheating. Major findings include evidence that (1) 
perceived teacher quality and felt moral obligation are directly related (i.e. perceived teacher 
quality and the justifiability of cheating are inversely related) (2) felt moral obligation played 
a large role in cheating behavior, (3) the degree to which peer norms were perceived to be 
favorable to cheating was a key predictor of whether cheating was judged to be justifiable; (4) 
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‘disintegrity’ appeared to be an appropriate umbrella term for cheating and surface learning 
behaviors; and (5) the statistical relationship between past and future cheating was a function 
of third-variable associations. 
The incidence of cheating observed among participants in the present study is 
reviewed below, followed by a summary of key findings related to measurement hypotheses, 
as pertain to psychometric modeling, multi-group factorial invariance, and demographic 
effects. Results are subsequently discussed in relation to key structural hypotheses in the 
PTLC model, followed by a discussion of the implications of these findings for educators. 
Prominent limitations of the present study are then discussed and suggestions made for future 
research in this vein. 
9.1 Cheating: Definition and incidence  
An effort was made to use language in cheating-related measures, including Self-
reported cheating, Justifiability of cheating, and Peer norms, that clearly indicated to participants 
that the specific behaviors queried would be interpreted unequivocally as cheating (see 
Appendices B and C). Measures were limited, as such, to what students understood to 
contravene the spirit and/or letter of rules related to honorable academic conduct, thus 
reflecting the definition of cheating given in Chapter Three (see section 3.1). At Time 1, 53% 
of students admitted to having cheated during the year, as compared to 35% who admitted 
specifically to having cheated on tests. Proportions were nearly identical at Time 2 (54% and 
34%), and in the Pilot Study (55% and 31%). This incidence of cheating in American 
international schools compares favorably to domestic American schools, where the reported 
incidence of cheating ‘in any form’ tends to be above 80%, and cheating on tests tends to be 
above 50%. 
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A difference was observed at Time 1 in the incidence of self-reported cheating between 
Grade Eight (48%) and Grade Nine (59%), that is consistent with prior findings that cheating 
is more prevalent at higher grade levels in secondary schools (Cizek, 1999; Galloway, 2012; 
Miller et al., 2007). This difference was reversed, however, at Time 2, when less cheating was 
reported by Grade Ten students (51%) than Grade Nine students (57%). This pattern was also 
observed with respect to the matched-samples longitudinal data. Students in this group who 
matriculated from Grade Eight to Grade Nine reported an increase in the incidence of cheating 
from 48% to 56%, whereas students who matriculated from Grade Nine to Grade Ten reported 
a decrease in cheating from 57% to 47%. 
9.2 Measurement hypotheses: Findings 
The PTLC model began with seventeen first-order factors (Model 1) derived from 
various sources in the psychometric literature. Many of these measures had not been used 
previously in structural equation modeling research and had, as such, not been subjected to 
the strict tests of construct validity entailed by congeneric and multivariate CFA. Measures 
associated with the Course Experience Questionnaire (CEQ) had also not been used previously 
for research on secondary school populations. CEQ measures were chosen instead for their 
long history of use in research on deep learning strategies and surface learning strategies, both 
of which were outcome variables in Model 1. Seven of the original seventeen factors of Model 
1 were, over the course of analyses of both Pilot Study data and data collected for Time 1 of 
the Main Study, either dropped due to model misfit or multicollinearity, or combined into 
second-order factor structures. The specific reasons for these decisions are covered in detail 
in prior chapters.  
9.2.1 Higher-order conceptions of class quality 
Students’ evaluations of class quality were initially hypothesized to consist of higher-
order factors for pedagogy and assessment. This hypothesis was not supported. Assessment 
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and pedagogy factors were highly correlated, instead, with a second-order factor for Teacher 
quality. Measures of Clear goals and standards and Mastery goal structure were found, in 
particular, to be extremely multicollinear with Good teaching, and were dropped from the 
study for this reason. Similar levels of multicollinearity between Mastery goal structure and 
Teacher commitment have previously been observed by Murdock et al. (2001, 2004), and Clear 
goals and standards has also been found to correlate highly with Good teaching in prior studies 
(Wilson et al., 1997).  
Four other contextual variables sharing bivariate correlations of between r = .750 - .800 
in the Pilot Study were fitted into a second-order factor structure that was identified 
principally with Good teaching. This second-order factor, dubbed Teacher quality, originally 
included a measure of student perceptions of classroom rules (Experience of classroom rules) 
and two measures of perceived assessment quality (Authenticity and Transparency), in addition 
to Good teaching. This group of four factors was reduced to a pair at Time 1 of the Main Study 
(Good teaching and Assessment quality), due to congeneric model misfit. It was nonetheless 
evident that all class quality measures, including Mastery goal structure, assessment measures, 
and CEQ measures, with the exception of Appropriate workload, were highly related through 
second-order conceptions of teacher quality.  
Appropriate workload, hypothesized in the present work to measure the moral 
obligation to work hard, was psychometrically distinct from measures of class quality. 
Finding that students hold higher-order conceptions of class quality that largely exclude the 
issue of workload is consistent with the results of higher-order factor analyses of CEQ data in 
previous studies (for a review, see Wilson et al. 1997). The congeneric model for Appropriate 
workload was, however, not sufficiently valid and reliable in the present study to be included 
in the PTLC model tested at Time 1 (Model 3).  
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Three class quality factors were sufficiently valid, reliable, and distinct to retain in the 
final model: (1) Good teaching and (2) Assessment quality, which formed the second-order factor 
Teacher quality, and (3) Usefulness of curriculum. The second-order factor Teacher quality 
consistently explained between 60% and 70% of the variance in Good teaching, and between 
75% and 99% of the variance in Assessment quality. This suggests that Teacher quality was 
defined in the Main Study principally in terms of Assessment quality, which stands in keeping 
with prior scholarship that argues for the crucial importance of assessment to student 
experience (e.g. Black & Wiliam, 1998; Hattie & Timperley, 2009; Waldrip et al., 2009). 
9.2.2 Learning strategies  
Measures for deep and surface learning strategies did not, on the whole, perform well 
in the present study. The measure Deep learning strategies was modified in the Pilot Study, but 
still failed to achieve good fit at Time 1 of the Main Study. The measure Surface learning 
strategies split into two separate factors in the Pilot Study. The more conceptually valid of 
these factors, which included items related to two key surface learning strategies (skipping 
and memorizing material), was retained for the Main Study. However, this modified measure 
Surface learning strategies additionally demonstrated misfit related to a method effect at Time 
2 that was addressed by freeing an error covariance parameter between two of its items (see 
section 7.2.3). Surface learning behaviors have proven difficult to measure psychometrically 
in prior secondary-level research (Ramsden et al., 1988; Wong, Lin, & Watkins, 1996), which 
suggests that individual strategies may be better measured and modeled as independent 
factors, possibly within higher-order structures. 
9.2.3 Multi-group invariance results 
An important assumption of all measurement hypotheses entailed by this study was 
that they would be ‘invariant’ (also ‘equivalent’) across subgroups that composed the overall 
sample. This assumption was tested at the level of the full measurement model at Times 1 and 
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2 with respect to gender and grade-level groups, and was also tested in the longitudinal 
analysis by treating Time 1 and Time 2 data as subgroups of the longitudinal sample. 
Invariance of cross-sectional data was also examined at the item-level with differential item 
functioning (DIF) analysis (Wang & Wang, 2012). 
Invariance analyses at Times 1 and 2 indicated that while factor variances and loadings 
were equivalent across both groups, the y-intercepts of observed variables differed 
significantly between genders. Non-invariance in observed variable y-intercepts is called 
‘scalar non-invariance’ (Byrne, 2012; Kline, 2011). The discovery of scalar non-invariance in 
the measurement model at Time 1 prompted an investigation of item-level mean differences 
using DIF analysis. Gender differences observed at the item-level were small and dispersed, 
with concentrations in measures of Subject self-concept, Peer norms, Justifiability of cheating, and 
Self-reported cheating, and at Time 2 also in Performance goal structure. The PTLC model was, 
based on these observations, tested separately on gender-specific data in the course of each 
cross-sectional analysis. 
A small deficit in scalar invariance was also observed with respect to longitudinal data. 
Item-level differences in longitudinal DIF analysis were small and sparse across the 
measurement model, and concentrated primarily in contextual factors. No significant 
longitudinal differences in factor structure were observed with respect to Peer norms, 
Justifiability of cheating, or Self-reported cheating. 
9.2.4 Demographic effects: MIMIC models and t-tests 
Group-level differences in factor mean scores were investigated with multiple-
indicator multiple-cause (MIMIC) models. It is important to emphasize that MIMIC analysis 
focuses on how the mean scores of overall factors vary by group, whereas invariance analysis 
(discussed in the previous section) is concerned with how aspects of the underlying data 
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structure of a latent factor varies between groups. Factor means were found to differ 
considerably between gender-groups and grade-level groups at Time 1, but only gender at 
Time 2.  
Mean differences by gender. Males at Time 1 had better self-concept as Science 
students, perceived performance goal structures as more prevalent, believed that cheating 
was more acceptable among their peers, believed that cheating was more justifiable in general, 
and reported having cheated more extensively during the preceding year. While the fact that 
male scores were higher for each of these measures is suggestive of a method effect in which 
males were simply more likely to circle higher Likert scores, significant differences running 
in the opposite direction on reversed items in both the Peer norms and Subject self-concept 
measures, suggest that the mean differences were, in fact, real. All of these gender differences 
were, moreover, significant again at Time 2, in addition to a significant difference in teacher 
quality, which males tended to evaluate more favorably. Together, these results are also 
consistent with prior studies that suggest cheating is more prevalent among males in self-
report-based research (Whitley, 1998), and especially when they are at lower grade levels than 
the females to whom they are compared (Finn & Frone, 2004; Newstead, Franklyn-Stokes, & 
Armstead, 1996). 
Cross-sectional, between-group mean differences. While a number of grade-level 
differences were observed at Time 1, the only one that persisted at Time 2, in Teacher quality, 
had the opposite sign, i.e. showed the opposite pattern observed at Time 1; namely the 
teachers received worse evaluations from older students (Grade Nine) at Time 1, but better 
evaluations from older students (Grade Ten) at Time 2. Teacher quality was seen most 
negatively, in other words, by Grade Nine students at both times. This might reflect the fact 
that the transition from Grade Eight to Grade Nine also entails a transition from the Middle 
School environment to the High School environment, wherein students tend to face both more 
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challenging workloads and higher pressure to achieve good grades. The ‘growing pains’ 
associated with such transitions may lead to a generally more negative outlook that would 
affect students’ perceptions of their teachers. Students transitioning from Grade Nine to Grade 
Ten may, by contrast, have largely adjusted to the challenges of high school, and may 
therefore greet their Grade Ten teachers with a more positive outlook. 
These systematic differences in how students at different grade levels tended to regard 
their teachers were not associated with mean differences in cheating behavior (i.e. differences 
in factor means for Self-reported cheating were not observed), except when moderated by 
English language ability and Paternal educational attainment, which were both associated 
with more cheating among Grade Nine students. They did, however, follow a pattern similar 
to that of the reported prevalence of cheating behavior (i.e. the percentage of students who 
reported having cheated in the prior year), in which cheating was observed to be more 
prevalent among Grade Nine students at both times. Grade Nine students reported more 
cheating at Time 1 (57%) than their Grade Eight counterparts (48%), and more again at Time 
2 (59%) than their Grade Ten counterparts (51%). The fact that Grade Nine students tended to 
both have lower regard for their teachers and the tendency to cheat more than their Grade 
Eight and Grade Ten counterparts supports the overarching PTLC hypothesis that perceived 
teacher quality and cheating behavior have an inversely proportional relationship, as a 
function of moral obligation. 
Longitudinal, within-group mean differences. Within-group mean differences in the 
matched-samples data (N = 225) used to estimate the longitudinal model were assessed with 
t-tests (see Table AD1 in Appendix AD). Differences observed to have taken place 
longitudinally, within matched grade-level groups during the year between Time 1 and Time 
2 showed two patterns: (1) a general deterioration in perceptions and behaviors over the 
transition from Grade Eight to Grade Nine, but (2) an overall improvement in perceptions 
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over the transition from Grade Nine to Grade Ten (see Appendix AD). The deterioration of 
measures observed over the Grade Eight-to-Nine transition included an increase in 
perceptions of performance goal structure and a decrease in perceived teacher quality, which 
accompanied an increase in the incidence of cheating, from 48% to 56%. Students who 
transitioned from Grade Nine to Grade Ten developed, by contrast, better opinions of their 
teachers and class curricula, and better self-concepts as Science students, which accompanied 
a decrease in the incidence of cheating from 57% to 47%. These results point to a general 
deterioration in students’ perceptions of teacher quality and academic integrity, following 
their transition from Grade Eight to Grade Nine, which is consistent with findings in the only 
published longitudinal study of the Grade Eight to Nine transition in American Schools 
(Anderman & Midgley, 2004). The present study is, however, the first to observe a 
longitudinal within-groups improvement both in students’ perceptions of teacher quality and 
in their academic integrity following their transition to Grade Ten. 
9.3 Structural hypotheses: Findings 
Structural equation models allow researchers to test multiple a priori structural 
hypotheses, simultaneously. A four-component PTLC framework was developed in Chapter 
Three (see Figure 3.8) to unpack the implications of the overarching PTLC hypothesis, that the 
degree of moral obligation that students feel to work hard and be honest in a given class context 
fluctuates directly with how well they think the basic obligations of teachers and classes are met in that 
context. This initial model, ‘Model 1’, comprised seventeen first-order factors and seventy-five 
hypothesized structural paths. These seventy-five structural hypotheses were summarized 
and justified as thirty-two more general hypotheses (see Section 3.4), in accord with wide 
consensus that a “model under investigation must be thoroughly justified by a synthesis of 
the theory thought to underlie the model” (Mueller & Hancock, 2010, p. 371). When, in the 
various models presented over the course of this study, hypothesized structural paths were 
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non-significant, the hypotheses they represented were not supported by the data, and vice 
versa. Individual structural hypotheses are referenced in the discussion that follows, albeit not 
in an exhaustive manner, so as not to distract from consideration of the primary hypothesis 
under consideration: the overarching PTLC hypothesis. 
The numbers of variables and structural hypotheses were, in fact, reduced over the 
course of subsequent analyses to a set of twenty-eight structural paths hypothesized among 
ten first-order factors and one second-order factor (Model 4). Of the two measures of felt moral 
obligation originally included in Model 1, Appropriate workload was dropped due to weak 
factor structure, which prevented a direct examination of students’ felt moral obligation to 
work hard. The PTLC hypothesis was examined principally, therefore, in terms of the moral 
obligation to be honest, using the scale Justifiability of cheating.  
The central implication of the PTLC hypothesis, that context affects integrity behavior 
as a function of felt moral obligation, was explicitly supported by the numerous significant 
indirect effects of context that were conveyed to both disintegrity variables by the perceived 
justifiability of cheating. The PTLC model consistently explained more than 50% of the 
variance in Self-reported cheating (see Table 9.1), and is the first model found to do so in research 
on secondary school students (see Chapter Two, section 2.5). This may reflect that the measure 
Justifiability of cheating captured variance from both cognitive and non-cognitive processes. 
The PTLC model represents student judgment of moral obligation (Justifiability of cheating) 
independently of the factors hypothesized to affect it (i.e. the potential reasons why students 
might feel cheating is justified), such that they are related statistically by the researcher, 
instead of cognitively by respondents. Cognition-intensive approaches, such as asking 
students to identify why they cheat, run the risk of ignoring non-cognitive processes and/or 
evoking a ‘moral dumbfounding’ effect in adolescent subjects (Bjorklund et al., 2000; 
Cushman et al., 2010; Sneddon, 2007). 
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The justifiability of cheating also explained variance in Surface learning strategies that 
was comparable to what it explained in Self-reported cheating, thereby supporting arguments 
that surface learning and cheating are both forms of academic ‘disintegrity’ (Miller et al., 
2011). Justifiability of cheating was, itself, well-explained by the PTLC model, wherein its most 
salient predictor was Peer norms. The structural alignment of Peer norms, Justifiability of 
cheating, and disintegrity behavior (Peer norms  Justifiability of cheating  Disintegrity) 
formed a consistent theme in analyses of the PTLC model that was most often accompanied 
by strong predictive paths from Performance goal structure and Teacher quality. The 
directionality of each of these structural connections is supported by prior experimental 
research reviewed in preceding chapters, with the exception of the path from Justifiability of 
cheating to Surface learning strategies. This chain of structural effects bearing on Self-reported 
cheating thus supports the causal hypothesis that perceived class quality and goal structure 
will influence cheating behavior as a function of whether students believe cheating is 
justifiable. Peer norms appear, moreover, to have conveyed information about appropriate in-
group behaviors and, by extension, about whether a teacher is performing well. 
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Table 9.1 
Variance explained in Self-reported cheating, Surface learning strategies, and Justifiability of cheating 
  Time 1   Time 2   Long. 
 Male   Female    Co-ed   Male  Female  Co-ed   Co-ed 
  Ind Comp  Ind Comp  Ind Comp  Comp*  Comp  Ind Comp  Comp 
 
Self-reported 
cheating 
74% 76%  63% 69%  67% 72%  81%  53%  57% 63%  61% 
 
Surface learning 
strategies 
55% 58%  36% 47%  41% 47%  71%  58%  51% 56%  61% 
 
Justifiability of 
cheating 
49% 54%  62% 66%  55% 60%  36%  57%  43% 43%  49% 
Note. Ind = Observed indicator variable estimation; Comp = Weighted composite score estimation 
*Results may have been enlarged due to suppression effects in the Time 2 Male Sample Model (See section 7.6.2).  
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9.3.1 Disintegrity 
Cheating and surface learning behaviors, referred to throughout the present work as 
‘disintegrity’ (Miller et al., 2011), share in common the pursuit of grade-credentials at the 
expense of meaningful learning (Marton & Säljö, 1976; Schab, 1991). Effect patterns observed 
in PTLC structural models analyzed in chapters Six, Seven, and Eight are consistent with a 
body of research related to student learning theory (Biggs & Tang, 2011), in which surface 
learning has been associated with a number of environmental variables related to teaching 
and assessment quality (Biggs, 1987, 1991; Biggs et al., 2001; Biggs & Tang, 2011; Kember & 
Gow, 1989; Trigwell & Prosser, 1991; Wilson & Fowler, 2005). Similar or identical factors have 
also been associated with cheating at the secondary level (Anderman et al., 2010; Day et al., 
2011; Evans & Craig, 1990a, 1990b; Murdock & Anderman, 2006; Murdock et al., 2001, 2004, 
2007; Nichols & Berliner, 2007; Sisti, 2007; Strom & Strom, 2007). While surface strategies such 
as rote learning do not usually violate academic codes of honor, and may even be adaptive in 
classes where superficial learning goals are emphasized, they lack integrity inasmuch as they 
produce false impressions of coherent understanding (Marton & Säljö, 1976; Miller et al., 
2011).  
The observed moderate-to-large bivariate correlations between Surface learning 
strategies and Self-reported cheating, together with the fact that the variance shared by these two 
constructs was explained almost exclusively by Justifiability of cheating, suggests that the term 
‘disintegrity’ is used advisedly to describe both cheating and surface learning. The variables 
Performance goal structure and Teacher quality were observed, moreover, to convey indirect 
effects to each outcome variable, separately, through the medium of Justifiability of cheating 
(see Appendix AF). In the co-ed model at Time 1, for instance, Performance goal structure 
exerted substantial indirect effects on Surface learning strategies and Self-reported cheating that 
were conveyed by Justifiability of cheating. Felt moral obligation appeared, as such, to act as a 
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conduit for the effects of perceived goal structure and teacher quality on both types of 
disintegrity behavior. These observations suggest that cheating and surface learning are both 
integrity-related behaviors that are interrelated in specific contexts through felt moral 
obligation. 
 Conventional cheating. In the same sense that surface learning may, as an aspect of 
academic disintegrity, have moral relevance, cheating may occupy a conventional, or rules-
based, domain in the minds of students (Eisenberg, 2004). The overarching hypothesis that 
students may sometimes sincerely believe that acts of cheating are justifiable suggests that 
they view such acts as violations of ‘conventional’ rules, instead of moral imperatives. This 
follows from the fact that judging an act of cheating to be justifiable, and the rules that forbid 
it to be morally imperative, involves a contradiction in terms. The fact that rules may be 
identified with either the moral domain or the conventional domain (Turiel, 1983, 2002; 2006) 
implies that disintegrity may entail two types of cheating: (1) cheating as a moral violation 
and (2) cheating as a conventional violation. The large amount of variance explained in Self-
reported cheating by Justifiability of cheating, discussed in the next section, indicates that many 
acts of cheating in secondary school are viewed by students as conventional violations. 
Self-reported cheating. Self-reported cheating at Time 1 had no direct effect on self-
reported cheating at Time 2. In the longitudinal structural model, which included 
autoregressive paths that represented variance explained by Time 1 measures in their Time 2 
counterparts, the autoregressive path for this longitudinal relationship was non-significant. 
The moderate bivariate correlation between the two measures of Self-reported cheating (r = .440, 
p < .001) appears, therefore, to have been the result of associations with variance in third-
variables that carried-over longitudinally. The correlation between Cheating at Times 1 and 2 
appeared, in other words, rooted in how individual students tended to perceive Science class 
contexts at Times 1 and 2. That is not to say that cheating was driven by context, per se, but by 
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perceptions of context that carried over from Time 1 to Time 2 due potentially to environmental 
similarities as well as context-free tendencies among students to perceive certain factors in 
certain ways.  This observation suggests that direct effects of past cheating on future cheating 
observed in cross-sectional research (e.g. Davis & Ludvigson, 1995; Harding et al., 2012; 
Mayhew et al., 2009; Passow et al., 2006; Whitley, 1998) may, in fact, be artifacts of how 
individual students tend to perceive themselves and class contexts.  
Self-reported cheating in the Time 2 iteration of the longitudinal model reflected, in 
particular, the degree to which students felt that cheating was justifiable. This was indicated 
by amounts of variance in excess of 50% that were consistently explained in Self-reported 
cheating by large predictive effects of Justifiability of cheating. A significant amount of variance 
in the Time 2 measure of Justifiability of cheating was explained, in turn, by its counterpart 
measure at Time 1, as well as by a number of indirect effects from self-concept and teaching 
context measures at Time 1. Many of these Time 1 variables also exerted significant indirect 
effects on Self-reported cheating at Time 2 (see Appendix AF). Past cheating (Time 1) appeared 
to share variance with future cheating (Time 2), therefore, as function of third-variable 
associations channeled through felt moral obligation. 
Perceptions of self and context at Time 1, including self-concept in relation to both 
Science ability and honesty, cheating-related peer norms, performance goal structures, and 
teacher quality exerted distinguishable indirect effects on Self-reported cheating at Time 2, 
firstly as a function of the variance they explained in their counterpart measures at Time 2, 
and secondly in the degree to which their Time 2 counterparts carried their effects over to 
Justifiability of cheating (see Appendix AF). This suggests that while schools often direct a great 
deal of attention to the immediate problem of cheating acts, through honor policies, 
monitoring, and punishment, patterns of cheating behavior over time appeared, in the present 
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study, to be rooted ultimately in how individual students tended to perceive themselves and 
their academic contexts.  
Surface learning strategies. This study joins a small body of research on the empirical 
relationship between academic integrity and learning strategy. Research in this area to date 
indicates that students who employ deep learning strategies, which are oriented to the 
substance of learning, are less likely to cheat (Anderman et al., 1998; Bong, 2008).  
Justifiability of cheating was the strongest predictor of Surface learning strategies in every 
iteration of the PTLC model, with the exception of the female sample model at Time 2. The 
substantial relationship between Justifiability of cheating and Surface learning strategies is 
interpreted here in the light of how Justifiability of cheating is believed to relate to Self-reported 
cheating. The surprising strength and consistency of this relationship suggests that students 
frequently engage in surface learning while understanding that it essentially cheats the duty 
to learn with integrity, i.e. to strive to understand and master course material. Instead of 
cheating the ‘letter of the law’ with respect to integrity, however, surface learning cheats its 
spirit. 
The large effects that Justifiability of cheating exerted on Surface learning strategies in 
cross-sectional models were observed to convey a number of indirect effects, such as those 
exerted by students’ perceptions of Science class contexts (see Appendix AF). This was also 
the case in the longitudinal model, where the Time 2 measure of Justifiability of cheating 
conveyed indirect effects of perceived context at Time 1. Thus, while the use of surface 
learning strategies at Time 2 was predicted by surface learning behaviors at Time 1, the 
otherwise large bivariate correlation between these variables (r = .632; see Table 8.2) appears 
to have largely reflected the effects of longitudinal continuity in third-variables, i.e. students 
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tending to perceive themselves and their Science classes in ways that influenced whether they 
studied in a surface manner.   
9.3.2 Justifiability of cheating 
Justifiability of cheating was treated in the present study as a measure of moral 
obligation that, by querying the end results of students’ judgment processes, i.e. the 
judgments they held at the time of the questionnaire, should have captured variance from 
both cognitive and non-cognitive mental processes (Haidt, 2001; Kahneman, 2011; Machery & 
Mallon, 2010), which are both associated with social contract-based judgment (Fiddick et al., 
2005). The measure Justifiability of cheating asked only for students’ final judgments of whether 
cheating was felt to be ‘justifiable’ or ‘reasonable’ in their Science class. Whatever cognitive 
and non-cognitive processes were involved in students’ judgment of this issue would have 
come to a conclusion, even if temporary, before students could report their judgments on the 
questionnaire. Experimental studies indicate that individuals tend to judge social contract 
violations as ‘cheating’ (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 2013). This broader conception 
of cheating may be ascribed, from a student point of view, to laziness, incompetence, injustice, 
or irresponsibility in a teacher. Such judgments are held to occur by rapid-fire, non-cognitive 
processes, and often to lead to negative reciprocation by those who feel cheated (Boles et al., 
2000; Gneezy, 2005; Pillulta & Murningham, 1996).  
Prior psychometric studies of academic cheating have generally been situated, by 
contrast, within the rational-cognitive paradigm in cheating psychology. The tendency in such 
studies to focus on students’ explicit reasons and intentions for cheating may have often 
obfuscated variance from non-cognitive processes. Qualitative studies of cheating typically 
focus, for instance, on getting students to explain why they cheat (e.g. Stephens & Nicholson, 
2008; Zito & McQuillan, 2011), which is likely to evoke moral dumbfounding among 
adolescents who are not yet ready to articulate their non-cognitive moral understandings 
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(Bjorklund et al., 2000; Sneddon, 2007). Multivariate models derived from the theory of 
planned behavior (TPB), which have been applied widely in cheating research at the tertiary 
level, hinge, by contrast, on measures of Intention to cheat (Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Mayhew et al., 
2009; Whitley, 1998). While TPB research has been moving in the direction of the dual-process 
paradigm factors for at least ten years (Harding, Carpenter, Finelli, & Passow, 2004; Harding 
et al., 2012; Passow et al., 2006), Intention to cheat, which emphasizes cognitive processes, such 
as planning and premeditation (Beck & Ajzen, 1991; Simkin & McLeod, 2010), remains at the 
center of the TPB model. The only two prior studies of academic cheating to have measured 
explicitly non-cognitive factors (McTernan et al., 2014; Murdock et al., 2008) did so in terms 
individual proneness to emotions such as shame and guilt, posed as personality constructs, 
within a decision-making framework.  
The overarching PTLC hypothesis that student perceptions of class quality drive 
disintegrity behaviors as a function of moral judgment was very clearly supported by the 
significant indirect effects of Teacher quality that were conveyed by Justifiability of cheating to 
both types of disintegrity. Perceiving that teachers were ‘worse’ affected moral judgment 
negatively (in favor of cheating), and appeared, thereby, to indirectly cause disintegrity to 
increase. The prominent mediating role played by Justifiability of cheating with respect to 
contextual effects supported the PTLC hypothesis in that it represented the degree to which 
students felt obliged to be honest according to whether they thought their teachers met the 
obligations entailed by teaching ‘well’.  
9.3.3 Peer norms 
The hypothesis that Peer norms would affect cheating behavior directly was not 
supported. Instead the mediated structural sequence involving ‘Peer norms  Justifiability of 
cheating  Self-reported cheating’ was a central and significant theme in all PTLC models tested. 
The strength and consistency of this structural sequence is consonant with prior research 
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indicating that cheating-related peer norms influence whether individuals believe that 
cheating is an appropriate in-group behavior (Eisenberg, 2004; Galloway, 2012; Gino et al., 
2009; Hartshorne & May, 1928; McCabe, Treviño, & Butterfield, 2001; Steiner, 1930; Schab, 
1980; Walker et al., 1966). The fact that Peer norms tended to mediate the effects of individuals’ 
perceptions of teacher quality on the justifiability of cheating in PTLC models is consistent, 
moreover, with the assertion of social comparison theory (Broeckelman-Post, 2008; Festinger, 
1954; Koul et al., 2009; Nora & Zhang, 2010) that individuals develop judgments in conformity 
with the judgments they perceive among their peers. The validity of this causal sequence, in 
which Peer norms conveys variance from Teacher quality to Justifiability of cheating, was 
supported by strong direct and indirect beta coefficients in all models tested, except the female 
sample model at Time 2. 
The decision to position Peer norms as a mediator of the effects of class quality on the 
justifiability of cheating reflected the hypothesis that rules against cheating are viewed as 
morally imperative only insomuch as the context within which those rules exist is viewed as 
morally legitimate. By communicating the social acceptability of cheating to individual 
students, peer norms were expected to convey group-level evaluations of class quality that 
would shape individual evaluations of the same. The variable Peer norms was thus expected 
to mediate the variance explained by Teacher quality in Justifiability of cheating.  
It is important to note that the structural relations observed among Teacher quality, Peer 
norms, and Justifiability of cheating do not appear to be the result of multicollinearity. The 
complete mediation at Time 2 by Peer norms of the effect of Teacher quality on Justifiability of 
cheating was accompanied, for instance, by moderate correlations between Peer norms and 
both Justifiability of cheating (r = .471) and Teacher quality (r = -.473), in addition to a slightly 
lower correlation between Teacher quality and Justifiability of cheating (r = -.388). These 
correlations were similar at Time 1, with the exception of that between Peer norms and 
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Justifiability of cheating (r = .600). While a correlation of .600 is undoubtedly strong, it still falls 
well below levels commonly used to demarcate multicollinearity, such as r > .800 (Field, 2009). 
At Time 1, moreover, Peer norms served as only a partial mediator at Time 1, such that its 
stronger association with Justifiability of cheating did not appear to affect the degree to which 
it mediated the effect of Teacher quality on Justifiability of cheating. Peer norms was also re-
positioned in ‘equivalent models’ (Kline, 2011) as a correlate (see Appendices Q and AB) and 
then as a predictor (see Appendices R and AC) of class quality variables. None of these 
equivalent models were significantly better in overall model fit than the hypothesized PTLC 
model in which Peer norms was a mediated of class context on downstream variables (see 
Figures 6.4 and 7.3, respectively). These observations, together with the significant indirect 
effects of Teacher quality conveyed by Peer norms to Justifiability of cheating in the PTLC model 
at Time 1 (β = -.150, p < .001), Time 2 (β = .121, p < .01), and in the longitudinal PTLC model 
(see Appendix AF), suggest that Peer norms is a lynchpin in the causal sequence ‘Class quality 
 Peer norms  Justifiability of cheating  Self-reported cheating’.  
Longitudinal peer effects. A substantial autoregressive path coefficient in the 
longitudinal model suggested that peer effects also carried over from year to year, regardless 
of class context, and may, as such, have prejudiced students’ perceptions of teacher quality 
and of whether cheating is justifiable, before they ever entered the classroom. Such carryover 
may have emanated from students’ personal tendencies to perceive higher levels of cheating, 
or from continuity in their peer group associations between years. Higher levels of perceived 
peer support for cheating may also have emanated from variables outside of class contexts, 
such as school culture or national culture (Crittenden et al., 2009a; Magnus et al., 2008; Teixeira 
et al., 2010), that were not included in Model 4. 
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9.3.4 Academic context quality 
The measure of Good teaching from the Course Experience Questionnaire (CEQ), which 
has been used to study associations between student experience and learning behavior at 
universities around the world for more than three decades (Barnhardt & Ginns, 2014), was 
used in the present study to gather data on student evaluations of class quality. This adds to 
a very small literature of student learning theory (SLT) research conducted in secondary 
schools (Ginns, Martin, & Papworth, 2014; Selmes, 1986), and an even smaller literature using 
SLT course experience measures at the secondary level (Ramsden et al., 1988, 1989). The 
present work also joins a small number of studies that have used CEQ measures to research 
academic cheating (Jurdi et al., 2011a, 2011b; Norton et al., 2001), and is the first study found 
to have done so at the secondary-level.  
Academic context quality was represented in the PTLC model principally in terms of 
the second-order factor Teacher quality, which included two first-order factors: Good teaching 
and Assessment quality. Teacher quality is conceptually similar to several teacher-related 
measures found to negatively predict self-reported cheating and pro-cheating attitudes in 
prior studies, including Teacher commitment (Murdock et al., 2001), Teacher caring and 
competence (Murdock et al., 2004), and Teacher credibility (Anderman et al., 2010). The 
hypothesis that student evaluations of class quality affect self-reported cheating behavior 
directly was not supported by PTLC model results. The effect of Teacher quality on Self-reported 
cheating was mediated, instead, by Peer norms and Justifiability of cheating.  
An important function served by Teacher quality in Model 4 was to completely mediate 
the effects of Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept. This relationship, theorized to represent 
cynicism (discussed further in section 9.3.6), transmitted a number of significant effects 
downstream in the model, especially to Peer norms and Justifiability of cheating, both in the Time 
2 cross-sectional model and the longitudinal model. 
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While Usefulness of curriculum, a proxy measure for students’ overall interest in a class, 
remained psychometrically distinct from the second-order factor Teacher quality, none of the 
often substantial bivariate correlations it shared with other factors manifested as a significant 
beta coefficient in any structural model tested. Stepwise regression analysis conducted with 
respect to co-ed models at Times 1 and 2 indicated that the effects of Usefulness of Curriculum 
were muted by the presence of Teacher quality (see Appendices N and Y). The large correlation 
between these two variables appeared to account for the variance that Usefulness of curriculum 
shared with downstream constructs. These observations led to the estimation of equivalent 
models at Times 1 and 2 that generally supported the possibility that Teacher quality could be 
modeled as a mediator of Usefulness of curriculum. It was not clear that the relationship should 
be unidirectional, however, and no clear theoretical or empirical support for modeling Teacher 
quality as a mediator of Usefulness of curriculum (as opposed to the other way around) was 
discovered in the literature.  
9.3.5 Performance goal structure 
Inclusion of Performance goal structure in the PTLC model extends a large and growing 
body of work on cheating in the field of achievement goal theory (AGT) (e.g. Bong, 2008; 
Brown-Wright et al., 2012; Murdock & Anderman, 2006; Yang, Huang & Chen, 2013). While 
the results of these studies have generally suggested that an orientation to personal 
performance goals is associated with higher levels of cheating, findings related to 
performance goal structures have been mixed (Anderman et al., 1998, 2010; Anderman & 
Midgley, 2001, 2004; Bong, 2008; Tas & Tekkaya, 2010; Anderman et al., 1998; Stephens & 
Gehlbach, 2007). Results of the present study are consistent with the findings of Anderman et 
al. (1998) that the perception of a performance goal structure in Science class is associated with 
higher levels of cheating. This finding is also consistent with experimental studies in which 
cheating has been caused by key aspects of a classroom performance structure, such as 
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extrinsic motivation (Lobel & Levanon, 1988; Mills, 1958) and knowledge of peer performance 
(Shelton & Hill, 1969; Taylor & Lewit, 1966). The present work also provides evidence that 
performance goal structures predict surface learning strategies among secondary school 
students. 
Performance goal structure was a significant predictor of Justifiability of cheating in every 
model tested, and was its strongest predictor in the Time 2 iteration of the longitudinal model. 
Its predictive effects on Justifiability of cheating were, in all of these models, conveyed to Surface 
learning strategies and Self-reported cheating in roughly equal portions. In the longitudinal 
model, a significant amount of variance in the tendency to perceive performance goals at Time 
2 was carried over from Time 1. This might reflect variance from either the broader school 
environment or from students’ personal achievement goal orientations. Achievement goal 
emphases are seen, for instance, to operate at three levels in schools: (1) students’ personal 
goal orientations, (2) classroom goal structures, and (3) school goal structures (Anderman & 
Midgley, 1997). What goals students perceive to be emphasized in a given class may, 
therefore, reflect variance at the individual or school levels. The fact that such perceptions 
were more prevalent among male respondents at both times might, additionally, reflect 
variance from personological factors.  
While respondents closely associated a mastery goal structure with teacher quality 
that was ‘good’, as evidenced by high multicollinearity between measures of Mastery goal 
structure and Good teaching in the Pilot Study, respondents did not associate a performance 
goal structure with teaching that was ‘bad’. While perceiving a performance goal structure 
predicted the justifiability of cheating in every model, it does not appear to have done so as 
an aspect of class quality. Performance goal structures may, instead, have oriented student 
efforts to ‘earning’ grades at the expense of learning by communicating “messages about the 
purposes of instruction” that “emphasize the demonstration of ability and competing 
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favorably with others as the main reasons for engaging in academic work” (Anderman & 
Midgley, 2004). The pursuit of grades at the expense of learning is a key conceptual similarity 
between surface learning and cheating that could explain why Performance goal structure 
indirectly predicted both disintegrity variables, as a function of Justifiability of cheating. Instead 
of affecting the degree of obligation students felt to meet a teacher’s expectations, performance 
goal structures may have shifted what the expectations were, from learning priorities to grade 
priorities. 
9.3.6 Self-concept 
Self-concept measures were included in the ‘Person’ component of the PTLC model, 
based on a broad body of evidence that personological factors explain substantial amounts of 
variance in ethical behavior (e.g. Burton, 1963; Gino et al., 2011; Miller et al., 2007; Whitley, 
1998). Measures of self-concept account for how individuals evaluate themselves in terms of 
various aspects of self-image, based on their perceptions of past performance and social 
comparison in those areas (Bong & Clark, 1999; Bong & Skaalvik, 2003). The two self-concept 
measures chosen for this study, Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept and Subject self-concept 
proved to be highly consistent over time, having the largest autoregressive path coefficients 
in the longitudinal model. Each Time 1 measure explained more than 50% of the variance in 
its Time 2 counterpart, yet the two types of self-concept shared only small bivariate 
correlations with one another (r’s = .206 - .212; see Table 8.2). These findings add to a small 
body of prior research in which self-concept has been measured in relation to academic 
integrity (Arvidson, 2004; Rost & Wild, 1994). 
A notable difference in how self-concept factors performed at Time 1 versus Time 2 
was the disappearance of their direct effects on outcome variables at the latter time. Direct 
effects of both self-concept constructs on integrity-related factors at Time 2 were 
overwhelmingly mediated by Teacher quality. This consolidation of personological effects 
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through mediator variables at Time 2 may have been a maturation effect (Kline, 2009), 
stemming from the higher cognitive functioning of students who were one year older at Time 
2, an effect of having transitioned to higher grade levels at Time 2, or a Hawthorne effect 
(Kline, 2009), in which students who participated in this project at Time 1 were stimulated to 
reflect more carefully on themes of honesty, justice, and cheating during the year leading up 
to Time 2 data collection. 
Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept. Two effect patterns were exhibited by 
Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept. At Time 1, it exerted significant inverse effects, both direct 
and indirect, on all three downstream variables related to cheating (Peer norms, Justifiability of 
cheating, and Self-reported cheating). In the Time 2 co-ed model, by contrast, all effects of this 
factor were mediated by Teacher quality. This difference between cross-sectional models was 
also observed between iterations of the longitudinal model. 
While these results are weaker than anticipated based on prior experimental studies 
in which moral self-concept has been observed to substantially influence dishonest behavior 
(Ariely, 2012; Gino et al., 2011; Mazar et al., 2008; Shalvi et al., 2011), the strongest downstream 
effects exerted by Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept were, in the co-ed model at Time 1 and 
in both gender-specific models at Time 2, associated with Justifiability of cheating. This pattern 
suggests that concern for maintaining a positive moral self-concept often weighed on 
students’ judgments of whether cheating was justifiable. These effects were not large, 
however. The ‘moral motivation’ that has been associated with felt moral obligation 
(Schroeder et al., 2010) appeared, instead, to relate principally to students’ perceptions of 
context. 
Mediation of Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept by Teacher quality at Time 2 was 
interpreted to suggest cynicism (Mills & Keil, 2005), in that students who rated themselves as 
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more dishonest were more likely to view their teachers in the same light, and vice versa. This 
mediation effect was first observed in the female sample model at Time 2, and found, 
subsequently, to carry-over to the Time 2 co-ed model, likely due to the larger proportion of 
females in the Time 2 sample (61%). This finding is consistent with statistical associations 
observed in prior research between Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept and perceived teacher 
quality (Hay, 2000; Martin et al., 2006), and with evidence that cynicism may be more 
prevalent among females, and may increase with age during adolescence (Galbraith & Merrill, 
2012; Simon et al., 2004). 
Subject self-concept. The measure of Subject self-concept used in the present study was 
related specifically to the subject of Science, in which more cheating has often been observed 
than in other subject areas at the secondary level (Miller et al., 2007; Murdock et al., 2001; 
Schab, 1991). The positive predictive effects of Subject self-concept on both types of disintegrity, 
observed in many of the models tested, were consistent with strong evidence that ability-
related self-beliefs, such as self-efficacy, are inverse predictors of cheating among secondary 
school students (Bong, 2008; Finn & Frone, 2004; Lee et al., 2014; Murdock et al., 2004; Nora & 
Zhang, 2010; Tas & Tekkaya, 2010). These associations were, however, stronger with Surface 
learning strategies than with Self-reported cheating. 
Subject self-concept was also a strong predictor of students’ perceptions of class context 
factors, implying that how students perceive their ability in a particular subject area informs 
how positively they evaluate classes in that subject area. While the strength of these effects 
was similar for males and females at both time points, females tended to report lower self-
concept related to Science and correspondingly worse evaluations of their Science teachers.  
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9.3.7 Differences between gender-specific models 
Several differences between gender-specific structural models were observed at both 
Times 1 and 2, of which all were related to whether, and to what degree, males and females 
judged cheating to be justifiable. Among males, for instance, Performance goal structure was a 
stronger predictor of Justifiability of cheating, which was, in turn, a stronger predictor of Surface 
learning strategies. Among females, by contrast, Peer norms was a stronger predictor of 
Justifiability of cheating than it was among males, yet the function of Peer norms as a complete 
mediator of Teacher quality on Justifiability of cheating was observed exclusively among males. 
Teacher quality exerted a direct effect on Justifiability of cheating in both female sample models. 
The effect of perceived peer norms on the justifiability of cheating was more prominent among 
females, in other words, but played a greater role shaping the effect of teacher quality on the 
justifiability of cheating among males. 
A notable feature of the female sample model at Time 2 was the failure of all 
hypothesized downstream effects of Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept to achieve statistical 
significance. Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept was found, instead, to exert indirect effects on 
downstream constructs as a function of Teacher quality. Such effects in female sample models 
generally carried over to co-ed models to a greater extent than did those of male sample 
models, due to larger proportions of female participants at Time 1 (59%), Time 2 (61%), and 
in the longitudinal sample (68%). 
9.4 The PTLC hypothesis: Reducing the scope of the ‘belief-behavior incongruity’ 
The results of this study suggest that mainstream contemporary scholarship tends to 
over-subscribe to the BBI and neutralization perspectives on academic cheating. The fact that 
the BBI is inconsistent with what rational-cognitive theories of moral psychology predict has 
been held to require the neutralization framework as a means of bridging the incongruity, or 
what Blasi (1983) described as the “fracture within the very core of the self” (p. 201). The 
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neutralization perspective entails, however, as argued in section 2.6, the problematic assertion 
that students who cheat overcome the internal discomforts associated with the BBI by 
intentionally deceiving themselves. 
A central assertion of the dual-process paradigm of moral psychology, that moral 
judgment is only partially rational (Cushman et al., 2010; Haidt, 2001, 2007), eliminates the 
need to assume that adolescents’ judge academic cheating according to abstract ethical beliefs. 
Cheating is, on its face, a much broader concept than academic cheating. All forms of social 
contract violation can, for instance, be described as cheating (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013). By 
this broader view, students who believe they are being mistreated or neglected, i.e. ‘cheated’, 
in specific academic contexts may cease to hold the view that rules mandating honesty are 
morally imperative within those contexts, because the social contract that legitimates those 
rules is no longer in force (Rettinger, 2007). While this view may be entirely irrational on a 
student’s part, identifying such rules with the conventional domain, instead of with the moral 
one (Eisenberg, 2004; Turiel, 1983, 2002, 2006), may still involve sincerely felt judgment that 
reflects genuine perceptions and beliefs, as opposed to techniques of neutralization. 
From a social contract perspective, cheating can be viewed as wrong in a broad ethical 
sense, even while violating rules that mandate honesty may be viewed as morally permissible 
under certain circumstances. Such reasoning is exemplified by the concept of criminal defense 
in Anglo-American legal systems. A criminal defense may concede that a law has been 
broken, but maintain that the infraction was not criminal due to extenuating circumstances 
(Morawetz, 1986). Such defenses can exonerate individuals who have broken laws, by 
highlighting for a judge or jury the special circumstances that led to the violation. Criminal 
defenses are, in other words, taken seriously in courtrooms, whereas similar defenses offered 
by students in studies of cheating are uniformly dismissed as deceptions. While schools 
should, indeed, not let students ‘off the hook’ who break rules that mandate honesty, the 
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possibility that students may sincerely believe that their justifications for cheating are valid is 
of value to scholarship on the psychology of cheating.   
Results of the present study indicate that a substantial proportion of cheating is done 
under the belief that external circumstances have, in fact, rendered it a conventional 
transgression. The belief appears to be sincere, in other words, as opposed to an intentional 
self-deception, in that it reflects lower moral obligation. This can be stated with a healthy 
measure of confidence because the linkages in the PTLC model between (1) whether cheating 
was viewed as justifiable, and (2) the circumstances hypothesized to lead students to view it 
that way, i.e. poor teaching and widespread peer cheating, were inferred statistically. They 
could not, in other words, have been distortions, lies, or neutralization techniques offered up 
by participants in the study. These results are also consistent with experimental studies in 
which negative perceptions of class context have been found to cause students to judge that 
cheating is more justifiable (Murdock et al., 2004, 2007). Cheating that students judge to be 
justifiable cannot also violate their moral beliefs. Such cheating, described in the present work 
as ‘cheating as a conventional violation’, would not, therefore, cause BBI. 
Results of the present study strongly endorse the hypothesis that cheating is often 
viewed by students as a conventional violation. This does not suggest, however, that cheating 
never induces BBI. There is strong evidence to suggest that many acts of cheating are felt by 
cheaters to be moral violations (e.g. Jensen et al., 2002; Stephens & Nicholson, 2008). The PTLC 
models tested in the present study explained, on average, roughly two-thirds of the variance 
in self-reported cheating, of which the majority was explained by the justifiability of cheating. 
The remaining third of variance in self-reported cheating that was not explained by the 
justifiability of cheating may reflect cheating as a moral violation. This implies that at least 
one-third of the cheating reported in this study may have been incongruent with respondents’ 
moral beliefs.  
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9.5 Implications for educators: Addressing the problem of disintegrity 
Many educators care dearly about student honesty, although the degree of this caring 
is often shown most clearly in the punishments meted out to cheaters, whether involving 
zeroes on major assignments or expulsions from school. Merit-based educational systems rely 
on integrity, lest they become mere fronts for otherwise meaningless activity. Cheating is a 
systemic threat, and the system tends to react vigorously. The focus on punishment and 
threats of punishment tends, however, to push solely in the direction of behavioral 
conformity, while ignoring moral maturity. The present study indicates that schools and 
educators should augment the emphasis they place on honor codes and punitive regimes with 
an emphasis on reducing the degree to which students judge cheating to be justifiable. 
Reducing the justifiability of cheating should, according to any of the PTLC models tested 
herein, be associated with a direct reduction in cheating behavior. While attempts to reduce 
cheating by improving students’ moral judgment have been made many times, they have 
uniformly been made from a rational-cognitive point of view and have generally had small to 
negligible effects on cheating behavior. Examples include ‘ethics education’ (Bebeau & 
Thoma, 1999; Evans & Craig, 1990a), ‘ethical philosophy programming’ (Seider et al., 2013, p. 
7), ‘cognitive dissonance interventions’ (Vinski & Tryon, 2009), and ‘cognitive inoculation 
treatments’ (Compton & Pfau, 2008, p. 104). The small to negligible effects of such programs 
on actual cheating behavior (e.g. Houston, 1983b, Sieder et al., 2012; Spear & Miller, 2012; 
Tittle & Rowe, 1973; Vinski & Tryon, 2009) are, in fact, consistent with the tenuous relationship 
between moral cognition and moral behavior (Blasi, 1980). 
While the issue of how to manage non-cognitive moral processes has not been dealt 
with previously in literature on academic integrity, three general suggestions for how 
individuals can take control of their own non-cognitive impulses are offered by Haidt (2007):  
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“We can [1] use conscious verbal reasoning, such as considering the costs and 
benefits of each course of action… [2] reframe a situation and see a new angle or 
consequence, thereby triggering a second flash of intuition that may compete with 
the first. And [3] we can talk with people who raise new arguments which then 
trigger in us new flashes of intuition followed by various kinds of reasoning” 
(p.999).  
These three suggestions are framed in terms of curbing impulses that have already 
occurred within an individual. Stepping back, however, they also suggest preventative 
approaches that can be implemented at a classroom or school level. Cognition-intensive 
programs and moral appeals intended to improve adolescent ethics reflect the first and third 
of these suggestions by, for instance, focusing on moral reasoning skills in order to strengthen 
their abilities to cope with non-cognitive impulses, and by presenting arguments designed to 
counter likely justifications for feeling that it is okay to cheat. Such programs focus, in essence, 
on improving cognitive control. The present research indicates that educators should also 
attend to Haidt’s (2007) second suggestion, i.e. reframing situations, by managing student 
perceptions of at least three factors: (1) the quality of educator skill and caring, (2) the intended 
goals of learning, and (3) the students’ own morality. 
9.5.1 Enforcing rules  
Ultimatum game studies show that people are often inclined to punish ‘cheaters’, even 
when doing so is damaging to themselves, thus foregoing their rational self-interest for the 
sake of moral ideals (e.g. Boles et al., 2000; Gneezy, 2005; Haidt, 2001; Pillutla & Murnighan, 
1996). This ‘Homo moralis view’ of human nature (Haidt, 2007), which is at the crux of the 
PTLC hypothesis, appears to cut in two directions with respect to cheating in schools. On one 
hand, deeming rules that forbid academic cheating to be merely conventional may be a non-
rational response by students to the perception that teachers are ‘cheating’ on their 
Chapter 9 Discussion │349 
 
 
professional responsibilities; on the other hand, the emphasis that school honor policies tend 
to place on punitive consequences may also be imbued with a tendency for non-rational 
responses by educators to cheating done by students. Research on cheating does suggest that 
careful monitoring and strict consequence systems are needed to prevent widespread 
cheating in connection to ‘contagion effects’ (Gino et al., 2009; Walker et al., 1966). But if 
students are cheating in response to perceptions, as this and many other studies suggest is 
often the case, then perception management is another, and perhaps better, means of 
addressing the problem.  
Rules, monitoring, and consequence systems are important to reducing the incidence 
of cheating, because they increase the risk of cheating, and thereby decrease its prevalence 
under all circumstances. Research shows that the incidence of cheating tends to be lower when 
honor policies are consistently enforced and clearly understood by students (Burrus et al., 
2007; McCabe & Katz, 2009). But the punitive regimes that typically accompany such policies 
have two major weaknesses: (1) they address only the symptoms of the problem, and (2) most 
of the cheating that goes on in schools is never detected.  
9.5.2 Managing perceptions 
Perceptions of poor teacher quality, widespread peer cheating, and performance goal 
structures have been shown in experimental and non-experimental studies to lead to higher 
levels of cheating. The amount of concern individuals have for their moral self-concept, which 
involves perceiving themselves as moral people, has also been found experimentally and non-
experimentally to cause systematic variation in cheating behavior. These studies were 
reviewed extensively in preceding chapters (e.g. see sections 2.3.3 and 5.1), and will not be 
reviewed again here. 
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Perceptions of teachers. Nowhere in this study is it proposed that students’ 
perceptions of ‘poor’ teacher quality are objectively valid, or that two wrongs ever make a 
right. PTLC model results demonstrate that, to the contrary, students’ perceptions of teachers 
are strongly associated with their subject self-concept, honesty-trustworthiness self-concept, 
and level of interest in class curricula. Substantial variance was also observed to carry over 
from measures of Teacher quality at Time 1 to its counterpart measure at Time 2, which 
suggests that students were exhibiting developed tendencies for liking Science teachers more 
or less. Teachers in this study faced factors, therefore, that were initially beyond their control, 
and that shaped how students perceived them from the beginning of the school year.   
The present research is consistent with evidence from prior studies that suggests 
teachers can reduce cheating in their classes by actively shaping students’ perceptions of 
themselves as competent and respectful (Murdock et al., 2008), caring (Murdock et al., 2004), 
and credible (Anderman et al., 2010). This does not mean that teachers should necessarily 
change how they teach and assess students, but that they should strive to shape how students 
perceive them. Teachers may, for instance, find appropriate ways to tout their own honesty 
and integrity, exploit opportunities to convey their caring for students, demonstrate their 
effort, communicate their strengths in terms of background training, knowledge, and 
experience, defend their particular approaches to pedagogy and assessment, and uphold (and 
enforce) the principle of mutual respect in their classes (Anderman et al., 2010; McCrosky & 
Young, 1981; Progue & Ah-Yun, 2006; Selman, 1980). Teachers should additionally look to 
their school administrators for public support of their efforts to make positive impressions on 
students, such as by touting their personal and professional accomplishments, hard work, 
caring, and integrity in front of students. The present research suggests that improving 
students’ perceptions of teachers should reduce cheating by increasing the moral obligation 
they feel to respect the teachers’ rules. 
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Learning goals. Disintegrity among students in the present study was associated with 
learning goals in two senses: (1) whether teachers emphasized performance goals, which 
appear more likely to orient students to grades over learning, and (2) whether the learning 
objectives emphasized on assessments were authentic and transparent. These findings, 
together with large amounts of prior research reviewed in Chapter Two, indicate that teachers 
and institutions should heavily emphasize mastery goals, and strive to design assessment 
tasks around purposes that are authentic and clearly understandable.  
A practical reality faced by many Western educators is that performance goals are 
inherent to the educational systems within which they work. It is not enough, therefore, to 
recommend that teachers emphasize mastery goals. Grades are important, and popular 
curricular programs such as Advanced Placement (AP) and the International Baccalaureate 
(IB) entail assessment programs that explicitly rank individual performance. To the extent that 
performance emphases are inevitable, teachers should actively shun performance-avoidance 
goals in favor of performance-approach goals. While promoting performance goals at all is 
generally discouraged (Brophy, 2005), performance-approach goals have had weak-to-
negligible associations with cheating behavior in published research (Bong, 2008; Niiya et al., 
2008; Tas & Tekkaya, 2010), and appear to be of greatest concern in academically advanced 
classes (Stephens & Gehlback, 2007; Taylor et al., 2002). Inasmuch as promoting performance-
approach goals in class is necessary, the messages they send that emphasize grades and peer 
comparisons over learning should be counterbalanced with strong, clear emphasis on mastery 
goals. The two types of goal are not mutually-exclusive. We can, indeed, strive to perform 
well by mastering material, even on a normative or competitive basis.  
Design-it-out. Teachers can also counteract the messages that performance goals send 
with assessment design. A recent and growing body of scholarship on how cheating can be 
‘designed-out’ of academic contexts has highlighted the need for assessment tasks that are 
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uniquely personalized and meaningful, such that (1) the intrinsic value of what is to be 
assessed can compete with the extrinsic value that students ascribe to grades and peer 
comparisons (Heckler et al., 2013; Howard & Davies, 2009; Sisti, 2007), and (2) the opportunity 
to cheat is limited or eliminated by the design, itself (Carroll & Appleton, 2001; Gannon-Leary 
et al., 2009). If surface learning strategies are, as the present research suggests, tied to 
justifications of cheating, meaningless work that calls for surface-level learning may, in fact, 
lead students to believe cheating is justified. 
Many principles for how to design-out cheating are also consistent with the design 
principles of ‘constructive alignment’, which Biggs (1996, 1999) developed in conjunction with 
the 3-P Model (see Figures 3.1 and 3.6). Students are held by the constructive alignment 
perspective to adopt surface or deep approaches to learning in response to “the messages 
[they] receive; and again, assessment becomes the chief source of these messages” (Biggs, 
1991, p. 26). The adoption of surface learning goals often reflects a failure, Biggs (1996) argues, 
to constructively align the components of the 3-P Model, “so that [1] objectives express the 
kinds of understanding that we want from students, [2] the teaching context encourages 
students to undertake the learning activities likely to achieve those understandings, and [3] 
the assessment tasks tell students what activities are required of them” (p. 57). Designing 
courses according to the principles of constructive alignment is intended to ‘entrap’ students 
in the dynamics of healthy constructivist learning by emphasizing the process of learning over 
its end-products (i.e. grades), and by structurally limiting opportunities to engage in surface 
learning.  
Grouping surface learning behavior together with cheating, under the rubric 
‘disintegrity’, highlights the common goal of both the ‘design-it-out’ and ‘constructive 
alignment’ conceptions of good assessment and course design: to channel students’ efforts 
into processes of learning with integrity. Both conceptions aim to inspire interest in the 
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substance and meaning of what is being learned, to facilitate the construction of personal 
understandings and skills, and to structurally improve the odds that students will exhibit 
integrity in their academic work. 
Self-perceptions. The third type of student perception that educators should strive to 
manage is moral self-concept. High moral self-concept has been shown to act as a buffer 
against the temptation to cheat in experimental studies (Gino et al., 2011; Mazar et al., 2008), 
and was, in keeping with such findings, observed in the present study to inversely predict 
whether students judged cheating to be justifiable. Recent research by Bryan et al. (2013) 
suggests that educators can manage students’ moral self-concepts by, in effect, casting a 
spotlight on them. 
Bryan et al. (2013) found that asking participants in an experimental study on cheating 
to ‘not be cheaters’ reduced cheating behavior far more than asking them ‘not to cheat’.  The 
difference was subtle but powerful. Asking participants not to cheat focused attention on the 
action of cheating, whereas asking them to not be cheaters focused attention on their moral 
‘beings’, i.e. their moral self-concepts. It is not known how well this technique works with 
adolescents, or whether it loses effect if repeated frequently over long periods of time. When 
educators talk to students about academic integrity, however, a sparing deployment of the 
request to “not be cheaters”, and reminders that ‘we are not cheaters’, may help reduce 
cheating by bringing focus to bear on students’ moral identities. 
9.5.3 Focusing on the Grade Eight – Grade Nine transition 
A final recommendation for addressing cheating at the secondary school level is to 
pay special attention to the Grade Eight-to-Nine transition. This is especially important at 
schools in which Grade Eight is incorporated into a middle school division that is segregated 
from the high school division. Results in the present study are consistent with the only other 
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longitudinal study of cheating over this transition (Anderman & Midgley, 2004). Students 
who made the transition from Grade Eight to Grade Nine during the research reported herein 
reported a higher incidence of cheating at the latter time (57%) than at the former (48%). The 
longitudinal nature of this study and the study conducted by Anderman and Midgley (2004) 
strengthens the basis for believing that the observed increase was caused by factors related to 
the grade-level transition. Policy initiatives aimed at reducing cheating would be well 
advised, therefore, to prioritize rising Ninth Graders. 
9.6 A bad idea: Literal teacher-learner contracts 
 ‘Contract’ is used in the PTLC framework as a metaphorical moral heuristic. It is 
metaphorical in the sense that the psychological dynamic it represents is not a literal contract, 
and a moral heuristic in the sense that it organizes the considerations involved in moral 
judgment (Sinnott-Armstrong et al., 2010). Literalizing contractarian relationships as actual 
contracts introduces a high level of what MacNeil (1980) refers to as ‘procedural regularity’, 
which involves externalizing the principals that govern proper behavior. Procedural 
regularity often becomes desirable, MacNeil (1980) argues, “when good faith and trust decline 
below certain levels” (p. 68). Between actors, in this case teachers and students, a high level of 
procedural regularity also sends the message that good faith and trust are low, and may 
encourage individuals to plan and act as if that were true. 
“The rise of procedural regularity respecting student-university relations is often 
hailed as a great step toward equality and justice. It can just as well be viewed as 
the result of a vast decline in trust and perceptions about an absence of good faith. 
So viewed it is a huge step backward.” (MacNeil, 1980, p. 68) 
While the urge to create literal contracts between students and teachers in order to 
clarify their relationships is understandable, and has been condoned in print (Deech, 2009; 
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Faucher & Caves, 2009; Frost, Hamlin & Barczyk, 2007; Gaffney-Rhys & Jones, 2010), using 
literal contracts to manage moral judgment is non-sequitur. As illustrated in the epigraph to 
this chapter, morality does not exist except through personal judgment and free will (Blasi, 
1980). Literalizing psychological teaching-learning contracts would effectively bureaucratize 
the substance of what students and teachers should share of their own accord, in the natural 
course of their relationships. It would ‘gut’, in other words, the very substance of what gives 
teacher-learner relationships the potential to be uplifting, inspiring, and moral. 
9.7 Limitations 
Foremost among the limitations faced by the present study were relatively small 
sample size, data collection at only two time points and exclusively within the context of 
Science class, scalar non-invariance, sundry measurement dysfunction, and the use of self-
reported data. While the sample was diverse, both geographically and culturally, its size 
restricted the range of modeling procedures that could be undertaken, as well as the statistical 
power associated with the more complex, multivariate models examined. The relationship of 
sample size to model complexity was expressed throughout the study as the N:q ratio, where 
N is sample size and q is the number of free model parameters. Low N:q ratios were more of 
an issue with respect to gender-specific models, which involved much smaller samples than 
co-ed models. Estimation of multivariate models with small samples at Time 2 and for the 
longitudinal analysis was accomplished by representing the variance of individual factors 
with weighted composite scores. This improved the N:q ratios of multivariate models, but 
never above N:q = 4.3, implying persistently low statistical power. Analyses with low 
statistical power tend to under-represent effect size magnitudes and significance levels. A 
number of nearly-significant beta paths would likely have achieved significance with higher 
statistical power, such as that from Teacher quality to Peer norms in the Time 2 female sample 
model where the N:q ratio was 3 (β = -.270, p = .063), and that from Teacher quality to 
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Justifiability of cheating in the Time 2 co-ed model where the N:q ratio was 1.5 (-.229, p = .077). 
The suppression and mediation effects noted in the male sample model at Time 2 may also 
have been caused by parameter estimates that were near zero due to low statistical power in 
what was the smallest sample used in the present study (N = 115). An N:q ratio of 10 - 20, as 
could be achieved with a sample of 2000 – 4000 for a cross-sectional test of Model 4 (q = 199), 
is recommended to optimize statistical power (Kline, 2011). 
A further sample-related limitation of the study was the inability to purge school-level 
variance from the overall dataset using multilevel analysis using the COMPLEX command in 
Mplus, due to having too few schools. Multilevel modeling in Mplus requires that a minimum 
of twenty clusters be specified (L. K. Muthén personal communication, 15 November 2012), 
whereas the Main Study sample was drawn from only eleven schools. The COMPLEX 
command purges variance due to clustering, as by school, in the computation of standard 
errors and chi-squared statistics for a model (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010). Purging 
school-level variance would have improved the independence of observations, an important 
assumption of structural equation modeling (Kline, 2011).  
The present study was also limited by the collection of data at only two time points 
and exclusively within the context of Science class. While collection from successive grade-
levels allowed a comparison of changes within-groups and between-groups over two years, 
a two-wave design is inherently restricted to modeling only two types of within-groups 
change, namely increase or decrease. A multiwave design involving three or more instances 
of data collection would have enabled growth curve modeling for the various factors under 
investigation. Growth curves modeling accommodates more complex patterns of change over 
time than cross-sectional or two-wave designs (Bollen & Curran, 2006; McArdle & 
Nesselroade, 2003). The focus within Science class contexts was also limiting in that the 
relationships observed between variables in the present study could be different in other class 
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contexts. Cheating has been found to be more common, for instance, in majors such as 
business at the university level (McCabe, 1997), and in ‘hard’ subjects such as Science at the 
secondary school level (Miller et al., 2007; Murdock et al., 2001; Schab, 1991). It is not clear, 
therefore, to what extent this work might generalize to ‘soft’ subjects such as English and 
History. 
Scalar non-invariance was another limitation in the present study. A small but 
significant amount of scalar non-invariance was observed between gender groups at Times 1 
and 2, as well as between the Time 1 and 2 response sets used for the longitudinal model. 
Scalar non-invariance, which involves group differences in the y-intercepts of the regression 
equations of observed variables, did not impede the use of composite variables to represent 
factor variances in multivariate models. It did, however, introduce ambiguity to the 
interpretation of differences observed between groups. Differential item functioning (DIF) 
analysis revealed a dispersion of low-level mean differences by gender in items that may, in 
sum, have conferred different operational definitions to several measures. The male 
conception of good teaching, for instance, might place greater emphasis on the timeliness and 
quality of feedback, whereas females might place greater emphasis on whether a teacher 
seems to care about what students have to say.  
Psychometric dysfunction in several measures may have limited the generalizability 
of results of both the female sample model and co-ed model at Time 2. Congeneric models for 
Performance goal structure (Midgley et al., 2000) and Surface learning strategies (Simon et al., 
2004)demonstrated significant measurement weakness in the female sample at Time 2 that 
seemed to carry across to the Time 2 co-ed analysis. Weakness demonstrated by these 
measures in Time 2 cross-sectional analyses cast doubt on the validity of their effects in the 
co-ed and female sample models. It is worth noting that these two measures did, however, 
perform acceptably well in longitudinal analyses. 
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While pains were taken to eliminate or modify weak measures in a pilot study 
conducted in the early stages of the overall program of this research, two post-hoc 
modifications were made at Time 2 that could not be cross-validated on separate data sets. 
Firstly, the congeneric model for Surface learning strategies was modified by freeing a 
covariance parameter between two of its indicator items in order to address what appeared 
to be a method effect. Secondly, a beta path was freed between Honesty-trustworthiness self-
concept and Teacher quality, in order to address substantial model misfit to the female sample 
at Time 2. These two changes, which resulted in Model 4, cast some degree of doubt on the 
validity of their effects in the model.  
Additionally, three constructs were dropped at Time One of the Main Study due to 
psychometric dysfunction. These included Deep learning strategies (Anderman et al., 1998), 
Experience of classroom rules (Gregory et al., 2010), and Appropriate workload (Wilson et al., 1997). 
The poor performance of these and other factors, noted above, might be related to the very 
high level of social-linguistic diversity in the current sample, and, in the case of Appropriate 
workload, also because it was originally designed for research at the university level.  
The loss of Appropriate workload further limited the representation of moral obligation 
the in the PTLC model to the single measure Justifiability of cheating. The study is therefore 
limited in what it says about moral obligation, broadly, which would also likely encompass 
judgments of whether one should follow other types of rules and social expectations, such as 
working diligently and respecting others. 
Limitations must also be addressed in relation to causal language. Causal language 
was used in discussions of the present research within the context of a body of prior 
experimental research that directly informed the PTLC model. No direct observations of 
causal processes could be made in the present study due to its non-experimental, passive-
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observational design. An individual respondent’s belief while taking the questionnaire that 
cheating was justifiable in Science class, for instance, cannot be inferred, solely on the basis of 
this research, to have caused his or her cheating behavior in that context during the preceding 
year.  
Additionally, not all hypotheses in the PTLC model were directly supported by prior 
experimental evidence. While all hypotheses were predicated upon strong causal theories, no 
experimental support was cited for the hypothesized downstream effects of Subject self-
concept, for instance, nor for any of the hypothesized effects exerted upon Peer norms or Surface 
learning strategies, whereas the hypothesized effects of Justifiability of cheating on Self-reported 
cheating had only indirect experimental support, principally from ultimatum game research 
(e.g. Boles et al., 2000; Gneezy, 2005; Haidt, 2001; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996).  
The correlational, self-report design of the present research additionally limited the 
study in several ways. Firstly, self-report measures do not represent features of objective 
reality, but only features of what respondents perceive and remember at the time of the 
questionnaire. Students in the present study were not, for instance, able to report on what 
their peers actually thought about cheating when they responded to items of the Peer norms 
measure, but only on what they believed their peers thought. Nor would it be warranted to 
judge, solely based on perceived teacher quality data in the present study, whether, or in what 
way, the teachers in question should improve. The self-report design thus confined 
consideration of class context to what students remembered and perceived, as highlighted in 
the discussion of managing perceptions (section 9.5.2).  
Similarly, the use of a self-report measure of cheating behavior introduced an 
unknown amount of variance from intra-psychic factors such as the accuracy of respondents’ 
memories and their willingness to report cheating honestly. Self-reported data is prone to a 
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variety of group- and individual-level response biases, or tendencies to answer questionnaire 
items in certain ways despite what is factually accurate (Austin, Deary, Gibson, et al., 1998). 
A noted type of response bias to which Self-reported cheating may be especially prone is 
‘socially desirable responding’, or the preference for giving answers that are more socially 
acceptable over those that are true (Harding et al., 2007; Miller et al., 2008; Paulhus, 1991; 
Walker, 2010). The potential for intra-psychic variance in the measurement of Self-reported 
cheating limits the interpretability of PTLC model results as it may have both biased how much 
cheating actually reported, and inflated correlations with other intra-psychic variables, such 
as Justifiability of cheating. This limitation is notably important in interpreting the consistently 
high statistical associations between Justifiability of cheating and Self-reported cheating, which 
were used to represent moral judgment and cheating behavior, respectively. While such 
biases have been found in prior studies of academic cheating to be small (Harding et al., 2007; 
Mayhew et al., 2009), a high degree of shared intra-psychic variance would misrepresent the 
relationship between moral judgment and actual behavior, and could be seen to argue for 
modeling the two variables as a single higher-order factor. 
9.8 Future research 
The present work indicates that understanding why secondary school students cheat 
is aided by allowing for the role of non-rational processes in moral judgment. Such processes 
have been observed in numerous experimental studies, of which only a portion is reviewed 
above. Future research on cheating should benefit from continuing to push past the limits of 
rational-cognition, to the fuller range of mechanisms incorporated by a dual-process view of 
moral psychology. Qualitative research that seeks to discover why adolescents cheat would, 
in particular, benefit from designing questioning formats to avoid, inasmuch as possible, the 
potential for moral dumbfounding. 
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Qualitative research would be useful, for instance, on the distinction between cheating 
as a conventional violation vs. cheating as a moral violation. Such research might avoid moral 
dumbfounding by focusing firstly on whether students’ judgments of the seriousness or 
triviality of particular types of cheating (e.g. test cheating vs. plagiarism vs. homework 
copying) fluctuate under various hypothetical conditions. The better we understand what 
conditions shape students’ moral judgments, the better we should be able to craft counter-
narratives and perception management strategies to manage those perceptions. Extending 
such research to exploring why students arrive at those judgments should anticipate 
difficulties associated with the adolescent ability to cognize and articulate such information, 
i.e. moral dumbfounding. 
The social contract perspective on academic cheating featured in this study also needs 
to be tested experimentally. While social contract hypotheses have strong experimental 
support in the field of evolutionary psychology, none of these experiments involved academic 
cheating. Experimental evidence of how breaking social contracts affects academic cheating 
would cross-validate PTLC model results, and might provide valuable insight into, 
conversely,  how social contracts can be managed and preserved.  
The PTLC model entails a four-category framework that can be populated in future 
research with variables not investigated here, such as personality constructs, additional moral 
obligation constructs, other integrity-related behaviors, and other types of learner perception. 
Several recent publications suggest that student perceptions of socio-cultural factors, such as 
the level of national corruption, might impart significant variance to Peer norms and 
Justifiability of cheating (Crittenden et al., 2009a; Magnus et al., 2008; Teixeira et al., 2010). This 
research has not yet been carried out at the secondary level, and could speak to how cheating 
in secondary schools, and efforts to stop it, shape, and are shaped by, broader socio-cultural 
processes. Another category of variable to consider for inclusion in future PTLC models is 
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that of interaction terms, such as between Usefulness of curriculum and Teacher quality 
(Murdock et al., 2004). 
Recent research related to expectancy-value theory (Eccles & Wigfield, 1994) suggests, 
for instance, that task-value may be an important moderator of the effects of students’ self-
perceived ability (measured herein as Subject self-concept) and cheating, as a function of fear-
of-failure (Lee et al., 2014). Including an ‘efficacyXtask-value’ interaction variable as a 
predictor of cheating behavior could augment the PTLC model by explaining variance in 
cheating that is likely to bear minimal relation to moral judgment. It may well be that variables 
related to anxiety and fear-of-failure would substantially increase the amount of variance in 
cheating already explained by the PTLC model. Models developed within the theory of 
planned behavior (TPB) have also explained as much as 71% of the variance in the intention 
to cheat (Mayhew et al., 2009). This compares favorably to the amount of variance explained 
in the justifiability of cheating in the present study (see Table 9.1), but, by focusing on 
intentions, it remains bound by the limits of the rational-cognitive paradigm. An integration 
of these models, in which the justifiability of cheating replaces the intention to cheat, could 
substantially increase variance explained in justifiability of cheating, which this research 
suggests should be a focal point of efforts to improve student ethics.  
A particularly valuable extension of the present work would involve growth-curve 
modeling with a multiwave design (Bollen & Curran, 2006; McArdle & Nesselroade, 2003). 
The tendency for self-reported cheating behavior to increase over the Grade Eight to Grade 
Nine transition, and yet decrease over the Grade Nine to Grade Ten transition, has important 
practical implications for schools in which Grade Eight and Grade Nine are segregated into 
the Middle and High School divisions (see also Anderman & Midgley, 2004). A consistent 
spike in cheating behavior following the Grade Eight to Grade Nine transition would suggest 
that schools’ efforts to improve student integrity should be brought to bear especially at the 
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beginning of Grade Nine. Collecting data in such schools at the end of Grade Eight, and then 
at both the middle and end of Grade Nine, as well as, ideally, one or two points during Grade 
Ten, would help confirm this pattern. 
Future research should also focus on gender differences among secondary school 
students with respect to the structural elements of the PTLC model and, more generally, with 
respect to non-rational processes underlying moral judgment. Invariance testing and gender-
specific model results in the present research suggest that males and females differ in how 
they arrive at judgments of whether to engage in disintegrity. The effect of Teacher quality on 
Justifiability of cheating was, for instance, fully mediated among males by Peer norms, whereas, 
among females, it was direct. The effects of self-concept variables and Performance goal 
structure on downstream constructs also appeared to be more prominent among males. Future 
research that can utilize larger gender-specific samples would be in a position to cross-
validate such differences with higher statistical power.  
Integrating non-contractarian perspectives. The PTLC model could also be integrated into 
broader models that explain more variance in cheating behavior by including variable 
relations that are non-contractarian in nature. An under-investigated source of variance that 
is of potential interest to future research on academic integrity, in general, is socio-historical 
identity. As pointed out in Section 2.2, for instance, cheating behavior in Russia has been 
associated with a wide-spread tendency to ‘hate’ students who inform on others, which 
Magnus et al. (2002) identify as a lingering effect of anti-government sentiment during the 
Soviet era. Additionally, surface approaches to learning have been found to be more likely in 
cultures where education is viewed as a revered form of economic and social mobility (e.g. 
Phan, 2009b). Studies incorporating data from Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (Crittenden et al., 2009a; Magnus et al., 2002) have found significant 
correlations, moreover, between academic cheating and perceived national corruption that 
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may well reflect specific socio-historical factors. Future research in this area might use 
multilevel modeling to analyze data collected from members of multiple well-defined cultural 
groups. Significant findings in this area could help elucidate national- and cultural-level 
differences in the psychology of disintegrity behavior, and may have political implications 
that further elevate the relevance of moral and educational psychology (Anderman, 2011). 
9.9 Chapter summary 
 The results of demographic, measurement, and structural analyses were discussed in 
this chapter in relation to (1) the hypotheses tested in the PTLC model, (2) the literatures and 
sub-disciplines within educational and moral psychology to which this work pertains, and (3) 
implications for educational practice. The evolution of the PTLC model was traced from 
Model 1, which included seventeen first-order factors, to Model 4, which included ten first-
order factors, one second-order factor, and two covariates (gender and grade-level). The two 
outcome variables retained in Model 4, Self-reported cheating and Surface learning strategies, 
were shown, additionally, to be advisedly grouped together as ‘disintegrity’. 
Prominent in all of the models discussed was strong support for the hypothesis that 
the justifiability of cheating mediates the effects of students’ perceptions of context on their 
disintegrity behaviors. This hypothesis was supported, in fact, to the near-complete exclusion 
of all hypothesized direct effects of context on cheating and surface learning strategies. The 
fact that the justifiability of cheating behavior fluctuated inversely with evaluations of class 
quality is consistent with the metaphor of a contract between teachers and learners, by which 
the felt obligations of students may be diminished or annulled to the extent that they believe 
a teacher has failed at his or her obligations.  
It was argued that the correspondence of higher cheating behavior to higher 
justifiability of cheating across all PTLC models indicated that students often did not view 
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cheating as a moral violation, but as a conventional one. Inasmuch as an act of cheating is 
viewed as a conventional violation, it should not conflict with an individual’s abstract moral 
beliefs. Belief-behavior incongruities and neutralization techniques appear, therefore, to 
apply to a narrower scope of cheating behavior than recent literature indicates.  
The large amount of variance explained in self-reported cheating behavior by whether 
cheating was judged to be justifiable suggested, moreover, that the measure Justifiability of 
cheating was capturing variance from both cognitive and non-cognitive processes. This is 
consistent with the dual-process paradigm of moral psychology, wherein non-cognitive 
processes are held to be managed, restrained, and articulated by cognitive ones. By asking for 
students’ fully-formed, or ‘terminal’, judgments of whether cheating was justifiable, without 
asking them to explain why they hold such judgments, or whether they intend to cheat, the 
measure Justifiability of cheating avoided moral dumbfounding, or the difficulty that 
individuals often face in cognizing judgments that are at least partly of non-cognitive origin. 
Implications of the present research were discussed next, highlighting that student-
participants in the present study demonstrated perceptual tendencies, instead of behavioral 
tendencies, related to cheating. Cheating behavior at Time 2 was not rooted in cheating 
behavior at Time 1, but in perceptions and judgments that carried across time. It was argued, 
in view of these findings, that educators should complement honor codes and punitive 
consequences with efforts to manage student perceptions of teacher quality, learning goals, 
and moral self-concept, so as to mitigate the tendencies, observed in the longitudinal model, 
to perceive academic contexts in ways that negatively affect felt moral obligation. Together, 
these recommendations are consistent with what has been referred to as ‘design-it-out’ and 
‘constructive alignment’, which are both design-based methods for structurally eliminating 
opportunities to engage in disintegrity behaviors, and that additionally counterbalance the 
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message, associated with performance goals, that normative performance is more important 
than learning.
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A:  
Composite score loadings, error variances, and normalization 
 
1. Estimate scale reliability using a weighted reliability estimation method such as 
Rho (Raykov, 2009) 
2. The factor loading for the composite score is the square root of the weighted 
reliability estimate. 
3. The error variance for the composite score is one minus the weighted reliability 
estimate (e.g. 1 – Rho). 
4. Under the MODEL command in Mplus fix the factor loading and error variance 
with syntax of the following form: 
Factor BY Compscore@[loading value]; 
Compscore@[error variance]; 
(Holmes-Smith, 2012) 
 
 
 
Normal equivalent deviates (NEDs) may be created, furthermore, for composite variables, 
using the following SPSS syntax: 
RANK VARIABLES=[insert variable name here] (A) 
  /NORMAL 
  /RANK 
  /PRINT=YES 
  /TIES=MEAN 
  /FRACTION=BLOM. 
Appendix B: Time 1 Questionnaire items │432 
 
 
432 
Appendix B: Time 1 Questionnaire items 
 
This survey is anonymous.  Please DO NOT write your name.  Instead, please provide the following 
information as an identification code: 
First 2 letters of 
your  
LAST NAME 
Number of years 
have you gone to 
THIS school 
MONTH 
Of birth (as a 
number) 
Number of OLDER 
brothers and sisters that 
you have  
First 2 letters of the 
STREET YOU LIVE 
ON 
     
 
 
 
1. Your age: _____       2. Your grade-level: ______ 
 
3. Please indicate your gender:      
 
  Male 
 
  Female 
 
4. Which word best describes your English language ability?   
  Fluent/native   High   Intermediate   Low   Beginner 
 
 
5. What language is 
spoken most by YOUR 
FAMILY at home? 
(please give one, only) 
1.  English 5.  Hindi 9.  Japanese 
2.  Spanish 6.  Bengali 10.
 
German 
3.  Arabic 7.  Portuguese 11.
 
Filipino/Tagalog 
4.  Mandarin 8.  Russian 12.
 
French 
13.    Other 
 
If ‘other’, which language? 
 
7. What is your parent’s/guardian’s level of education? Female parent or 
guardian 
Male parent or 
guardian 
Less than high school diploma or certificate 
1.  1.  
High school diploma or certificate 
2.  2.  
Trade or apprenticeship 
3.  3.  
University or college degree 
4.  4.  
Advanced degree (eg. Masters, PhD, medical, business, law, etc.) 
5.  5.  
SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
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SUBJECT SELF-CONCEPT (Marsh et al., 2005) 
1. Science is one of my best subjects. 
2. I am hopeless in Science class. 
3. Work in Science classes is easy for me. 
4. I get good grades/marks in Science. 
5. I learn things quickly in Science classes. 
 
HONESTY-TRUSTWORTHINESS SELF-CONCEPT (Marsh, 1992) 
6. I sometimes take things that belong to other people. 
7. I am honest. 
8. I sometimes tell lies to stay out of trouble. 
9. I always tell the truth. 
10. Cheating on a test is OK if I do not get caught. 
11. Honesty is very important to me. 
12. I sometimes cheat. 
13. When I make a promise I keep it. 
14. I often tell lies. 
15. People can really count on me to do the right thing. 
 
 
MASTERY GOAL STRUCTURE (Anderman & Midgley, 2004) 
16. My Science teacher thinks mistakes are okay as long as we are learning. 
17. My Science teacher wants us to understand our work, not just memorize it. 
18. My Science teacher really wants us to enjoy learning new things. 
19. My Science teacher recognizes us for trying hard. 
20. My Science teacher gives us time to really explore and understand new ideas. 
PERFORMANCE GOAL STRUCTURE (Anderman & Midgley, 2004) 
21. My Science teacher points out those students who get good grades as an example to all of 
us.  
22. My Science teacher lets us know which students get the highest scores on a test.  
SECTION C: MOTIVATIONAL CONTEXT 
SECTION B: PERSON 
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23. My Science teacher makes it obvious when certain students are not doing well on their 
math work.  
24. My Science teacher tells us how we compare to other students.  
25. My Science teacher calls on smart students more than on other students.  
 
 
 
GOOD TEACHING (Wilson et al., 1997) 
26. My Science teacher motivates students to do their best work. 
27. *My Science teacher gives a lot of time to commenting on students’ work. 
28. *My Science teacher makes a good effort to understand problems students may be having 
with their work. 
29. My Science teacher normally gives helpful feedback about how you are doing. 
30. My Science teacher is very good at explaining things to us. 
31. *My Science teacher works hard to make science interesting. 
32. *My Science teacher doesn’t really care about what students have to say. 
33. My Science class really tries to get the best out of all students. 
 
APPROPRIATE ASSESSMENT (Wilson et al., 1997) 
34. To do well in my Science class, all you really need is a good memory.  
35. *My Science teacher seems to care more about what you’ve memorized than what you’ve 
understood.  
36. My Science teacher asks us too many questions just about facts.  
37. *It would be possible to succeed in my Science class just by studying for tests and quizzes 
the night before. 
 
CLEAR GOALS AND STANDARDS (Wilson et al., 1997) 
38. *It’s always easy in my Science class to know what I need to do to get a good grade.  
39. *In my Science class, you usually have a clear idea of what you’re supposed to do. 
40. *It’s often hard to figure out what the teacher expects of you in my Science class. 
41. *The goals and purposes of my Science class are NOT made very clear. 
42. My Science teacher makes it clear right from the start what she/he expects from students. 
 
 
SECTION D: ACADEMIC CONTEXT (MEASURES OF PERCEIVED QUALTIY) 
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APPROPRIATE WORKLOAD (Wilson et al., 1997) 
43. *The amount of work in my Science class is too large.  
44. *It seems to me that my Science teacher tries to cover too much material.  
45. *In my Science class, we are usually given enough time to understand the things we have 
to learn.  
46. There’s a lot of pressure on you as a student in my Science class.  
47. *The large amount of work you have to do in my Science class means you can’t understand 
it all completely.  
 
USEFULNESS OF CURRICULUM (Rowe & Hill, 1998) 
48. In my Science class I learn things that will be useful to me when I leave school. 
49. *What I learn in my Science class will be useful to me later on as a student. 
50. What I learn in my Science class is useful to me. 
51. What I learn in my Science class will be useful to me in the future. 
 
TRANSPARENCY OF ASSESSMENT (Dorman & Knightley, 2006)  
52. *I understand what is needed in all graded assignments in my Science class. 
53. *I know what is needed to successfully accomplish graded assignments in my Science 
class. 
54. *I know in advance HOW I will be graded in my Science class.  
55. *I am told in advance WHY I am being ask to do graded assignments in my Science class.  
56. *I am told in advance WHEN I will be graded in my Science class.  
57. *I am told in advance WHAT science topics and information I will be graded on in my 
Science class.  
58. *I understand the purpose of graded assignments in my Science class.  
 
AUTHENTICITY OF ASSESSMENT (Dorman & Knightley, 2006) 
59. I am asked to apply my learning to real-life situations in my Science class. 
60. *In my Science class, graded assignments are meaningful. 
61. *In my Science class, graded assignments are useful. 
62. *I find that in my Science class, graded assignments relate to the real world. 
63. *In my Science class, graded assignments check my understanding of topics. 
64. *In my Science class, graded assignments test my ability to use what I’ve learned. 
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65. *In my Science class, graded assignments examine my ability to answer important 
questions. 
EXPERIENCE OF SCHOOL RULES (Gregory, 2010) 
66. *Everyone knows the rules for how students should behave in my Science class. 
67. *The rules in my Science class are fair.  
68. *The punishment for breaking rules in my Science class is the same no matter who you are.  
69. *My Science teacher makes sure that everyone follows the rules in class. 
70. *If a rule is broken in my Science class, students know what the teacher will do about it.  
71. *If a student breaks the rules in my Science class, the teacher will do something about it.  
 
PEER NORMS (Mayhew et al., 2009) 
72. *If I cheated on a test in Science class this year, most of my classmates would think that’s 
okay.  
73. *Most of my classmates in Science class this year would be willing to cheat on a Science 
test to avoid failing.  
74. *Most of my classmates would NOT think it’s okay if I cheated in Science class this year.  
75. *Most of my classmates think that I should NOT cheat in Science class.  
76. *My classmates will look down on me if I cheat in Science class this year.  
77. *Most of my classmates expect me to cheat in my Science class this year. 
78. *None of my classmates think it is okay to cheat in my Science class this year 
 
 
 
DEEP LEARNING STRATEGIES (Anderman et al., 1998) 
79. When working on a Science problem, I try to see how it connects with something in 
everyday life.  
80. When I make mistakes in Science, I try to figure out why.  
81. I try to connect new work in Science to what I’ve learned before.  
82. I take my time to figure out my work in Science.  
83. If I can’t solve a Science problem one way, I try to use a different way.  
84. I spend some time thinking about how to do my Science work before I start it.  
85. I ask myself questions when I work on Science to make sure I understand.  
SURFACE LEARNING STRATEIGES (Simon et al., 2004) 
SECTION E: LEARNING STRATEGIES 
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86. *I study for Science class by rehearsing (repeating over and over) important information.  
87. *I study for Science class by memorizing things I do not understand.  
88. *I study for Science class by rehearsing and repeating the material over and over until I can 
write it exactly, word-for-word. 
89. I study for Science class by skipping over parts I think the teacher will not ask questions 
about.  
90. I study for Science class by skipping parts I do not understand.  
91. I study for Science class by skipping parts I do not find important.  
 
 
 
JUSTIFIABILITY OF CHEATING IN SCIENCE CLASS (Murdock et al., 2004) 
92. Students would have a good reason to cheat on a test in my Science class. 
93. Students would be justified to cheat on an exam in my Science class. 
94. **It’s reasonable to cheat in my Science class. 
95. **I can understand why students would cheat in my Science class. 
 
ACTUAL CHEATING IN SCIENCE CLASS (Midgley et al., 2000) 
96. *I sometimes cheat on Science tests, this year.  
97. **I sometimes cheat on my Science class work, this year.  (Anderman et al., 1998) 
98. * I have cheated on Science class work by copying answers from other students this year.   
99. * I have cheated in Science class this year. 
  
SECTION F:  ACADEMIC INTEGRITY 
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Appendix C: Original and modified item wording 
Adjusted Original 
Self-concept 
SUBJECT SELF-CONCEPT (Marsh et al., 2005) 
1. Science is one of my best subjects. 
2. I am hopeless in Science class. 
3. I often need help in Science. 
4. I look forward to Science classes. 
5. I have trouble understanding anything 
that involves Science. 
6. Work in Science classes is easy for me. 
7. I do badly at tests of Science. 
8. I enjoy studying for Science. 
9. I get good grades/marks in Science. 
10. I never want to take another Science 
course. 
11. I have always done well in Science. 
12. I hate Science. 
13. I learn things quickly in Science classes. 
 
HONESTY-TRUST. SELF-CONCEPT (Marsh, 
1992) 
14. I sometimes take things that belong to 
other people. 
15. I am honest. 
16. I sometimes tell lies to stay out of trouble. 
17. I always tell the truth. 
18. Cheating on a test is OK if I do not get 
caught. 
19. Honesty is very important to me. 
20. I sometimes cheat. 
21. When I make a promise I keep it. 
22. I often tell lies. 
23. People can really count on me to do the 
right thing. 
 
 
 
 
Self-concept 
SUBJECT SELF-CONCEPT (Marsh et al., 2005) 
1. Science is one of my best subjects. 
2. I am hopeless in Science class. 
3. I often need help in Science. 
4. I look forward to Science classes. 
5. I have trouble understanding anything 
that involves Science. 
6. Work in Science classes is easy for me. 
7. I do badly at tests of Science. 
8. I enjoy studying for Science. 
9. I get good grades/marks in Science. 
10. I never want to take another Science 
course. 
11. I have always done well in Science. 
12. I hate Science. 
13. I learn things quickly in Science classes. 
 
HONESTY-TRUST. SELF-CONCEPT (Marsh, 
1992) 
14. I sometimes take things that belong to 
other people. 
15. I am honest. 
16. I sometimes tell lies to stay out of trouble. 
17. I always tell the truth. 
18. Cheating on a test is OK if I do not get 
caught. 
19. Honesty is very important to me. 
20. I sometimes cheat. 
21. When I make a promise I keep it. 
22. I often tell lies. 
23. People can really count on me to do the 
right thing. 
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Motivational Context Scales 
MASTERY GOAL STRUCTURE (Midgley et al., 
2000)  
24. My Science teacher thinks mistakes are 
okay as long as we are learning. 
25. My Science teacher wants us to 
understand our work, not just memorize 
it. 
26. My Science teacher really wants us to 
enjoy learning new things. 
27. My Science teacher recognizes us for 
trying hard. 
28. My Science teacher gives us time to really 
explore and understand new ideas. 
 
PERFORMANCE GOAL STRUCTURE (Anderman 
& Midgley, 2004) 
29. My Science teacher points out those 
students who get good grades as an 
example to all of us.  
30. My Science teacher lets us know which 
students get the highest scores on a test.  
31. My Science teacher makes it obvious 
when certain students are not doing well 
on their math work.  
32. My Science teacher tells us how we 
compare to other students.  
33. My Science teacher calls on smart 
students more than on other students.  
 
Academic Context Scales 
GOOD TEACHING (Wilson et al., 1997) 
34. [My Science teacher] motivates students 
to do their best work. 
35. *[My Science teacher] [gives a lot of time 
to] commenting on students’ work. 
36. *[My Science teacher] makes a [good] 
effort to understand [problems] students 
may be having with their work. 
Motivational Context Scales 
MASTERY GOAL STRUCTURE (Midgley et al., 
2000) 
24. My Science teacher thinks mistakes are 
okay as long as we are learning. 
25. My Science teacher wants us to 
understand our work, not just memorize 
it. 
26. My Science teacher really wants us to 
enjoy learning new things. 
27. My Science teacher recognizes us for 
trying hard. 
28. My Science teacher gives us time to really 
explore and understand new ideas.  
 
PERFORMANCE GOAL STRUCTURE (Anderman 
& Midgley, 2004) 
29. My Science teacher points out those 
students who get good grades as an 
example to all of us.  
30. My Science teacher lets us know which 
students get the highest scores on a test.  
31. My Science teacher makes it obvious 
when certain students are not doing well 
on their math work.  
32. My Science teacher tells us how we 
compare to other students.  
33. My Science teacher calls on smart 
students more than on other students.  
 
Academic Context Scales 
GOOD TEACHING (Wilson et al., 1997) 
34. The teaching staff of this course motivate 
students to do their best work. 
35. Staff here put a lot of time into 
commenting on students’ work. 
36. The staff here make a real effort to 
understand difficulties students may be 
having with their work. 
Appendix C: Original and modified item wording │440 
 
 
440 
37. [My Science teacher] normally gives 
helpful feedback [about] how you are 
doing. 
38. [My Science teacher] is [very] good at 
explaining things to us. 
39. *[My Science teacher] works hard to make 
[science] interesting. 
40. *[My Science teacher] [doesn’t really care 
about] what students have to say. 
41. [My Science class] really tries to get the 
best out of all students.   
 
APPROPRIATE ASSESSMENT (Wilson et al., 
1997) 
42. To do well in [my Science class], all you 
really need is a good memory.  
43. *[My Science teacher] [seems to care more 
about] what you’ve memorized than what 
you’ve understood.  
44. My Science teacher asks us too many 
questions just about facts.  
45. It would be possible to [succeed in] [my 
Science class] just by [studying for tests 
and quizzes the night before]. 
 
CLEAR GOALS AND STANDARDS (Wilson et al., 
1997) 
46. *It’s always easy [in my Science class] to 
know [what I need to do to get a good 
grade]. 
47. *[In my Science class], you usually have a 
clear idea of [what you’re supposed to 
do]. 
48. *It’s often hard to [figure out] what [the 
teacher expects] of you in [my Science] 
class. 
49. *The [goals and purposes] of [my Science 
class] are NOT made very clear. 
37. Teaching staff here normally gives helpful 
feedback on how you are doing. 
 
38. Our lecturers are extremely good at 
explaining things to us. 
39. Teaching staff here work hard to make 
subjects interesting. 
40. Staff here show no real interest in what 
students have to say. 
41. This course really tries to get the best out 
of all its students.  
 
APPROPRIATE ASSESSMENT (Wilson et al., 
1997) 
42. To do well in this course, all you really 
need is a good memory. 
43. Staff seem more interested in testing what 
you’ve memorized than what you’ve 
understood.  
44. Too many staff ask us just about facts.  
 
45. It would be possible to get through this 
course just by working hard around exam 
times. 
 
CLEAR GOALS AND STANDARDS (Wilson et al., 
1997) 
46. It’s always easy here to know the 
standard of work expected. 
 
47. You usually have a clear idea of where 
you’re going and what’s expected of you.  
 
48. It’s often hard to discover what’s expected 
of you in this course.  
 
49. The aims and objectives of this course are 
NOT made very clear. 
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50. [My Science teacher] makes it clear right 
from the start what [she/he] expects from 
students. 
 
APPROPRIATE WORKLOAD (Wilson et al., 1997) 
51. *The [amount of work] in my Science class 
is too [large].  
52. *It seems to me that [my Science teacher] 
tries to cover too [much material]. 
53. *In [my Science class], we are [usually] 
given enough time to understand the 
things we have to learn.  
54. There’s a lot of pressure on you as a 
student [in my Science class].  
55. *The [large amount] of work [you have to 
do] in [my Science class] means you can’t 
understand it all completely.  
 
USEFULNESS OF CURRICULUM (Rowe & Hill, 
1998) 
56. In my [Science] class I learn things that 
will be useful to me when I leave school. 
57. *What I learn in [my Science] class will be 
useful to me [later on as a student]. 
58. What I learn in [my Science] class is useful 
to me. 
59. What I learn in [my Science] class will be 
useful to me in the future. 
 
TRANSPARENCY OF ASSESS. (Dorman & 
Knightley, 2006) 
60. *I understand what is needed in all 
[graded assignments in my Science class]. 
61. *I know what is needed to successfully 
accomplish [graded assignments in my 
Science class]. 
62. *I know in advance HOW I will be 
[graded in my Science class]. 
50. The staff here make it clear right from the 
start what they expect from students. 
 
 
APPROPRIATE WORKLOAD (Wilson et al., 1997) 
51. The workload is too heavy.  
 
52. It seems to me that the syllabus tries to 
cover too many subjects.  
53. We are generally given enough time to 
understand the things we have to learn.   
 
54. There’s a lot of pressure on you as a 
student here.  
55. The sheer volume of work to be got 
through in this course means you can’t 
comprehend it all thoroughly. 
 
USEFULNESS OF CURRICULUM (Rowe & Hill, 
1998) 
56. In my class I learn things that will be 
useful to me when I leave school. 
57. What I learn in class will be useful to me 
when I go to secondary school. 
58. What I learn in class is useful to me. 
 
59. What I learn in class will be useful to me 
in the future. 
 
TRANSPARENCY OF ASSESS. (Dorman & 
Knightley, 2006) 
60. I understand what is needed in all Science 
assessment tasks. 
61. I know what is needed to successfully 
accomplish Science assessment tasks. 
 
62. I know in advance HOW I will be 
assessed.  
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63. *I am told in advance WHY I am being 
[ask to do graded assignments in my 
Science class].  
64. *I am told in advance WHEN I [will be 
graded in my Science class]. 
65. *I am told in advance WHAT science 
topics and information I [will be graded] 
on [in my Science class]. 
66. *I understand the purpose of [graded 
assignments in my Science class]. 
 
AUTHENTICITY OF ASSESS. (Dorman & 
Knightley, 2006) 
67. I am asked to apply my learning to real-
life situations in my Science class. 
68. *[In my Science class], [graded 
assignments] are meaningful. 
69. *[In my Science class], [graded 
assignments] are useful. 
70. *I find [that in my Science class] [graded 
assignments] [relate] to the real world [in 
important ways]. 
71. *[In my Science class], [graded 
assignments] check my understanding of 
topics. 
72. * In my Science class, [graded 
assignments] test my ability to [use what 
I’ve learned]. 
73. In my Science class, [Graded assignments] 
examine my ability to answer important 
questions. 
 
EXPERIENCE OF SCHOOL RULES (Gregory et 
al., 1989) 
74. *Everyone knows the rules for [how 
students should behave in my Science 
class]. 
75. *[The rules in my Science class] are fair.  
 
63. I am told in advance WHY I am being 
assessed.  
 
64. I am told in advance WHEN I am being 
assessed.  
65. I am told in advance WHAT science 
topics and information I am being 
assessed on. 
66. I understand the purpose of Science 
assessment. 
 
AUTHENTICITY OF ASSESS. (Dorman & 
Knightley, 2006) 
67. I am asked to apply my learning to real-
life situations in Science class. 
68. My Science assessment tasks are 
meaningful. 
69. My Science assessment tasks are useful. 
 
70. I find science assessment tasks relevant to 
the real world. 
 
 
71. Science assessment tasks check my 
understanding of topics. 
 
72. Assessment in Science class tests my 
ability to apply learning. 
 
73. Assessment in Science class examines my 
ability to answer important questions. 
 
 
EXPERIENCE OF SCHOOL RULES (Gregory et 
al., 1989) 
74. Everyone knows the school rules for 
student conduct.  
 
75. The school rules are fair.  
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76. *The punishment for breaking [rules in 
my Science class] is the same no matter 
who you are. 
77. *[My Science teacher makes sure that 
everyone follows the rules in class.] 
78. *If a [rule is broken in my Science class], 
students know [what the teacher will do 
about it]. 
79. *If a student breaks the rules [in my 
Science class, the teacher will do 
something about it]. 
 
PEER NORMS (Mayhew et al., 2009) 
80. *If I cheated on a test [in Science class this 
year, most of my classmates] would [think 
that’s okay].  
 
81. *[Most of my classmates in Science class 
this year] would be willing to cheat on [a 
Science test to avoid failing]. 
 
82. *[Most of my classmates] would NOT 
[think it’s okay] if I cheated [in Science 
class this year].  
 
83. *Most [of my classmates] think that I 
should NOT cheat [in Science class this 
year]. 
 
84. *[My classmates] will look down on me if 
I cheat [in Science class this year].  
 
 
85. *[Most of my classmates] expect me to 
cheat [in Science class this year.]  
 
86. *[None of my classmates think it is okay 
to cheat in Science class this year.] 
 
76. The punishment for breaking school rules 
is the same no matter who you are.  
 
77. School rules are strictly enforced. 
 
78. If a school rule is broken, students know 
what kind of punishment will follow.  
 
79. If a student breaks the rules in this school, 
he or she will be punished. 
 
 
PEER NORMS (Mayhew et al., 2009) 
80. If I cheated on an in-class test, most 
people who are important to me (e.g., my 
family, friends, etc.) would approve of my 
behavior.  
81. The people in my life whose opinions I 
value (e.g., my family, friends, etc.) would 
be willing to cheat on an in- class test or 
exam if they were in my situation.  
82. The people in my life whose opinions I 
value (e.g., my family, friends, etc.) would 
NOT approve if I cheated on an in-class 
test.  
83. Most people who are important to me 
(e.g., my family, friends, colleagues, 
teachers, etc.) think I should NOT cheat 
on an in-class test or exam. 
84. Most people who are important to me 
(e.g., my family, friends, colleagues, 
teachers, etc.) will look down on me if I 
cheat on an in-class test or exam. 
85. People whose opinions I value (e.g., my 
family, friends, etc.) expect me to cheat on 
an in-class test or exam.  
86. NO ONE who is important to me (e.g., my 
family, friends, etc.) thinks it is OK to 
cheat on an in-class test or exam. 
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Learning strategies 
DEEP LEARNING STRATEGIES (Anderman et al., 
1998) 
87. When working on a Science problem, I try 
to see how it connects with something in 
everyday life.   
88. When I make mistakes in Science, I try to 
figure out why.  
89. I try to connect new work in Science to 
what I’ve learned before.  
90. I take my time to figure out my work in 
Science.  
91. If I can’t solve a Science problem one way, 
I try to use a different way.  
92. *I spend some time thinking about how to 
do my Science [work] before I start it.  
93. I ask myself questions when I work on 
Science to make sure I understand.  
 
SURFACE LEARNING STRATEGIES (Simon et 
al., 2004) 
94. *I study [for Science class] by rehearsing 
(repeating over and over) [important 
information].  
95. *I study [for Science class] by memorizing 
[things] I do not understand.  
96. *I study [for Science class] by rehearsing 
[and repeating] the material over and over 
until I can [write it exactly, word-for-
word]. 
97. I study [for Science class] by skipping 
over parts I think the teacher will not ask 
questions about. 
98. I study [for Science class] by skipping 
parts I do not understand.  
99. I study [for Science class] by skipping 
parts I do not find important.  
 
 
Learning strategies 
DEEP LEARNING STRATEGIES (Anderman et al., 
1998) 
87. When working on a Science problem, I try 
to see how it connects with something in 
everyday life.  
88. When I make mistakes in Science, I try to 
figure out why. 
89. I try to connect new work in Science to 
what I’ve learned before.  
90. I take my time to figure out my work in 
Science.  
91. If I can’t solve a Science problem one way, 
I try to use a different way.  
92. I spend some time thinking about how to 
do my Science before I start it.  
93. I ask myself questions when I work on 
Science to make sure I understand. 
  
SURFACE LEARNING STRATEGIES (Simon et 
al., 2004) 
94. I study, or will study, by rehearsing 
(repeating over and over) the material 
different times.  
95. I study, or will study, by memorizing 
something I do not understand.  
96. I study, or will study, by rehearsing 
material until I can reproduce it literally.  
 
 
97. I study, or will study, course material by 
skipping over parts I think the teacher 
will not ask questions about.  
98. I study, or sill study, by skipping parts I 
do not understand.  
99. I study, or will study, by skipping parts I 
do not find important.  
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Academic integrity 
JUSTIFIABILITY OF CHEATING (Murdock et al., 
2004) 
100. Students would have a good reason to 
cheat on a test in [my Science class].   
101. Students would be justified to cheat on an 
exam in [my Science class]. 
 
102. *[It’s reasonable] to cheat in [my] Science 
class. 
103. *[I can understand why students would 
cheat in my Science class.] 
 
ACTUAL CHEATING (Midgley et al., 2000) 
104. *I sometimes [cheat on Science] tests, [this 
year]. 
105. I sometimes cheat on my [Science] class 
work, [this year].   
106.  * I have cheated on Science class work by 
copying answers from other students [this 
year].   
107.  *I have cheated in Science class this year. 
Academic integrity 
JUSTIFIABILITY OF CHEATING (Various) 
100. Students would have a good reason to 
cheat on a test in Ms. Jones’s class.  
(Murdock et al., 2004) 
101. Students would be justified to cheat on an 
exam in Dr. James’ class.  (Murdock et al., 
2004) 
102. Is it okay to cheat in Science class?  
(Anderman et al., 1998) 
103.  (Developed based on Murdock et al., 
2004; Murdock et al., 2007)  
 
ACTUAL CHEATING (Midgley et al., 2000) 
104. I sometimes copy answers from other 
students during tests.  
105. I sometimes cheat on my class work.   
 
106. I sometimes copy answers from other 
students when I do my class work.  
  
107. I cheat on my Science work (Anderman et 
al., 1998) 
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Appendix D: Time 2 questionnaire 
UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY 
Faculty of Education and Social Work, NSW 2006 
Dr. Paul Ginns, Senior Lecturer (Rm 914, Bld A35) 
Ph/Fax: +61 (02) 9351-2611/5027 Email: paul.ginns@sydney.edu.au 
 
STUDENT QUESTIONNAIRE: ACADEMIC INTEGRITY IN CONTEXT 
Dear Student, 
This questionnaire looks at how students’ experiences in Science class affect their study strategies, 
attitudes towards academic cheating, and actual academic cheating in Science class. Science is the 
class chosen for research in all schools that participate in this study. We are very interested in your 
experiences, and what they say about how school experiences, in general, may be improved. Your 
answers will be combined with the answers from many other students to get an overall picture of how 
study strategies and academic integrity are affected by class experiences.   
Your answers are confidential. Please do not write your name anywhere on the questionnaire form. 
Your individual answers will never be reported to your parents, your school, or anyone else.  Since 
the questionnaire is anonymous, however, it cannot be withdrawn after you hand it in (because we 
will no longer know who filled it out). All questionnaires will be stored in a secure location at the 
University of Sydney in Australia. Only aggregated (group) scores from the overall study will be 
submitted for publication; a PhD thesis will also be produced. In this way, your individual answers 
will be hidden (as an anonymous part of a large group). 
This questionnaire should take about 30 minutes to complete.  It should be given only to students who 
participated in this project, last year. If you have any questions after reading this information, please 
contact Bradford Barnhardt at the University of Sydney on +61 2 9351 6260 or 
bbar6232@uni.sydney.edu.  
Thank you very much for your time, 
Dr. Paul Ginns (Chief Investigator, University of Sydney) 
Bradford Barnhardt (PhD Student, University of Sydney) 
 
INSTEAD OF WRITING YOUR NAME, please create an 
IDENTIFICATION CODE, below 
Your answers on this questionnaire are confidential. Your individual answers will not be reported to 
your parents, your school or anyone else, ever. 
IDENTIFICATION CODE 
LAST 2 letters 
of your 
FAMILY NAME 
LAST two letters 
of your 
FIRST NAME 
MONTH of birth 
 
(as a number) 
LAST 2 numbers of your MOBILE 
PHONE (If you do not have your 
own mobile phone, put 00) 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
1. Your age: 
 
__________ 
 
2. Your grade level: 
 
__________ 
 
SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
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3. Please indicate your gender: 
 
  Male 
 
  Female 
 
4. How do you rate your English skills?   
 Very good  Good  Average  Poor  Very poor 
 
 
5. What language is 
spoken most by YOUR 
FAMILY at home? 
(please choose one, 
only) 
1.  English 5.  Hindi 9.  Japanese 
2.  Spanish 6.  Bengali 10.
 
German 
3.  Arabic 7.  Portuguese 11.
 
Filipino/Tagalog 
4.  Mandarin 8.  Russian 12.
 
French 
13.   Other 
 
If ‘Other’, which language? 
    
6. What is your parent’s/guardian’s level of education? Female parent or 
guardian 
Male parent or 
guardian 
Less than high school diploma or certificate 
1.  1.  
High school diploma or certificate 
2.  2.  
Trade or apprenticeship 
3.  3.  
University or college degree 
4.  4.  
Advanced degree (eg. Masters, PhD, medical, business, law, etc.) 
5.  5.  
 
 
SECTION B: ABOUT ME 
 
HOW DO YOU SEE YOURSELF? 
In this section, we ask how you see yourself in terms of Science and Honesty – not just this year, but 
overall. Remember, your answers are anonymous and confidential.  Thank you! 
For each of the items below, please mark a number to indicate your level of agreement. 
1—agree strongly 
2—agree 
3—neutral 
4—disagree 
5—disagree strongly 
               Agree                                Disagree 
            Strongly       Strongly 
1 People can really count on me to do the right thing.  
1        2        3        4        5 
2 I learn things quickly in Science class.  
1        2        3        4        5 
3 I get good grades in Science.  
1        2        3        4        5 
4 Science is one of my best subjects.  
1        2        3        4        5 
5 I always tell the truth.  
1        2        3        4        5 
6 When I make a promise I keep it.  
1        2        3        4        5 
* Items that were added to the questionnaire at Time 2 
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            Agree                    Disagree 
          Strongly                   Strongly 
7 I am honest. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
8 Honesty is very important to me. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
9 I often tell lies. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
10 Work in Science class is easy for me. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
11 I am hopeless in Science class. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
 
 
SECTION C: ABOUT MY SCIENCE CLASS 
 
HOW ABOUT YOUR SCIENCE CLASS, THIS YEAR?? 
The last section asked how you see yourself as a Science student, overall.  In this section, we ask about 
your experience in Science class, THIS YEAR.  What’s good and bad about it?? 
We chose Science class as the context for our questions in this section because we had to focus on just 
one subject.  All students who do this survey are asked the same questions. 
Will this make your teacher look good or bad?  No.  The answers you and your classmates give in this 
section will never be reported to your school or to your science teacher.  So the way you answer cannot 
make your science teacher look good or bad. 
Please just let us know what is true.  Thank you! 
For each of the items below, please mark a number to indicate your level of agreement. 
1—agree strongly 
2—agree 
3—neutral 
4—disagree 
5—disagree strongly 
            Agree                                Disagree 
          Strongly                   Strongly 
*12 Science class this year makes me feel capable. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*13 Science class this year makes me feel that I belong and my 
classmates care about me. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
14 My Science teacher gives a lot of time to commenting on students’ 
work. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
15 What I learn in my Science class is useful to me. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
16 The rules in my Science class are fair. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
* Items that were added to the questionnaire at Time 2 
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                     Agree       Disagree 
                     Strongly                   Strongly 
17 There’s a lot of pressure on you as a student in my Science class.  
1        2        3        4        5 
*18 Science class this year makes me feel like a good student. 1        2        3        4        5 
19 My Science teacher makes sure that everyone follows the rules in 
class. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
20 Most of my classmates think that I should NOT cheat in Science 
class. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*21 The work assigned for Science class this year takes too much time.  
1        2        3        4        5 
22 If a student breaks the rules in my Science class, the teacher will do 
something about it. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
23 I understand the purpose of graded assignments in my Science 
class. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
24 The large amount of work you have to do in my Science class 
means you can’t understand it all completely. 
  
1        2        3        4        5 
25 My classmates will look down on me if I cheat in Science class this 
year. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
26 I understand what is needed in all graded assignments in my 
Science class. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
27 My Science teacher is very good at explaining things to us.  
1        2        3        4        5 
*28 Science class this year makes me feel free.  
1        2        3        4        5 
29 In my Science class, we are usually given enough time to 
understand the things we have to learn. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*30 Science class this year makes me feel involved with close friends.  
1        2        3        4        5 
*31 Science class this year makes me feel pressured.  
1        2        3        4        5 
*32 The amount of work assigned for Science class this year is not 
reasonable. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
33 My Science teacher normally gives helpful feedback about how you 
are doing. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
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34 None of my classmates think it is okay to cheat in my Science class 
this year. 
 
 1        2        3        4        5 
35 If a rule is broken in my Science class, students know what the 
teacher will do about it. 
 
 1        2        3        4        5 
36 In my Science class, graded assignments check my understanding 
of topics. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*37 Science class this year makes me feel competent. 1        2        3        4        5 
* Items that were added to the questionnaire at Time 2 
 
                   Agree       Disagree 
                   Strongly       Strongly 
*38 Science class this year makes me feel that I’m doing what I want 
to be doing. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*39 Science class this year makes me feel like I am able to do well at 
Science. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*40 The workload in Science class this year requires too much effort. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
41 My Science teacher makes a good effort to understand problems 
students may be having with their work. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
42 The amount of work in my Science class is too large. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
43 In my Science class I learn things that will be useful to me when I 
leave school. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
44 Everyone knows the rules for how students should behave in my 
Science class. 
  
1        2        3        4        5 
*45 Science class this year makes me feel emotionally close to my 
classmates. 
  
1        2        3        4        5 
46 What I learn in my Science class will be useful to me later on as a 
student. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*47 Science class this year makes me feel that my Science skills are 
improving. 
 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
48 If I cheated on a test in Science class this year, most of my 
classmates would think that’s okay.  
 
1        2        3        4        5 
49 The punishment for breaking rules in my Science class is the same 
no matter who you are. 
  
1        2        3        4        5 
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50 In my Science class, graded assignments are useful. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
51 My Science teacher tells us how we compare to other students. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
52 My Science teacher motivates students to do their best work. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*53 Science class this year makes me feel free to decide for myself 
what to do. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
54 What I learn in my Science class will be useful to me in the future. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
55 Most of my classmates would NOT think it’s okay if I cheated in 
Science class this year. 
  
1        2        3        4        5 
56 I know in advance HOW I will be graded in my Science class. 1        2        3        4        5 
57 My Science teacher works hard to make science interesting. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
58 My Science teacher doesn’t really care about what students have 
to say. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
* Items that were added to the questionnaire at Time 2 
 
                   Agre           Disagree 
                   Strongly       Strongly 
59 My Science teacher points out those students who get good grades 
as an example to all of us. 
1        2        3        4       5 
*60 Science class this year makes me feel free to work in my own 
way. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
61 In my Science class, graded assignments test my ability to use 
what I’ve learned. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*62 Science class this year makes me feel like I’m good at Science. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
63 My Science teacher makes it obvious when certain students are 
not doing well on their Science work. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
64 My Science teacher lets us know which students get the highest 
scores on a test. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
65 My Science class really tries to get the best out of all students. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
66 In my Science class, graded assignments examine my ability to 
answer important questions. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
* Items that were added to the questionnaire at Time 2 
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SECTION D: HOW I LEARN AND ACHIEVE IN SCIENCE CLASS 
 
This last short section lets us know how you learn and achieve grades in Science class, THIS YEAR. 
Your answers will help us understand how your experiences relate to your behavior in Science class. 
We hope this information will help us understand how to improve student experiences, overall. 
Remember, your answers are anonymous and confidential.  Thank you! 
For each of the items below, please mark a number to indicate your level of agreement. 
1—agree strongly 
2—agree 
3—neutral 
4—disagree 
5—disagree strongly 
                     Agree      Disagree 
                   Strongly       Strongly 
67 It’s reasonable to cheat in my Science class. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*68 I try to do the smallest amount of work possible for Science class. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
69 I ask myself questions when I work on Science to make sure I 
understand. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*70 Cheating on Science work this year would make-up for some 
things that were wrong with the class. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
71 I try to connect new work in Science to what I’ve learned before. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
72 I sometimes cheat on Science tests, this year. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
73 When working on a Science problem, I try to see how it connects 
with something in everyday life. 
  
1        2        3        4        5 
74 Students would have a good reason to cheat on a test in my 
Science class. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
75 I study for Science class by skipping parts I do not understand. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
76 I study for Science class by memorizing things I do not 
understand. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
77 I have cheated in Science class this year. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*78 I try to complete Science assignments with the smallest effort 
possible. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
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79 I study for Science class by skipping over parts I think the teacher 
will not ask questions about. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
* Items that were added to the questionnaire at Time 2 
 
 
                   Agree       Disagree 
                   Strongly       Strongly 
80 I sometimes cheat on my Science class work, this year. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
81 I take my time to figure out my work in Science. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*82 Cheating on a Science exam this year would balance-out some 
things that were unfair about the class this year. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
83 When I make mistakes in Science, I try to figure out why. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
84 I have cheated on Science class work by copying answers from 
other students this year. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
85 If I can’t solve a Science problem one way, I try to use a different 
way. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*86 I try to finish work for Science class as quickly as possible, even if 
it means I don’t learn very much. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
87 I study for Science class by skipping parts I do not find important. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
*88 Cheating on Science assignments this year is fair. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
89 Students would be justified to cheat on an exam in my Science 
class. 
 
1        2        3        4        5 
 
* Items that were added to the questionnaire at Time 2 
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Construct acronyms, definitions, and valences 
  
 
Variable 
 
Acronym 
 
Definition and (valence) 
Person (Perceptions of self) 
Subject self-concept ‘SUB’ A student’s assessment of his/her own strength/ability 
in a given subject area.  
(LOWER score = more positive self-concept) 
Honesty-trustworthiness 
self-concept 
‘HON’ A student’s assessment of his/her tendency to be 
honest/trustworthy.  
(LOWER score = more positive self-concept) 
Context (Perceptions of Science Class) 
Performance goal 
structure 
‘PERF’ Perception of the degree to which the Science teacher 
emphasizes ‘performance goals’. E.g. competitive and 
approval-seeking goals, as contrasted with ‘mastery 
goals’. 
(LOWER score = more performance goal structure in 
Science class) 
Usefulness of curriculum ‘CURUSE’ Perception of the degree to which the curriculum in 
Science class is useful  
(LOWER score = curriculum perceived as more useful) 
Teacher quality 
(See ‘TEACHER’, below) 
‘GTEACH’ Perception of the pedagogical quality along such lines 
as feedback, clarity, and supportiveness. 
(LOWER score = better perception of teacher quality) 
Assessment quality 
(See ‘TEACHER’, below) 
‘ASSESS’ Perception of the quality of assessment in terms of 
authenticity and transparency.  
(LOWER score = better perception of assessment 
quality) 
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TEACHER QUALITY 
(This ‘second-order 
factor’ comprises two 
first order factors found 
to be multicollinear: 
assessment (ASSESS), 
and good teaching 
(GTEACH)) 
‘TEACHER’ =ASSESS + GTEACH. This higher-order factor 
represents a global measure students’ experience of a 
particular teacher. TEACHER combines student 
perceptions of the quality of assessment, and 
pedagogical skill in Science class. Both first-order 
measures appear, statistically, to reflect a single 
underlying source of variance: the teacher.  
(LOWER score = better perception teacher)  
Peer cheating norms ‘PEER’ The degree to which peers in Science class are 
perceived to condone cheating  
(LOWER score = perception that cheating is more 
accepted by a respondent’s peers) 
Moral obligation: 
Justifiability of cheating ‘CHJUST’ The degree to which cheating is viewed as justifiable, 
for oneself or others, within the specific context of 
Science class 
(LOWER score = more justifiable) 
Behavior: 
Surface learning 
strategies 
‘SURF’ The use of effort-minimizing/corner-cutting strategies 
such as memorizing, over-reliance on formulae, and 
generally targeting the production of answers purely to 
fulfill work requirements.  
(LOWER score = more use of surface strategies) 
Self-Reported cheating ‘CHEAT’ The frequency or degree of a student’s cheating 
behaviour during the year, in Science class  
(LOWER score = more cheating) 
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Appendix F:  
Item descriptive statistics: Time 1 vs. Pilot Study 
Table F1 
Item descriptive statistics: Pilot vs. Time 1  
  Time 1 sample (n=493)  Pilot sample (n=96)  Δ = (Time 1) - (Pilot) 
   mean SE SD var. S K  mean SE SD var. S K  Δmean ΔSD Δvar. ΔS ΔK 
SUB                     
sub2  2.43 0.05 1.04 1.08 0.40 -0.41  2.33 0.10 1.01 1.02 0.59 0.25  0.10 0.03 0.06 -0.19 -0.66 
sub3  2.31 0.05 1.01 1.01 0.52 -0.13  2.32 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.47 0.00  -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.13 
sub5  2.85 0.06 1.23 1.52 0.08 -0.90  2.65 0.12 1.22 1.49 0.39 -0.76  0.20 0.01 0.03 -0.31 -0.14 
sub13  2.72 0.05 1.10 1.20 0.17 -0.56  2.58 0.10 1.02 1.05 0.31 -0.25  0.14 0.07 0.16 -0.14 -0.30 
sub15  1.88 0.05 1.03 1.06 1.00 0.20  1.79 0.10 0.98 0.97 1.25 1.17  0.09 0.05 0.10 -0.25 -0.97 
HON                     
hon 1  1.86 0.03 0.72 0.51 0.62 0.60  2.20 0.08 0.82 0.67 0.69 0.86  -0.34 -0.10 -0.15 -0.07 -0.26 
hon 6  2.46 0.04 0.89 0.80 0.39 0.16  2.58 0.09 0.93 0.86 0.36 0.13  -0.12 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.04 
hon 8  1.90 0.04 0.79 0.63 0.60 0.02  1.92 0.09 0.87 0.75 1.15 2.08  -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 -0.55 -2.06 
hon 9  1.98 0.03 0.78 0.60 0.77 1.19  2.10 0.09 0.88 0.77 0.94 1.40  -0.13 -0.10 -0.16 -0.17 -0.21 
hon10  1.77 0.04 0.83 0.69 1.01 0.78  1.79 0.09 0.92 0.84 1.35 2.04  -0.02 -0.09 -0.15 -0.34 -1.26 
hon11  2.17 0.04 0.98 0.96 0.65 -0.14  2.31 0.11 1.04 1.08 0.72 -0.05  -0.14 -0.06 -0.12 -0.07 -0.10 
 
Note. SE = Standard error; SD = Standard deviation; Var. = variance; S = Skewness; K = Kurtosis; Δ = ‘change in’. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON 
= Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = 
Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning 
strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level. 
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Table F1, continued 
  Time 1 sample (n=493)  Pilot sample (n=96)  Δ = (Time 1) - (Pilot) 
    mean SE SD var. S K  mean SE SD var. S K  Δmean ΔSD Δvar. ΔS ΔK 
GTEACH 
 
                   
gteach18  3.12 0.05 1.06 1.11 -0.03 -0.57  3.13 0.10 1.00 0.99 0.00 -0.48  -0.01 0.06 0.12 -0.04 -0.09 
gteach33  2.42 0.05 1.18 1.40 0.67 -0.36  2.41 0.13 1.29 1.68 0.63 -0.70  0.02 -0.11 -0.28 0.05 0.34 
gteach39  2.52 0.05 1.09 1.19 0.46 -0.45  2.44 0.11 1.06 1.13 0.54 -0.26  0.08 0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.19 
gteach50  2.52 0.05 1.07 1.15 0.58 -0.18  2.48 0.10 1.01 1.01 0.50 0.04  0.04 0.07 0.14 0.08 -0.22 
gteach62  2.39 0.05 1.06 1.12 0.68 0.09  2.31 0.12 1.21 1.46 0.65 -0.49  0.08 -0.15 -0.34 0.03 0.57 
gteach67  2.40 0.05 1.08 1.16 0.61 -0.11  2.41 0.13 1.31 1.72 0.58 -0.78  -0.01 -0.23 -0.56 0.03 0.67 
gteach68  2.26 0.05 1.10 1.21 0.66 -0.18  2.20 0.12 1.18 1.40 0.77 -0.30  0.06 -0.08 -0.19 -0.11 0.11 
gteach77  2.48 0.04 1.00 0.99 0.55 0.10  2.44 0.12 1.18 1.39 0.47 -0.42  0.04 -0.18 -0.39 0.08 0.52 
PERF                     
perf61  3.49 0.05 1.16 1.36 -0.36 -0.75  3.36 0.11 1.12 1.24 0.07 -0.85  0.13 0.05 0.11 -0.43 0.11 
perf69  3.24 0.06 1.24 1.54 -0.15 -0.99  2.89 0.13 1.26 1.58 0.06 -0.98  0.36 -0.02 -0.04 -0.21 -0.01 
perf74  3.17 0.06 1.25 1.56 -0.09 -0.98  3.09 0.11 1.10 1.20 -0.04 -0.65  0.07 0.15 0.36 -0.05 -0.33 
perf75  3.61 0.06 1.34 1.79 -0.54 -0.94  3.22 0.13 1.27 1.60 -0.23 -0.87  0.39 0.07 0.19 -0.31 -0.07 
CURUSE                     
curuse19  2.53 0.05 1.12 1.26 0.50 -0.43  2.41 0.12 1.13 1.28 0.66 -0.02  0.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.17 -0.41 
curuse53  2.61 0.05 1.11 1.23 0.50 -0.36  2.48 0.11 1.12 1.26 0.55 -0.15  0.13 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.22 
curuse56  2.31 0.05 1.02 1.04 0.58 -0.14  2.27 0.11 1.08 1.17 0.56 -0.16  0.04 -0.06 -0.12 0.02 0.03 
curuse64  2.48 0.05 1.08 1.16 0.51 -0.25  2.46 0.12 1.22 1.49 0.61 -0.42  0.02 -0.15 -0.34 -0.10 0.16 
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Table F1, continued 
  Time 1 sample (n=493)  Pilot sample (n=96)  Δ = (Time 1) - (Pilot) 
    mean SE SD var. S K  mean SE SD var. S K  Δmean ΔSD Δvar. ΔS ΔK 
ASSESS 
                    
auth44  2.06 0.04 0.86 0.73 0.73 0.68  2.11 0.10 0.94 0.88 0.70 0.45  -0.05 -0.08 -0.15 0.03 0.23 
auth60  2.30 0.04 0.94 0.89 0.50 0.13  2.24 0.10 0.98 0.96 0.80 0.80  0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.29 -0.67 
auth71  2.31 0.04 0.90 0.80 0.40 0.07  2.41 0.09 0.90 0.81 0.42 0.23  -0.10 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.16 
auth78  2.15 0.04 0.94 0.89 0.68 0.36  2.19 0.10 0.95 0.91 0.35 -0.80  -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.32 1.16 
trans28  2.04 0.04 0.90 0.81 0.93 1.01  1.95 0.09 0.91 0.83 1.04 1.36  0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.35 
trans32  2.18 0.04 0.86 0.73 0.57 0.21  2.23 0.08 0.80 0.64 0.31 -0.24  -0.05 0.05 0.09 0.26 0.46 
trans66  2.29 0.04 0.95 0.91 0.71 0.45  2.41 0.11 1.05 1.11 0.34 -0.43  -0.11 -0.10 -0.20 0.37 0.88 
PEER                     
peer24  2.02 0.04 0.99 0.98 1.01 0.78  3.63 0.12 1.20 1.44 -0.43 -0.75  -1.61 -0.21 -0.46 1.44 1.53 
peer31  2.12 0.04 0.96 0.92 0.70 0.10  3.20 0.14 1.40 1.95 -0.15 -1.20  -1.08 -0.44 -1.03 0.85 1.30 
peer40  2.10 0.05 1.04 1.09 0.85 0.23  3.28 0.14 1.37 1.89 -0.18 -1.19  -1.19 -0.33 -0.80 1.02 1.43 
peer58  2.26 0.05 1.16 1.33 0.72 -0.30  3.67 0.13 1.24 1.53 -0.49 -0.85  -1.41 -0.08 -0.19 1.21 0.55 
peer65  3.79 0.05 1.15 1.32 -0.75 -0.15  3.63 0.14 1.37 1.88 -0.57 -0.91  0.17 -0.22 -0.56 -0.19 0.76 
SURF                     
surf87  3.99 0.05 1.00 1.01 -0.89 0.22  3.81 0.11 1.10 1.21 -0.79 0.02  0.18 0.89 -0.09 -2.10 1.00 
surf88  2.94 0.06 1.27 1.62 0.08 -1.05  2.79 0.12 1.13 1.28 0.33 -0.73  0.15 1.16 0.49 -1.20 -1.39 
surf91  3.46 0.05 1.20 1.43 -0.31 -0.85  3.56 0.11 1.03 1.07 -0.43 -0.57  -0.11 1.09 0.40 -1.38 -0.42 
surf97  3.60 0.05 1.14 1.30 -0.37 -0.78  3.54 0.11 1.04 1.07 -0.32 -0.62  0.06 1.03 0.26 -1.44 -0.46 
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Table F1, continued 
  Time 1 sample (n=493)  Pilot sample (n=96)  Δ = (Time 1) - (Pilot) 
    mean SE SD var. S K   mean SE SD var. S K   Δmean ΔSD Δvar. ΔS ΔK 
CHJUST 
 
                   
chjust79 
 4.21 0.04 0.94 0.89 -1.06 0.57  4.35 0.10 0.99 0.99 -1.55 1.80  -0.15 0.84 -0.11 -2.05 2.12 
chjust86 
 3.95 0.05 1.17 1.37 -0.95 -0.02  3.97 0.12 1.18 1.40 -0.87 -0.24  -0.02 1.05 0.19 -2.35 0.85 
chjust99 
 3.97 0.05 1.19 1.42 -1.01 0.16  3.77 0.13 1.30 1.69 -0.59 -0.88  0.20 1.06 0.12 -2.71 0.74 
CHEAT 
                    
cheat84 
 4.41 0.04 0.95 0.90 -1.58 1.63  4.42 0.11 1.04 1.09 -1.76 2.09  -0.01 0.84 -0.14 -2.66 3.40 
cheat92 
 4.28 0.05 1.02 1.05 -1.26 0.51  4.36 0.10 1.02 1.03 -1.46 1.05  -0.08 0.92 0.03 -2.30 1.97 
cheat95 
 4.16 0.05 1.12 1.25 -1.11 0.09  4.29 0.10 1.01 1.03 -1.11 -0.16  -0.13 1.02 0.24 -2.14 1.21 
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Time 1 MIMIC model results estimated with all observed indicators 
 
Table G1 
MIMIC results: standardized beta coefficients for covariates 
  Gen Gra Eng Mom Dad 
Person      
Subject self-concept .242*** .005 .092 .107* .116* 
Honesty-trust. self-concept -.059 -.036 .056 .010 .031 
Teaching context      
Performance goal structure .134* .012 -.115* .016 -.089 
Teacher .063 .156** -.043 .000 .030 
Usefulness of curriculum .060 .136** .026 -.003 -.022 
Peer cheating norms .229*** -.214*** .017 -.014 .026 
Moral obligation      
Justifiability of cheating .183** -.157** -.034 .090 -.086 
Behavior      
Surface learning strategies .024 -.149** -.134* .047 -.093 
Self-reported cheating .138** -.064 -.034 .037 -.068 
Note. Model fit: 2(1289) = 2036; RMSEA = .037, CIs = .034 - .040, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR 
= .054; SCF = .953, and the second model, which included all two-way interactions of these variables, 
(2(1489) = 2266; RMSEA = .035, CIs = .032 - .038, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .051; SCF 
= .948). Gen = Gender, Gra = Grade-level, Eng = English proficiency, Mom = Maternal educational 
attainment, Dad = Paternal educational attainment, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .000
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Table G2 
MIMIC results: standardized beta coefficients for two-way interaction variables 
  GenXGra GenXEng GenXMom GenXDad GraXEng GraXMom GraXDad EngXMom EngXDad MomXDad 
Person           
Subject self-concept .105 .146 .111 -.099 -.057 -.058 .214* .129* .017 .021 
Honesty-trust. self-concept -.071 -.087 .132 -.049 .133 -.104 .043 -.038 -.024 .007 
Teaching context           
Performance goal structure .116 -.236** .092 -.129 .093 -.080 .138 .075 .052 -.162* 
Teacher .077 .090 .078 -.101 -.127 -.099 .135 .033 .068 .051 
Usefulness of curriculum .044 .027 .034 -.198 -.011 -.084 .148 .026 .084 .125* 
Peer cheating norms .058 -.118 -.061 .016 .120 .066 .027 .032 -.001 -.049 
Moral obligation           
Justifiability of cheating .054 -.139 .063 .047 .127 -.007 -.065 .035 .012 -.044 
Behavior           
Surface learning strategies -.029 -.176* -.002 -.256** .115 .104 .115 -.023 .045 -.062 
Self-reported cheating .052 -.152 -.012 -.097 .166 .049 .050 .019 .001 -.046 
 
Note. Model fir: 2(1489) = 2266; RMSEA = .035, CIs = .032 - .038, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .051; SCF = .948. Gen = Gender, Gra = 
Grade-level, Eng = English proficiency, Mom = Maternal educational attainment, Dad = Paternal educational attainment, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .000.
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Gender-specific congeneric models 
Table H1 
Congeneric model results for male respondents at Time 1 
 CFA  
N = 201    Loading RMSEA     
 Scale (# items) 2 p df range value CIs CFI TLI SRMR Rho 
Subject self-concept (5)  2.2 .82 5 .65-.87 .00 .00-.06 1.0 1.02 .01 .90 
Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) 12.6 .18 9 .44-.90 .05 .00-.10 .99 .98 .03 .84 
Performance structure (4) .32 .85 2 .52-.87 .00 .00-.08 1.0 1.05 .01 .72 
Good teaching (8) 25.0 .20 20 .45-.77 .04 .00-.07 .99 .98 .03 .86 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) 2.9 .23 2 .66-.89 .05 .00-.16 1.0 .99 .01 .88 
Assessment quality (7) 20.3 .12 14 .62-.76 .05 .00-.09 .98 .97 .04 .86 
Peer norms (5) 7.6 .18 5 .63-.73 .05 .00-.12 .99 .97 .02 .81 
Surface learning strategies (4) 5.6 .06 2 .35-.90 .09 .00-.19 .97 .90 .03 .73 
Justifiability of cheating (3) .22 .64 1 .63-.84 .00 .00-.15 1.0 1.03 .01 .78 
Self-reported cheating (3) .56 .45 1 .76-.89 .00 .00-.17 1.0 1.01 .01 .88 
 
Table H2 
Congeneric model results for female respondents at Time 1 
 CFA  
N = 292    Loading RMSEA     
 Scale (# items) 2 p df range value CIs CFI TLI SRMR Rho 
Subject self-concept (5)  1.79 .88 5 .73-.83 .00 .00-.04 1.00 1.01 .01 .90 
Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) 6.72 .67 9 .38-.88 .00 .00-.05 1.00 1.01 .02 .80 
Performance structure (4) 3.64 .16 2 .53-.84 .05 .00-.14 .99 .97 .02 .74 
Good teaching (8) 37.8 .01 20 .37-.75 .06 .03-.08 .97 .96 .03 .86 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) 1.29 .53 2 .72-.93 .00 .00-.10 1.00 1.01 .01 .90 
Assessment quality (7) 18.4 .19 14 .58-.71 .03 .00-.07 .99 .98 .03 .83 
Peer norms (5) 12.8 .03 5 .46-.71 .07 .02-.12 .96 .92 .03 .76 
Surface learning strategies (4) 3.75 .15 2 .31-.86 .06 .00-.14 .99 .97 .02 .70 
Justifiability of cheating (3) .670 .41 1 .44-.79 .00 .00-.14 1.00 1.02 .01 .67 
Self-reported cheating (3) 1.00 .32 1 .72-.88 .00 .00-.16 1.00 1.00 .04 .85 
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Standardized beta coefficients for gender-specific models estimated with 
weighted composites 
Table I1 
Male sample model estimated with weighted composites: standardized beta coefficients 
 
 
Predictors 
 N = 201 Grade Sub Hon Perf Curuse Teacher Peer Chjust 
Sub -.019        
Hon -.001 ---       
Perf .038 -.058 ---      
Curuse .074 .515*** --- ---     
Teacher .038 .470*** --- --- ---    
Peer -.253** --- -.143 -.104 .417 -.691**   
Chjust -.122 .172 -.212* .300** -.093 -.306 .355**  
Surf .078 -.328** --- .242* -.123 .395 --- .685*** 
Cheat .068 -.146 -.267** -.117 .081 .128 .071 .811*** 
 
 
Table I2 
Female sample model estimated with weighted composites: standardized beta coefficients 
 
 
Predictors 
 N = 292 Grade Sub Hon Perf Curuse Teacher Peer Chjust 
Sub -.045        
Hon -.017 ---       
Perf .058 -.034 ---      
Curuse .124* .480*** --- ---     
Teacher .182** .462*** --- --- ---    
Peer -.089 --- -.148* .236** -.089 -.359**   
Chjust -.012 .038 -.262** .175* -.010 -.400** .401***  
Surf -.103 -.197* --- .047 -.076 .542*** --- .542*** 
Cheat -.058 -.339*** -.084 .034 -.003 .227 -.134 .834*** 
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Table J1 
CFA: Estimated correlation matrix for the Time 1 male sample 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       CURUSE1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB1           1.000 
 HON1           0.192         1.000 
 PERF1         -0.095        -0.060         1.000 
 GTEACH1        0.396         0.089        -0.144         1.000 
 CURUSE1        0.519         0.122        -0.102         0.694         1.000 
 ASSESS1        0.396         0.090        -0.144         0.725         0.695 
 PEER1         -0.086        -0.160         0.026        -0.278        -0.181 
 SURF1         -0.300        -0.287         0.463        -0.209        -0.266 
 CHJUST1       -0.144        -0.308         0.355        -0.373        -0.367 
 CHEAT1        -0.220        -0.496         0.181        -0.218        -0.195 
 TEACHER1       0.465         0.105        -0.170         0.851         0.816 
 
              ASSESS1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 ASSESS1        1.000 
 PEER1         -0.278         1.000 
 SURF1         -0.209         0.226         1.000 
 CHJUST1       -0.374         0.492         0.641         1.000 
 CHEAT1        -0.218         0.472         0.516         0.783         1.000 
 TEACHER1       0.852        -0.327        -0.246        -0.439        -0.256 
 
 
Table J2 
Structural model: Estimated correlation matrix for the Time 1 male sample 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       CURUSE1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB1           1.000 
 HON1           0.194         1.000 
 PERF1         -0.097        -0.018         1.000 
 GTEACH1        0.392         0.077        -0.145         1.000 
 CURUSE1        0.521         0.102        -0.103         0.696         1.000 
 ASSESS1        0.390         0.076        -0.145         0.724         0.694 
 PEER1         -0.118        -0.161         0.021        -0.277        -0.177 
 SURF1         -0.308        -0.225         0.457        -0.205        -0.265 
 CHJUST1       -0.153        -0.301         0.347        -0.377        -0.364 
 CHEAT1        -0.230        -0.492         0.163        -0.214        -0.186 
 TEACHER1       0.459         0.090        -0.171         0.852         0.817 
 GRADE         -0.010         0.014         0.037         0.032         0.065 
 
              ASSESS1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 ASSESS1        1.000 
 PEER1         -0.276         1.000 
 SURF1         -0.204         0.247         1.000 
 CHJUST1       -0.376         0.488         0.644         1.000 
 CHEAT1        -0.213         0.477         0.507         0.781         1.000 
 TEACHER1       0.849        -0.326        -0.240        -0.443        -0.251 
 GRADE          0.032        -0.254        -0.058        -0.217        -0.105 
 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal 
structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good teaching; 
CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF 
= Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level.
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Appendix K: Female sample model correlation matrix 
Table K1 
Estimated correlation matrix of the CFA for the Time 1 female sample 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       CURUSE1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB1           1.000 
 HON1           0.216         1.000 
 PERF1         -0.051        -0.072         1.000 
 GTEACH1        0.360         0.262        -0.063         1.000 
 CURUSE1        0.471         0.166         0.065         0.513         1.000 
 ASSESS1        0.438         0.319        -0.076         0.777         0.624 
 PEER1         -0.265        -0.249         0.275        -0.407        -0.328 
 SURF1         -0.345        -0.253         0.215        -0.350        -0.325 
 CHJUST1       -0.285        -0.446         0.324        -0.467        -0.347 
 CHEAT1        -0.463        -0.416         0.266        -0.347        -0.281 
 TEACHER1       0.450         0.328        -0.078         0.799         0.642 
 
              ASSESS1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 ASSESS1        1.000 
 PEER1         -0.495         1.000 
 SURF1         -0.426         0.497         1.000 
 CHJUST1       -0.568         0.681         0.524         1.000 
 CHEAT1        -0.423         0.475         0.537         0.729         1.000 
 TEACHER1       0.973        -0.509        -0.438        -0.584        -0.435 
 
 
Table K2 
Estimated correlation matrix of the structural model for the Time 1 female sample 
             SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       CURUSE1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB1           1.000 
 HON1           0.228         1.000 
 PERF1         -0.053        -0.013         1.000 
 GTEACH1        0.374         0.082        -0.067         1.000 
 CURUSE1        0.473         0.105         0.065         0.525         1.000 
 ASSESS1        0.441         0.096        -0.079         0.776         0.619 
 PEER1         -0.254        -0.165         0.273        -0.404        -0.325 
 SURF1         -0.347        -0.196         0.213        -0.343        -0.321 
 CHJUST1       -0.294        -0.363         0.318        -0.446        -0.343 
 CHEAT1        -0.469        -0.379         0.255        -0.313        -0.269 
 TEACHER1       0.461         0.101        -0.082         0.811         0.647 
 GRADE         -0.043        -0.033         0.050         0.130         0.103 
 
              ASSESS1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 ASSESS1        1.000 
 PEER1         -0.476         1.000 
 SURF1         -0.404         0.406         1.000 
 CHJUST1       -0.526         0.689         0.543         1.000 
 CHEAT1        -0.369         0.445         0.532         0.726         1.000 
 TEACHER1       0.957        -0.497        -0.422        -0.550        -0.386 
 GRADE          0.154        -0.129        -0.152        -0.098        -0.053 
 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal 
structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good teaching; 
CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF 
= Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level.
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Co-ed structural model output, Time 1 (N = 493) 
 
 
MODEL FIT INFORMATION 
 
Number of Free Parameters                      197 
 
Loglikelihood 
 
          H0 Value                      -30258.349 
          H0 Scaling Correction Factor      1.2206 
            for MLR 
          H1 Value                      -29110.708 
          H1 Scaling Correction Factor      1.1391 
            for MLR 
 
Information Criteria 
 
          Akaike (AIC)                   60910.699 
          Bayesian (BIC)                 61738.199 
          Sample-Size Adjusted BIC       61112.920 
            (n* = (n + 2) / 24) 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit 
 
          Value                           2039.400* 
          Degrees of Freedom                  1175 
          P-Value                           0.0000 
          Scaling Correction Factor         1.1255 
            for MLR 
 
*   The chi-square value for MLM, MLMV, MLR, ULSMV, WLSM and WLSMV cannot be used 
    for chi-square difference testing in the regular way.  MLM, MLR and WLSM 
    chi-square difference testing is described on the Mplus website.  MLMV, WLSMV, 
    and ULSMV difference testing is done using the DIFFTEST option. 
 
RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation) 
 
          Estimate                           0.039 
          90 Percent C.I.                    0.036  0.041 
          Probability RMSEA <= .05           1.000 
 
CFI/TLI 
 
          CFI                                0.909 
          TLI                                0.902 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit for the Baseline Model 
 
          Value                          10789.419 
          Degrees of Freedom                  1274 
          P-Value                           0.0000 
 
SRMR (Standardized Root Mean Square Residual) 
 
          Value                              0.056 
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MODEL RESULTS 
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 SUB1     BY 
    SUB2               1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    SUB3               0.933      0.044     21.135      0.000 
    SUB5               1.160      0.051     22.618      0.000 
    SUB13              1.042      0.045     23.215      0.000 
    SUB15              0.837      0.045     18.638      0.000 
 
 HON1     BY 
    HON_1              1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    HON6               2.152      0.278      7.755      0.000 
    HON8               1.474      0.216      6.838      0.000 
    HON9               2.249      0.284      7.928      0.000 
    HON10              2.178      0.281      7.739      0.000 
    HON11              1.828      0.281      6.497      0.000 
 
 PERF1    BY 
    PERF61             1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    PERF69             1.483      0.136     10.901      0.000 
    PERF74             1.172      0.138      8.508      0.000 
    PERF75             1.240      0.154      8.038      0.000 
 
 GTEACH1  BY 
    GTEACH18           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    GTEACH33           2.119      0.254      8.355      0.000 
    GTEACH39           1.765      0.193      9.145      0.000 
    GTEACH50           1.826      0.206      8.845      0.000 
    GTEACH62           1.784      0.197      9.047      0.000 
    GTEACH67           1.896      0.227      8.346      0.000 
    GTEACH68           1.368      0.194      7.065      0.000 
    GTEACH77           1.562      0.213      7.328      0.000 
 
 CURUSE1  BY 
    CURUSE19           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    CURUSE53           1.205      0.066     18.294      0.000 
    CURUSE56           1.005      0.066     15.160      0.000 
    CURUSE64           1.190      0.065     18.257      0.000 
 
 ASSESS1  BY 
    TRANS28            1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    TRANS32            0.922      0.066     14.030      0.000 
    TRANS66            1.042      0.106      9.820      0.000 
    AUTH44             1.065      0.087     12.224      0.000 
    AUTH60             1.196      0.095     12.606      0.000 
    AUTH71             0.978      0.085     11.467      0.000 
    AUTH78             1.119      0.108     10.378      0.000 
 
 PEER1    BY 
    PEER24             1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    PEER31             1.061      0.101     10.455      0.000 
    PEER40             1.143      0.086     13.345      0.000 
    PEER58             1.172      0.128      9.188      0.000 
    PEER65             0.863      0.101      8.552      0.000 
 
 SURF1    BY 
    SURF87             1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    SURF88             0.820      0.139      5.901      0.000 
    SURF91             1.647      0.219      7.532      0.000 
    SURF97             1.649      0.210      7.863      0.000 
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CHJUST1  BY 
    CHJUST79           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    CHJUST86           1.153      0.077     14.896      0.000 
    CHJUST99           0.840      0.081     10.424      0.000 
 
 CHEAT1   BY 
    CHEAT84            1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    CHEAT92            1.124      0.063     17.981      0.000 
    CHEAT95            1.066      0.076     14.006      0.000 
 
 TEACHER1 BY 
    GTEACH1            1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    ASSESS1            1.481      0.226      6.562      0.000 
 
 CHEAT1   ON 
    CHJUST1            0.784      0.112      7.014      0.000 
    PERF1             -0.042      0.056     -0.746      0.456 
    PEER1              0.062      0.067      0.924      0.356 
    SUB1              -0.232      0.058     -3.979      0.000 
    HON1              -0.422      0.142     -2.984      0.003 
    TEACHER1           0.331      0.204      1.620      0.105 
    CURUSE1            0.061      0.065      0.943      0.346 
 
 SURF1    ON 
    CHJUST1            0.380      0.082      4.657      0.000 
    PERF1              0.133      0.058      2.293      0.022 
    SUB1              -0.135      0.045     -2.997      0.003 
    TEACHER1           0.122      0.170      0.716      0.474 
    CURUSE1           -0.050      0.062     -0.808      0.419 
 
 CHJUST1  ON 
    SUB1               0.059      0.053      1.118      0.264 
    PEER1              0.382      0.080      4.753      0.000 
    PERF1              0.267      0.067      3.963      0.000 
    TEACHER1          -0.523      0.209     -2.507      0.012 
    CURUSE1           -0.059      0.072     -0.810      0.418 
    HON1              -0.595      0.191     -3.114      0.002 
 
 PEER1    ON 
    PERF1              0.147      0.073      2.011      0.044 
    TEACHER1          -0.826      0.219     -3.776      0.000 
    CURUSE1            0.044      0.086      0.513      0.608 
    HON1              -0.329      0.144     -2.287      0.022 
 
 PERF1    ON 
    SUB1              -0.053      0.046     -1.158      0.247 
 
 TEACHER1 ON 
    SUB1               0.196      0.031      6.419      0.000 
 
 CURUSE1  ON 
    SUB1               0.470      0.050      9.407      0.000 
 
 CHEAT1   ON 
    GENDER             0.046      0.070      0.650      0.516 
    GRADE              0.022      0.062      0.354      0.723 
 
 SURF1    ON 
    GENDER            -0.058      0.054     -1.058      0.290 
    GRADE             -0.054      0.050     -1.073      0.283 
 
 CHJUST1  ON 
    GENDER             0.145      0.070      2.086      0.037 
    GRADE             -0.084      0.067     -1.252      0.211 
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PEER1    ON 
    GENDER             0.248      0.074      3.343      0.001 
    GRADE             -0.226      0.075     -3.037      0.002 
 
 PERF1    ON 
    GENDER             0.240      0.078      3.071      0.002 
    GRADE              0.051      0.068      0.745      0.456 
 
 TEACHER1 ON 
    GENDER            -0.039      0.036     -1.090      0.276 
    GRADE              0.087      0.035      2.498      0.012 
 
 CURUSE1  ON 
    GENDER            -0.119      0.070     -1.694      0.090 
    GRADE              0.168      0.071      2.376      0.017 
 
 HON1     ON 
    GENDER            -0.053      0.033     -1.611      0.107 
    GRADE             -0.009      0.029     -0.293      0.769 
 
 SUB1     ON 
    GENDER             0.483      0.084      5.742      0.000 
    GRADE             -0.053      0.083     -0.642      0.521 
 
 SUB1     WITH 
    HON1               0.053      0.017      3.228      0.001 
 
 PERF1    WITH 
    TEACHER1          -0.024      0.014     -1.673      0.094 
    CURUSE1            0.012      0.028      0.427      0.669 
 
 TEACHER1 WITH 
    CURUSE1            0.131      0.024      5.565      0.000 
 
 SURF1    WITH 
    CHEAT1             0.015      0.017      0.903      0.366 
 
 Intercepts 
    SUB2               1.740      0.175      9.937      0.000 
    SUB3               1.663      0.163     10.229      0.000 
    SUB5               2.044      0.203     10.061      0.000 
    SUB13              2.003      0.185     10.816      0.000 
    SUB15              1.302      0.147      8.853      0.000 
    HON_1              1.954      0.073     26.624      0.000 
    HON6               2.671      0.140     19.069      0.000 
    HON8               2.040      0.103     19.729      0.000 
    HON9               2.194      0.146     15.002      0.000 
    HON10              1.980      0.146     13.532      0.000 
    HON11              2.348      0.124     18.916      0.000 
    PERF61             3.075      0.155     19.892      0.000 
    PERF69             2.625      0.211     12.421      0.000 
    PERF74             2.676      0.179     14.935      0.000 
    PERF75             3.094      0.191     16.170      0.000 
    GTEACH18           2.921      0.093     31.282      0.000 
    GTEACH33           2.002      0.171     11.678      0.000 
    GTEACH39           2.166      0.146     14.883      0.000 
    GTEACH50           2.154      0.147     14.637      0.000 
    GTEACH62           2.037      0.146     13.942      0.000 
    GTEACH67           2.021      0.154     13.118      0.000 
    GTEACH68           1.990      0.118     16.794      0.000 
    GTEACH77           2.166      0.128     16.858      0.000 
    CURUSE19           2.149      0.170     12.604      0.000 
    CURUSE53           2.152      0.200     10.741      0.000 
    CURUSE56           1.934      0.167     11.559      0.000 
    CURUSE64           2.026      0.197     10.304      0.000 
    TRANS28            1.746      0.119     14.665      0.000 
    TRANS32            1.907      0.113     16.880      0.000 
    TRANS66            1.985      0.126     15.722      0.000 
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    AUTH44             1.751      0.126     13.929      0.000 
    AUTH60             1.950      0.142     13.730      0.000 
    AUTH71             2.022      0.120     16.894      0.000 
    AUTH78             1.816      0.135     13.470      0.000 
    PEER24             3.776      0.166     22.802      0.000 
    PEER31             3.431      0.178     19.313      0.000 
    PEER40             3.326      0.189     17.623      0.000 
    PEER58             3.636      0.192     18.928      0.000 
    PEER65             3.614      0.148     24.364      0.000 
    SURF87             4.118      0.133     31.016      0.000 
    SURF88             3.045      0.122     24.912      0.000 
    SURF91             3.664      0.214     17.120      0.000 
    SURF97             3.804      0.213     17.902      0.000 
    CHJUST79           4.007      0.166     24.144      0.000 
    CHJUST86           3.715      0.191     19.468      0.000 
    CHJUST99           3.802      0.146     26.064      0.000 
    CHEAT84            4.194      0.169     24.787      0.000 
    CHEAT92            4.044      0.186     21.690      0.000 
    CHEAT95            3.931      0.178     22.130      0.000 
 
 Residual Variances 
    SUB2               0.301      0.038      7.824      0.000 
    SUB3               0.329      0.031     10.593      0.000 
    SUB5               0.473      0.048      9.753      0.000 
    SUB13              0.351      0.034     10.238      0.000 
    SUB15              0.517      0.045     11.574      0.000 
    HON_1              0.421      0.037     11.524      0.000 
    HON6               0.380      0.032     12.033      0.000 
    HON8               0.431      0.029     15.103      0.000 
    HON9               0.148      0.018      8.008      0.000 
    HON10              0.262      0.025     10.609      0.000 
    HON11              0.658      0.053     12.343      0.000 
    PERF61             0.925      0.070     13.290      0.000 
    PERF69             0.594      0.084      7.074      0.000 
    PERF74             0.970      0.089     10.937      0.000 
    PERF75             1.128      0.099     11.452      0.000 
    GTEACH18           0.932      0.058     16.174      0.000 
    GTEACH33           0.590      0.049     11.924      0.000 
    GTEACH39           0.628      0.049     12.809      0.000 
    GTEACH50           0.552      0.054     10.244      0.000 
    GTEACH62           0.547      0.052     10.577      0.000 
    GTEACH67           0.511      0.044     11.543      0.000 
    GTEACH68           0.871      0.067     12.910      0.000 
    GTEACH77           0.554      0.059      9.369      0.000 
    CURUSE19           0.606      0.059     10.283      0.000 
    CURUSE53           0.280      0.035      8.044      0.000 
    CURUSE56           0.383      0.047      8.057      0.000 
    CURUSE64           0.228      0.032      7.180      0.000 
    TRANS28            0.477      0.043     11.152      0.000 
    TRANS32            0.451      0.043     10.598      0.000 
    TRANS66            0.548      0.057      9.566      0.000 
    AUTH44             0.362      0.033     10.894      0.000 
    AUTH60             0.419      0.043      9.668      0.000 
    AUTH71             0.488      0.046     10.564      0.000 
    AUTH78             0.472      0.048      9.860      0.000 
    PEER24             0.773      0.092      8.381      0.000 
    PEER31             0.921      0.083     11.035      0.000 
    PEER40             0.809      0.084      9.614      0.000 
    PEER58             0.656      0.090      7.276      0.000 
    PEER65             1.057      0.117      9.039      0.000 
    SURF87             0.697      0.071      9.786      0.000 
    SURF88             1.413      0.080     17.678      0.000 
    SURF91             0.587      0.073      7.990      0.000 
    SURF97             0.455      0.082      5.521      0.000 
    CHJUST79           0.328      0.038      8.528      0.000 
    CHJUST86           0.624      0.080      7.840      0.000 
    CHJUST99           1.023      0.111      9.222      0.000 
    CHEAT84            0.265      0.048      5.549      0.000 
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    CHEAT92            0.242      0.036      6.678      0.000 
    CHEAT95            0.525      0.077      6.776      0.000 
    SUB1               0.724      0.062     11.671      0.000 
    HON1               0.089      0.022      4.006      0.000 
    PERF1              0.414      0.074      5.624      0.000 
    GTEACH1            0.056      0.017      3.338      0.001 
    CURUSE1            0.485      0.053      9.217      0.000 
    ASSESS1            0.058      0.020      2.920      0.003 
    PEER1              0.403      0.066      6.131      0.000 
    SURF1              0.181      0.034      5.298      0.000 
    CHJUST1            0.246      0.041      6.028      0.000 
    CHEAT1             0.206      0.036      5.689      0.000 
    TEACHER1           0.093      0.025      3.777      0.000 
 
 
STANDARDIZED MODEL RESULTS 
 
 
STDYX Standardization 
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 SUB1     BY 
    SUB2               0.849      0.021     40.819      0.000 
    SUB3               0.821      0.019     42.835      0.000 
    SUB5               0.830      0.020     41.395      0.000 
    SUB13              0.841      0.018     46.226      0.000 
    SUB15              0.717      0.027     26.869      0.000 
 
 HON1     BY 
    HON_1              0.419      0.050      8.417      0.000 
    HON6               0.723      0.030     24.354      0.000 
    HON8               0.558      0.038     14.721      0.000 
    HON9               0.869      0.021     42.338      0.000 
    HON10              0.787      0.025     30.940      0.000 
    HON11              0.560      0.040     14.064      0.000 
 
 PERF1    BY 
    PERF61             0.563      0.044     12.867      0.000 
    PERF69             0.783      0.036     21.723      0.000 
    PERF74             0.614      0.044     13.813      0.000 
    PERF75             0.607      0.044     13.948      0.000 
 
 GTEACH1  BY 
    GTEACH18           0.402      0.047      8.635      0.000 
    GTEACH33           0.760      0.024     31.179      0.000 
    GTEACH39           0.686      0.031     22.210      0.000 
    GTEACH50           0.721      0.032     22.742      0.000 
    GTEACH62           0.715      0.031     22.935      0.000 
    GTEACH67           0.747      0.028     26.975      0.000 
    GTEACH68           0.528      0.046     11.519      0.000 
    GTEACH77           0.665      0.042     15.897      0.000 
 
 CURUSE1  BY 
    CURUSE19           0.720      0.032     22.822      0.000 
    CURUSE53           0.879      0.016     53.880      0.000 
    CURUSE56           0.796      0.030     26.709      0.000 
    CURUSE64           0.896      0.016     55.841      0.000 
 
 ASSESS1  BY 
    TRANS28            0.638      0.034     18.912      0.000 
    TRANS32            0.618      0.039     15.701      0.000 
    TRANS66            0.628      0.042     14.922      0.000 
    AUTH44             0.712      0.031     22.752      0.000 
    AUTH60             0.727      0.029     24.859      0.000 
    AUTH71             0.626      0.038     16.335      0.000 
    AUTH78             0.682      0.034     20.301      0.000 
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 PEER1    BY 
    PEER24             0.640      0.046     13.932      0.000 
    PEER31             0.629      0.042     15.136      0.000 
    PEER40             0.681      0.040     17.201      0.000 
    PEER58             0.727      0.042     17.133      0.000 
    PEER65             0.523      0.056      9.354      0.000 
 
 SURF1    BY 
    SURF87             0.553      0.053     10.419      0.000 
    SURF88             0.357      0.051      7.006      0.000 
    SURF91             0.766      0.034     22.337      0.000 
    SURF97             0.805      0.039     20.602      0.000 
 
 CHJUST1  BY 
    CHJUST79           0.790      0.029     27.601      0.000 
    CHJUST86           0.733      0.035     20.899      0.000 
    CHJUST99           0.522      0.050     10.545      0.000 
 
 CHEAT1   BY 
    CHEAT84            0.838      0.031     26.773      0.000 
    CHEAT92            0.875      0.020     43.971      0.000 
    CHEAT95            0.759      0.036     20.854      0.000 
 
 TEACHER1 BY 
    GTEACH1            0.829      0.032     26.006      0.000 
    ASSESS1            0.908      0.033     27.732      0.000 
 
 CHEAT1   ON 
    CHJUST1            0.730      0.083      8.754      0.000 
    PERF1             -0.035      0.046     -0.755      0.450 
    PEER1              0.057      0.061      0.934      0.350 
    SUB1              -0.258      0.063     -4.114      0.000 
    HON1              -0.160      0.053     -3.021      0.003 
    TEACHER1           0.146      0.089      1.646      0.100 
    CURUSE1            0.062      0.066      0.940      0.347 
 
 SURF1    ON 
    CHJUST1            0.505      0.077      6.541      0.000 
    PERF1              0.157      0.065      2.415      0.016 
    SUB1              -0.216      0.065     -3.301      0.001 
    TEACHER1           0.077      0.106      0.730      0.466 
    CURUSE1           -0.073      0.088     -0.827      0.408 
 
 CHJUST1  ON 
    SUB1               0.071      0.063      1.119      0.263 
    PEER1              0.379      0.065      5.847      0.000 
    PERF1              0.237      0.057      4.198      0.000 
    TEACHER1          -0.249      0.099     -2.526      0.012 
    CURUSE1           -0.064      0.079     -0.813      0.416 
    HON1              -0.242      0.060     -4.045      0.000 
 
 PEER1    ON 
    PERF1              0.132      0.063      2.103      0.035 
    TEACHER1          -0.396      0.098     -4.051      0.000 
    CURUSE1            0.049      0.095      0.512      0.609 
    HON1              -0.135      0.052     -2.564      0.010 
 
 PERF1    ON 
    SUB1              -0.072      0.061     -1.170      0.242 
 
 TEACHER1 ON 
    SUB1               0.493      0.046     10.638      0.000 
 
 CURUSE1  ON 
    SUB1               0.514      0.044     11.582      0.000 
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 CHEAT1   ON 
    GENDER             0.028      0.043      0.652      0.514 
    GRADE              0.014      0.039      0.354      0.723 
 
 SURF1    ON 
    GENDER            -0.051      0.048     -1.057      0.290 
    GRADE             -0.048      0.046     -1.055      0.291 
 
 CHJUST1  ON 
    GENDER             0.097      0.046      2.092      0.036 
    GRADE             -0.057      0.045     -1.252      0.210 
 
 PEER1    ON 
    GENDER             0.166      0.050      3.350      0.001 
    GRADE             -0.154      0.048     -3.190      0.001 
 
 PERF1    ON 
    GENDER             0.180      0.057      3.179      0.001 
    GRADE              0.039      0.052      0.746      0.456 
 
 TEACHER1 ON 
    GENDER            -0.054      0.050     -1.098      0.272 
    GRADE              0.123      0.046      2.681      0.007 
 
 CURUSE1  ON 
    GENDER            -0.072      0.043     -1.697      0.090 
    GRADE              0.103      0.042      2.462      0.014 
 
 HON1     ON 
    GENDER            -0.086      0.051     -1.705      0.088 
    GRADE             -0.014      0.048     -0.294      0.769 
 
 SUB1     ON 
    GENDER             0.268      0.045      5.952      0.000 
    GRADE             -0.030      0.047     -0.640      0.522 
 
 SUB1     WITH 
    HON1               0.210      0.050      4.158      0.000 
 
 PERF1    WITH 
    TEACHER1          -0.122      0.071     -1.715      0.086 
    CURUSE1            0.026      0.061      0.431      0.667 
 
 TEACHER1 WITH 
    CURUSE1            0.618      0.046     13.344      0.000 
 
 SURF1    WITH 
    CHEAT1             0.079      0.083      0.943      0.345 
 
 Intercepts 
    SUB2               1.674      0.182      9.186      0.000 
    SUB3               1.656      0.175      9.472      0.000 
    SUB5               1.657      0.175      9.447      0.000 
    SUB13              1.831      0.185      9.887      0.000 
    SUB15              1.263      0.152      8.317      0.000 
    HON_1              2.733      0.122     22.337      0.000 
    HON6               2.993      0.172     17.420      0.000 
    HON8               2.577      0.123     20.896      0.000 
    HON9               2.828      0.190     14.915      0.000 
    HON10              2.388      0.161     14.803      0.000 
    HON11              2.399      0.129     18.622      0.000 
    PERF61             2.643      0.163     16.244      0.000 
    PERF69             2.118      0.184     11.505      0.000 
    PERF74             2.144      0.160     13.369      0.000 
    PERF75             2.314      0.169     13.664      0.000 
    GTEACH18           2.771      0.122     22.784      0.000 
    GTEACH33           1.695      0.154     10.995      0.000 
    GTEACH39           1.988      0.147     13.571      0.000 
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    GTEACH50           2.008      0.154     13.017      0.000 
    GTEACH62           1.926      0.151     12.766      0.000 
    GTEACH67           1.879      0.154     12.183      0.000 
    GTEACH68           1.811      0.118     15.324      0.000 
    GTEACH77           2.175      0.146     14.860      0.000 
    CURUSE19           1.915      0.168     11.364      0.000 
    CURUSE53           1.942      0.189     10.266      0.000 
    CURUSE56           1.893      0.175     10.809      0.000 
    CURUSE64           1.886      0.195      9.696      0.000 
    TRANS28            1.945      0.149     13.093      0.000 
    TRANS32            2.230      0.148     15.026      0.000 
    TRANS66            2.087      0.146     14.290      0.000 
    AUTH44             2.044      0.165     12.389      0.000 
    AUTH60             2.069      0.158     13.117      0.000 
    AUTH71             2.258      0.139     16.202      0.000 
    AUTH78             1.933      0.152     12.688      0.000 
    PEER24             3.301      0.189     17.450      0.000 
    PEER31             2.779      0.168     16.534      0.000 
    PEER40             2.708      0.170     15.957      0.000 
    PEER58             3.081      0.194     15.913      0.000 
    PEER65             2.996      0.166     18.099      0.000 
    SURF87             4.110      0.220     18.669      0.000 
    SURF88             2.392      0.103     23.151      0.000 
    SURF91             3.076      0.193     15.962      0.000 
    SURF97             3.350      0.210     15.987      0.000 
    CHJUST79           4.291      0.268     16.029      0.000 
    CHJUST86           3.200      0.214     14.932      0.000 
    CHJUST99           3.205      0.184     17.375      0.000 
    CHEAT84            4.436      0.302     14.672      0.000 
    CHEAT92            3.973      0.261     15.252      0.000 
    CHEAT95            3.532      0.219     16.113      0.000 
 
 Residual Variances 
    SUB2               0.278      0.035      7.874      0.000 
    SUB3               0.326      0.031     10.370      0.000 
    SUB5               0.311      0.033      9.327      0.000 
    SUB13              0.293      0.031      9.577      0.000 
    SUB15              0.486      0.038     12.717      0.000 
    HON_1              0.824      0.042     19.752      0.000 
    HON6               0.478      0.043     11.138      0.000 
    HON8               0.689      0.042     16.273      0.000 
    HON9               0.246      0.036      6.893      0.000 
    HON10              0.381      0.040      9.502      0.000 
    HON11              0.687      0.045     15.423      0.000 
    PERF61             0.683      0.049     13.878      0.000 
    PERF69             0.386      0.056      6.840      0.000 
    PERF74             0.622      0.055     11.388      0.000 
    PERF75             0.631      0.053     11.941      0.000 
    GTEACH18           0.838      0.037     22.408      0.000 
    GTEACH33           0.422      0.037     11.401      0.000 
    GTEACH39           0.529      0.042     12.466      0.000 
    GTEACH50           0.480      0.046     10.486      0.000 
    GTEACH62           0.489      0.045     10.977      0.000 
    GTEACH67           0.442      0.041     10.684      0.000 
    GTEACH68           0.722      0.048     14.930      0.000 
    GTEACH77           0.558      0.056     10.037      0.000 
    CURUSE19           0.481      0.045     10.581      0.000 
    CURUSE53           0.228      0.029      7.939      0.000 
    CURUSE56           0.367      0.047      7.737      0.000 
    CURUSE64           0.198      0.029      6.884      0.000 
    TRANS28            0.593      0.043     13.752      0.000 
    TRANS32            0.618      0.049     12.688      0.000 
    TRANS66            0.606      0.053     11.486      0.000 
    AUTH44             0.493      0.045     11.059      0.000 
    AUTH60             0.472      0.042     11.104      0.000 
    AUTH71             0.608      0.048     12.689      0.000 
    AUTH78             0.535      0.046     11.663      0.000 
    PEER24             0.591      0.059     10.050      0.000 
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    PEER31             0.604      0.052     11.553      0.000 
    PEER40             0.536      0.054      9.951      0.000 
    PEER58             0.471      0.062      7.639      0.000 
    PEER65             0.726      0.059     12.402      0.000 
    SURF87             0.694      0.059     11.833      0.000 
    SURF88             0.872      0.036     23.966      0.000 
    SURF91             0.414      0.053      7.879      0.000 
    SURF97             0.353      0.063      5.614      0.000 
    CHJUST79           0.376      0.045      8.329      0.000 
    CHJUST86           0.463      0.051      9.023      0.000 
    CHJUST99           0.727      0.052     14.054      0.000 
    CHEAT84            0.297      0.053      5.656      0.000 
    CHEAT92            0.234      0.035      6.701      0.000 
    CHEAT95            0.424      0.055      7.664      0.000 
    SUB1               0.928      0.024     38.379      0.000 
    HON1               0.992      0.009    113.341      0.000 
    PERF1              0.967      0.020     49.098      0.000 
    GTEACH1            0.313      0.053      5.935      0.000 
    CURUSE1            0.742      0.044     16.898      0.000 
    ASSESS1            0.176      0.059      2.960      0.003 
    PEER1              0.752      0.044     17.164      0.000 
    SURF1              0.588      0.061      9.678      0.000 
    CHJUST1            0.453      0.054      8.457      0.000 
    CHEAT1             0.328      0.054      6.030      0.000 
    TEACHER1           0.755      0.044     17.288      0.000 
 
 
R-SQUARE 
 
    Observed                                        Two-Tailed 
    Variable        Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
    SUB2               0.722      0.035     20.410      0.000 
    SUB3               0.674      0.031     21.418      0.000 
    SUB5               0.689      0.033     20.698      0.000 
    SUB13              0.707      0.031     23.113      0.000 
    SUB15              0.514      0.038     13.435      0.000 
    HON_1              0.176      0.042      4.209      0.000 
    HON6               0.522      0.043     12.177      0.000 
    HON8               0.311      0.042      7.361      0.000 
    HON9               0.754      0.036     21.169      0.000 
    HON10              0.619      0.040     15.470      0.000 
    HON11              0.313      0.045      7.032      0.000 
    PERF61             0.317      0.049      6.433      0.000 
    PERF69             0.614      0.056     10.862      0.000 
    PERF74             0.378      0.055      6.907      0.000 
    PERF75             0.369      0.053      6.974      0.000 
    GTEACH18           0.162      0.037      4.317      0.000 
    GTEACH33           0.578      0.037     15.589      0.000 
    GTEACH39           0.471      0.042     11.105      0.000 
    GTEACH50           0.520      0.046     11.371      0.000 
    GTEACH62           0.511      0.045     11.468      0.000 
    GTEACH67           0.558      0.041     13.487      0.000 
    GTEACH68           0.278      0.048      5.760      0.000 
    GTEACH77           0.442      0.056      7.948      0.000 
    CURUSE19           0.519      0.045     11.411      0.000 
    CURUSE53           0.772      0.029     26.940      0.000 
    CURUSE56           0.633      0.047     13.355      0.000 
    CURUSE64           0.802      0.029     27.920      0.000 
    TRANS28            0.407      0.043      9.456      0.000 
    TRANS32            0.382      0.049      7.851      0.000 
    TRANS66            0.394      0.053      7.461      0.000 
    AUTH44             0.507      0.045     11.376      0.000 
    AUTH60             0.528      0.042     12.430      0.000 
    AUTH71             0.392      0.048      8.167      0.000 
    AUTH78             0.465      0.046     10.151      0.000 
    PEER24             0.409      0.059      6.966      0.000 
    PEER31             0.396      0.052      7.568      0.000 
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    PEER40             0.464      0.054      8.600      0.000 
    PEER58             0.529      0.062      8.566      0.000 
    PEER65             0.274      0.059      4.677      0.000 
    SURF87             0.306      0.059      5.209      0.000 
    SURF88             0.128      0.036      3.503      0.000 
    SURF91             0.586      0.053     11.169      0.000 
    SURF97             0.647      0.063     10.301      0.000 
    CHJUST79           0.624      0.045     13.800      0.000 
    CHJUST86           0.537      0.051     10.449      0.000 
    CHJUST99           0.273      0.052      5.273      0.000 
    CHEAT84            0.703      0.053     13.386      0.000 
    CHEAT92            0.766      0.035     21.986      0.000 
    CHEAT95            0.576      0.055     10.427      0.000 
 
     Latent                                         Two-Tailed 
    Variable        Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
    SUB1               0.072      0.024      2.973      0.003 
    HON1               0.008      0.009      0.891      0.373 
    PERF1              0.033      0.020      1.683      0.092 
    GTEACH1            0.687      0.053     13.003      0.000 
    CURUSE1            0.258      0.044      5.879      0.000 
    ASSESS1            0.824      0.059     13.866      0.000 
    PEER1              0.248      0.044      5.654      0.000 
    SURF1              0.412      0.061      6.768      0.000 
    CHJUST1            0.547      0.054     10.221      0.000 
    CHEAT1             0.672      0.054     12.339      0.000 
    TEACHER1           0.245      0.044      5.601      0.000 
 
 
QUALITY OF NUMERICAL RESULTS 
 
     Condition Number for the Information Matrix              0.676E-04 
       (ratio of smallest to largest eigenvalue) 
 
 
TECHNICAL 4 OUTPUT 
 
 
     ESTIMATES DERIVED FROM THE MODEL 
 
 
           ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       CURUSE1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.692        -0.096         0.418         0.199         0.379 
 
 
           ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              ASSESS1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.295         0.015        -0.126         0.200         0.214 
 
 
           ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER1      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.199         1.592         1.438 
 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       CURUSE1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.174         0.063         0.142         0.081         0.171 
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           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              ASSESS1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.115         0.157         0.122         0.158         0.158 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER1      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.081         0.022         0.022 
 
 
           ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       CURUSE1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB1           0.780 
 HON1           0.047         0.090 
 PERF1         -0.014        -0.006         0.429 
 GTEACH1        0.148         0.010        -0.027         0.180 
 CURUSE1        0.352         0.023         0.002         0.203         0.653 
 ASSESS1        0.219         0.014        -0.040         0.183         0.300 
 PEER1         -0.095        -0.040         0.097        -0.101        -0.147 
 SURF1         -0.152        -0.035         0.118        -0.066        -0.132 
 CHJUST1       -0.103        -0.075         0.175        -0.119        -0.192 
 CHEAT1        -0.211        -0.106         0.125        -0.082        -0.142 
 TEACHER1       0.148         0.010        -0.027         0.123         0.203 
 GENDER         0.116        -0.013         0.053         0.015         0.029 
 GRADE         -0.005        -0.003         0.017         0.020         0.037 
 
 
           ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              ASSESS1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 ASSESS1        0.328 
 PEER1         -0.150         0.536 
 SURF1         -0.097         0.144         0.307 
 CHJUST1       -0.176         0.324         0.237         0.544 
 CHEAT1        -0.122         0.281         0.225         0.446         0.628 
 TEACHER1       0.183        -0.101        -0.066        -0.119        -0.082 
 GENDER         0.022         0.057         0.005         0.075         0.057 
 GRADE          0.029        -0.063        -0.029        -0.049        -0.026 
 
 
           ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER1      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
 TEACHER1       0.123 
 GENDER         0.015         0.241 
 GRADE          0.020         0.016         0.246 
 
 
  
          S.E. FOR ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       CURUSE1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB1           0.064 
 HON1           0.017         0.023 
 PERF1          0.033         0.004         0.076 
 GTEACH1        0.027         0.004         0.016         0.045 
 CURUSE1        0.051         0.009         0.033         0.035         0.075 
 ASSESS1        0.037         0.006         0.024         0.030         0.040 
 PEER1          0.028         0.012         0.032         0.023         0.035 
 SURF1          0.034         0.009         0.031         0.016         0.030 
 CHJUST1        0.042         0.015         0.037         0.024         0.036 
 CHEAT1         0.043         0.019         0.030         0.018         0.033 
 TEACHER1       0.027         0.004         0.016         0.032         0.035 
 GENDER         0.020         0.008         0.017         0.009         0.019 
 GRADE          0.021         0.007         0.017         0.009         0.020 
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           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              ASSESS1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 ASSESS1        0.049 
 PEER1          0.030         0.082 
 SURF1          0.023         0.029         0.064 
 CHJUST1        0.030         0.039         0.043         0.064 
 CHEAT1         0.026         0.041         0.046         0.053         0.078 
 TEACHER1       0.030         0.023         0.016         0.024         0.018 
 GENDER         0.013         0.019         0.014         0.019         0.020 
 GRADE          0.013         0.020         0.014         0.019         0.019 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER1      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
 TEACHER1       0.032 
 GENDER         0.009         0.004 
 GRADE          0.009         0.011         0.003 
 
           ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       CURUSE1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB1           1.000 
 HON1           0.179         1.000 
 PERF1         -0.024        -0.029         1.000 
 GTEACH1        0.395         0.075        -0.098         1.000 
 CURUSE1        0.494         0.096         0.004         0.591         1.000 
 ASSESS1        0.433         0.082        -0.107         0.752         0.648 
 PEER1         -0.146        -0.181         0.202        -0.325        -0.249 
 SURF1         -0.312        -0.210         0.325        -0.280        -0.295 
 CHJUST1       -0.158        -0.341         0.362        -0.380        -0.322 
 CHEAT1        -0.301        -0.447         0.240        -0.245        -0.222 
 TEACHER1       0.477         0.090        -0.118         0.829         0.714 
 GENDER         0.266        -0.087         0.163         0.071         0.072 
 GRADE         -0.012        -0.020         0.052         0.094         0.092 
 
 
           ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              ASSESS1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 ASSESS1        1.000 
 PEER1         -0.357         1.000 
 SURF1         -0.307         0.355         1.000 
 CHJUST1       -0.416         0.600         0.581         1.000 
 CHEAT1        -0.268         0.484         0.512         0.763         1.000 
 TEACHER1       0.908        -0.393        -0.338        -0.458        -0.295 
 GENDER         0.077         0.159         0.020         0.206         0.145 
 GRADE          0.103        -0.173        -0.107        -0.134        -0.065 
           ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER1      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
 TEACHER1       1.000 
 GENDER         0.085         1.000 
 GRADE          0.113         0.067         1.000 
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           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       CURUSE1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB1           0.000 
 HON1           0.053         0.000 
 PERF1          0.057         0.017         0.000 
 GTEACH1        0.040         0.024         0.058         0.000 
 CURUSE1        0.044         0.029         0.061         0.039         0.000 
 ASSESS1        0.046         0.027         0.063         0.034         0.039 
 PEER1          0.039         0.051         0.064         0.049         0.053 
 SURF1          0.053         0.041         0.060         0.051         0.053 
 CHJUST1        0.062         0.059         0.058         0.053         0.052 
 CHEAT1         0.054         0.050         0.050         0.043         0.049 
 TEACHER1       0.045         0.029         0.069         0.032         0.037 
 GENDER         0.045         0.050         0.052         0.043         0.047 
 GRADE          0.048         0.048         0.052         0.042         0.047 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              ASSESS1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 ASSESS1        0.000 
 PEER1          0.051         0.000 
 SURF1          0.057         0.047         0.000 
 CHJUST1        0.053         0.052         0.053         0.000 
 CHEAT1         0.048         0.052         0.053         0.036         0.000 
 TEACHER1       0.033         0.055         0.061         0.058         0.051 
 GENDER         0.047         0.051         0.052         0.051         0.048 
 GRADE          0.046         0.050         0.052         0.052         0.048 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER1      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
 TEACHER1       0.000 
 GENDER         0.052         0.000 
 GRADE          0.050         0.045         0.000 
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Appendix M:  
Indirect effects (standardized) in Model 3 for the co-ed sample, Time 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STANDARDIZED TOTAL, TOTAL INDIRECT, SPECIFIC INDIRECT, AND DIRECT EFFECTS 
 
STDYX Standardization 
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
Effects from CURUSE1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total                0.032      0.075      0.424      0.671 
  Total indirect      -0.031      0.061     -0.498      0.618 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.003      0.006      0.444      0.657 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.047      0.058     -0.815      0.415 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.013      0.026      0.513      0.608 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    CURUSE1            0.062      0.066      0.940      0.347 
 
 
Effects from PERF1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total                0.183      0.049      3.708      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.217      0.049      4.436      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.008      0.009      0.846      0.398 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.173      0.047      3.715      0.000 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.037      0.019      1.973      0.049 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    PERF1             -0.035      0.046     -0.755      0.450 
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Effects from PEER1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total                0.334      0.059      5.664      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.277      0.057      4.898      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1              0.277      0.057      4.898      0.000 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1              0.057      0.061      0.934      0.350 
 
 
Effects from SUB1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total               -0.286      0.054     -5.302      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.028      0.050     -0.555      0.579 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.002      0.004      0.620      0.535 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.032      0.034      0.939      0.348 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.052      0.048      1.082      0.279 
 
    CHEAT1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1               0.072      0.045      1.616      0.106 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1              -0.001      0.001     -0.700      0.484 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.003      0.444      0.657 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.011      0.013     -0.884      0.377 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1              -0.012      0.011     -1.108      0.268 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.024      0.030     -0.811      0.417 
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CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.090      0.039     -2.287      0.022 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1              -0.003      0.003     -0.970      0.332 
 
 CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.007      0.013      0.515      0.607 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.054      0.018     -3.066      0.002 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    SUB1              -0.258      0.063     -4.114      0.000 
 
 
Effects from HON1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total               -0.381      0.055     -6.964      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.221      0.052     -4.268      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.008      0.009     -0.877      0.380 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    HON1              -0.176      0.050     -3.527      0.000 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.037      0.017     -2.203      0.028 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    HON1              -0.160      0.053     -3.021      0.003 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total               -0.168      0.080     -2.101      0.036 
  Total indirect      -0.314      0.082     -3.853      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.023      0.025     -0.899      0.369 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.182      0.079     -2.308      0.021 
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    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.110      0.034     -3.215      0.001 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    TEACHER1           0.146      0.089      1.646      0.100 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE1 to SURF1 
 
  Total               -0.096      0.090     -1.062      0.288 
  Total indirect      -0.023      0.041     -0.561      0.575 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.032      0.040     -0.812      0.417 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.009      0.018      0.512      0.609 
 
  Direct 
    SURF1 
    CURUSE1           -0.073      0.088     -0.827      0.408 
 
 
Effects from PERF1 to SURF1 
 
  Total                0.303      0.061      4.974      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.145      0.039      3.744      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.120      0.036      3.340      0.001 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.025      0.013      1.932      0.053 
 
  Direct 
    SURF1 
    PERF1              0.157      0.065      2.415      0.016 
 
 
Effects from SUB1 to SURF1 
 
  Total               -0.313      0.055     -5.690      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.097      0.049     -1.980      0.048 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1              -0.011      0.011     -1.035      0.301 
 
    SURF1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.037      0.045     -0.824      0.410 
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SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.036      0.033      1.087      0.277 
 
    SURF1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1               0.038      0.053      0.723      0.469 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1              -0.009      0.008     -1.118      0.264 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.017      0.021     -0.808      0.419 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.062      0.027     -2.279      0.023 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1              -0.002      0.002     -0.980      0.327 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.005      0.009      0.514      0.607 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.038      0.013     -2.922      0.003 
 
  Direct 
    SURF1 
    SUB1              -0.216      0.065     -3.301      0.001 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER1 to SURF1 
 
  Total               -0.125      0.099     -1.261      0.207 
  Total indirect      -0.202      0.058     -3.466      0.001 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.126      0.054     -2.311      0.021 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.076      0.025     -3.075      0.002 
 
  Direct 
    SURF1 
    TEACHER1           0.077      0.106      0.730      0.466 
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Effects from SUB1 to CHJUST1 
 
  Total               -0.170      0.059     -2.879      0.004 
  Total indirect      -0.241      0.044     -5.530      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1              -0.017      0.015     -1.136      0.256 
 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.033      0.041     -0.810      0.418 
 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.123      0.049     -2.485      0.013 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1              -0.004      0.004     -0.988      0.323 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.009      0.018      0.517      0.605 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.074      0.023     -3.241      0.001 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.071      0.063      1.119      0.263 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE1 to CHJUST1 
 
  Total               -0.046      0.082     -0.560      0.576 
  Total indirect       0.018      0.036      0.514      0.607 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.018      0.036      0.514      0.607 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.064      0.079     -0.813      0.416 
 
 
Effects from PERF1 to CHJUST1 
 
  Total                0.287      0.057      5.014      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.050      0.025      2.031      0.042 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.050      0.025      2.031      0.042 
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 Direct 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.237      0.057      4.198      0.000 
 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER1 to CHJUST1 
 
  Total               -0.400      0.095     -4.227      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.150      0.044     -3.454      0.001 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.150      0.044     -3.454      0.001 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.249      0.099     -2.526      0.012 
 
 
Effects from HON1 to CHJUST1 
 
  Total               -0.293      0.061     -4.791      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.051      0.022     -2.299      0.022 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.051      0.022     -2.299      0.022 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST1 
    HON1              -0.242      0.060     -4.045      0.000 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE1 to PEER1 
 
  Total                0.049      0.095      0.512      0.609 
  Total indirect       0.000      0.000      0.000      1.000 
 
  Direct 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.049      0.095      0.512      0.609 
 
 
Effects from HON1 to PEER1 
 
  Total               -0.135      0.052     -2.564      0.010 
  Total indirect       0.000      0.000      0.000      1.000 
 
  Direct 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.135      0.052     -2.564      0.010 
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Appendix N: 
Stepwise regression of predictors of Time 1 variables 
Table N1 
Standardized coefficients of stepwise regression on Peer norms and Justifiability of cheating, Time 1 
  
Peer norms   Justifiability of cheating 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6  Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step5 Step 6 
  β β β β β β  β β β β  β β 
Curuse -.250*** -.249*** --- -.225*** -.228*** .050  -.329*** -.334*** -.303*** -.284*** -.297*** -.050 
Gender  .180*** --- .168** .150** .165**   .235*** .251*** .222*** .182*** .187*** 
Grade  -.163** --- -.167** -.173*** -.157**   -.129** -.132** -.133** -.143** -.125** 
Sub   --- --- --- ---    -.062 -.018 .000 .061 
Hon    -.171** -.162** -.113*     -.308*** -.293*** -.250*** 
Perf     .161* .117      .323*** .280*** 
Teacher           -.401***             -.401*** 
 
Table N2 
Standardized coefficients of stepwise regression on Surface learning strategies and Self-reported cheating, Time 1 
  
Surface learning strategies   Self-reported cheating 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6  Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step5 Step 6 
  β β β β β β  β β β β  β β 
Curuse -.184*** -.282*** -.106* --- -.177** -.079  -.231*** -.237*** -.087 -.066 -.073 .024 
Gender  .039 .098 --- .054 .054   .161** .225*** .182*** .159*** .161*** 
Grade  -.081 -.099* --- -.106* -.099*   -.055 -.072 -.079 -.085 -.077 
Sub   -.144*** --- -.225** -.198**    -.305*** -.241*** -.232*** -.209*** 
Hon    --- --- ---     -.395*** -.386*** -.307*** 
Perf     .307*** .292***      .189*** .174*** 
Teacher           -.158             -.156* 
Note. All models satisfied fit requirements for multivariate models (see Table 5.1); CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; Grade = Grade-level; SUB = Subject self-concept; HON 
= Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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Appendix O: 
Standardized beta coefficients for the Time 1 Co-ed model, estimated with 
composite scores 
Table O1 
Co-ed sample model: standardized beta coefficients estimated with composite scores, Time 1 
 
 
Predictors 
 N = 493 Grade Gender Sub Hon Perf Curuse Teacher Peer Chjust 
Sub -.033 .278***        
Hon -.008 -.061 ---       
Perf .046 .166** -.049 ---      
Curuse .108* -.077 .515*** --- ---     
Teacher .120** -.045 .495*** --- --- ---    
Peer -.158** .170** --- -.150** .098 .041 -.392***   
Chjust -.061 .117* .103 -.235*** .243*** -.063 -.321** .373***  
Surf -.041 -.074 -.248*** --- .135* -.086 .147 --- .588*** 
Cheat .005 .016 -.255*** -.174** -.047 .027 .188 .005 .805*** 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal 
structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE 
= Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface 
learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level.
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Appendix P: Equivalent model 1, Time 1 
Usefulness of curriculum positioned as a predictor of Teacher quality 
 
Figure P1. Equivalent Model 1, Time 1: Usefulness of curriculum positioned as a correlate of Teacher quality (N = 493). 2(1176) = 1962; RMSEA = .037, CIs = .034 
- .040, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .059; N:q = 2.5; SCF = .962. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = 
Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; 
PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level
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Appendix Q: Equivalent model 2, Time 1 
Peer norms positioned as a correlate of class context 
 
Figure Q1. Equivalent Model 2, Time 1: Peer norms positioned as a correlate of class context (N = 493). 2(1175) = 1971; RMSEA = .037, CIs = .034 - .040, pclose = 
1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .059; N:q = 2.5; SCF = .962. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance 
goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer 
norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level.
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Appendix R: Equivalent model 3, Time 1 
Peer norms positioned as a predictor of class context 
 
Figure R1. Equivalent Model 3, Time 1: Peer norms positioned as a predictor of class context (N = 493). 2(1175) = 1965; RMSEA = .037, CIs = .034 - .042, pclose = 
1.00; TLI = .91; CFI = .92; SRMR = .056; N:q = 2.5; SCF = .962. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance 
goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer 
norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level. 
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Appendix S:  
Item descriptive statistics: Time 2 vs. Time 1 
Table S1 
Item descriptive statistics: Time 2 vs. Time 1 
  Time 2 sample (n=297)  Time 1 sample (n=493)  Δ = (Time 2) - (Time 1) 
  Mean SE SD Var. S K  Mean SE SD Var. S K  ΔMean ΔSD ΔVar. ΔS ΔK 
SUB                     
sub2  2.29 0.06 1.06 1.12 0.43 -0.55  2.43 0.05 1.04 1.08 0.40 -0.41  -0.14 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.15 
sub3  2.12 0.06 1.04 1.07 0.83 -0.22  2.31 0.05 1.01 1.01 0.52 -0.13  -0.19 0.03 0.06 0.31 -0.09 
sub4  2.55 0.08 1.34 1.79 0.37 -1.10  2.85 0.06 1.23 1.52 0.08 -0.90  -0.30 0.10 0.26 0.28 -0.20 
sub10  2.52 0.06 1.09 1.20 0.32 -0.45  2.72 0.05 1.10 1.20 0.17 -0.56  -0.20 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.10 
sub11  1.97 0.06 1.09 1.19 1.08 0.42  1.88 0.05 1.03 1.06 1.00 0.20  0.09 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.22 
HON                     
hon1  1.81 0.05 0.79 0.62 1.05 1.87  1.86 0.03 0.72 0.51 0.62 0.60  -0.05 0.07 0.11 0.44 1.27 
hon6  2.40 0.05 0.91 0.83 0.54 0.37  2.46 0.04 0.89 0.80 0.39 0.16  -0.06 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.21 
hon8  1.88 0.05 0.86 0.74 0.97 0.98  1.90 0.04 0.79 0.63 0.60 0.02  -0.02 0.07 0.11 0.37 0.96 
hon9  2.00 0.05 0.87 0.75 0.97 1.49  1.98 0.03 0.78 0.60 0.77 1.19  0.02 0.09 0.15 0.20 0.30 
hon10  1.79 0.06 0.98 0.95 1.36 1.66  1.77 0.04 0.83 0.69 1.01 0.78  0.02 0.15 0.26 0.35 0.88 
hon11  2.39 0.06 1.01 1.02 0.55 -0.16  2.17 0.04 0.98 0.96 0.65 -0.14  0.22 0.03 0.06 -0.10 -0.02 
 
 
Note. SE = Standard error; SD = Standard deviation; Var. = variance; S = Skewness; K = Kurtosis; Δ = ‘change in’. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON 
= Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = 
Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning 
strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level. 
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Table S1, continued 
  Time 2 sample (n=297)  Time 1 sample (n=493)  Δ = (Time 2) - (Time 1) 
   Mean SE SD Var. S K  Mean SE SD Var. S K  ΔMean ΔSD ΔVar. ΔS ΔK 
GTEACH                     
gteach18  2.67 0.07 1.13 1.27 0.29 -0.67  3.12 0.05 1.06 1.11 -0.03 -0.57  -0.45 0.07 0.16 0.32 -0.10 
gteach33  2.54 0.07 1.21 1.47 0.49 -0.59  2.42 0.05 1.18 1.40 0.67 -0.36  0.12 0.03 0.07 -0.19 -0.23 
gteach39  2.51 0.06 1.00 1.01 0.49 -0.19  2.52 0.05 1.09 1.19 0.46 -0.45  -0.01 -0.09 -0.18 0.03 0.26 
gteach50  2.46 0.06 1.03 1.06 0.53 -0.25  2.52 0.05 1.07 1.15 0.58 -0.18  -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 
gteach62  2.32 0.06 1.02 1.04 0.50 -0.57  2.39 0.05 1.06 1.12 0.68 0.09  -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 -0.19 -0.66 
gteach67  2.32 0.06 1.11 1.23 0.72 -0.05  2.40 0.05 1.08 1.16 0.61 -0.11  -0.08 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.05 
gteach68  2.29 0.07 1.11 1.24 0.72 -0.19  2.26 0.05 1.10 1.21 0.66 -0.18  0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.00 
gteach77  2.45 0.06 0.99 0.97 0.23 -0.54  2.48 0.04 1.00 0.99 0.55 0.10  -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.32 -0.64 
PERF                     
perf61  3.46 0.07 1.13 1.28 -0.38 -0.63  3.49 0.05 1.16 1.36 -0.36 -0.75  -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 0.12 
perf69  3.37 0.07 1.21 1.47 -0.22 -0.95  3.24 0.06 1.24 1.54 -0.15 -0.99  0.13 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 0.05 
perf74  3.49 0.07 1.15 1.32 -0.36 -0.68  3.17 0.06 1.25 1.56 -0.09 -0.98  0.32 -0.10 -0.24 -0.27 0.30 
perf75  3.88 0.07 1.17 1.36 -0.83 -0.26  3.61 0.06 1.34 1.79 -0.54 -0.94  0.27 -0.17 -0.43 -0.28 0.68 
CURUSE                     
curuse19  2.39 0.06 1.10 1.21 0.62 -0.21  2.53 0.05 1.12 1.26 0.50 -0.43  -0.14 -0.02 -0.05 0.13 0.22 
curuse53  2.48 0.06 1.04 1.08 0.43 -0.36  2.61 0.05 1.11 1.23 0.50 -0.36  -0.13 -0.07 -0.15 -0.07 0.00 
curuse56  2.39 0.06 1.04 1.09 0.62 -0.12  2.31 0.05 1.02 1.04 0.58 -0.14  0.08 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 
curuse64  2.47 0.06 1.08 1.16 0.52 -0.27  2.48 0.05 1.08 1.16 0.51 -0.25  -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 
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Table S1, continued 
  Time 2 sample (n=297)  Time 1 sample (n=493)  Δ = (Time 2) - (Time 1) 
    Mean SE SD Var. S K  Mean SE SD Var. S K  ΔMean ΔSD ΔVar. ΔS ΔK 
ASSESS                     
auth44  2.10 0.05 0.85 0.72 0.72 0.65  2.06 0.04 0.86 0.73 0.73 0.68  0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
auth60  2.19 0.05 0.88 0.77 0.56 0.02  2.30 0.04 0.94 0.89 0.50 0.13  -0.11 -0.06 -0.12 0.06 -0.11 
auth71  2.14 0.05 0.84 0.71 0.45 -0.12  2.31 0.04 0.90 0.80 0.40 0.07  -0.17 -0.06 -0.10 0.04 -0.19 
auth78  2.31 0.05 0.90 0.81 0.51 0.31  2.15 0.04 0.94 0.89 0.68 0.36  0.16 -0.04 -0.08 -0.17 -0.05 
trans28  1.97 0.05 0.85 0.73 0.79 0.52  2.04 0.04 0.90 0.81 0.93 1.01  -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 -0.15 -0.50 
trans32  2.15 0.05 0.91 0.83 0.79 0.70  2.18 0.04 0.86 0.73 0.57 0.21  -0.03 0.05 0.09 0.22 0.49 
trans66  2.18 0.06 0.95 0.90 0.72 0.21  2.29 0.04 0.95 0.91 0.71 0.45  -0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.24 
PEER                     
peer24  1.97 0.06 1.01 1.02 0.91 0.41  2.02 0.04 0.99 0.98 1.01 0.78  -0.05 0.02 0.04 -0.10 -0.37 
peer31  2.41 0.07 1.12 1.25 0.51 -0.47  2.12 0.04 0.96 0.92 0.70 0.10  0.29 0.16 0.33 -0.19 -0.57 
peer40  2.55 0.07 1.21 1.47 0.40 -0.76  2.10 0.05 1.04 1.09 0.85 0.23  0.45 0.17 0.38 -0.45 -1.00 
peer58  2.39 0.07 1.14 1.29 0.39 -0.74  2.26 0.05 1.16 1.33 0.72 -0.30  0.13 -0.02 -0.04 -0.33 -0.44 
peer65  2.24 0.06 1.02 1.04 0.55 -0.26  3.79 0.05 1.15 1.32 -0.08 -0.02  -1.55 -0.13 -0.28 0.62 -0.24 
SURF                     
surf87  3.96 0.06 1.05 1.10 -1.03 0.64  3.99 0.05 1.00 1.01 -0.89 0.22  -0.03 0.04 0.09 -0.14 0.42 
surf88  2.88 0.07 1.22 0.05 0.21 -0.89  2.94 0.06 1.27 1.62 0.08 -1.05  -0.06 -0.06 -1.58 0.13 0.17 
surf91  3.37 0.07 1.18 1.39 -0.32 -0.78  3.46 0.05 1.20 1.43 -0.31 -0.85  -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 
surf97  3.60 0.07 1.13 1.28 -0.58 -0.42  3.60 0.05 1.14 1.30 -0.37 -0.78  0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.21 0.36 
 
Appendix S: Item descriptive statistics: Time 2 vs. Time 1│495 
 
     
 
 
Table S1, continued 
  Time 2 sample (n=297)  Time 1 sample (n=493)  Δ = (Time 2) - (Time 1) 
  Mean SE SD Var. S K  Mean SE SD Var. S K  ΔMean ΔSD ΔVar. ΔS ΔK 
CHJUST                     
chjust79  4.22 0.05 0.92 0.85 -1.27 1.61  4.21 0.04 0.94 0.89 -1.06 0.57  0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.21 1.04 
chjust86  3.94 0.07 1.14 1.14 -0.88 -0.15  3.95 0.05 1.17 1.37 -0.95 -0.02  -0.01 -0.03 -0.23 0.07 -0.13 
chjust99  4.14 0.06 1.08 1.08 -1.18 0.68  3.97 0.05 1.19 1.42 -1.01 0.16  0.17 -0.12 -0.34 -0.16 0.52 
CHEAT                     
cheat84  4.37 0.06 0.98 0.95 -1.59 1.95  4.41 0.04 0.95 0.90 -1.58 1.63  -0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.31 
cheat92  4.29 0.06 1.08 1.17 -1.44 1.10  4.28 0.05 1.02 1.05 -1.26 0.51  0.01 0.06 0.12 -0.18 0.59 
cheat95  4.16 0.06 1.11 1.24 -1.15 0.25  4.16 0.05 1.12 1.25 -1.11 0.09  0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.16 
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Appendix T: 
Gender-specific congeneric model results, Time 2 
Table T1 
Congeneric model results for male respondents at Time 2 
 CFA  
N = 115    Loading RMSEA     
 Scale (# items) 2 p df range value CIs CFI TLI SRMR Rho 
Subject self-concept (5)  .70 .98 5 .48-.90 .000 .000-.000 1.00 1.05 .007 .90 
Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) 15.2 .09 9 .40-.87 .077 .000-.143 .97 .94 .041 .83 
Performance structure (4) 1.4 .51 2 .57-.86 .000 .000-.165 1.00 1.03 .018 .78 
Good teaching (8) 31.8 .046 20 .19-.85 .072 .010-.117 .96 .94 .044 .86 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) 1.3 .53 2 .74-.91 .000 .000-.162 1.00 1.02 .009 .91 
Assessment quality 30.6 .01 14 .70-.80 .102 .052-.151 .93 .90 .046 .91 
Peer norms (5) 1.1 .96 5 .63-.92 .000 .000-.000 1.00 1.05 .012 .85 
Surface learning strategies (4) .26 .61 1 .46-.85 .000 .000-.197 1.00 1.05 .007 .81 
Justifiability of cheating (3) .07 .80 1 .62-.81 .000 .000-.158 1.00 1.08 0.01 .75 
Self-reported cheating (3) .33 .56 1 .68-.92 .000 .000-.205 1.00 1.04 .008 .87 
 
Table T2 
Congeneric model results for female respondents at Time 2 
 CFA  
(N = 182)    Loading RMSEA     
 Scale (# items) 2 p df range value CIs CFI TLI SRMR Rho 
Subject self-concept (5)  6.6 .25 5 .78-.91 .042 .000-.117 1.00 .99 .013 .93 
Honesty-trust. self-concept (6) 8.6 .47 9 .54-.89 .000 .000-.081 1.00 1.00 .024 .88 
Performance structure (4) 11.9 .003 2 .48-.87 .165 .083-.261 .92 .76 .040 .77 
Good teaching (8) 35.1 .02 20 .44-.82 .064 .026-.099 .97 .96 .035 .88 
Usefulness of curriculum (4) 1.4 .51 2 .79-.94 .000 .000-.131 1.00 1.01 .007 .93 
Assessment quality 32.9 .003 14 .57-.79 .086 .048-.125 .94 .92 .047 .86 
Peer norms (5) 9.1 .10 5 .54-.85 .067 .000-.136 .98 .95 .07 .85 
Surface learning strategies (4) 3.3 .07 1 .39-.88 .112 .000-.256 .98 .90 .022 .72 
Justifiability of cheating (3) .001 .97 1 .65-.83 .000 .000-.000 1.00 1.05 .001 .78 
Self-reported cheating (3) 2.3 .13 1 .65-.96 .083 .000-.233 .99 .96 .113 .85 
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Appendix U: Male sample model correlation matrices, Time 2 
Table U1 
CFA: Estimated correlation matrix for the Time 2 male sample 
              SUB2          HON2          PERF2         GTEACH2       ASSESS2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB2           1.000 
 HON2           0.330         1.000 
 PERF2          0.282        -0.090         1.000 
 GTEACH2        0.421         0.362         0.225         1.000 
 ASSESS2        0.457         0.393         0.244         0.921         1.000 
 CURUSE2        0.531         0.230         0.243         0.651         0.707 
 PEER2         -0.330        -0.328        -0.267        -0.583        -0.633 
 SURF2         -0.279        -0.315         0.304        -0.045        -0.049 
 CHJUST2       -0.178        -0.439         0.326        -0.262        -0.284 
 CHEAT2        -0.367        -0.450        -0.115        -0.426        -0.462 
 TEACHER2       0.457         0.393         0.244         0.921         1.000 
 
              CURUSE2       PEER2         SURF2         CHJUST2       CHEAT2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 CURUSE2        1.000 
 PEER2         -0.532         1.000 
 SURF2         -0.127         0.099         1.000 
 CHJUST2       -0.210         0.351         0.765         1.000 
 CHEAT2        -0.423         0.577         0.390         0.786         1.000 
 TEACHER2       0.707        -0.633        -0.049        -0.284        -0.462 
 
Table U2 
Structural model: Estimated correlation matrix for the Time 2 male sample 
              SUB2          HON2          PERF2         GTEACH2       ASSESS2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB2           1.000 
 HON2           0.336         1.000 
 PERF2          0.272         0.088         1.000 
 GTEACH2        0.427         0.142         0.225         1.000 
 ASSESS2        0.464         0.154         0.244         0.922         1.000 
 CURUSE2        0.532         0.177         0.243         0.652         0.707 
 PEER2         -0.386        -0.240        -0.285        -0.567        -0.615 
 SURF2         -0.290        -0.306         0.274        -0.001        -0.001 
 CHJUST2       -0.200        -0.346         0.287        -0.212        -0.230 
 CHEAT2        -0.391        -0.403        -0.159        -0.377        -0.409 
 TEACHER2       0.464         0.154         0.244         0.922         1.000 
 
              CURUSE2       PEER2         SURF2         CHJUST2       CHEAT2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 CURUSE2        1.000 
 PEER2         -0.529         1.000 
 SURF2         -0.115         0.112         1.000 
 CHJUST2       -0.200         0.324         0.759         1.000 
 CHEAT2        -0.414         0.561         0.389         0.777         1.000 
 TEACHER2       0.707        -0.615        -0.001        -0.230        -0.409 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal 
structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good teaching; 
CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF 
= Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level.
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Appendix V: Female sample model correlation matrix, Time 2 
Table V1 
Estimated correlation matrix of the CFA for the Time 2 female sample 
              SUB2          HON2          PERF2         GTEACH2       ASSESS2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB2           1.000 
 HON2           0.245         1.000 
 PERF2          0.022        -0.099         1.000 
 GTEACH2        0.419         0.358        -0.015         1.000 
 ASSESS2        0.502         0.429        -0.018         0.730         1.000 
 CURUSE2        0.543         0.230         0.061         0.517         0.619 
 PEER2         -0.066        -0.324         0.125        -0.318        -0.381 
 SURF2         -0.501        -0.226         0.218        -0.522        -0.626 
 CHJUST2       -0.368        -0.195         0.277        -0.455        -0.545 
 CHEAT2        -0.366        -0.252         0.188        -0.359        -0.430 
 TEACHER2       0.537         0.458        -0.019         0.781         0.935 
 
              CURUSE2       PEER2         SURF2         CHJUST2       CHEAT2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 CURUSE2        1.000 
 PEER2         -0.283         1.000 
 SURF2         -0.494         0.275         1.000 
 CHJUST2       -0.407         0.566         0.655         1.000 
 CHEAT2        -0.347         0.364         0.603         0.713         1.000 
 TEACHER2       0.662        -0.407        -0.669        -0.583        -0.460 
 
 
Table V2 
Estimated correlation matrix of the structural model for the Time 2 female sample 
              SUB2          HON2          PERF2         GTEACH2       ASSESS2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB2           1.000 
 HON2           0.246         1.000 
 PERF2          0.025         0.001         1.000 
 GTEACH2        0.421         0.324         0.007         1.000 
 ASSESS2        0.498         0.384         0.008         0.732         1.000 
 CURUSE2        0.544         0.129         0.061         0.504         0.597 
 PEER2         -0.218        -0.296         0.100        -0.295        -0.349 
 SURF2         -0.519        -0.238         0.208        -0.510        -0.603 
 CHJUST2       -0.417        -0.140         0.270        -0.446        -0.528 
 CHEAT2        -0.396        -0.229         0.175        -0.349        -0.413 
 TEACHER2       0.535         0.412         0.009         0.787         0.931 
 
              CURUSE2       PEER2         SURF2         CHJUST2       CHEAT2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 CURUSE2        1.000 
 PEER2         -0.256         1.000 
 SURF2         -0.484         0.375         1.000 
 CHJUST2       -0.398         0.566         0.643         1.000 
 CHEAT2        -0.331         0.396         0.608         0.710         1.000 
 TEACHER2       0.641        -0.375        -0.648        -0.567        -0.444 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal 
structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Experience of assessment; GTEACH = Good teaching; 
CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF 
= Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; Grade = Grade-level.
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Appendix W: 
Full output for Model 4 co-ed data (N = 297)  
estimated with observed indicator variables, Time 2 
MODEL FIT INFORMATION 
 
Number of Free Parameters                      199 
 
Loglikelihood 
 
          H0 Value                      -17300.886 
          H0 Scaling Correction Factor      1.3399 
            for MLR 
          H1 Value                      -16224.500 
          H1 Scaling Correction Factor      1.1412 
            for MLR 
 
Information Criteria 
 
          Akaike (AIC)                   34999.772 
          Bayesian (BIC)                 35734.824 
          Sample-Size Adjusted BIC       35103.727 
            (n* = (n + 2) / 24) 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit 
 
          Value                           1943.855* 
          Degrees of Freedom                  1173 
          P-Value                           0.0000 
          Scaling Correction Factor         1.1075 
            for MLR 
 
*   The chi-square value for MLM, MLMV, MLR, ULSMV, WLSM and WLSMV cannot be used 
    for chi-square difference testing in the regular way.  MLM, MLR and WLSM 
    chi-square difference testing is described on the Mplus website.  MLMV, WLSMV, 
    and ULSMV difference testing is done using the DIFFTEST option. 
 
RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation) 
 
          Estimate                           0.047 
          90 Percent C.I.                    0.043  0.051 
          Probability RMSEA <= .05           0.907 
 
CFI/TLI 
 
          CFI                                0.894 
          TLI                                0.885 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit for the Baseline Model 
 
          Value                           8537.683 
          Degrees of Freedom                  1274 
          P-Value                           0.0000 
 
SRMR (Standardized Root Mean Square Residual) 
 
          Value                              0.069 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix W: Full output for Model 4 co-ed data (N = 297) estimated with observed 
indicator variables, Time 2 │500 
 
     
 
 
MODEL RESULTS 
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 SUB2     BY 
    SUB2_2             1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    SUB3_2             0.994      0.044     22.708      0.000 
    SUB4_2             1.261      0.049     25.743      0.000 
    SUB10_2            1.014      0.049     20.721      0.000 
    SUB11_2            0.791      0.069     11.474      0.000 
 
 HON2     BY 
    HON1_2             1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    HON5_2             1.367      0.196      6.957      0.000 
    HON6_2             1.235      0.133      9.258      0.000 
    HON7_2             1.634      0.174      9.402      0.000 
    HON8_2             1.740      0.190      9.160      0.000 
    HON9_2             1.129      0.174      6.481      0.000 
 
 PERF2    BY 
    PERF51_2           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    PERF59_2           1.486      0.174      8.544      0.000 
    PERF63_2           1.064      0.140      7.597      0.000 
    PERF64_2           1.227      0.177      6.929      0.000 
 
 CURUSE2  BY 
    CURU15_2           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    CURU43_2           1.060      0.066     16.169      0.000 
    CURU46_2           1.045      0.069     15.180      0.000 
    CURU54_2           1.135      0.068     16.599      0.000 
 
 PEER2    BY 
    PEER20_2           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    PEER25_2           1.323      0.136      9.703      0.000 
    PEER34_2           1.334      0.138      9.696      0.000 
    PEER48_2           1.248      0.146      8.567      0.000 
    PEER55_2           1.435      0.140     10.232      0.000 
 
 SURF2    BY 
    SURF75_2           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    SURF76_2           0.646      0.116      5.553      0.000 
    SURF79_2           0.984      0.118      8.353      0.000 
    SURF87_2           1.041      0.100     10.387      0.000 
 
 CHJUST2  BY 
    CHJU67_2           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    CHJU74_2           1.256      0.145      8.685      0.000 
    CHJU89_2           1.057      0.147      7.190      0.000 
 
 CHEAT2   BY 
    CHEA72_2           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    CHEA80_2           1.408      0.161      8.771      0.000 
    CHEA84_2           1.242      0.151      8.215      0.000 
 
 ASSESS2  BY 
    TRAN23_2           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    TRAN26_2           1.044      0.097     10.797      0.000 
    TRAN56_2           1.122      0.094     11.926      0.000 
    AUTH36_2           0.977      0.096     10.164      0.000 
    AUTH50_2           1.134      0.093     12.142      0.000 
    AUTH61_2           1.072      0.093     11.509      0.000 
    AUTH66_2           1.144      0.104     10.958      0.000 
 
 GTEACH2  BY 
    GTEA14_2           1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    GTEA27_2           1.128      0.105     10.713      0.000 
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    GTEA33_2           0.984      0.081     12.157      0.000 
    GTEA41_2           1.136      0.091     12.508      0.000 
    GTEA52_2           1.061      0.096     11.104      0.000 
    GTEA57_2           1.103      0.109     10.095      0.000 
    GTEA58_2           0.495      0.112      4.426      0.000 
    GTEA65_2           1.013      0.096     10.594      0.000 
 
 TEACHER2 BY 
    GTEACH2            1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    ASSESS2            0.934      0.117      7.954      0.000 
 
 CHEAT2   ON 
    CURUSE2           -0.075      0.078     -0.963      0.336 
    CHJUST2            0.708      0.155      4.584      0.000 
    PERF2             -0.161      0.091     -1.776      0.076 
    PEER2              0.098      0.100      0.986      0.324 
    SUB2              -0.049      0.063     -0.787      0.431 
    HON2              -0.079      0.113     -0.704      0.481 
    TEACHER2           0.073      0.133      0.551      0.581 
 
 SURF2    ON 
    CURUSE2           -0.107      0.096     -1.115      0.265 
    CHJUST2            0.678      0.159      4.264      0.000 
    PERF2              0.111      0.092      1.213      0.225 
    SUB2              -0.164      0.079     -2.080      0.038 
    TEACHER2           0.079      0.175      0.450      0.653 
 
 CHJUST2  ON 
    SUB2              -0.107      0.067     -1.597      0.110 
    CURUSE2           -0.007      0.092     -0.077      0.939 
    PEER2              0.322      0.120      2.681      0.007 
    PERF2              0.396      0.087      4.552      0.000 
    TEACHER2          -0.260      0.146     -1.781      0.075 
    HON2              -0.002      0.122     -0.013      0.990 
 
 PEER2    ON 
    CURUSE2           -0.077      0.072     -1.068      0.286 
    PERF2             -0.037      0.062     -0.602      0.547 
    TEACHER2          -0.428      0.123     -3.484      0.000 
    HON2              -0.127      0.095     -1.328      0.184 
 
 PERF2    ON 
    SUB2               0.082      0.049      1.656      0.098 
 
 TEACHER2 ON 
    SUB2               0.240      0.047      5.150      0.000 
    HON2               0.394      0.087      4.513      0.000 
 
 CURUSE2  ON 
    SUB2               0.489      0.071      6.884      0.000 
 
 CHEAT2   ON 
    GENDER             0.093      0.080      1.167      0.243 
    GRADE              0.062      0.069      0.890      0.373 
 
 SURF2    ON 
    GENDER            -0.005      0.111     -0.046      0.963 
    GRADE              0.127      0.087      1.459      0.145 
 
 CHJUST2  ON 
    GENDER             0.210      0.091      2.313      0.021 
    GRADE              0.061      0.075      0.818      0.413 
 
 PEER2    ON 
    GENDER             0.306      0.080      3.836      0.000 
    GRADE             -0.196      0.076     -2.570      0.010 
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PERF2    ON 
    GENDER             0.355      0.106      3.367      0.001 
    GRADE             -0.184      0.084     -2.184      0.029 
 
 TEACHER2 ON 
    GENDER             0.025      0.074      0.333      0.739 
    GRADE             -0.214      0.075     -2.843      0.004 
 
 CURUSE2  ON 
    GENDER            -0.016      0.094     -0.171      0.864 
    GRADE             -0.180      0.090     -1.988      0.047 
 
 HON2     ON 
    GENDER            -0.027      0.059     -0.453      0.651 
    GRADE              0.012      0.058      0.210      0.834 
 
 SUB2     ON 
    GENDER             0.461      0.113      4.084      0.000 
    GRADE             -0.183      0.110     -1.667      0.096 
 
 SUB2     WITH 
    HON2               0.126      0.036      3.457      0.001 
 
 PERF2    WITH 
    TEACHER2           0.022      0.026      0.839      0.401 
    CURUSE2            0.025      0.033      0.762      0.446 
 
 TEACHER2 WITH 
    CURUSE2            0.196      0.040      4.930      0.000 
 
 SURF2    WITH 
    CHEAT2            -0.015      0.033     -0.470      0.638 
 
 SURF87_2 WITH 
    SURF79_2           0.219      0.084      2.612      0.009 
 
 Intercepts 
    SUB2_2             1.817      0.243      7.481      0.000 
    SUB3_2             1.651      0.237      6.968      0.000 
    SUB4_2             1.960      0.306      6.408      0.000 
    SUB10_2            2.039      0.248      8.236      0.000 
    SUB11_2            1.602      0.190      8.412      0.000 
    HON1_2             1.840      0.134     13.717      0.000 
    HON5_2             2.438      0.191     12.783      0.000 
    HON6_2             1.909      0.162     11.751      0.000 
    HON7_2             2.040      0.217      9.413      0.000 
    HON8_2             1.838      0.232      7.908      0.000 
    HON9_2             2.415      0.162     14.945      0.000 
    PERF51_2           3.124      0.212     14.709      0.000 
    PERF59_2           2.866      0.289      9.929      0.000 
    PERF63_2           3.130      0.215     14.562      0.000 
    PERF64_2           3.465      0.244     14.207      0.000 
    GTEA14_2           2.844      0.181     15.734      0.000 
    GTEA27_2           2.743      0.202     13.558      0.000 
    GTEA33_2           2.687      0.179     14.979      0.000 
    GTEA41_2           2.660      0.197     13.469      0.000 
    GTEA52_2           2.508      0.188     13.364      0.000 
    GTEA57_2           2.519      0.192     13.136      0.000 
    GTEA58_2           2.378      0.104     22.966      0.000 
    GTEA65_2           2.631      0.177     14.855      0.000 
    CURU15_2           2.459      0.210     11.692      0.000 
    CURU43_2           2.554      0.221     11.542      0.000 
    CURU46_2           2.459      0.218     11.283      0.000 
    CURU54_2           2.545      0.237     10.722      0.000 
    TRAN23_2           2.132      0.171     12.473      0.000 
    TRAN26_2           2.325      0.176     13.218      0.000 
    TRAN56_2           2.365      0.189     12.501      0.000 
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    AUTH36_2           2.260      0.163     13.844      0.000 
    AUTH50_2           2.373      0.184     12.878      0.000 
    AUTH61_2           2.323      0.175     13.283      0.000 
    AUTH66_2           2.496      0.187     13.334      0.000 
    PEER20_2           3.758      0.178     21.087      0.000 
    PEER25_2           3.232      0.228     14.171      0.000 
    PEER34_2           3.084      0.226     13.646      0.000 
    PEER48_2           3.273      0.214     15.317      0.000 
    PEER55_2           3.370      0.240     14.035      0.000 
    SURF75_2           3.388      0.257     13.182      0.000 
    SURF76_2           2.507      0.172     14.559      0.000 
    SURF79_2           2.807      0.250     11.245      0.000 
    SURF87_2           2.997      0.269     11.141      0.000 
    CHJU67_2           3.567      0.211     16.926      0.000 
    CHJU74_2           3.125      0.250     12.519      0.000 
    CHJU89_2           3.460      0.231     14.977      0.000 
    CHEA72_2           3.726      0.213     17.465      0.000 
    CHEA80_2           3.382      0.285     11.864      0.000 
    CHEA84_2           3.357      0.252     13.311      0.000 
 
 Residual Variances 
    SUB2_2             0.248      0.057      4.349      0.000 
    SUB3_2             0.213      0.028      7.665      0.000 
    SUB4_2             0.406      0.057      7.167      0.000 
    SUB10_2            0.304      0.039      7.877      0.000 
    SUB11_2            0.644      0.107      6.026      0.000 
    HON1_2             0.395      0.063      6.301      0.000 
    HON5_2             0.415      0.050      8.255      0.000 
    HON6_2             0.403      0.049      8.301      0.000 
    HON7_2             0.159      0.024      6.622      0.000 
    HON8_2             0.283      0.039      7.348      0.000 
    HON9_2             0.737      0.082      9.037      0.000 
    PERF51_2           0.819      0.089      9.176      0.000 
    PERF59_2           0.465      0.092      5.069      0.000 
    PERF63_2           0.801      0.115      6.987      0.000 
    PERF64_2           0.677      0.097      6.985      0.000 
    GTEA14_2           0.717      0.071     10.044      0.000 
    GTEA27_2           0.762      0.107      7.148      0.000 
    GTEA33_2           0.473      0.057      8.370      0.000 
    GTEA41_2           0.349      0.050      6.996      0.000 
    GTEA52_2           0.422      0.049      8.569      0.000 
    GTEA57_2           0.562      0.081      6.944      0.000 
    GTEA58_2           1.101      0.114      9.635      0.000 
    GTEA65_2           0.405      0.045      9.079      0.000 
    CURU15_2           0.453      0.066      6.899      0.000 
    CURU43_2           0.229      0.033      6.901      0.000 
    CURU46_2           0.261      0.038      6.952      0.000 
    CURU54_2           0.179      0.039      4.556      0.000 
    TRAN23_2           0.371      0.044      8.490      0.000 
    TRAN26_2           0.435      0.059      7.385      0.000 
    TRAN56_2           0.448      0.051      8.840      0.000 
    AUTH36_2           0.376      0.045      8.341      0.000 
    AUTH50_2           0.314      0.046      6.778      0.000 
    AUTH61_2           0.295      0.039      7.535      0.000 
    AUTH66_2           0.341      0.040      8.432      0.000 
    PEER20_2           0.622      0.087      7.110      0.000 
    PEER25_2           0.549      0.079      6.919      0.000 
    PEER34_2           0.759      0.108      7.007      0.000 
    PEER48_2           0.669      0.113      5.927      0.000 
    PEER55_2           0.219      0.070      3.129      0.002 
    SURF75_2           0.462      0.079      5.863      0.000 
    SURF76_2           1.217      0.106     11.530      0.000 
    SURF79_2           0.774      0.100      7.731      0.000 
    SURF87_2           0.595      0.090      6.592      0.000 
    CHJU67_2           0.376      0.055      6.781      0.000 
    CHJU74_2           0.556      0.099      5.590      0.000 
    CHJU89_2           0.625      0.101      6.190      0.000 
    CHEA72_2           0.447      0.093      4.803      0.000 
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    CHEA80_2           0.170      0.052      3.258      0.001 
    CHEA84_2           0.459      0.076      6.041      0.000 
    SUB2               0.806      0.078     10.357      0.000 
    HON2               0.220      0.053      4.196      0.000 
    PERF2              0.401      0.083      4.839      0.000 
    CURUSE2            0.534      0.067      7.954      0.000 
    PEER2              0.273      0.052      5.235      0.000 
    SURF2              0.311      0.083      3.736      0.000 
    CHJUST2            0.271      0.055      4.957      0.000 
    CHEAT2             0.213      0.051      4.155      0.000 
    ASSESS2            0.029      0.024      1.225      0.221 
    GTEACH2            0.176      0.040      4.422      0.000 
    TEACHER2           0.241      0.046      5.242      0.000 
 
STANDARDIZED MODEL RESULTS 
 
STDYX Standardization 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 SUB2     BY 
    SUB2_2             0.882      0.028     31.788      0.000 
    SUB3_2             0.895      0.016     54.621      0.000 
    SUB4_2             0.879      0.018     49.495      0.000 
    SUB10_2            0.863      0.021     41.938      0.000 
    SUB11_2            0.676      0.054     12.626      0.000 
 
 HON2     BY 
    HON1_2             0.599      0.061      9.755      0.000 
    HON5_2             0.706      0.035     19.953      0.000 
    HON6_2             0.675      0.053     12.725      0.000 
    HON7_2             0.887      0.023     38.946      0.000 
    HON8_2             0.838      0.029     28.912      0.000 
    HON9_2             0.525      0.056      9.300      0.000 
 
 PERF2    BY 
    PERF51_2           0.597      0.056     10.575      0.000 
    PERF59_2           0.826      0.037     22.181      0.000 
    PERF63_2           0.625      0.063      9.986      0.000 
    PERF64_2           0.708      0.047     14.974      0.000 
 
 CURUSE2  BY 
    CURU15_2           0.791      0.034     23.265      0.000 
    CURU43_2           0.888      0.018     48.135      0.000 
    CURU46_2           0.872      0.021     41.852      0.000 
    CURU54_2           0.919      0.019     49.662      0.000 
 
 PEER2    BY 
    PEER20_2           0.623      0.054     11.461      0.000 
    PEER25_2           0.746      0.040     18.428      0.000 
    PEER34_2           0.693      0.047     14.857      0.000 
    PEER48_2           0.692      0.054     12.753      0.000 
    PEER55_2           0.888      0.037     24.280      0.000 
 
 SURF2    BY 
    SURF75_2           0.760      0.049     15.574      0.000 
    SURF76_2           0.422      0.070      5.985      0.000 
    SURF79_2           0.665      0.054     12.279      0.000 
    SURF87_2           0.731      0.050     14.611      0.000 
 
 CHJUST2  BY 
    CHJU67_2           0.746      0.043     17.426      0.000 
    CHJU74_2           0.756      0.046     16.301      0.000 
    CHJU89_2           0.676      0.055     12.258      0.000 
 CHEAT2   BY 
    CHEA72_2           0.727      0.060     12.137      0.000 
    CHEA80_2           0.924      0.025     36.729      0.000 
    CHEA84_2           0.792      0.039     20.144      0.000 
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 ASSESS2  BY 
    TRAN23_2           0.696      0.039     18.018      0.000 
    TRAN26_2           0.683      0.046     14.778      0.000 
    TRAN56_2           0.703      0.039     17.854      0.000 
    AUTH36_2           0.685      0.042     16.361      0.000 
    AUTH50_2           0.767      0.035     21.766      0.000 
    AUTH61_2           0.759      0.036     20.835      0.000 
    AUTH66_2           0.757      0.032     24.002      0.000 
 
 GTEACH2  BY 
    GTEA14_2           0.656      0.042     15.650      0.000 
    GTEA27_2           0.689      0.049     14.136      0.000 
    GTEA33_2           0.725      0.037     19.647      0.000 
    GTEA41_2           0.817      0.029     28.485      0.000 
    GTEA52_2           0.769      0.031     24.662      0.000 
    GTEA57_2           0.735      0.039     18.635      0.000 
    GTEA58_2           0.328      0.071      4.588      0.000 
    GTEA65_2           0.760      0.030     25.296      0.000 
 
 TEACHER2 BY 
    GTEACH2            0.822      0.035     23.263      0.000 
    ASSESS2            0.957      0.035     27.065      0.000 
 
 CHEAT2   ON 
    CURUSE2           -0.093      0.098     -0.946      0.344 
    CHJUST2            0.687      0.121      5.693      0.000 
    PERF2             -0.153      0.086     -1.779      0.075 
    PEER2              0.087      0.090      0.969      0.332 
    SUB2              -0.065      0.083     -0.780      0.436 
    HON2              -0.053      0.075     -0.704      0.482 
    TEACHER2           0.063      0.114      0.551      0.581 
 
 SURF2    ON 
    CURUSE2           -0.116      0.102     -1.145      0.252 
    CHJUST2            0.586      0.114      5.155      0.000 
    PERF2              0.094      0.080      1.179      0.238 
    SUB2              -0.192      0.091     -2.103      0.036 
    TEACHER2           0.060      0.133      0.453      0.651 
 
 CHJUST2  ON 
    SUB2              -0.144      0.089     -1.631      0.103 
    CURUSE2           -0.009      0.116     -0.077      0.939 
    PEER2              0.295      0.091      3.245      0.001 
    PERF2              0.388      0.085      4.591      0.000 
    TEACHER2          -0.229      0.129     -1.769      0.077 
    HON2              -0.001      0.084     -0.013      0.990 
 
 PEER2    ON 
    CURUSE2           -0.107      0.100     -1.076      0.282 
    PERF2             -0.040      0.066     -0.601      0.548 
    TEACHER2          -0.412      0.105     -3.914      0.000 
    HON2              -0.095      0.071     -1.336      0.181 
 
 PERF2    ON 
    SUB2               0.113      0.067      1.683      0.092 
 
 TEACHER2 ON 
    SUB2               0.369      0.064      5.801      0.000 
    HON2               0.306      0.060      5.084      0.000 
 
 CURUSE2  ON 
    SUB2               0.523      0.059      8.886      0.000 
 
 CHEAT2   ON 
    GENDER             0.064      0.054      1.179      0.239 
    GRADE              0.044      0.049      0.889      0.374 
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 SURF2    ON 
    GENDER            -0.003      0.068     -0.046      0.963 
    GRADE              0.080      0.055      1.464      0.143 
 
 CHJUST2  ON 
    GENDER             0.149      0.064      2.315      0.021 
    GRADE              0.045      0.055      0.814      0.416 
 
 PEER2    ON 
    GENDER             0.238      0.055      4.318      0.000 
    GRADE             -0.156      0.055     -2.823      0.005 
 
 PERF2    ON 
    GENDER             0.257      0.064      4.026      0.000 
    GRADE             -0.136      0.060     -2.260      0.024 
 
 TEACHER2 ON 
    GENDER             0.020      0.060      0.335      0.737 
    GRADE             -0.177      0.057     -3.136      0.002 
 
 CURUSE2  ON 
    GENDER            -0.009      0.053     -0.171      0.864 
    GRADE             -0.103      0.052     -1.977      0.048 
 
 HON2     ON 
    GENDER            -0.028      0.062     -0.445      0.656 
    GRADE              0.013      0.062      0.210      0.834 
 
 SUB2     ON 
    GENDER             0.241      0.057      4.236      0.000 
    GRADE             -0.099      0.059     -1.673      0.094 
 
 SUB2     WITH 
    HON2               0.299      0.063      4.713      0.000 
 
 PERF2    WITH 
    TEACHER2           0.071      0.082      0.867      0.386 
    CURUSE2            0.055      0.071      0.765      0.444 
 
 TEACHER2 WITH 
    CURUSE2            0.546      0.068      8.064      0.000 
 
 SURF2    WITH 
    CHEAT2            -0.060      0.127     -0.469      0.639 
 
 SURF87_2 WITH 
    SURF79_2           0.322      0.094      3.442      0.001 
 
 Intercepts 
    SUB2_2             1.722      0.239      7.192      0.000 
    SUB3_2             1.599      0.245      6.538      0.000 
    SUB4_2             1.468      0.232      6.323      0.000 
    SUB10_2            1.867      0.243      7.672      0.000 
    SUB11_2            1.472      0.190      7.735      0.000 
    HON1_2             2.345      0.214     10.948      0.000 
    HON5_2             2.681      0.221     12.145      0.000 
    HON6_2             2.220      0.224      9.916      0.000 
    HON7_2             2.360      0.275      8.597      0.000 
    HON8_2             1.884      0.248      7.607      0.000 
    HON9_2             2.393      0.165     14.498      0.000 
    PERF51_2           2.770      0.231     11.995      0.000 
    PERF59_2           2.369      0.257      9.218      0.000 
    PERF63_2           2.730      0.217     12.577      0.000 
    PERF64_2           2.973      0.257     11.546      0.000 
    GTEA14_2           2.535      0.164     15.506      0.000 
    GTEA27_2           2.277      0.170     13.397      0.000 
    GTEA33_2           2.691      0.184     14.635      0.000 
    GTEA41_2           2.599      0.202     12.882      0.000 
Appendix W: Full output for Model 4 co-ed data (N = 297) estimated with observed 
indicator variables, Time 2 │507 
 
     
 
    GTEA52_2           2.470      0.185     13.353      0.000 
    GTEA57_2           2.281      0.181     12.618      0.000 
    GTEA58_2           2.140      0.103     20.845      0.000 
    GTEA65_2           2.684      0.193     13.939      0.000 
    CURU15_2           2.237      0.194     11.505      0.000 
    CURU43_2           2.460      0.226     10.871      0.000 
    CURU46_2           2.359      0.222     10.627      0.000 
    CURU54_2           2.372      0.230     10.331      0.000 
    TRAN23_2           2.513      0.182     13.847      0.000 
    TRAN26_2           2.575      0.194     13.296      0.000 
    TRAN56_2           2.512      0.194     12.933      0.000 
    AUTH36_2           2.685      0.196     13.706      0.000 
    AUTH50_2           2.718      0.218     12.479      0.000 
    AUTH61_2           2.785      0.205     13.597      0.000 
    AUTH66_2           2.797      0.218     12.844      0.000 
    PEER20_2           3.728      0.266     14.002      0.000 
    PEER25_2           2.903      0.241     12.043      0.000 
    PEER34_2           2.552      0.214     11.918      0.000 
    PEER48_2           2.889      0.219     13.208      0.000 
    PEER55_2           3.319      0.273     12.149      0.000 
    SURF75_2           3.238      0.331      9.783      0.000 
    SURF76_2           2.060      0.159     12.941      0.000 
    SURF79_2           2.384      0.240      9.946      0.000 
    SURF87_2           2.650      0.286      9.263      0.000 
    CHJU67_2           3.877      0.363     10.685      0.000 
    CHJU74_2           2.742      0.271     10.127      0.000 
    CHJU89_2           3.224      0.305     10.572      0.000 
    CHEA72_2           3.829      0.370     10.338      0.000 
    CHEA80_2           3.138      0.358      8.757      0.000 
    CHEA84_2           3.026      0.298     10.144      0.000 
 
 Residual Variances 
    SUB2_2             0.223      0.049      4.555      0.000 
    SUB3_2             0.199      0.029      6.794      0.000 
    SUB4_2             0.228      0.031      7.293      0.000 
    SUB10_2            0.255      0.036      7.159      0.000 
    SUB11_2            0.543      0.072      7.510      0.000 
    HON1_2             0.642      0.073      8.738      0.000 
    HON5_2             0.502      0.050     10.038      0.000 
    HON6_2             0.545      0.072      7.622      0.000 
    HON7_2             0.213      0.040      5.258      0.000 
    HON8_2             0.298      0.049      6.131      0.000 
    HON9_2             0.724      0.059     12.205      0.000 
    PERF51_2           0.644      0.067      9.566      0.000 
    PERF59_2           0.317      0.062      5.154      0.000 
    PERF63_2           0.610      0.078      7.794      0.000 
    PERF64_2           0.498      0.067      7.437      0.000 
    GTEA14_2           0.570      0.055     10.367      0.000 
    GTEA27_2           0.525      0.067      7.813      0.000 
    GTEA33_2           0.474      0.053      8.869      0.000 
    GTEA41_2           0.333      0.047      7.113      0.000 
    GTEA52_2           0.409      0.048      8.534      0.000 
    GTEA57_2           0.460      0.058      7.949      0.000 
    GTEA58_2           0.892      0.047     19.034      0.000 
    GTEA65_2           0.422      0.046      9.226      0.000 
    CURU15_2           0.375      0.054      6.979      0.000 
    CURU43_2           0.212      0.033      6.481      0.000 
    CURU46_2           0.240      0.036      6.624      0.000 
    CURU54_2           0.155      0.034      4.563      0.000 
    TRAN23_2           0.516      0.054      9.607      0.000 
    TRAN26_2           0.534      0.063      8.469      0.000 
    TRAN56_2           0.506      0.055      9.128      0.000 
    AUTH36_2           0.530      0.057      9.236      0.000 
    AUTH50_2           0.412      0.054      7.630      0.000 
    AUTH61_2           0.425      0.055      7.688      0.000 
    AUTH66_2           0.427      0.048      8.959      0.000 
    PEER20_2           0.612      0.068      9.043      0.000 
    PEER25_2           0.443      0.060      7.329      0.000 
Appendix W: Full output for Model 4 co-ed data (N = 297) estimated with observed 
indicator variables, Time 2 │508 
 
     
 
    PEER34_2           0.520      0.065      8.035      0.000 
    PEER48_2           0.522      0.075      6.955      0.000 
    PEER55_2           0.212      0.065      3.270      0.001 
    SURF75_2           0.422      0.074      5.694      0.000 
    SURF76_2           0.822      0.059     13.824      0.000 
    SURF79_2           0.558      0.072      7.762      0.000 
    SURF87_2           0.465      0.073      6.349      0.000 
    CHJU67_2           0.444      0.064      6.952      0.000 
    CHJU74_2           0.428      0.070      6.097      0.000 
    CHJU89_2           0.543      0.075      7.284      0.000 
    CHEA72_2           0.472      0.087      5.424      0.000 
    CHEA80_2           0.147      0.046      3.154      0.002 
    CHEA84_2           0.373      0.062      5.993      0.000 
    SUB2               0.932      0.030     30.772      0.000 
    HON2               0.999      0.004    265.150      0.000 
    PERF2              0.885      0.039     22.705      0.000 
    CURUSE2            0.707      0.061     11.564      0.000 
    PEER2              0.693      0.057     12.067      0.000 
    SURF2              0.491      0.089      5.527      0.000 
    CHJUST2            0.575      0.075      7.664      0.000 
    CHEAT2             0.426      0.085      5.045      0.000 
    ASSESS2            0.084      0.068      1.244      0.213 
    GTEACH2            0.325      0.058      5.596      0.000 
    TEACHER2           0.660      0.058     11.328      0.000 
 
 
R-SQUARE 
 
    Observed                                        Two-Tailed 
    Variable        Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
    SUB2_2             0.777      0.049     15.894      0.000 
    SUB3_2             0.801      0.029     27.310      0.000 
    SUB4_2             0.772      0.031     24.748      0.000 
    SUB10_2            0.745      0.036     20.969      0.000 
    SUB11_2            0.457      0.072      6.313      0.000 
    HON1_2             0.358      0.073      4.878      0.000 
    HON5_2             0.498      0.050      9.977      0.000 
    HON6_2             0.455      0.072      6.363      0.000 
    HON7_2             0.787      0.040     19.473      0.000 
    HON8_2             0.702      0.049     14.456      0.000 
    HON9_2             0.276      0.059      4.650      0.000 
    PERF51_2           0.356      0.067      5.287      0.000 
    PERF59_2           0.683      0.062     11.090      0.000 
    PERF63_2           0.390      0.078      4.993      0.000 
    PERF64_2           0.502      0.067      7.487      0.000 
    GTEA14_2           0.430      0.055      7.825      0.000 
    GTEA27_2           0.475      0.067      7.068      0.000 
    GTEA33_2           0.526      0.053      9.823      0.000 
    GTEA41_2           0.667      0.047     14.243      0.000 
    GTEA52_2           0.591      0.048     12.331      0.000 
    GTEA57_2           0.540      0.058      9.318      0.000 
    GTEA58_2           0.108      0.047      2.294      0.022 
    GTEA65_2           0.578      0.046     12.648      0.000 
    CURU15_2           0.625      0.054     11.633      0.000 
    CURU43_2           0.788      0.033     24.068      0.000 
    CURU46_2           0.760      0.036     20.926      0.000 
    CURU54_2           0.845      0.034     24.831      0.000 
    TRAN23_2           0.484      0.054      9.009      0.000 
    TRAN26_2           0.466      0.063      7.389      0.000 
    TRAN56_2           0.494      0.055      8.927      0.000 
    AUTH36_2           0.470      0.057      8.180      0.000 
    AUTH50_2           0.588      0.054     10.883      0.000 
    AUTH61_2           0.575      0.055     10.418      0.000 
    AUTH66_2           0.573      0.048     12.001      0.000 
    PEER20_2           0.388      0.068      5.731      0.000 
    PEER25_2           0.557      0.060      9.214      0.000 
    PEER34_2           0.480      0.065      7.428      0.000 
Appendix W: Full output for Model 4 co-ed data (N = 297) estimated with observed 
indicator variables, Time 2 │509 
 
     
 
    PEER48_2           0.478      0.075      6.377      0.000 
    PEER55_2           0.788      0.065     12.140      0.000 
    SURF75_2           0.578      0.074      7.787      0.000 
    SURF76_2           0.178      0.059      2.993      0.003 
    SURF79_2           0.442      0.072      6.140      0.000 
    SURF87_2           0.535      0.073      7.305      0.000 
    CHJU67_2           0.556      0.064      8.713      0.000 
    CHJU74_2           0.572      0.070      8.151      0.000 
    CHJU89_2           0.457      0.075      6.129      0.000 
    CHEA72_2           0.528      0.087      6.069      0.000 
    CHEA80_2           0.853      0.046     18.364      0.000 
    CHEA84_2           0.627      0.062     10.072      0.000 
 
     Latent                                         Two-Tailed 
    Variable        Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
    SUB2               0.068      0.030      2.248      0.025 
    HON2               0.001      0.004      0.247      0.805 
    PERF2              0.115      0.039      2.940      0.003 
    CURUSE2            0.293      0.061      4.782      0.000 
    PEER2              0.307      0.057      5.355      0.000 
    SURF2              0.509      0.089      5.723      0.000 
    CHJUST2            0.425      0.075      5.673      0.000 
    CHEAT2             0.574      0.085      6.786      0.000 
    ASSESS2            0.916      0.068     13.532      0.000 
    GTEACH2            0.675      0.058     11.632      0.000 
    TEACHER2           0.340      0.058      5.842      0.000 
 
     ESTIMATES DERIVED FROM THE MODEL 
 
 
           ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB2          HON2          PERF2         CURUSE2       PEER2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.469        -0.025         0.337        -0.065         0.273 
 
 
           ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SURF2         CHJUST2       CHEAT2        ASSESS2       GTEACH2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.575         0.648         0.645        -0.166        -0.178 
 
 
           ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER2      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
      1        -0.178         1.613         1.495 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB2          HON2          PERF2         CURUSE2       PEER2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.240         0.129         0.199         0.204         0.168 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SURF2         CHJUST2       CHEAT2        ASSESS2       GTEACH2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.242         0.195         0.192         0.154         0.163 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED MEANS FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER2      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
      1         0.163         0.028         0.029 
 
 
 
Appendix W: Full output for Model 4 co-ed data (N = 297) estimated with observed 
indicator variables, Time 2 │510 
 
     
 
           ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB2          HON2          PERF2         CURUSE2       PEER2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB2           0.865 
 HON2           0.122         0.221 
 PERF2          0.118         0.007         0.453 
 CURUSE2        0.429         0.059         0.090         0.755 
 PEER2         -0.125        -0.085        -0.015        -0.185         0.394 
 SURF2         -0.254        -0.063         0.129        -0.229         0.153 
 CHJUST2       -0.139        -0.069         0.161        -0.157         0.192 
 CHEAT2        -0.187        -0.079         0.037        -0.201         0.195 
 ASSESS2        0.251         0.108         0.062         0.316        -0.166 
 GTEACH2        0.269         0.115         0.066         0.338        -0.178 
 TEACHER2       0.269         0.115         0.066         0.338        -0.178 
 GENDER         0.109        -0.006         0.093         0.050         0.054 
 GRADE         -0.046         0.003        -0.050        -0.067        -0.015 
 
 
           ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SURF2         CHJUST2       CHEAT2        ASSESS2       GTEACH2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SURF2          0.632 
 CHJUST2        0.366         0.471 
 CHEAT2         0.268         0.348         0.500 
 ASSESS2       -0.147        -0.145        -0.149         0.348 
 GTEACH2       -0.157        -0.155        -0.160         0.341         0.541 
 TEACHER2      -0.157        -0.155        -0.160         0.341         0.366 
 GENDER         0.045         0.084         0.066         0.028         0.030 
 GRADE          0.044         0.013         0.033        -0.059        -0.063 
 
 
           ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER2      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
 TEACHER2       0.366 
 GENDER         0.030         0.237 
 GRADE         -0.063         0.000         0.250 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB2          HON2          PERF2         CURUSE2       PEER2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB2           0.081 
 HON2           0.038         0.052 
 PERF2          0.045         0.009         0.098 
 CURUSE2        0.070         0.020         0.044         0.097 
 PEER2          0.031         0.026         0.033         0.051         0.078 
 SURF2          0.061         0.020         0.059         0.060         0.030 
 CHJUST2        0.047         0.025         0.053         0.046         0.045 
 CHEAT2         0.052         0.030         0.038         0.051         0.044 
 ASSESS2        0.038         0.025         0.032         0.052         0.033 
 GTEACH2        0.051         0.028         0.036         0.057         0.033 
 TEACHER2       0.051         0.028         0.036         0.057         0.033 
 GENDER         0.027         0.014         0.025         0.026         0.020 
 GRADE          0.028         0.014         0.022         0.026         0.020 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SURF2         CHJUST2       CHEAT2        ASSESS2       GTEACH2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SURF2          0.115 
 CHJUST2        0.059         0.086 
 CHEAT2         0.054         0.071         0.104 
 ASSESS2        0.045         0.036         0.032         0.056 
 GTEACH2        0.049         0.039         0.036         0.046         0.087 
 TEACHER2       0.049         0.039         0.036         0.046         0.070 
 GENDER         0.028         0.024         0.023         0.018         0.021 
 GRADE          0.027         0.023         0.021         0.018         0.022 
Appendix W: Full output for Model 4 co-ed data (N = 297) estimated with observed 
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           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER2      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
 TEACHER2       0.070 
 GENDER         0.021         0.006 
 GRADE          0.022         0.014         0.000 
 
 
           ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB2          HON2          PERF2         CURUSE2       PEER2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB2           1.000 
 HON2           0.280         1.000 
 PERF2          0.188         0.023         1.000 
 CURUSE2        0.531         0.145         0.154         1.000 
 PEER2         -0.215        -0.287        -0.035        -0.340         1.000 
 SURF2         -0.343        -0.169         0.241        -0.332         0.306 
 CHJUST2       -0.217        -0.215         0.348        -0.263         0.447 
 CHEAT2        -0.285        -0.237         0.077        -0.327         0.440 
 ASSESS2        0.457         0.389         0.156         0.616        -0.449 
 GTEACH2        0.392         0.334         0.134         0.529        -0.385 
 TEACHER2       0.478         0.407         0.163         0.643        -0.469 
 GENDER         0.242        -0.028         0.285         0.117         0.175 
 GRADE         -0.099         0.013        -0.148        -0.155        -0.049 
 
 
           ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SURF2         CHJUST2       CHEAT2        ASSESS2       GTEACH2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SURF2          1.000 
 CHJUST2        0.670         1.000 
 CHEAT2         0.477         0.717         1.000 
 ASSESS2       -0.313        -0.357        -0.358         1.000 
 GTEACH2       -0.269        -0.307        -0.308         0.786         1.000 
 TEACHER2      -0.327        -0.373        -0.374         0.957         0.822 
 GENDER         0.117         0.252         0.190         0.097         0.083 
 GRADE          0.112         0.036         0.094        -0.201        -0.173 
 
 
           ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER2      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
 TEACHER2       1.000 
 GENDER         0.101         1.000 
 GRADE         -0.210        -0.001         1.000 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB2          HON2          PERF2         CURUSE2       PEER2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB2           0.000 
 HON2           0.066         0.000 
 PERF2          0.063         0.028         0.000 
 CURUSE2        0.057         0.040         0.069         0.000 
 PEER2          0.044         0.062         0.078         0.069         0.000 
 SURF2          0.076         0.052         0.092         0.081         0.059 
 CHJUST2        0.070         0.070         0.084         0.074         0.084 
 CHEAT2         0.068         0.078         0.078         0.067         0.062 
 ASSESS2        0.058         0.055         0.073         0.055         0.055 
 GTEACH2        0.054         0.051         0.067         0.050         0.051 
 TEACHER2       0.060         0.059         0.078         0.053         0.057 
 GENDER         0.057         0.062         0.061         0.060         0.060 
 GRADE          0.061         0.062         0.062         0.059         0.061 
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           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SURF2         CHJUST2       CHEAT2        ASSESS2       GTEACH2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SURF2          0.000 
 CHJUST2        0.067         0.000 
 CHEAT2         0.073         0.065         0.000 
 ASSESS2        0.090         0.081         0.059         0.000 
 GTEACH2        0.079         0.069         0.052         0.033         0.000 
 TEACHER2       0.094         0.083         0.061         0.035         0.035 
 GENDER         0.071         0.066         0.061         0.064         0.057 
 GRADE          0.067         0.066         0.061         0.059         0.055 
 
 
           S.E. FOR ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              TEACHER2      GENDER        GRADE 
              ________      ________      ________ 
 TEACHER2       0.000 
 GENDER         0.068         0.000 
 GRADE          0.064         0.058         0.000 
 
Appendix X: Indirect effects (standardized) in Model 4 for the Co-ed sample, Time 2│513 
 
     
 
Appendix X: 
Indirect effects (standardized) in Model 4 for the Co-ed sample, Time 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STANDARDIZED TOTAL, TOTAL INDIRECT, SPECIFIC INDIRECT, AND DIRECT EFFECTS 
 
STDYX Standardization 
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
Effects from CURUSE2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.130      0.096     -1.358      0.175 
  Total indirect      -0.037      0.082     -0.451      0.652 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2           -0.009      0.014     -0.669      0.503 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2           -0.006      0.080     -0.077      0.938 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2           -0.022      0.023     -0.963      0.335 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    CURUSE2           -0.093      0.098     -0.946      0.344 
 
Effects from PERF2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total                0.102      0.074      1.384      0.166 
  Total indirect       0.255      0.082      3.099      0.002 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2             -0.003      0.007     -0.503      0.615 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2              0.267      0.081      3.310      0.001 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2             -0.008      0.014     -0.582      0.561 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    PERF2             -0.153      0.086     -1.779      0.075 
 
Appendix X: Indirect effects (standardized) in Model 4 for the Co-ed sample, Time 2│514 
 
     
 
Effects from PEER2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total                0.290      0.074      3.901      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.203      0.080      2.530      0.011 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2              0.203      0.080      2.530      0.011 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2              0.087      0.090      0.969      0.332 
 
Effects from SUB2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.299      0.072     -4.137      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.235      0.066     -3.543      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2              -0.017      0.014     -1.233      0.218 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.048      0.053     -0.918      0.359 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    SUB2              -0.099      0.065     -1.525      0.127 
 
    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2               0.023      0.042      0.549      0.583 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.000      0.001     -0.475      0.634 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.005      0.007     -0.666      0.505 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.013      0.014     -0.938      0.348 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.030      0.020      1.529      0.126 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.003      0.042     -0.077      0.938 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.058      0.037     -1.559      0.119 
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    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2              -0.001      0.002     -0.562      0.574 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.011      0.012     -0.946      0.344 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.031      0.014     -2.186      0.029 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    SUB2              -0.065      0.083     -0.780      0.436 
 
 
Effects from HON2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.146      0.084     -1.746      0.081 
  Total indirect      -0.094      0.060     -1.553      0.120 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    HON2              -0.008      0.010     -0.823      0.411 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    HON2              -0.001      0.057     -0.013      0.990 
 
    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2               0.019      0.035      0.549      0.583 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.011      0.012     -0.916      0.360 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    HON2              -0.019      0.016     -1.215      0.224 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.048      0.030     -1.587      0.113 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.026      0.013     -2.003      0.045 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    HON2              -0.053      0.075     -0.704      0.482 
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Effects from TEACHER2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.214      0.108     -1.977      0.048 
  Total indirect      -0.277      0.099     -2.784      0.005 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2          -0.036      0.038     -0.941      0.347 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2          -0.157      0.098     -1.606      0.108 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2          -0.083      0.038     -2.204      0.027 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2           0.063      0.114      0.551      0.581 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE2 to SURF2 
 
  Total               -0.140      0.133     -1.057      0.290 
  Total indirect      -0.024      0.068     -0.349      0.727 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2           -0.005      0.068     -0.077      0.939 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2           -0.018      0.018     -1.009      0.313 
 
  Direct 
    SURF2 
    CURUSE2           -0.116      0.102     -1.145      0.252 
 
 
Effects from PERF2 to SURF2 
 
  Total                0.315      0.089      3.519      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.221      0.069      3.186      0.001 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2              0.227      0.070      3.272      0.001 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2             -0.007      0.012     -0.583      0.560 
 
  Direct 
    SURF2 
    PERF2              0.094      0.080      1.179      0.238 
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Effects from SUB2 to SURF2 
 
  Total               -0.368      0.074     -4.983      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.176      0.065     -2.724      0.006 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.011      0.011      0.955      0.340 
 
    SURF2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.061      0.052     -1.165      0.244 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    SUB2              -0.085      0.051     -1.658      0.097 
 
    SURF2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2               0.022      0.049      0.448      0.654 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.026      0.018      1.461      0.144 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.003      0.036     -0.077      0.939 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.049      0.030     -1.669      0.095 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2              -0.001      0.001     -0.561      0.575 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.010      0.010     -0.994      0.320 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.026      0.011     -2.499      0.012 
 
  Direct 
    SURF2 
    SUB2              -0.192      0.091     -2.103      0.036 
 
 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER2 to SURF2 
 
  Total               -0.145      0.134     -1.081      0.280 
  Total indirect      -0.205      0.080     -2.566      0.010 
 
Appendix X: Indirect effects (standardized) in Model 4 for the Co-ed sample, Time 2│518 
 
     
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2          -0.134      0.077     -1.733      0.083 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2          -0.071      0.028     -2.544      0.011 
 
  Direct 
    SURF2 
    TEACHER2           0.060      0.133      0.453      0.651 
 
 
Effects from SUB2 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.253      0.072     -3.516      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.108      0.065     -1.656      0.098 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.044      0.028      1.540      0.124 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.005      0.061     -0.077      0.939 
 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.085      0.049     -1.715      0.086 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2              -0.001      0.002     -0.559      0.576 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.016      0.017     -0.971      0.332 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.045      0.017     -2.614      0.009 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST2 
    SUB2              -0.144      0.089     -1.631      0.103 
 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE2 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.041      0.115     -0.354      0.724 
  Total indirect      -0.032      0.032     -0.987      0.323 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2           -0.032      0.032     -0.987      0.323 
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Direct 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2           -0.009      0.116     -0.077      0.939 
 
 
Effects from PERF2 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total                0.377      0.085      4.448      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.012      0.020     -0.582      0.561 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2             -0.012      0.020     -0.582      0.561 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2              0.388      0.085      4.591      0.000 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER2 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.350      0.131     -2.672      0.008 
  Total indirect      -0.121      0.046     -2.617      0.009 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2          -0.121      0.046     -2.617      0.009 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2          -0.229      0.129     -1.769      0.077 
 
 
Effects from HON2 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.136      0.074     -1.844      0.065 
  Total indirect      -0.135      0.049     -2.740      0.006 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    HON2              -0.028      0.022     -1.278      0.201 
 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.070      0.040     -1.729      0.084 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.037      0.016     -2.264      0.024 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST2 
    HON2              -0.001      0.084     -0.013      0.990 
 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE2 to PEER2 
 
  Total               -0.107      0.100     -1.076      0.282 
  Total indirect       0.000      0.000      0.000      1.000 
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  Direct 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2           -0.107      0.100     -1.076      0.282 
 
 
Effects from HON2 to PEER2 
 
  Total               -0.221      0.066     -3.343      0.001 
  Total indirect      -0.126      0.040     -3.146      0.002 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.126      0.040     -3.146      0.002 
 
  Direct 
    PEER2 
    HON2              -0.095      0.071     -1.336      0.181  
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Appendix Y: Stepwise regression of predictors of Time 2 variables 
Table Y1 
Standardized coefficients of stepwise regression on Peer norms and Justifiability of cheating, Time 2 
  Peer norms   Justifiability of cheating 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6  Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step5 Step 6 
  β β β β β β  β β β β  β β 
Curuse -.358*** -.394*** --- -.343*** -.334*** -.117  -.274*** -.304*** -.230*** -.213* -.244** -.066 
Gender  .215*** --- .204*** .216*** .224***   .274*** .298*** .287*** .220*** .228 
Grade  -.105 --- -.096 -.102 -.137**   -.007 -.010 -.003 .032 .001 
Sub   --- --- --- ---    -.144 -.106 -.154 -.117 
Hon    -.221** -.227** -.103     -.157* -.112 -.013 
Perf     -.061 -.039      .356*** .366*** 
Teacher           -.384***             -.349** 
 
Table Y2 
Standardized coefficients of stepwise regression on Surface learning strategies and Self-reported cheating, Time 2 
  Surface learning strategies   Self-reported cheating 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 Step 6  Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step5 Step 6 
  β β β β β β  β β β β β  β 
Curuse -.328*** -.337*** -.196* --- -.211* -.134  -.338*** -.354*** -.273** -.256** .261** -.160 
Gender  .159* .201*** --- .141* .140*   .224*** -.159 .242*** .231*** .233*** 
Grade  .062 .055 --- .087 .073   .049 .252*** .050 .055 .036 
Sub   -.260** --- -.295** -.269**    .043 -.128 -.137 -.119 
Hon    --- --- ---     -.143 -.137 -.082 
Perf     .298*** .297**      .060 .069 
Teacher           -.146             -.194 
Note. All models satisfied fit requirements for multivariate models (see Table 5.1); CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; Grade = Grade-level; SUB = Subject self-concept; HON 
= Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Appendix Z: 
Standardized beta coefficients for Model 4 co-ed data (N = 297)  
estimated with composite scores, Time 2 
Table Z1 
Model 4, Time 2: Standardized beta coefficients estimated with composite scores 
  
 
 Predictors 
 N = 297 Grade Gender Sub Hon Perf Curuse Teacher Peer Chjust 
Sub -.099 .245***        
Hon .014 -.033 ---       
Perf -.128* .264*** .095 ---      
Curuse -.105* -.016 .540*** --- ---     
Teacher -.173** .041 .394*** .294*** --- ---    
Peer -.150** .249*** --- -.103 -.008 -.056 -.456***   
Chjust .059 .134* -.144 -.049 .372*** -.028 -.201 .290**  
Surf .088 -.022 -.253** --- .142 -.061 .058 --- .596*** 
Cheat .035 .060 -.113 -.070 -.139 -.033 .024 .093 .695*** 
 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance 
goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; 
CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of 
cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p 
< .001. 
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Appendix AA: Equivalent model 1, Time 2  
Usefulness of curriculum positioned as a predictor of Teacher quality 
 
Figure AA1. Equivalent Model 1, Time 2: Usefulness of curriculum positioned as a predictor of Teacher quality (N = 297). 2(1174) = 1822; RMSEA = .043, CIs = 
.039 - .047, pclose = 1.00; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .069; N:q = 1.5; SCF = .937. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; 
PERF = Performance structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of 
curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < 
.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Appendix AB: Equivalent model 2, Time 2  
Peer norms positioned as a correlate of class context 
 
Figure AB1. Equivalent Model 2, Time 2: Peer norms positioned as a correlate of class context  (N = 297). 2(1173) = 1818; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .039 - .047, pclose 
= .999; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .068; N:q = 1.5; SCF = .937. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance 
structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms 
for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
Appendix AC: Equivalent model 3, Time 2: Peer norms positioned as a predictor of class context │525 
 
     
 
Appendix AC: Equivalent model 3, Time 2  
Peer norms positioned as a predictor of class context 
 
Figure AC1. Equivalent Model 3, Time 2: Peer norms positioned as a predictor of class context (N = 297). 2(1173) = 1820; RMSEA = .043, CIs = .039 - .047, pclose 
= .999; TLI = .90; CFI = .91; SRMR = .068; N:q = 1.5; SCF = .937. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance 
structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms 
for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Appendix AD: 
Paired-samples t-tests, longitudinal matched samples, Time 2 
Table AD1 
Two-tailed paired-samples t-tests, longitudinal matched samples 
 
Class of 2016  Class of 2015  
 Grade 8 → Grade 9 transition (N = 123)   Grade 9 → Grade 10 transition (N = 102)  
 Grade 8  Grade 9     Grade 9  Grade 10    
 M SD  M SD t Sig. Interpretation M SD  M SD t Sig. Interpretation 
Sub 2.43 .919  2.44 .916 -.082 NS  2.52 1.02  2.22 1.07 4.45 .000 Better self-concept at G10 
Hon 2.01 .676  1.96 .709 1.04 NS  1.96 .548  1.93 .682 .491 NS  
Perf 3.38 .911  3.65 .940 -2.65 .009 More prevalent at G9 3.49 .983  3.52 1.04 -.246 NS  
Curuse 2.47 .946  2.61 1.00 -1.46 NS  2.57 1.06  2.26 1.03 2.96 .004 More useful at G10 
Gteach 2.42 .747  2.60 .866 -2.04 .044 Worse evaluations at G9 2.65 .894  2.24 .765 3.92 .000 Better evaluations at G10 
Assess 2.20 .628  2.21 .685 -.133 NS  2.26 .665  2.00 .620 4.04 .000 Better evaluations at G10 
Peer 3.68 .789  3.83 .810 -1.74 NS  3.55 .856  3.67 1.00 -.1.35 NS  
Chjust 4.13 .930  4.06 .848 .889 NS  4.08 .933  4.16 .949 -.736 NS  
Surf 3.69 0.95  3.45 .953 2.67 .009 More prevalent at G9 3.54 .960  3.66 .979 -1.13 NS  
Cheat 4.39 .884  4.23 .993 1.57 NS  4.40 .876  4.45 .962 -.489 NS  
 
Note. SUB = Subject self-concept; HON = Honesty-trustworthiness self-concept; PERF = Performance goal structure; TEACHER = Teacher quality, ASSESS = 
Assessment quality; GTEACH = Good teaching; CURUSE = Usefulness of curriculum; PEER = Peer norms for cheating; CHJUST = Justifiability of cheating; 
SURF = Surface learning strategies; CHEAT = Self-reported cheating.
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Appendix AE: 
Longitudinal model output 
MODEL FIT INFORMATION 
 
Number of Free Parameters                      151 
 
Loglikelihood 
 
          H0 Value                       -5218.936 
          H1 Value                       -5128.920 
 
Information Criteria 
 
          Akaike (AIC)                   10739.871 
          Bayesian (BIC)                 11255.703 
          Sample-Size Adjusted BIC       10777.153 
            (n* = (n + 2) / 24) 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit 
 
          Value                            180.031 
          Degrees of Freedom                   119 
          P-Value                           0.0003 
 
RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation) 
 
          Estimate                           0.048 
          90 Percent C.I.                    0.033  0.061 
          Probability RMSEA <= .05           0.590 
 
CFI/TLI 
 
          CFI                                0.967 
          TLI                                0.937 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit for the Baseline Model 
 
          Value                           2088.462 
          Degrees of Freedom                   230 
          P-Value                           0.0000 
 
SRMR (Standardized Root Mean Square Residual) 
 
          Value                              0.043 
 
MODEL RESULTS 
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 SUB1     BY 
    NSUB               0.959      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 HON1     BY 
    NHON               0.906      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 PERF1    BY 
    NPERF              0.849      0.000    999.000    999.000 
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 GTEACH1  BY 
    NGTEACH            0.933      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 ASSESS1  BY 
    NASSESS            0.917      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 CURUSE1  BY 
    NCURUSE            0.954      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 PEER1    BY 
    NPEER              0.860      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 SURF1    BY 
    NSURF              0.843      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 CHJUST1  BY 
    NCHJUST            0.889      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 CHEAT1   BY 
    NCHEAT             0.927      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 SUB2     BY 
    NSUB2              0.959      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 HON2     BY 
    NHON2              0.922      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 PERF2    BY 
    NPERF2             0.889      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 GTEACH2  BY 
    NGTEA2             0.938      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 ASSESS2  BY 
    NASSESS2           0.943      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 CURUSE2  BY 
    NCURU2             0.964      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 PEER2    BY 
    NPEER2             0.922      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 SURF2    BY 
    NSURF2             0.872      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 CHJUST2  BY 
    NCHJUST2           0.877      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 CHEAT2   BY 
    NCHEAT2            0.917      0.000    999.000    999.000 
 
 TEACHER1 BY 
    ASSESS1            1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    GTEACH1            0.948      0.081     11.634      0.000 
 
 TEACHER2 BY 
    ASSESS2            1.000      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    GTEACH2            0.800      0.072     11.185      0.000 
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 CHEAT2   ON 
    CHJUST2            0.596      0.110      5.399      0.000 
    PERF2             -0.081      0.076     -1.065      0.287 
    PEER2              0.133      0.081      1.654      0.098 
    SUB2              -0.116      0.075     -1.556      0.120 
    HON2              -0.028      0.067     -0.426      0.670 
    TEACHER2           0.088      0.098      0.898      0.369 
    CURUSE2           -0.051      0.088     -0.585      0.559 
    CHEAT1             0.054      0.088      0.618      0.537 
 
 SURF2    ON 
    CHJUST2            0.513      0.117      4.379      0.000 
    PERF2              0.184      0.084      2.203      0.028 
    SUB2              -0.025      0.087     -0.290      0.772 
    TEACHER2          -0.077      0.100     -0.764      0.445 
    CURUSE2           -0.126      0.100     -1.259      0.208 
    SURF1              0.231      0.087      2.667      0.008 
 
 CHJUST2  ON 
    SUB2              -0.102      0.082     -1.243      0.214 
    PEER2              0.219      0.087      2.523      0.012 
    PERF2              0.300      0.074      4.036      0.000 
    TEACHER2          -0.070      0.110     -0.641      0.522 
    CURUSE2           -0.133      0.098     -1.360      0.174 
    HON2              -0.037      0.072     -0.508      0.611 
    CHJUST1            0.276      0.087      3.183      0.001 
 
 PEER2    ON 
    PERF2             -0.105      0.070     -1.507      0.132 
    TEACHER2          -0.358      0.107     -3.354      0.001 
    CURUSE2           -0.051      0.092     -0.559      0.576 
    HON2              -0.105      0.072     -1.458      0.145 
    PEER1              0.379      0.073      5.201      0.000 
 
 PERF2    ON 
    SUB2               0.016      0.080      0.202      0.840 
    PERF1              0.313      0.086      3.662      0.000 
 
 TEACHER2 ON 
    SUB2               0.281      0.069      4.069      0.000 
    TEACHER1           0.357      0.072      4.988      0.000 
    HON2               0.210      0.057      3.671      0.000 
 
 CURUSE2  ON 
    SUB2               0.416      0.069      6.027      0.000 
    CURUSE1            0.282      0.062      4.524      0.000 
 
 SUB2     ON 
    SUB1               0.773      0.052     14.972      0.000 
 
 HON2     ON 
    HON1               0.739      0.065     11.422      0.000 
 
 CHEAT1   ON 
    CHJUST1            0.432      0.132      3.284      0.001 
    PERF1              0.017      0.079      0.220      0.826 
    PEER1              0.069      0.098      0.707      0.480 
    SUB1              -0.196      0.067     -2.907      0.004 
    HON1              -0.210      0.063     -3.339      0.001 
    TEACHER1          -0.081      0.120     -0.669      0.503 
    CURUSE1            0.113      0.099      1.144      0.253 
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 SURF1    ON 
    CHJUST1            0.785      0.133      5.913      0.000 
    PERF1              0.028      0.102      0.273      0.785 
    SUB1              -0.254      0.094     -2.716      0.007 
    TEACHER1           0.116      0.156      0.740      0.459 
    CURUSE1           -0.058      0.126     -0.459      0.646 
 
 CHJUST1  ON 
    SUB1               0.021      0.076      0.279      0.780 
    PEER1              0.401      0.088      4.549      0.000 
    PERF1              0.296      0.074      3.997      0.000 
    TEACHER1          -0.049      0.138     -0.352      0.725 
    CURUSE1           -0.177      0.107     -1.653      0.098 
    HON1              -0.171      0.066     -2.594      0.010 
 
 PEER1    ON 
    PERF1              0.123      0.091      1.347      0.178 
    TEACHER1          -0.591      0.159     -3.720      0.000 
    CURUSE1            0.165      0.130      1.275      0.202 
    HON1              -0.222      0.082     -2.699      0.007 
 
 PERF1    ON 
    SUB1               0.088      0.086      1.018      0.309 
 
 TEACHER1 ON 
    SUB1               0.413      0.073      5.623      0.000 
    HON1               0.160      0.059      2.703      0.007 
 
 CURUSE1  ON 
    SUB1               0.546      0.068      8.057      0.000 
 
 CHEAT2   ON 
    GENDER            -0.002      0.127     -0.012      0.991 
    GRADE2             0.121      0.110      1.100      0.271 
 
 SURF2    ON 
    GENDER             0.042      0.144      0.290      0.772 
    GRADE2             0.156      0.123      1.271      0.204 
 
 CHJUST2  ON 
    GENDER             0.162      0.144      1.123      0.261 
    GRADE2             0.126      0.124      1.017      0.309 
 
 PEER2    ON 
    GENDER             0.384      0.134      2.862      0.004 
    GRADE2            -0.274      0.122     -2.253      0.024 
 
 PERF2    ON 
    GENDER             0.357      0.158      2.266      0.023 
    GRADE2            -0.195      0.142     -1.366      0.172 
 
 TEACHER2 ON 
    GENDER             0.279      0.124      2.261      0.024 
    GRADE2            -0.372      0.114     -3.268      0.001 
 
 CURUSE2  ON 
    GENDER             0.079      0.122      0.647      0.517 
    GRADE2            -0.279      0.111     -2.515      0.012 
 
 SUB2     ON 
    GENDER             0.111      0.102      1.093      0.275 
    GRADE2            -0.288      0.091     -3.165      0.002 
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 HON2     ON 
    GENDER             0.106      0.123      0.862      0.389 
    GRADE2            -0.034      0.115     -0.294      0.768 
 
 
 CHEAT1   ON 
    GENDER             0.154      0.114      1.351      0.177 
    GRADE2            -0.043      0.097     -0.439      0.661 
 
 SURF1    ON 
    GENDER            -0.174      0.160     -1.090      0.276 
    GRADE2             0.015      0.136      0.109      0.914 
 
 CHJUST1  ON 
    GENDER             0.165      0.128      1.285      0.199 
    GRADE2             0.004      0.111      0.041      0.968 
 
 PEER1    ON 
    GENDER             0.287      0.149      1.920      0.055 
    GRADE2            -0.141      0.140     -1.009      0.313 
 
 PERF1    ON 
    GENDER             0.209      0.172      1.219      0.223 
    GRADE2             0.113      0.153      0.739      0.460 
 
 TEACHER1 ON 
    GENDER            -0.147      0.136     -1.076      0.282 
    GRADE2             0.181      0.121      1.495      0.135 
 
 CURUSE1  ON 
    GENDER            -0.272      0.134     -2.029      0.042 
    GRADE2             0.099      0.120      0.821      0.411 
 
 SUB1     ON 
    GENDER             0.593      0.138      4.292      0.000 
    GRADE2             0.027      0.129      0.210      0.834 
 
 HON1     ON 
    GENDER            -0.142      0.155     -0.916      0.360 
    GRADE2            -0.021      0.146     -0.143      0.886 
 
 SUB2     WITH 
    HON2               0.057      0.038      1.528      0.126 
 
 PERF2    WITH 
    TEACHER2           0.070      0.057      1.212      0.226 
    CURUSE2            0.080      0.056      1.416      0.157 
 
 TEACHER2 WITH 
    CURUSE2            0.287      0.048      5.930      0.000 
 
 SURF2    WITH 
    CHEAT2             0.047      0.047      0.997      0.319 
 
 SUB1     WITH 
    HON1               0.239      0.070      3.412      0.001 
 
 PERF1    WITH 
    TEACHER1          -0.151      0.069     -2.193      0.028 
    CURUSE1            0.052      0.068      0.766      0.443 
 
 TEACHER1 WITH 
    CURUSE1            0.389      0.061      6.396      0.000 
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 SURF1    WITH 
    CHEAT1             0.072      0.048      1.526      0.127 
 
 Intercepts 
    NSUB              -1.193      1.181     -1.010      0.313 
    NHON               0.398      1.255      0.317      0.751 
    NPERF             -1.306      1.241     -1.052      0.293 
    NGTEACH           -1.693      1.137     -1.489      0.137 
    NCURUSE           -1.099      1.233     -0.892      0.372 
    NASSESS           -1.753      1.167     -1.502      0.133 
    NPEER              1.291      1.240      1.041      0.298 
    NSURF              0.245      1.254      0.196      0.845 
    NCHJUST           -0.012      1.127     -0.010      0.992 
    NCHEAT             0.325      1.068      0.304      0.761 
    NSUB2              1.514      1.169      1.295      0.195 
    NHON2              0.431      1.252      0.344      0.730 
    NPERF2             0.689      1.215      0.567      0.571 
    NGTEA2             2.176      0.969      2.246      0.025 
    NCURU2             2.739      1.189      2.305      0.021 
    NASSESS2           2.739      1.180      2.322      0.020 
    NPEER2             1.096      1.218      0.900      0.368 
    NSURF2            -2.470      1.216     -2.031      0.042 
    NCHJUST2          -1.544      1.140     -1.354      0.176 
    NCHEAT2           -2.012      1.073     -1.876      0.061 
 
 Residual Variances 
    NSUB               0.080      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NHON               0.180      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NPERF              0.280      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NGTEACH            0.130      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NCURUSE            0.090      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NASSESS            0.160      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NPEER              0.260      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NSURF              0.290      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NCHJUST            0.210      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NCHEAT             0.140      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NSUB2              0.080      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NHON2              0.150      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NPERF2             0.210      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NGTEA2             0.120      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NCURU2             0.070      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NASSESS2           0.110      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NPEER2             0.150      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NSURF2             0.240      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NCHJUST2           0.230      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    NCHEAT2            0.160      0.000    999.000    999.000 
    SUB1               0.844      0.088      9.614      0.000 
    HON1               0.958      0.111      8.636      0.000 
    PERF1              0.916      0.123      7.446      0.000 
    GTEACH1            0.245      0.059      4.129      0.000 
    ASSESS1            0.147      0.061      2.420      0.016 
    CURUSE1            0.673      0.075      8.990      0.000 
    PEER1              0.600      0.096      6.248      0.000 
    SURF1              0.416      0.091      4.568      0.000 
    CHJUST1            0.285      0.059      4.861      0.000 
    CHEAT1             0.273      0.047      5.772      0.000 
    TEACHER1           0.597      0.090      6.653      0.000 
    SUB2               0.319      0.043      7.451      0.000 
    HON2               0.432      0.068      6.373      0.000 
    PERF2              0.789      0.102      7.703      0.000 
    GTEACH2            0.374      0.062      6.059      0.000 
    ASSESS2            0.011      0.059      0.190      0.849 
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    CURUSE2            0.558      0.062      9.056      0.000 
    PEER2              0.492      0.069      7.175      0.000 
    SURF2              0.354      0.073      4.887      0.000 
    CHJUST2            0.391      0.066      5.886      0.000 
    CHEAT2             0.262      0.054      4.862      0.000 
    TEACHER2           0.518      0.080      6.475      0.000 
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STANDARDIZED MODEL RESULTS 
 
STDYX Standardization 
 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
 SUB1     BY 
    NSUB               0.956      0.004    224.528      0.000 
 
 HON1     BY 
    NHON               0.902      0.010     93.151      0.000 
 
 PERF1    BY 
    NPERF              0.841      0.016     51.417      0.000 
 
 GTEACH1  BY 
    NGTEACH            0.931      0.007    138.660      0.000 
 
 ASSESS1  BY 
    NASSESS            0.913      0.009    107.124      0.000 
 
 CURUSE1  BY 
    NCURUSE            0.951      0.005    199.375      0.000 
 
 PEER1    BY 
    NPEER              0.855      0.015     58.283      0.000 
 
 SURF1    BY 
    NSURF              0.836      0.017     49.936      0.000 
 
 CHJUST1  BY 
    NCHJUST            0.860      0.014     61.393      0.000 
 
 CHEAT1   BY 
    NCHEAT             0.897      0.010     88.031      0.000 
 
 SUB2     BY 
    NSUB2              0.955      0.004    221.997      0.000 
 
 HON2     BY 
    NHON2              0.919      0.008    115.446      0.000 
 
 PERF2    BY 
    NPERF2             0.882      0.012     74.235      0.000 
 
 GTEACH2  BY 
    NGTEA2             0.936      0.006    151.213      0.000 
 
 ASSESS2  BY 
    NASSESS2           0.939      0.006    162.563      0.000 
 
 CURUSE2  BY 
    NCURU2             0.961      0.004    257.057      0.000 
 
  
PEER2    BY 
    NPEER2             0.916      0.008    111.241      0.000 
 
 SURF2    BY 
    NSURF2             0.861      0.014     62.354      0.000 
 
 CHJUST2  BY 
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    NCHJUST2           0.848      0.015     55.558      0.000 
 
 CHEAT2   BY 
    NCHEAT2            0.882      0.012     74.672      0.000 
 
 TEACHER1 BY 
    ASSESS1            0.920      0.034     26.773      0.000 
    GTEACH1            0.865      0.035     24.474      0.000 
 
 TEACHER2 BY 
    ASSESS2            0.994      0.032     30.813      0.000 
    GTEACH2            0.781      0.040     19.610      0.000 
 
 CHEAT2   ON 
    CHJUST2            0.639      0.108      5.923      0.000 
    PERF2             -0.096      0.090     -1.067      0.286 
    PEER2              0.157      0.094      1.664      0.096 
    SUB2              -0.135      0.087     -1.561      0.119 
    HON2              -0.034      0.080     -0.425      0.671 
    TEACHER2           0.103      0.114      0.903      0.366 
    CURUSE2           -0.060      0.103     -0.584      0.559 
    CHEAT1             0.054      0.088      0.618      0.537 
 
 SURF2    ON 
    CHJUST2            0.472      0.102      4.642      0.000 
    PERF2              0.187      0.084      2.212      0.027 
    SUB2              -0.025      0.088     -0.290      0.771 
    TEACHER2          -0.077      0.101     -0.766      0.444 
    CURUSE2           -0.127      0.101     -1.259      0.208 
    SURF1              0.237      0.089      2.668      0.008 
 
 CHJUST2  ON 
    SUB2              -0.111      0.089     -1.247      0.212 
    PEER2              0.240      0.094      2.566      0.010 
    PERF2              0.331      0.080      4.142      0.000 
    TEACHER2          -0.077      0.119     -0.644      0.520 
    CURUSE2           -0.145      0.107     -1.359      0.174 
    HON2              -0.041      0.081     -0.508      0.612 
    CHJUST1            0.274      0.083      3.290      0.001 
 
 PEER2    ON 
    PERF2             -0.106      0.070     -1.516      0.130 
    TEACHER2          -0.357      0.101     -3.532      0.000 
    CURUSE2           -0.051      0.091     -0.559      0.576 
    HON2              -0.107      0.073     -1.462      0.144 
    PEER1              0.386      0.070      5.554      0.000 
 
 PERF2    ON 
    SUB2               0.016      0.079      0.202      0.840 
    PERF1              0.316      0.082      3.868      0.000 
 
 TEACHER2 ON 
    SUB2               0.280      0.067      4.183      0.000 
    TEACHER1           0.335      0.063      5.325      0.000 
    HON2               0.214      0.059      3.630      0.000 
 
 
 CURUSE2  ON 
    SUB2               0.415      0.065      6.419      0.000 
    CURUSE1            0.285      0.061      4.637      0.000 
 
 SUB2     ON 
    SUB1               0.779      0.036     21.663      0.000 
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 HON2     ON 
    HON1               0.742      0.045     16.578      0.000 
 
 CHEAT1   ON 
    CHJUST1            0.459      0.135      3.404      0.001 
    PERF1              0.021      0.094      0.220      0.826 
    PEER1              0.083      0.117      0.707      0.479 
    SUB1              -0.230      0.079     -2.927      0.003 
    HON1              -0.252      0.074     -3.383      0.001 
    TEACHER1          -0.089      0.132     -0.669      0.503 
    CURUSE1            0.133      0.116      1.146      0.252 
 
 SURF1    ON 
    CHJUST1            0.700      0.105      6.657      0.000 
    PERF1              0.028      0.102      0.273      0.785 
    SUB1              -0.250      0.091     -2.741      0.006 
    TEACHER1           0.107      0.144      0.743      0.458 
    CURUSE1           -0.057      0.125     -0.459      0.646 
 
 CHJUST1  ON 
    SUB1               0.023      0.084      0.279      0.780 
    PEER1              0.452      0.094      4.829      0.000 
    PERF1              0.331      0.080      4.143      0.000 
    TEACHER1          -0.050      0.143     -0.352      0.725 
    CURUSE1           -0.197      0.119     -1.655      0.098 
    HON1              -0.194      0.074     -2.610      0.009 
 
 PEER1    ON 
    PERF1              0.122      0.090      1.352      0.176 
    TEACHER1          -0.544      0.135     -4.024      0.000 
    CURUSE1            0.163      0.127      1.279      0.201 
    HON1              -0.223      0.081     -2.738      0.006 
 
 PERF1    ON 
    SUB1               0.087      0.085      1.022      0.307 
 
 TEACHER1 ON 
    SUB1               0.441      0.068      6.451      0.000 
    HON1               0.174      0.064      2.717      0.007 
 
 CURUSE1  ON 
    SUB1               0.544      0.058      9.397      0.000 
 
 CHEAT2   ON 
    GENDER            -0.001      0.072     -0.012      0.991 
    GRADE2             0.074      0.067      1.101      0.271 
 
 SURF2    ON 
    GENDER             0.020      0.070      0.290      0.772 
    GRADE2             0.082      0.064      1.271      0.204 
 
 CHJUST2  ON 
    GENDER             0.086      0.077      1.124      0.261 
    GRADE2             0.072      0.071      1.019      0.308 
 
 
 PEER2    ON 
    GENDER             0.187      0.065      2.879      0.004 
    GRADE2            -0.142      0.063     -2.260      0.024 
 
 PERF2    ON 
    GENDER             0.173      0.075      2.291      0.022 
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    GRADE2            -0.100      0.073     -1.371      0.170 
 
 TEACHER2 ON 
    GENDER             0.136      0.060      2.252      0.024 
    GRADE2            -0.193      0.060     -3.242      0.001 
 
 CURUSE2  ON 
    GENDER             0.039      0.060      0.648      0.517 
    GRADE2            -0.146      0.058     -2.527      0.011 
 
 SUB2     ON 
    GENDER             0.054      0.050      1.092      0.275 
    GRADE2            -0.150      0.048     -3.152      0.002 
 
 
 HON2     ON 
    GENDER             0.050      0.058      0.862      0.389 
    GRADE2            -0.017      0.058     -0.294      0.768 
 
 CHEAT1   ON 
    GENDER             0.088      0.065      1.352      0.176 
    GRADE2            -0.026      0.059     -0.439      0.661 
 
 SURF1    ON 
    GENDER            -0.083      0.077     -1.091      0.275 
    GRADE2             0.008      0.070      0.109      0.914 
 
 CHJUST1  ON 
    GENDER             0.088      0.069      1.286      0.198 
    GRADE2             0.003      0.063      0.041      0.968 
 
 PEER1    ON 
    GENDER             0.137      0.071      1.930      0.054 
    GRADE2            -0.072      0.071     -1.010      0.312 
 
 PERF1    ON 
    GENDER             0.100      0.082      1.224      0.221 
    GRADE2             0.058      0.079      0.740      0.459 
 
 TEACHER1 ON 
    GENDER            -0.076      0.071     -1.080      0.280 
    GRADE2             0.100      0.067      1.494      0.135 
 
 CURUSE1  ON 
    GENDER            -0.132      0.065     -2.039      0.041 
    GRADE2             0.051      0.062      0.822      0.411 
 
 SUB1     ON 
    GENDER             0.288      0.064      4.480      0.000 
    GRADE2             0.014      0.067      0.210      0.834 
 
 HON1     ON 
    GENDER            -0.068      0.074     -0.918      0.359 
    GRADE2            -0.011      0.074     -0.143      0.886 
 
 SUB2     WITH 
    HON2               0.155      0.099      1.562      0.118 
 
 PERF2    WITH 
    TEACHER2           0.109      0.090      1.213      0.225 
    CURUSE2            0.120      0.083      1.439      0.150 
 
 TEACHER2 WITH 
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    CURUSE2            0.535      0.066      8.152      0.000 
 
 SURF2    WITH 
    CHEAT2             0.155      0.147      1.049      0.294 
 
 SUB1     WITH 
    HON1               0.266      0.071      3.739      0.000 
 
 PERF1    WITH 
    TEACHER1          -0.204      0.089     -2.279      0.023 
    CURUSE1            0.066      0.086      0.770      0.441 
 
 TEACHER1 WITH 
    CURUSE1            0.613      0.059     10.385      0.000 
 
 SURF1    WITH 
    CHEAT1             0.215      0.131      1.645      0.100 
 
 
 
 Intercepts 
    NSUB              -1.239      1.223     -1.013      0.311 
    NHON               0.404      1.274      0.317      0.751 
    NPERF             -1.334      1.263     -1.056      0.291 
    NGTEACH           -1.715      1.144     -1.500      0.134 
    NCURUSE           -1.137      1.271     -0.894      0.371 
    NASSESS           -1.787      1.180     -1.513      0.130 
    NPEER              1.313      1.257      1.045      0.296 
    NSURF              0.250      1.277      0.196      0.845 
    NCHJUST           -0.013      1.255     -0.010      0.992 
    NCHEAT             0.385      1.264      0.305      0.761 
    NSUB2              1.583      1.216      1.302      0.193 
    NHON2              0.440      1.276      0.345      0.730 
    NPERF2             0.709      1.250      0.567      0.570 
    NGTEA2             2.215      0.971      2.282      0.022 
    NCURU2             2.864      1.222      2.343      0.019 
    NASSESS2           2.833      1.200      2.361      0.018 
    NPEER2             1.137      1.260      0.902      0.367 
    NSURF2            -2.564      1.245     -2.059      0.039 
    NCHJUST2          -1.706      1.252     -1.362      0.173 
    NCHEAT2           -2.372      1.250     -1.897      0.058 
 
 Residual Variances 
    NSUB               0.086      0.008     10.606      0.000 
    NHON               0.186      0.017     10.613      0.000 
    NPERF              0.292      0.028     10.604      0.000 
    NGTEACH            0.133      0.012     10.676      0.000 
    NCURUSE            0.096      0.009     10.607      0.000 
    NASSESS            0.166      0.016     10.682      0.000 
    NPEER              0.269      0.025     10.732      0.000 
    NSURF              0.301      0.028     10.732      0.000 
    NCHJUST            0.261      0.024     10.814      0.000 
    NCHEAT             0.196      0.018     10.735      0.000 
    NSUB2              0.087      0.008     10.642      0.000 
    NHON2              0.156      0.015     10.660      0.000 
    NPERF2             0.222      0.021     10.618      0.000 
    NGTEA2             0.124      0.012     10.730      0.000 
    NCURU2             0.077      0.007     10.654      0.000 
    NASSESS2           0.118      0.011     10.846      0.000 
    NPEER2             0.161      0.015     10.709      0.000 
    NSURF2             0.259      0.024     10.876      0.000 
    NCHJUST2           0.281      0.026     10.852      0.000 
    NCHEAT2            0.222      0.021     10.673      0.000 
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    SUB1               0.916      0.037     24.647      0.000 
    HON1               0.995      0.010     97.691      0.000 
    PERF1              0.973      0.026     37.598      0.000 
    GTEACH1            0.253      0.061      4.136      0.000 
    ASSESS1            0.154      0.063      2.433      0.015 
    CURUSE1            0.725      0.058     12.574      0.000 
    PEER1              0.629      0.076      8.306      0.000 
    SURF1              0.438      0.083      5.273      0.000 
    CHJUST1            0.378      0.069      5.443      0.000 
    CHEAT1             0.408      0.065      6.318      0.000 
    TEACHER1           0.739      0.061     12.169      0.000 
    SUB2               0.352      0.048      7.324      0.000 
    HON2               0.452      0.066      6.855      0.000 
    PERF2              0.850      0.058     14.728      0.000 
    GTEACH2            0.390      0.062      6.260      0.000 
    ASSESS2            0.012      0.064      0.190      0.849 
    CURUSE2            0.614      0.056     10.962      0.000 
    PEER2              0.537      0.064      8.361      0.000 
    SURF2              0.392      0.070      5.620      0.000 
    CHJUST2            0.511      0.070      7.327      0.000 
    CHEAT2             0.393      0.074      5.302      0.000 
    TEACHER2           0.565      0.061      9.338      0.000 
 
 
 
R-SQUARE 
 
    Observed                                        Two-Tailed 
    Variable        Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
    NSUB               0.914      0.008    112.264      0.000 
    NHON               0.814      0.017     46.575      0.000 
    NPERF              0.708      0.028     25.708      0.000 
    NGTEACH            0.867      0.012     69.330      0.000 
    NCURUSE            0.904      0.009     99.688      0.000 
    NASSESS            0.834      0.016     53.562      0.000 
    NPEER              0.731      0.025     29.142      0.000 
    NSURF              0.699      0.028     24.968      0.000 
    NCHJUST            0.739      0.024     30.696      0.000 
    NCHEAT             0.804      0.018     44.015      0.000 
    NSUB2              0.913      0.008    110.998      0.000 
    NHON2              0.844      0.015     57.723      0.000 
    NPERF2             0.778      0.021     37.117      0.000 
    NGTEA2             0.876      0.012     75.606      0.000 
    NCURU2             0.923      0.007    128.529      0.000 
    NASSESS2           0.882      0.011     81.282      0.000 
    NPEER2             0.839      0.015     55.621      0.000 
    NSURF2             0.741      0.024     31.177      0.000 
    NCHJUST2           0.719      0.026     27.779      0.000 
    NCHEAT2            0.778      0.021     37.336      0.000 
 
     Latent                                         Two-Tailed 
    Variable        Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
    SUB1               0.084      0.037      2.257      0.024 
    HON1               0.005      0.010      0.471      0.638 
    PERF1              0.027      0.026      1.055      0.292 
    GTEACH1            0.747      0.061     12.237      0.000 
    ASSESS1            0.846      0.063     13.386      0.000 
    CURUSE1            0.275      0.058      4.777      0.000 
    PEER1              0.371      0.076      4.906      0.000 
    SURF1              0.562      0.083      6.770      0.000 
    CHJUST1            0.622      0.069      8.967      0.000 
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    CHEAT1             0.592      0.065      9.168      0.000 
    TEACHER1           0.261      0.061      4.289      0.000 
    SUB2               0.648      0.048     13.485      0.000 
    HON2               0.548      0.066      8.319      0.000 
    PERF2              0.150      0.058      2.601      0.009 
    GTEACH2            0.610      0.062      9.805      0.000 
    ASSESS2            0.988      0.064     15.407      0.000 
    CURUSE2            0.386      0.056      6.901      0.000 
    PEER2              0.463      0.064      7.207      0.000 
    SURF2              0.608      0.070      8.727      0.000 
    CHJUST2            0.489      0.070      7.009      0.000 
    CHEAT2             0.607      0.074      8.185      0.000 
    TEACHER2           0.435      0.061      7.183      0.000 
 
 
QUALITY OF NUMERICAL RESULTS 
 
     Condition Number for the Information Matrix              0.178E-05 
       (ratio of smallest to largest eigenvalue) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       ASSESS1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB1           0.921 
 HON1           0.220         0.962 
 PERF1          0.110         0.012         0.942 
 GTEACH1        0.378         0.235        -0.100         0.970 
 ASSESS1        0.399         0.248        -0.106         0.765         0.954 
 CURUSE1        0.470         0.128         0.099         0.574         0.606 
 PEER1         -0.159        -0.345         0.204        -0.423        -0.446 
 SURF1         -0.337        -0.292         0.252        -0.335        -0.353 
 CHJUST1       -0.131        -0.335         0.358        -0.368        -0.388 
 CHEAT1        -0.252        -0.424         0.189        -0.309        -0.327 
 TEACHER1       0.399         0.248        -0.106         0.765         0.807 
 SUB2           0.722         0.169         0.082         0.282         0.297 
 HON2           0.176         0.708         0.014         0.174         0.184 
 PERF2          0.089        -0.003         0.311        -0.029        -0.031 
 GTEACH2        0.330         0.223        -0.006         0.302         0.318 
 ASSESS2        0.412         0.279        -0.008         0.377         0.398 
 CURUSE2        0.438         0.106         0.058         0.268         0.283 
 PEER2         -0.213        -0.320         0.056        -0.329        -0.348 
 SURF2         -0.262        -0.236         0.218        -0.284        -0.299 
 CHJUST2       -0.200        -0.247         0.202        -0.271        -0.286 
 CHEAT2        -0.242        -0.234         0.104        -0.233        -0.245 
 TEACHER2       0.412         0.279        -0.008         0.377         0.398 
 GENDER         0.130        -0.031         0.059         0.018         0.019 
 GRADE2         0.016        -0.007         0.033         0.046         0.048 
 
 
           ESTIMATED COVARIANCE MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES, CONTINUED 
              CURUSE1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 CURUSE1        0.929 
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 PEER1         -0.222         0.955 
 SURF1         -0.309         0.443         0.949 
 CHJUST1       -0.264         0.571         0.591         0.754 
 CHEAT1        -0.190         0.443         0.484         0.483         0.668 
 TEACHER1       0.606        -0.446        -0.353        -0.388        -0.327 
 SUB2           0.356        -0.102        -0.259        -0.089        -0.184 
 HON2           0.095        -0.247        -0.216        -0.239        -0.307 
 PERF2          0.036         0.095         0.076         0.143         0.080 
 GTEACH2        0.264        -0.163        -0.193        -0.148        -0.168 
 ASSESS2        0.329        -0.204        -0.242        -0.185        -0.210 
 CURUSE2        0.403        -0.086        -0.193        -0.101        -0.120 
 PEER2         -0.239         0.493         0.280         0.333         0.299 
 SURF2         -0.260         0.321         0.447         0.389         0.311 
 CHJUST2       -0.225         0.344         0.323         0.381         0.290 
 CHEAT2        -0.212         0.286         0.274         0.290         0.258 
 TEACHER2       0.329        -0.204        -0.242        -0.185        -0.210 
 GENDER         0.013         0.065        -0.001         0.084         0.056 
 GRADE2         0.029        -0.048        -0.008        -0.012        -0.018 
 
              TEACHER1      SUB2          HON2          PERF2         GTEACH2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 TEACHER1       0.807 
 SUB2           0.297         0.907 
 HON2           0.184         0.197         0.955 
 PERF2         -0.031         0.094         0.010         0.929 
 GTEACH2        0.318         0.366         0.261         0.101         0.961 
 ASSESS2        0.398         0.457         0.326         0.126         0.733 
 CURUSE2        0.283         0.503         0.112         0.146         0.482 
 PEER2         -0.348        -0.197        -0.314        -0.070        -0.338 
 SURF2         -0.299        -0.284        -0.210         0.299        -0.286 
 CHJUST2       -0.286        -0.226        -0.227         0.276        -0.244 
 CHEAT2        -0.245        -0.282        -0.223         0.073        -0.227 
 TEACHER2       0.398         0.457         0.326         0.126         0.733 
 GENDER         0.019         0.120        -0.001         0.095         0.076 
 GRADE2         0.048        -0.057        -0.012        -0.033        -0.071 
              ASSESS2       CURUSE2       PEER2         SURF2         CHJUST2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 ASSESS2        0.927 
 CURUSE2        0.602         0.909 
 PEER2         -0.422        -0.274         0.916 
 SURF2         -0.357        -0.336         0.312         0.905 
 CHJUST2       -0.305        -0.263         0.374         0.589         0.765 
 CHEAT2        -0.283        -0.277         0.371         0.466         0.523 
 TEACHER2       0.916         0.602        -0.422        -0.357        -0.305 
 GENDER         0.095         0.066         0.056         0.048         0.074 
 GRADE2        -0.089        -0.083        -0.039         0.069         0.036 
 
              CHEAT2        TEACHER2      GENDER        GRADE2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 CHEAT2         0.666 
 TEACHER2      -0.283         0.916 
 GENDER         0.039         0.095         0.218 
 GRADE2         0.051        -0.089         0.016         0.248 
 
           ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES 
              SUB1          HON1          PERF1         GTEACH1       ASSESS1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 SUB1           1.000 
 HON1           0.234         1.000 
 PERF1          0.118         0.013         1.000 
 GTEACH1        0.400         0.243        -0.105         1.000 
 ASSESS1        0.426         0.259        -0.112         0.795         1.000 
 CURUSE1        0.508         0.136         0.106         0.605         0.644 
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 PEER1         -0.170        -0.360         0.215        -0.440        -0.468 
 SURF1         -0.361        -0.306         0.266        -0.349        -0.371 
 CHJUST1       -0.157        -0.394         0.425        -0.430        -0.457 
 CHEAT1        -0.322        -0.529         0.238        -0.384        -0.409 
 TEACHER1       0.463         0.281        -0.121         0.865         0.920 
 SUB2           0.790         0.181         0.089         0.300         0.319 
 HON2           0.188         0.739         0.015         0.181         0.192 
 PERF2          0.097        -0.003         0.333        -0.031        -0.033 
 GTEACH2        0.351         0.232        -0.006         0.312         0.332 
 ASSESS2        0.446         0.295        -0.008         0.397         0.423 
 CURUSE2        0.479         0.113         0.062         0.285         0.303 
 PEER2         -0.232        -0.341         0.061        -0.349        -0.372 
 SURF2         -0.287        -0.253         0.236        -0.303        -0.322 
 CHJUST2       -0.239        -0.287         0.238        -0.314        -0.335 
 CHEAT2        -0.309        -0.292         0.131        -0.289        -0.308 
 TEACHER2       0.449         0.297        -0.008         0.400         0.425 
 GENDER         0.289        -0.068         0.130         0.040         0.043 
 GRADE2         0.034        -0.015         0.068         0.093         0.099 
 
              CURUSE1       PEER1         SURF1         CHJUST1       CHEAT1 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 CURUSE1        1.000 
 PEER1         -0.235         1.000 
 SURF1         -0.329         0.466         1.000 
 CHJUST1       -0.315         0.673         0.698         1.000 
 CHEAT1        -0.241         0.555         0.608         0.680         1.000 
 TEACHER1       0.700        -0.509        -0.404        -0.497        -0.445 
 SUB2           0.388        -0.110        -0.279        -0.107        -0.236 
 HON2           0.101        -0.258        -0.227        -0.281        -0.384 
 PERF2          0.039         0.101         0.081         0.171         0.101 
 GTEACH2        0.279        -0.170        -0.202        -0.174        -0.210 
 ASSESS2        0.355        -0.217        -0.258        -0.222        -0.267 
 CURUSE2        0.439        -0.093        -0.207        -0.122        -0.155 
 PEER2         -0.259         0.527         0.301         0.401         0.383 
 SURF2         -0.284         0.345         0.482         0.471         0.400 
 CHJUST2       -0.267         0.402         0.379         0.501         0.406 
 CHEAT2        -0.269         0.359         0.345         0.410         0.387 
 TEACHER2       0.357        -0.218        -0.259        -0.223        -0.269 
 GENDER         0.029         0.142        -0.003         0.208         0.146 
 GRADE2         0.060        -0.099        -0.016        -0.027        -0.045 
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           ESTIMATED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR THE LATENT VARIABLES, CONTINUED 
              TEACHER1      SUB2          HON2          PERF2         GTEACH2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 TEACHER1       1.000 
 SUB2           0.347         1.000 
 HON2           0.209         0.212         1.000 
 PERF2         -0.036         0.103         0.010         1.000 
 GTEACH2        0.361         0.392         0.272         0.107         1.000 
 ASSESS2        0.460         0.498         0.346         0.136         0.776 
 CURUSE2        0.330         0.554         0.120         0.159         0.516 
 PEER2         -0.404        -0.216        -0.336        -0.076        -0.360 
 SURF2         -0.350        -0.313        -0.226         0.326        -0.306 
 CHJUST2       -0.364        -0.271        -0.265         0.328        -0.285 
 CHEAT2        -0.335        -0.363        -0.280         0.092        -0.283 
 TEACHER2       0.463         0.501         0.348         0.137         0.781 
 GENDER         0.046         0.269        -0.002         0.211         0.167 
 GRADE2         0.107        -0.120        -0.025        -0.069        -0.146 
 
              ASSESS2       CURUSE2       PEER2         SURF2         CHJUST2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 ASSESS2        1.000 
 CURUSE2        0.656         1.000 
 PEER2         -0.458        -0.300         1.000 
 SURF2         -0.390        -0.371         0.342         1.000 
 CHJUST2       -0.362        -0.315         0.446         0.708         1.000 
 CHEAT2        -0.361        -0.356         0.475         0.600         0.733 
 TEACHER2       0.994         0.660        -0.461        -0.392        -0.364 
 GENDER         0.212         0.149         0.126         0.108         0.180 
 GRADE2        -0.186        -0.176        -0.082         0.145         0.082 
 
              CHEAT2        TEACHER2      GENDER        GRADE2 
              ________      ________      ________      ________ 
 CHEAT2         1.000 
 TEACHER2      -0.363         1.000 
 GENDER         0.104         0.213         1.000 
 GRADE2         0.126        -0.187         0.070         1.000
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Appendix AF: 
Indirect effects (standardized) in the longitudinal model 
 
STANDARDIZED TOTAL, TOTAL INDIRECT, SPECIFIC INDIRECT, AND DIRECT EFFECTS 
 
STDYX Standardization 
                                                    Two-Tailed 
                    Estimate       S.E.  Est./S.E.    P-Value 
 
Effects from CURUSE2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.169      0.108     -1.566      0.117 
  Total indirect      -0.109      0.074     -1.458      0.145 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2           -0.008      0.015     -0.534      0.594 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2           -0.093      0.070     -1.322      0.186 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2           -0.008      0.014     -0.546      0.585 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    CURUSE2           -0.060      0.103     -0.584      0.559 
 
 
Effects from PERF2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total                0.083      0.081      1.025      0.305 
  Total indirect       0.179      0.070      2.546      0.011 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2             -0.017      0.015     -1.141      0.254 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2              0.212      0.067      3.166      0.002 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2             -0.016      0.013     -1.217      0.224 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    PERF2             -0.096      0.090     -1.067      0.286 
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Effects from PEER2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total                0.310      0.091      3.415      0.001 
  Total indirect       0.153      0.066      2.334      0.020 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2              0.153      0.066      2.334      0.020 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2              0.157      0.094      1.664      0.096 
 
 
Effects from SUB2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.291      0.077     -3.782      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.156      0.062     -2.496      0.013 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2              -0.002      0.008     -0.199      0.842 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.025      0.043     -0.582      0.560 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    SUB2              -0.071      0.058     -1.219      0.223 
 
    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2               0.029      0.033      0.880      0.379 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.000      0.001     -0.200      0.842 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.003      0.006     -0.532      0.595 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.016      0.011     -1.384      0.166 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.003      0.017      0.202      0.840 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
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    SUB2              -0.038      0.030     -1.294      0.196 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.014      0.022     -0.627      0.531 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.000      0.001     -0.200      0.842 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.003      0.006     -0.544      0.586 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.015      0.009     -1.747      0.081 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    SUB2              -0.135      0.087     -1.561      0.119 
 
 
Effects from HON2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.106      0.081     -1.308      0.191 
  Total indirect      -0.072      0.057     -1.264      0.206 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    HON2              -0.017      0.015     -1.105      0.269 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    HON2              -0.026      0.052     -0.505      0.613 
 
    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2               0.022      0.025      0.870      0.384 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.012      0.009     -1.359      0.174 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    HON2              -0.016      0.013     -1.229      0.219 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.011      0.017     -0.623      0.533 
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    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.012      0.007     -1.703      0.089 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    HON2              -0.034      0.080     -0.425      0.671 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER2 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.057      0.113     -0.504      0.614 
  Total indirect      -0.160      0.085     -1.890      0.059 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2          -0.056      0.038     -1.476      0.140 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2          -0.049      0.077     -0.635      0.525 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2          -0.055      0.028     -1.940      0.052 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2           0.103      0.114      0.903      0.366 
 
 
Effects from CHJUST1 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total                0.200      0.060      3.334      0.001 
  Total indirect       0.200      0.060      3.334      0.001 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1            0.025      0.041      0.614      0.539 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1            0.175      0.058      3.022      0.003 
 
 
Effects from PEER1 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total                0.215      0.047      4.590      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.215      0.047      4.590      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1              0.005      0.010      0.462      0.644 
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    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1              0.061      0.037      1.617      0.106 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1              0.011      0.019      0.609      0.543 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1              0.079      0.031      2.559      0.010 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1              0.059      0.028      2.143      0.032 
 
 
 
Effects from PERF1 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total                0.120      0.037      3.195      0.001 
  Total indirect       0.120      0.037      3.195      0.001 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PERF1              0.001      0.006      0.203      0.839 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1             -0.030      0.029     -1.028      0.304 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.001      0.001      0.436      0.663 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.008      0.014      0.606      0.545 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.007      0.007      1.033      0.302 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1             -0.005      0.005     -1.092      0.275 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.058      0.024      2.460      0.014 
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    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1              0.067      0.027      2.440      0.015 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.001      0.002      0.559      0.576 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.010      0.008      1.234      0.217 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.007      0.006      1.141      0.254 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1             -0.005      0.004     -1.158      0.247 
 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER1 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.151      0.056     -2.709      0.007 
  Total indirect      -0.151      0.056     -2.709      0.007 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    TEACHER1          -0.005      0.010     -0.463      0.643 
 
    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1           0.035      0.039      0.884      0.377 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.002      0.005     -0.459      0.646 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.001      0.004     -0.305      0.760 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.033      0.022     -1.505      0.132 
 
 
Appendix AG: Human Research Ethics Committee Approval Letter (protocol 14193) │550 
 
     
 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1          -0.019      0.013     -1.423      0.155 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.009      0.025     -0.350      0.726 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1          -0.016      0.026     -0.631      0.528 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.006      0.010     -0.600      0.549 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.043      0.021     -2.084      0.037 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.032      0.017     -1.903      0.057 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1          -0.018      0.010     -1.828      0.068 
 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE1 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.045      0.048     -0.946      0.344 
  Total indirect      -0.045      0.048     -0.946      0.344 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CURUSE1            0.007      0.013      0.549      0.583 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1           -0.017      0.029     -0.580      0.562 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.001      0.002      0.437      0.662 
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    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.005      0.009     -0.573      0.567 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.010      0.010      1.007      0.314 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1           -0.002      0.004     -0.529      0.597 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.034      0.024     -1.455      0.146 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1           -0.026      0.021     -1.271      0.204 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.002      0.003      0.546      0.585 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.013      0.012      1.118      0.264 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.010      0.009      1.105      0.269 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1           -0.002      0.004     -0.541      0.588 
 
 
Effects from SUB1 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.315      0.059     -5.302      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.315      0.059     -5.302      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    SUB1              -0.013      0.021     -0.602      0.547 
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 CHEAT2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.105      0.068     -1.557      0.120 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.000      0.000      0.199      0.842 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.004      0.007      0.548      0.584 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.002      0.254      0.800 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.002      0.005     -0.462      0.644 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1 
    SUB1              -0.003      0.004     -0.725      0.469 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.001      0.006     -0.199      0.842 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.009      0.016     -0.579      0.563 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.019      0.033     -0.582      0.561 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.004      0.015      0.278      0.781 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.055      0.046     -1.217      0.224 
 
    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1               0.015      0.017      0.875      0.381 
 
    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2 
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    SUB1               0.022      0.026      0.880      0.379 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.000      0.000      0.401      0.689 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.000      0.001      0.436      0.663 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.001      0.002     -0.458      0.647 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.001      0.520      0.603 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.003      0.005     -0.572      0.568 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.001      0.002     -0.305      0.761 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.001      0.726      0.468 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.005      0.005      1.000      0.317 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.015      0.010     -1.459      0.145 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.000      0.001     -0.746      0.455 
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    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.000      0.001     -0.200      0.842 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.001      0.002     -0.528      0.597 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.003      0.005     -0.532      0.595 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.008      0.006     -1.386      0.166 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.012      0.009     -1.381      0.167 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.005      0.005      0.937      0.349 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.019      0.013     -1.433      0.152 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.004      0.011     -0.349      0.727 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.006      0.006      0.943      0.346 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.003      0.013      0.202      0.840 
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    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.014      0.011     -1.258      0.209 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.030      0.023     -1.291      0.197 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.007      0.012     -0.628      0.530 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.011      0.017     -0.627      0.531 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.000      0.000      0.490      0.624 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.002      0.545      0.586 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.003      0.005     -0.597      0.551 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.001      0.786      0.432 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.007      0.006      1.108      0.268 
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    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.019      0.010     -1.966      0.049 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.001      0.760      0.447 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.005      0.005      1.096      0.273 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.014      0.008     -1.810      0.070 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.000      0.001     -0.767      0.443 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.000      0.001     -0.200      0.841 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.001      0.002     -0.540      0.589 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.003      0.005     -0.544      0.586 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.008      0.005     -1.750      0.080 
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    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.012      0.007     -1.740      0.082 
 
 
Effects from HON1 to CHEAT2 
 
  Total               -0.205      0.059     -3.477      0.001 
  Total indirect      -0.205      0.059     -3.477      0.001 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    HON1              -0.014      0.023     -0.606      0.545 
 
    CHEAT2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.025      0.059     -0.425      0.671 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.001      0.002     -0.457      0.648 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    HON1              -0.005      0.008     -0.598      0.550 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.001      0.002     -0.459      0.646 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.013      0.010     -1.392      0.164 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.012      0.011     -1.103      0.270 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    HON1              -0.034      0.017     -1.965      0.049 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.020      0.039     -0.505      0.614 
 
    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1               0.006      0.007      0.843      0.399 
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    CHEAT2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2 
    HON1               0.016      0.019      0.869      0.385 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1               0.000      0.001     -0.452      0.651 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.003      0.004     -0.594      0.552 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1               0.000      0.001     -0.305      0.761 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.006      0.004     -1.320      0.187 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.003      0.003     -1.267      0.205 
 
    CHEAT2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.009      0.007     -1.353      0.176 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.018      0.009     -1.880      0.060 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.002      0.004     -0.349      0.727 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.013      0.008     -1.689      0.091 
 
 
 
 
Appendix AG: Human Research Ethics Committee Approval Letter (protocol 14193) │559 
 
     
 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.012      0.010     -1.228      0.219 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.003      0.005     -0.615      0.538 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.008      0.013     -0.622      0.534 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.001      0.002     -0.586      0.558 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.007      0.005     -1.658      0.097 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.006      0.004     -1.564      0.118 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.003      0.002     -1.528      0.126 
 
    CHEAT2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.009      0.005     -1.692      0.091 
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Effects from CURUSE2 to SURF2 
 
  Total               -0.201      0.104     -1.925      0.054 
  Total indirect      -0.074      0.053     -1.388      0.165 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2           -0.068      0.053     -1.302      0.193 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2           -0.006      0.011     -0.545      0.586 
 
  Direct 
    SURF2 
    CURUSE2           -0.127      0.101     -1.259      0.208 
 
Effects from PERF2 to SURF2 
 
  Total                0.331      0.078      4.246      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.144      0.049      2.939      0.003 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2              0.156      0.051      3.088      0.002 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2             -0.012      0.010     -1.216      0.224 
 
  Direct 
    SURF2 
    PERF2              0.187      0.084      2.212      0.027 
 
Effects from SUB2 to SURF2 
 
  Total               -0.199      0.082     -2.440      0.015 
  Total indirect      -0.174      0.057     -3.021      0.003 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.003      0.015      0.201      0.841 
 
    SURF2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.053      0.043     -1.232      0.218 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    SUB2              -0.052      0.044     -1.197      0.231 
 
    SURF2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.022      0.029     -0.751      0.453 
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    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.003      0.012      0.202      0.840 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.028      0.022     -1.275      0.202 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.010      0.016     -0.625      0.532 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.000      0.001     -0.200      0.842 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.002      0.004     -0.544      0.587 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.011      0.006     -1.747      0.081 
 
  Direct 
    SURF2 
    SUB2              -0.025      0.088     -0.290      0.771 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER2 to SURF2 
 
  Total               -0.154      0.104     -1.478      0.139 
  Total indirect      -0.077      0.056     -1.361      0.174 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2          -0.036      0.057     -0.633      0.527 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2          -0.040      0.021     -1.939      0.052 
 
  Direct 
    SURF2 
    TEACHER2          -0.077      0.101     -0.766      0.444 
 
 
Effects from CHJUST1 to SURF2 
 
  Total                0.295      0.068      4.358      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.295      0.068      4.358      0.000 
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  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1            0.165      0.066      2.519      0.012 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1            0.129      0.046      2.800      0.005 
 
 
Effects from PERF1 to SURF2 
 
  Total                0.230      0.047      4.846      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.230      0.047      4.846      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    PERF1              0.007      0.024      0.273      0.785 
 
    SURF2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1              0.059      0.030      1.946      0.052 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.055      0.026      2.122      0.034 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.043      0.018      2.345      0.019 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1              0.049      0.021      2.402      0.016 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.009      0.008      1.199      0.230 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.007      0.006      1.218      0.223 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.005      0.005      1.142      0.253 
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    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1             -0.004      0.003     -1.158      0.247 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER1 to SURF2 
 
  Total               -0.137      0.057     -2.423      0.015 
  Total indirect      -0.137      0.057     -2.423      0.015 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    TEACHER1           0.025      0.036      0.710      0.477 
 
    SURF2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1          -0.026      0.034     -0.764      0.445 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.008      0.024     -0.346      0.729 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.006      0.019     -0.350      0.727 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1          -0.012      0.019     -0.629      0.529 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.041      0.021     -1.910      0.056 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.032      0.016     -2.007      0.045 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.024      0.013     -1.904      0.057 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1          -0.014      0.007     -1.826      0.068 
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Effects from CURUSE1 to SURF2 
 
  Total               -0.100      0.054     -1.857      0.063 
  Total indirect      -0.100      0.054     -1.857      0.063 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CURUSE1           -0.014      0.030     -0.452      0.651 
 
    SURF2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1           -0.036      0.030     -1.218      0.223 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.033      0.023     -1.395      0.163 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.025      0.018     -1.429      0.153 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1           -0.020      0.016     -1.253      0.210 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.012      0.011      1.086      0.277 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.010      0.009      1.106      0.269 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.007      0.006      1.105      0.269 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1           -0.002      0.003     -0.541      0.588 
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Effects from SUB1 to SURF2 
 
  Total               -0.302      0.063     -4.827      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.302      0.063     -4.827      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    SUB1              -0.059      0.031     -1.920      0.055 
 
    SURF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.020      0.068     -0.291      0.771 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.002      0.262      0.793 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.007      0.016     -0.452      0.651 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.004      0.014      0.277      0.782 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1               0.011      0.016      0.704      0.481 
 
    SURF2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.005      0.006      0.902      0.367 
 
    SURF2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.002      0.012      0.201      0.841 
 
    SURF2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.020      0.016     -1.206      0.228 
 
    SURF2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.041      0.033     -1.229      0.219 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.003      0.011      0.278      0.781 
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    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.041      0.034     -1.195      0.232 
 
    SURF2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.011      0.015     -0.758      0.448 
 
    SURF2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.017      0.022     -0.750      0.453 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.005      0.005      0.914      0.361 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.018      0.013     -1.375      0.169 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.004      0.011     -0.345      0.730 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.004      0.004      0.929      0.353 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.014      0.010     -1.408      0.159 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.003      0.008     -0.349      0.727 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.004      0.005      0.939      0.348 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.002      0.010      0.202      0.840 
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    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.011      0.009     -1.240      0.215 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.022      0.017     -1.272      0.204 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.005      0.009     -0.626      0.532 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.008      0.013     -0.624      0.532 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.001      0.776      0.438 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.007      0.006      1.078      0.281 
 
    SURF2 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.018      0.010     -1.818      0.069 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.001      0.781      0.435 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.005      0.005      1.096      0.273 
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    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.014      0.007     -1.900      0.057 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.000      0.001      0.760      0.447 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.004      0.004      1.096      0.273 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.010      0.006     -1.812      0.070 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.000      0.000     -0.766      0.444 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.000      0.001     -0.200      0.842 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.001      0.002     -0.540      0.589 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.002      0.003     -0.544      0.587 
 
    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.006      0.003     -1.749      0.080 
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    SURF2 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.009      0.005     -1.741      0.082 
 
 
Effects from SUB2 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.217      0.079     -2.761      0.006 
  Total indirect      -0.106      0.046     -2.291      0.022 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.005      0.026      0.202      0.840 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.060      0.045     -1.328      0.184 
 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.021      0.034     -0.635      0.525 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2               0.000      0.002     -0.200      0.842 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2              -0.005      0.009     -0.546      0.585 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2              -0.024      0.013     -1.838      0.066 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST2 
    SUB2              -0.111      0.089     -1.247      0.212 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE2 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.157      0.108     -1.456      0.146 
  Total indirect      -0.012      0.022     -0.548      0.584 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2           -0.012      0.022     -0.548      0.584 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2           -0.145      0.107     -1.359      0.174 
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Effects from PERF2 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total                0.305      0.080      3.837      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.025      0.020     -1.247      0.213 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2             -0.025      0.020     -1.247      0.213 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2              0.331      0.080      4.142      0.000 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER2 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.163      0.113     -1.438      0.150 
  Total indirect      -0.086      0.041     -2.068      0.039 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2          -0.086      0.041     -2.068      0.039 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2          -0.077      0.119     -0.644      0.520 
 
 
Effects from HON2 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.102      0.077     -1.330      0.183 
  Total indirect      -0.061      0.031     -1.947      0.052 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    HON2              -0.026      0.020     -1.259      0.208 
 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.016      0.026     -0.631      0.528 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.018      0.010     -1.789      0.074 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST2 
    HON2              -0.041      0.081     -0.508      0.612 
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Effects from PEER1 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total                0.216      0.051      4.228      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.216      0.051      4.228      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1              0.124      0.046      2.716      0.007 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1              0.093      0.040      2.325      0.020 
 
 
Effects from PERF1 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total                0.213      0.047      4.501      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.213      0.047      4.501      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.091      0.035      2.612      0.009 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1              0.104      0.037      2.829      0.005 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.015      0.012      1.252      0.211 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.011      0.010      1.167      0.243 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1             -0.008      0.007     -1.185      0.236 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER1 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.186      0.058     -3.187      0.001 
  Total indirect      -0.186      0.058     -3.187      0.001 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.014      0.039     -0.350      0.726 
 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1          -0.026      0.040     -0.640      0.522 
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    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.067      0.031     -2.167      0.030 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.050      0.025     -2.027      0.043 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1          -0.029      0.015     -1.938      0.053 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE1 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.063      0.051     -1.233      0.217 
  Total indirect      -0.063      0.051     -1.233      0.217 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.054      0.036     -1.483      0.138 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1           -0.041      0.032     -1.304      0.192 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.020      0.018      1.130      0.258 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.015      0.013      1.127      0.260 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1           -0.003      0.006     -0.544      0.587 
 
 
Effects from SUB1 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.261      0.064     -4.046      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.261      0.064     -4.046      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.006      0.023      0.278      0.781 
 
    CHJUST2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.087      0.070     -1.244      0.213 
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    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.008      0.008      0.944      0.345 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.029      0.020     -1.460      0.144 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.006      0.017     -0.349      0.727 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.009      0.009      0.960      0.337 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.004      0.020      0.202      0.840 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.022      0.017     -1.290      0.197 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.047      0.035     -1.324      0.185 
 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.011      0.018     -0.636      0.525 
 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.017      0.026     -0.635      0.526 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.002      0.789      0.430 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.011      0.010      1.120      0.263 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.030      0.015     -2.034      0.042 
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    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.001      0.767      0.443 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.008      0.007      1.118      0.264 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.022      0.012     -1.916      0.055 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1 
    SUB1              -0.001      0.001     -0.774      0.439 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.000      0.002     -0.200      0.841 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.002      0.004     -0.543      0.587 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.004      0.007     -0.546      0.585 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.013      0.007     -1.845      0.065 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1              -0.019      0.010     -1.830      0.067 
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Effects from HON1 to CHJUST2 
 
  Total               -0.209      0.060     -3.501      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.209      0.060     -3.501      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    HON1              -0.053      0.026     -2.032      0.042 
 
    CHJUST2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.031      0.060     -0.507      0.612 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.028      0.014     -1.938      0.053 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.002      0.007     -0.349      0.727 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.021      0.012     -1.773      0.076 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.019      0.015     -1.257      0.209 
 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.004      0.007     -0.623      0.533 
 
    CHJUST2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.012      0.019     -0.630      0.528 
 
    CHJUST2 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.012      0.007     -1.699      0.089 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.009      0.005     -1.631      0.103 
 
    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.005      0.003     -1.590      0.112 
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    CHJUST2 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.014      0.008     -1.776      0.076 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE2 to PEER2 
 
  Total               -0.051      0.091     -0.559      0.576 
  Total indirect       0.000      0.000      0.000      1.000 
 
  Direct 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2           -0.051      0.091     -0.559      0.576 
 
 
Effects from HON2 to PEER2 
 
  Total               -0.184      0.070     -2.644      0.008 
  Total indirect      -0.077      0.031     -2.504      0.012 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2              -0.077      0.031     -2.504      0.012 
 
  Direct 
    PEER2 
    HON2              -0.107      0.073     -1.462      0.144 
 
 
Effects from PERF1 to PEER2 
 
  Total                0.014      0.042      0.324      0.746 
  Total indirect       0.014      0.042      0.324      0.746 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.047      0.036      1.307      0.191 
 
    PEER2 
    PERF2 
    PERF1             -0.034      0.024     -1.406      0.160 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER1 to PEER2 
 
  Total               -0.330      0.068     -4.855      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.330      0.068     -4.855      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.210      0.063     -3.319      0.001 
 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1          -0.120      0.040     -2.996      0.003 
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Effects from CURUSE1 to PEER2 
 
  Total                0.048      0.055      0.874      0.382 
  Total indirect       0.048      0.055      0.874      0.382 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.063      0.050      1.256      0.209 
 
    PEER2 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1           -0.015      0.026     -0.554      0.579 
 
 
Effects from HON1 to PEER2 
 
  Total               -0.280      0.056     -4.990      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.280      0.056     -4.990      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.086      0.035     -2.470      0.014 
 
    PEER2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.080      0.055     -1.459      0.144 
 
    PEER2 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.037      0.017     -2.122      0.034 
 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.021      0.010     -2.045      0.041 
 
    PEER2 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2 
    HON1              -0.057      0.023     -2.470      0.014 
 
 
Effects from SUB1 to PERF2 
 
  Total                0.040      0.065      0.615      0.539 
  Total indirect       0.040      0.065      0.615      0.539 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    PERF2 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.027      0.028      0.992      0.321 
 
    PERF2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.012      0.062      0.202      0.840 
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Effects from SUB1 to TEACHER2 
 
  Total                0.366      0.052      7.056      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.366      0.052      7.056      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1               0.148      0.037      4.028      0.000 
 
    TEACHER2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.218      0.053      4.095      0.000 
 
 
Effects from HON1 to TEACHER2 
 
  Total                0.217      0.047      4.635      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.217      0.047      4.635      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    TEACHER2 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1               0.058      0.024      2.466      0.014 
 
    TEACHER2 
    HON2 
    HON1               0.159      0.045      3.537      0.000 
 
 
Effects from SUB1 to CURUSE2 
 
  Total                0.479      0.047     10.142      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.479      0.047     10.142      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CURUSE2 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.155      0.038      4.124      0.000 
 
    CURUSE2 
    SUB2 
    SUB1               0.324      0.053      6.109      0.000 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total                0.090      0.116      0.778      0.437 
  Total indirect      -0.043      0.070     -0.619      0.536 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.014      0.022      0.627      0.530 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.090      0.062     -1.455      0.146 
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    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.034      0.030      1.130      0.259 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    CURUSE1            0.133      0.116      1.146      0.252 
 
 
Effects from PERF1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total                0.208      0.080      2.592      0.010 
  Total indirect       0.187      0.062      3.009      0.003 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.010      0.016      0.624      0.533 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.152      0.060      2.551      0.011 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.025      0.020      1.253      0.210 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    PERF1              0.021      0.094      0.220      0.826 
 
 
Effects from PEER1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total                0.290      0.095      3.046      0.002 
  Total indirect       0.207      0.076      2.735      0.006 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1              0.207      0.076      2.735      0.006 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1              0.083      0.117      0.707      0.479 
 
 
Effects from SUB1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total               -0.271      0.070     -3.851      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.041      0.058     -0.704      0.481 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.002      0.008      0.214      0.831 
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    CHEAT1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.072      0.064      1.133      0.257 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.011      0.039      0.278      0.781 
 
    CHEAT1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.039      0.059     -0.665      0.506 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.001      0.002      0.532      0.595 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.007      0.012      0.626      0.531 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.020      0.029     -0.694      0.488 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.013      0.014      0.941      0.347 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.049      0.034     -1.432      0.152 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.010      0.029     -0.350      0.727 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.002      0.003      0.790      0.430 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.018      0.016      1.120      0.263 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.050      0.024     -2.039      0.041 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    SUB1              -0.230      0.079     -2.927      0.003 
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Effects from HON1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total               -0.453      0.066     -6.881      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.201      0.050     -4.028      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.018      0.027     -0.690      0.490 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    HON1              -0.089      0.042     -2.104      0.035 
 
    CHEAT1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.015      0.024     -0.656      0.512 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.008      0.012     -0.677      0.499 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.046      0.024     -1.952      0.051 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.004      0.012     -0.350      0.727 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.020      0.012     -1.708      0.088 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    HON1              -0.252      0.074     -3.383      0.001 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER1 to CHEAT1 
 
  Total               -0.270      0.123     -2.184      0.029 
  Total indirect      -0.181      0.081     -2.227      0.026 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHEAT1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.045      0.065     -0.699      0.485 
 
    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.023      0.066     -0.351      0.726 
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    CHEAT1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.113      0.052     -2.172      0.030 
 
  Direct 
    CHEAT1 
    TEACHER1          -0.089      0.132     -0.669      0.503 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE1 to SURF1 
 
  Total               -0.144      0.133     -1.084      0.279 
  Total indirect      -0.086      0.086     -1.004      0.315 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.138      0.085     -1.624      0.104 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.051      0.044      1.184      0.237 
 
  Direct 
    SURF1 
    CURUSE1           -0.057      0.125     -0.459      0.646 
 
 
Effects from PERF1 to SURF1 
 
  Total                0.298      0.091      3.262      0.001 
  Total indirect       0.270      0.072      3.725      0.000 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.231      0.068      3.394      0.001 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.039      0.029      1.335      0.182 
 
  Direct 
    SURF1 
    PERF1              0.028      0.102      0.273      0.785 
 
 
Effects from SUB1 to SURF1 
 
  Total               -0.330      0.079     -4.190      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.080      0.073     -1.096      0.273 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.002      0.009      0.263      0.793 
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    SURF1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.031      0.068     -0.459      0.646 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.016      0.059      0.279      0.781 
 
    SURF1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1               0.047      0.064      0.736      0.462 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.020      0.021      0.969      0.333 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.075      0.047     -1.593      0.111 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.015      0.045     -0.348      0.728 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.003      0.004      0.809      0.419 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.028      0.024      1.172      0.241 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.076      0.031     -2.441      0.015 
 
  Direct 
    SURF1 
    SUB1              -0.250      0.091     -2.741      0.006 
 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER1 to SURF1 
 
  Total               -0.100      0.140     -0.714      0.475 
  Total indirect      -0.207      0.100     -2.080      0.038 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.035      0.101     -0.349      0.727 
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    SURF1 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.172      0.064     -2.676      0.007 
 
  Direct 
    SURF1 
    TEACHER1           0.107      0.144      0.743      0.458 
 
 
Effects from SUB1 to CHJUST1 
 
  Total               -0.141      0.079     -1.788      0.074 
  Total indirect      -0.164      0.063     -2.613      0.009 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.029      0.029      0.982      0.326 
 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1              -0.107      0.066     -1.622      0.105 
 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.022      0.063     -0.351      0.726 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1 
    SUB1               0.005      0.006      0.814      0.416 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1 
    SUB1               0.040      0.034      1.191      0.234 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    SUB1              -0.108      0.042     -2.589      0.010 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST1 
    SUB1               0.023      0.084      0.279      0.780 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE1 to CHJUST1 
 
  Total               -0.123      0.122     -1.009      0.313 
  Total indirect       0.074      0.061      1.203      0.229 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.074      0.061      1.203      0.229 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST1 
    CURUSE1           -0.197      0.119     -1.655      0.098 
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Effects from PERF1 to CHJUST1 
 
  Total                0.386      0.082      4.716      0.000 
  Total indirect       0.055      0.041      1.358      0.175 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    PERF1              0.055      0.041      1.358      0.175 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST1 
    PERF1              0.331      0.080      4.143      0.000 
 
 
Effects from TEACHER1 to CHJUST1 
 
  Total               -0.296      0.130     -2.279      0.023 
  Total indirect      -0.246      0.085     -2.888      0.004 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1          -0.246      0.085     -2.888      0.004 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1          -0.050      0.143     -0.352      0.725 
 
 
Effects from HON1 to CHJUST1 
 
  Total               -0.346      0.071     -4.874      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.152      0.045     -3.362      0.001 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.101      0.042     -2.408      0.016 
 
    CHJUST1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.009      0.025     -0.351      0.726 
 
    CHJUST1 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.043      0.021     -1.995      0.046 
 
  Direct 
    CHJUST1 
    HON1              -0.194      0.074     -2.610      0.009 
 
 
Effects from CURUSE1 to PEER1 
 
  Total                0.163      0.127      1.279      0.201 
  Total indirect       0.000      0.000      0.000      1.000 
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  Direct 
    PEER1 
    CURUSE1            0.163      0.127      1.279      0.201 
 
 
Effects from HON1 to PEER1 
 
  Total               -0.318      0.077     -4.107      0.000 
  Total indirect      -0.095      0.042     -2.284      0.022 
 
  Specific indirect 
 
    PEER1 
    TEACHER1 
    HON1              -0.095      0.042     -2.284      0.022 
 
  Direct 
    PEER1 
    HON1              -0.223      0.081     -2.738      0.006 
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